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Abstract
Generally upheld within disciplines as diverse as moral and political 
philosophy, economics, and political science is a standardised, “sub-Humean” 
conception o f instrumental reason that is viewed as the only viable model o f 
rationality, claiming its relative neutrality towards substantive evaluative 
content and supposed amenability to a radically secularised and pluralistic 
worldview as among its chief virtues. Based on these features, the standard 
model is conceptualised as freestanding and unsituated by a notion o f objective 
normativity -  in short, instrumental reason comes to acquire subjectivist 
connotations and neglects broader ethical issues that demand constraint upon 
self-interested, self-projecting behaviour.
Contemporary moral and political philosophers have rightly contested this 
model o f rationality. However, their critical aim is undercut by their chosen 
methodological strategy: these current philosophers, against the background o f 
the now dominant model, utilise and reappropriate the practical philosophy o f 
Aristotle, Hume, and Kant as a point o f departure for examining problems that 
are distinctive to contemporary liberal moral and political thinking. But in 
accepting a number o f key presuppositions o f the standard model, these 
critiques end up emulating the subjectivism and unsituatedness o f the standard 
model. Thus, overlap between proponents and critics o f the standard model 
signals a deeper ambivalence towards moral frameworks and foundationalist 
claims.
In contrast to the unsuccessful retrieval strategies o f Aristotle, Hume, and Kant, 
the thesis argues that a critical stance towards the standard model must 
disentangle the terms o f  contemporary debates from those immanent to the 
philosophical frameworks o f each o f these key historical thinkers, thereby 
achieving the critical distance from contemporary concerns necessary to the 
elucidation o f historically and conceptually important differences between 
current and past approaches to instrumental reason.
The thesis illustrates the importance o f philosophical frameworks to our 
conception o f instrumental reason through the comparative exegetical analysis 
o f Aristotle, Hume, and Kant. Interpretations o f each thinker reveal the 
significance o f their respective philosophical frameworks in helping them avoid 
the subjectivist and freestanding connotations o f the standard model. 
Specifically, since Aristotle, Hume, and Kant incorporate a notion o f  ethical 
normative objectivity within their frameworks, I show that these three thinkers 
represent a rich if  divergent historical tradition according to which an adequate 
understanding o f the normative significance o f  instrumental practical reasoning 
depends on situating it within a broader moral, social, or metaphysical 
framework. I establish how Aristotle’s, Hum e’s, and Kant’s thinking about 
practical reason is integrated within a more general frame o f moral and political 
theorising that in each case reflects a degree o f  philosophical unease with the 
allure o f a freestanding conception o f instrumental rationality. Thus, a 
sympathetic examination o f these historical thinkers’ metaphysical 
commitments are important to illustrate the need for contemporary philosophers 
to directly confront, examine and articulate the comparative moral framework 
situating our current conception o f instrumental reason.
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11 Introduction
I. The Dilemma o f  Instrumental Reason
This thesis provides a comparative investigation o f divergent conceptions o f  the role 
o f instrumental reasoning in the history o f philosophy with a view to diagnosing and 
explaining a predominant ambivalence? concerning the nature and status o f instrumental 
reasoning in current moral and political philosophy. This ambivalence reveals itself in a 
simultaneous aversion against and pull towards the idea o f instrumental reasoning: while 
frequently decried as morally flawed or impoverished, instrumental conceptions o f  practical 
reasoning are also generally accepted as inescapable for us on broader methodological 
grounds. For proponents o f the currently dominant, “sub-Humean”1 conceptions of 
practical instrumental reason (what I subsequently also call “the standard model”) its 
freestanding nature and alleged neutrality towards objective normativity are considered its 
most beneficial features. Even as detractors express concerns about the absence of 
standards o f normative objectivity and the resultant subjectivist implications o f the standard 
model, common to both critics and proponents is the thought that the avoidance o f 
metaphysical commitments is an appropriate philosophical reflection o f our times.
To provide an accurate diagnosis o f this underlying ambivalence towards the role o f 
instrumental reasoning my thesis examines a range o f  influential historical conceptions and 
their partial reappropriations by contemporary critics o f the standard model. I argue that 
these attempts at partial historical retrieval tend to “lift out” discrete elements o f their 
positions irrespective o f  how these claims are situated within their wider original 
philosophical frameworks. This strategy reflects a widespread hesitancy to commit oneself 
to foundationalist philosophical arguments which specify the ends or goods o f  practical 
reason.
In part this reluctance to posit comprehensive, foundationalist arguments is 
understandable: the paradigm o f scientific explanation has been successful in numerous 
areas o f study and it seems inevitable that this type o f explanation will penetrate into 
philosophical discussions of morality. On these grounds, it seems more in keeping with the 
scientific worldview to adopt a stance o f value neutrality or even scepticism about the 
existence o f objective moral facts.2 Not only are those dubious metaphysical commitments
t
traditionally associated with moral objectivism avoided, but the fact o f  value pluralism, too,
1 “Sub-Humean” refers to the term used by Bernard Williams to describe a model of instrumental 
reasoning that claims to be inspired by Hume. I will explain the supposed Humean lineage in the 
following section but argue against this attribution in Chapters 4 and 5.
2 J. L. Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990) pp. 38-42.
2can be much better accommodated. These background concerns inform debates between 
contemporary Humeans and Kantians about the motivational authority and normative 
source o f reason (such as Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard). It is also evident 
among neo-Aristotelian attempts to formulate “objective lists” articulating the ends o f 
practical reason, but all the while linking these ends to the expression o f individual 
autonomy in a pluralistic domain (seen in the work o f Joseph Raz and Martha Nussbaum).
However, despite their intention to criticise and provide an alternative to the sub- 
Humean model I will examine how contemporary reappropriations are likely to collapse 
back into a version o f the subjectivism o f the standard model. For both critics and 
proponents o f the standard model, instrumental reason is not constrained within a wider 
framework o f moral thinking in which it is situated. To clarify my terminological use, 
throughout this thesis I will refer to a number o f different frameworks: “philosophical”, 
“situating”, “orientating”, “moral” frameworks. “Philosophical” frameworks refer more 
specifically to the architectonic structure o f a theory which tries to articulate and structure 
the content o f “situating”, “orientating”, “moral”, or “normative” frameworks. These latter 
terms -  which I will use interchangeably with the geographical terms, “horizons” and 
“landscapes” -  refer to constitutive values and goods which grant broader meaning and 
significance to human life as well as situating our practical agency. I will discuss the 
function o f the importance o f  these frameworks in the latter sections.
In my thesis these problems form the backbone o f  my scepticism about the success o f 
contemporary re-appropriations o f historical conceptions o f practical reason, though I share 
their anxiety about the ubiquity o f the standard model within the social sciences. Alongside 
its use in moral philosophy I outline economic and political theory’s application o f the 
standard model in the following section. Section in explores Charles Taylor’s rejection o f 
the standard model; in this section I shall also explain my scepticism about the possibility 
o f partial historical retrieval as a possible alternative to the standard model. Finally, 
Section IV provides the structure o f the overall thesis.
II. The Standard Model Outlined
i) The Sub-Humean Model
Though the standard model is widely thought o f as based on Hume’s account o f 
practical action, its supporters, including Bernard Williams, Michael Smith, and David 
Gauthier, point out that this model does not represent a close textual rendering o f  Hume’s 
views. Rather, their conclusions simplify and gain inspiration from Hum e’s most
3polemical statements about desire and reason.3 Moreover, accounts o f the standard model 
are not homogenous and vary in some respects: though Gauthier’s Hobbesian reading o f  the 
Humean model is clearly influenced by the economic model o f rational choice, other 
proponents o f the standard model are not.4 Williams and Smith are both concerned with 
providing an empirically plausible account o f motivation which rejects the reductivism o f 
Gauthier’s views.5 Some accept Hume’s account o f motivational reasons but reject his 
account o f normativity.6
Articulations o f the standard model may differ in subtle ways but there is nonetheless 
consensus over a number o f core features which are also deemed its chief virtues. These 
include, first, its neutrality towards objectivist claims and commitment to a subjectivist 
philosophical framework. Second, this subjectivism helps avoid the positing o f 
questionable metaphysical claims. Finally, the predictive capacity o f this model is 
commended, particularly among rational choice theorists and economists.
First, the subjectivist framework o f the sub-Humean model is considered an asset 
because value pluralism can be readily accommodated within it. Its proponents want to 
forward a strong explanatory and naturalistic theory o f practical action even whilst 
maintaining a stance o f value neutrality. A theoretical minimalism is endorsed and 
reflected in their philosophical framework: any commitment to objectivist claims that exert 
conceptual pressure on the kinds o f  ends individual agents should adopt is conscientiously 
avoided. Instead, the focus is on the necessary constituents o f practical motivation — belief 
and desire -  in order to provide an empirically plausible explanatory framework o f  practical 
action. The belief-desire model specifies that “actions are caused and rationalised by a pair 
o f mental states: a desire for some end, where ends can be thought o f as ways the would 
could be, and a belief o f the agent that something she can just do, [...] has some suitable 
chance o f making the world the relevant way.”7
According to this belief-desire model, reason itself is inert -  reasons are motivational 
only when they are related to what Williams’ calls an agent’s “subjective motivational set”. 
Though usually conceived o f as containing subjective desires for particular ends, Williams 
notes that this set may be comprised o f “dispositions o f evaluation, patterns o f  emotional
3 Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reason” in Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973-80 
(Cambridge: UP, 1981) p. 102.
4 The Hobbesian reading of the Humean model means literally that Hume is interpreted as very 
similar to Hobbes in his account of human motivation and action. This helps explains the 
misreading of Hume by contemporary readers, Gauthier and Jean Hampton among them.
5 Ibid., p. 102. Also Michael Smith in The Moral Problem (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994) criticises 
Gauthier’s version of the sub-Humean model. I will provide an outline of Gautheir’s views later in 
this section.
6 See Smith, The Moral Problem.
7 Michael Smith, “Instrumental Desires, Instrumental Rationality, ” Aristotelian Society 
Supplementary Volume 78 (2004): 101.
4reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they may be abstractly called, 
embodying commitments o f the agent.”8 Normative reasons become motivational through 
the internalist requirement: our norms or justificatory reasons must be connected to our 
subjective motivational set and are therefore internal not external reasons.9
This subjective turn shifts attention to the specific agent and her internal reasons 
rather than a relevant conception o f objective normativity -  be it in the form o f  objective 
specifications o f the good, reason or desire.10 The agent-relativity o f  reasons entails that 
instrumental reason’s function is thought o f as the promotion o f subjective ends. Most 
proponents o f the standard model suggest these subjective aims and commitments will not 
necessarily be self-interested. But, as Williams suggests, one can only “hope” that the 
agent will have altruistic, other-regarding commitments and projects which also form 
reasons for action.11 This theory passes no judgement as to whether other-regarding 
interests ought to or do shape one’s individual choices.12
This leads to another considered virtue o f the standard model. The subjectivist 
philosophical framework situating the standard model frees conceptions o f practical reason 
from the metaphysical burdens associated with moral objectivism, thereby better 
accommodating the social reality o f value pluralism and our scientific viewpoint. 
Scepticism about objective ends o f reason stems from a pervasive dichotomy operating 
within contemporary moral philosophy: the source o f human value is thought either to
8 Williams, “Internal Reason,” p. 105.
9 Ibid., pp. 101-13.
10 It is clear that this aspect has overlap with the economist’s discussion of welfare and utility. 
Economists believe the maximisation of utility depends entirely on an agent’s individual 
consumption and the pursuit of their self-interest. All choices, if they are considered rational, are 
reduced to the pursuit and maximisation of an individual’s own self-interest. This theory passes no 
judgement as to whether other-regarding interests in fact do, or ought to, shape and delimit one’s 
individual choices. This model may say little about the substantive content of one’s preferences, but 
it nonetheless presumes much in terms of the motivation behind preference-formation. A close 
connection is said to obtain between action that promotes individual interests -  also called “welfare” 
-  and what it means to be rational. According to this model, both prudence and rational choice are 
equivalent to enlightened self-interest: even the choices of the most altruistic person are thought to 
be maximising their own personal utility. Economic theories of instrumental rationality therefore 
assume that social, political or external goods possess an instrumental, not intrinsic, significance, 
where their value lies solely in their benefit and importance to individuals.
11 Williams, “Internal Reason,” p. 105.
12 It should be noted that Smith tries to situate his endorsement of the sub-Humean account of 
motivation within an anti-Humean theory of normative reasons. But ultimately he ends up 
endorsing a species of the subjectivism he tries to avoid. Smith writes, “[t]o say that someone has a
normative reason toOis to say that there is some normative requirement that she <t>s, and is thus to
say the her O-ing is justified from the perspective of the normative system that generates that 
requirement. As I see it [...] normative reasons are thus best thought of as truths: that is, 
propositions of the general form ‘As 0-ing is desirable or required’. These truths may well be many 
and varied, as many and varied as there are normative systems for generating requirements” (The 
Moral Problem, p. 95, emphasis added). The subjectivist implications of the standard model 
penetrate into Smith’s account of normative reasons, mainly because he cannot move away from 
scepticism about the existence of substantive objective ends of practical reason.
5derive from objective moral facts or must be viewed as the product o f individual creation 
and anthropocentric power.13 I f  normative principles had value independent o f the human 
will and motivation, a priori claims would be required o f all systems o f morality. The sub- 
Humean model subscribes to the view that, if  moral objectivism is metaphysically 
implausible in our scientific age, normativity must stem from a form o f “creative anti­
realism”. Incidences o f akrasia and depression may illustrate how normative reasons can 
exist independently o f motivating reasons14; yet normative reasons are still understood as 
the result o f individual, subjective preferences or social construction.
The normativity o f instrumental reason itself is grounded in standards o f coherence 
and consistency between contingent desires rather than in substantive foundationalist 
commitments deemed metaphysically questionable from a scientific viewpoint. Smith 
describes these standards in terms o f local and global coherence: local coherence demands 
that desired ends and instrumental reasons must be appropriately related to each other. 
Global coherence goes further and demands that an agent’s complementing instrumental 
desires are consistent with their means-end beliefs and non-instrumental desires. In other 
words, norms o f rationality are restricted to the structural consistency o f that particular 
agent’s subjective motivational set, between their means-end beliefs and instrumental and 
non-instrumental desires. One is rational if  an agent is “in a state o f maximal preparedness 
to act in way that optimally satisfy their desires, given their beliefs, under a whole range o f 
counterfactual circumstances”15, but is nonetheless silent on the qualitative content o f  one’s 
choices.
ii) The influence o f  sub-Humean model in economic theory
For many, the standard model’s descriptive nature lends itself well to the predictive 
and policy aspirations o f economics. Economists adopt this language o f desire satisfaction, 
subjective preference rankings, and maximisation which then enables them to make policy 
recommendations based on predictions about human practical behaviour. Though it “does 
not, and it cannot, enable us to evade the necessity o f choosing between alternatives,” the 
standard model does propose a tidy solution to problems posed by divisiveness and “split 
personalities”; “ it does make it possible for us to bring our different choices into
13 On this objection, see John E. Hare, “Essay Review on Christine Korsgaard’s Creating the 
Kingdom o f Ends? Faith and Philosophy 17 (2000): 375-7. For someone who adheres to this 
division in his interpretation of Kant, see J. B. Schneewind, The Invention o f Autonomy: A History o f 
Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: UP, 1998). For these strategies, see Mackie, Ethics.
14 See Smith.
15 Smith, “Instrumental Desires,” p. 108.
6harmony”. 16 Lionel Robbins writes, “it cannot remove the ultimate limitations on human 
action. But it does make it possible within these limitations to act consistently.”17 Here 
Robbins implies that the standard model does not claim to represent the full range o f human 
agency but aspires to conceptualise practical action under certain idealised circumstances 
so as to explain consistent action.
However, the usability o f  the sub-Humean model within economic theory is subject 
to debate. Amartya Sen, Daniel Hausman, and Albert Hirschman argue that the underlying 
assumptions o f the standard model represent an overly simplified description o f rational 
choice. For Sen, economic theory needs to draw upon different concepts and “a more 
elaborate structure” related to one’s practical agency, which would then make allowances 
for complex choices and aims.18 Similarly, Hirschman points out that numerous activities, 
choices, and complex ends are not conducive to predictable outcome and deviate from the 
idealised assumptions o f the standard model. Pursuits o f some goods such as truth, beauty, 
justice, and friendship “are strongly characterized by a certain fusion o f (and confusion 
between) striving and attaining”, writes Hirschman, and “a means-end or cost-benefit 
calculus is impossible under the circumstances”.19 The supposed ethical neutrality o f the 
standard model has also come under attack. Hausman suggests that the welfare economist 
must consider more seriously the unavoidability o f ethical issues and value judgements 
when explaining human agency or addressing economic problems.20
These critics hope that by engaging with the ethical dimensions o f human agency, 
economists can improve the explanatory force and practical applicability o f their theoretical 
model.21 Though I am sympathetic to these criticisms it should be recognised that 
economists who utilise the standard model generally accept that their conception o f 
rationality involves heavily idealised and artificial presuppositions for the purposes o f 
prediction. Since my worries about the standard model lie elsewhere in the field o f moral 
and political philosophy I refrain my commenting on this specific debate. Ultimately, 
however, my point is that the success o f the standard model in one disciplinary area, such 
as economics, helps explain its hegemony elsewhere, which is illustrated precisely in the 
rational choice models adopted by contemporary political theorists such David Gauthier 
and John Rawls.
16 Lionel Robbins, “The Nature and Significance of Economic Science,” in Daniel Hausman, ed., 
The Philosophy o f Economics 2nd ed. (Cambridge: UP, 1994) p. 95.
17 Ibid.
18 Amartya Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory,” 
Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 6:4 (1977): 336.
19 Albert Hirschman, “Against parsimony: three easy ways of complicating economic discourse,” 
American Economic Review 74 (2): 91-2.
20 Daniel M. Hausman and Michael S. McPherson, “Economics, Rationality, and Ethics,” in 
Hausman, ed., Philosophy o f Economics, p. 263.
21 Ibid, p. 272.
7iii) The influence o f  sub-Humean model in rational choice theory
The synthesis between the belief-desire model and economist’s presuppositions about 
the maximising tendencies o f humans is manifested in the rational choice theories adopted 
within mainstream political theory. In Morals by Agreement Gauthier adopts the standard 
model to generate a conception o f political morality, where he claims that reason seeks to 
maximise individual interests, benefits, or preferences, providing the necessary causal 
information towards these subjective ends.22 Reason has no objective ends:
[I]n identifying rationality with the maximization o f a measure o f preference, the 
theory o f  rational choice disclaims all concern with the ends o f action. Ends may be 
inferred from individual preferences; if  the relationships among these preferences, 
and the manner in which they are held, satisfy the conditions o f rational choice, then 
the theory accepts whatever ends they imply?3
Gauthier’s model o f rational choice suggests that value is subjectively “created or 
determined through preference” or the “product o f our affections” as opposed to an 
objective feature o f the world.24
The economist’s version o f the standard model is also evident in John Rawls’ chosen 
model o f  rational choice in A Theory o f  Justice?5 Like Gauthier, Rawls suggests that this 
“concept o f rationality [...] is the standard one familiar in social theory”, whereby “a 
rational person is thought to have a coherent set o f preferences between the options open to 
him.”26 Further, “ [h]e ranks these options according to how well they further his purposes; 
he follows the plan which will satisfy more o f his desires rather than less, and which has 
the greater chance o f being successfully executed.”27 Rawls claims that the two principles 
o f justice as fairness will be generated from these assumptions about individual rational 
choice in the original position. Rational individuals “try to protect their liberties, widen 
their opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting their aims whatever they are”
22 David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (Oxford, Clarendon, 1986) p. 7.
23 Ibid., emphasis added.
24 Ibid., p. 47.
25 See Onora O’Neill, Constructions o f Reason: Explorations o f Kant’s Practical Philosophy 
(Cambridge: UP, 1989) p. 207.
26 John Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, revised ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1999) pp. 123-4.
27 Ibid., pp. 124.
8and this is “a rational decision in the ordinary sense.”28 In short, the only rational principle 
is “to adopt that plan which maximizes the expected net balance o f  satisfaction.”29
Like other proponents o f the sub-Humean model, Gauthier and Rawls are 
noncommittal about the substantive ends o f individual agents, confining reason to the 
determination o f means and the maximisation o f  subjective interests, and therefore situate 
their account o f rational choice within a subjectivist and naturalistic philosophical 
framework. As the supporting foundation to their theories, if  this model o f rational choice 
is neutral towards objective ends, Gauthier’s and Rawls’ liberalism appear to accommodate 
well both pluralism in society as well as the predominance o f the scientific outlook. These 
latter virtues, according to Gauthier, account for the standard model’s “universal 
acceptance” in the social sciences.30
III. The Standard Model Rejected
Despite Gauthier’s bold statement, the sub-Humean model o f instrumental reason is 
problematic for a number o f moral philosophers.31 In his genealogy o f modem selfhood 
Charles Taylor provides an incisive account o f the animating roots o f the standard model: 
instrumental reason has turned into a problem because it has become situated within an 
ethic o f domination and technological control which has a number o f subjectivist, 
reductivist, and atomistic implications in both public life and personal experience. This 
current philosophical framework reflects a powerful but limited historical vision which 
loses credibility once we properly explore the full breadth o f moral sources underlying why 
instrumental reason has significance for us.32
Ultimately, the entrenchment o f this distorting philosophical framework o f 
instrumental reason is due to what Taylor calls “the naturalistic temper” in philosophy.33
28 Ibid., p. 123.
29 Ibid., p. 365, also see p. 367.
30 Gauthier, Morals by Agreement, p. 8. According to Gauthier, the standard model as a rational 
choice theory is based on the view that “[t]he best explanation we can provide for our observations 
is that there are physical objects with properties that, given our sensory apparatus, cause those 
observations”; and “physical properties [are] part of any adequate account of our experience and 
environment.” (p. 56)
31 See John McDowell, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” Proceedings o f  the 
Aristotelian Society Supplement (1978): 13-29, and “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 68 (1979): 331-50; 
Onora O’Neill, “Four Models of Practical Reasoning,” in Bounds o f Justice (Cambridge: UP, 2000) 
pp. 11-28; Jean E. Hampton, The Authority o f Reason (Cambridge: UP, 1998) and “Rethinking 
Reason,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29:3 (1992): 219-36; Christine Korsgaard, “The 
Normativity of Instrumental Reason,” in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical 
Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) pp. 220-234
32 Taylor criticises anti-instrumentalist readings and critiques of modernity, such as endorsed by Leo 
Strauss, on the same grounds.
33 Taylor speaks of this distortion in Ethics o f Authenticity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1991) p. 
101, but the factors leading to this distortion is more fully explored in Sources o f the Self; The
9Under the broad heading o f “the naturalistic temper” are three characteristics. Two o f these 
have already been examined in the course o f my general outline o f the standard model 
above, thus my description o f them in the context o f Taylor’s position will be brief.
First, according to Taylor the naturalistic temper tries to do away with “a given 
ontology o f the human but focuses instead on subjective moral reactions which are 
reducible to sociobiological explanation.34 Determination o f ends or goods depends on 
instinctual individual desires, inclinations and choices. Goods cannot be distinguished in 
qualitative terms -  they occupy the same spectrum with no higher or lower ways o f  life.35
Second, the naturalist expresses outright hostility towards or does away altogether 
with orientating frameworks incorporating strong qualitative distinctions about the “good 
life” -  a seemingly necessary concession to the social reality o f pluralism. The “stripped- 
down ontology which excludes these frameworks seems to them more in keeping with a 
scientific outlook.”36 Rejected is the notion that moral frameworks are constitutive o f the 
self, necessary in order to orientate oneself and understand one’s identity.
Finally, the naturalistic temper assumes that our understanding o f  human behaviour 
must be continuous with natural science explanation. According to Taylor this tendency is 
manifest in moral philosophy’s misconstrual o f Hume’s fact/value distinction: accounts o f 
the good are allocated to the sphere o f values rather than fact.
Two possibilities emerge from this last distinction: on one account the good is 
relegated to the sphere o f subjective value, and to determine these goods would be a 
subjective enterprise, a “projection” o f subjective properties. Naturalistic explanation 
could not include value articulation and descriptions or terms which bridge the fact-value 
divide are invalid. The second possibility is to shift our theoretical focus onto rules and 
obligatory action away from substantive articulations o f the good. In Taylor’s words, 
“ [t]he focus is on the principles, or injunctions, or standards which guide action, while 
visions o f the good are altogether neglected. Morality is narrowly concerned with what we 
ought to do, and not also with what is valuable in itself, or what we should admire or 
love.”37
At root, however, both possibilities embrace what Taylor calls a “procedural” as 
opposed to “substantive” conception o f practical reason. A “substantive” account o f  reason 
maintains that correct reasoning is constituted and defined by substantial truth; it reflects an
Making o f Modern Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1989). Taylor’s account is much more 
complex and multilayered but for purposes of brevity some simplification is unavoidable.
34 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 19.
35 Ibid., p. 23.
36 Ibid., p. 19.
37 Ibid., p. 84.
10
accurate moral vision.38 Reason is a form o f cognising and participating within a natural, 
cosmological order which is also defined as good. This characterises ancient models o f 
rationality. But if  the domain o f “value” and notions o f  the substantive good have a 
questionable epistemological and metaphysical status from a modem naturalist viewpoint, 
practical reason must be “procedural”. This means that reason is “defined in terms o f  a 
certain style, method, or procedure o f thought”.39 The subjectivist turn in contemporary 
moral and political philosophy is therefore unsurprising, for, according to Taylor, the 
procedural account tries to accord some significance to practical reason whilst prioritising 
the agent’s desires, inclinations, or subjective will.40 Practical reason so defined is 
committed to a specific method applied to reaching an open, unarticulated outcome.41 The 
predominance o f the standard model attests to the entrenchment o f procedural accounts o f 
practical reason in contemporary moral philosophy.
Taylor provides an incisive response to these three factors. Against the first two, he 
provides a convincing account o f how situating frameworks incorporating strong 
qualitative distinctions provide an important and inescapable source o f substance and worth 
to one’s life, essentially constituting one’s sense o f self.42 Taylor writes,
[T]he horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense o f them have to 
include these strong qualitative discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant ju st as a 
contingently true psychological fact about human beings [...]. Rather the claim is 
that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive o f human agency, 
that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we 
would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood.43
Using the example o f language, Taylor illustrates how moral frameworks function as a 
necessary orientating horizon, as a point o f reference for one’s own views on what is good, 
valuable, endorsable or not.44 Thus, the naturalist view that such frameworks can be hived 
o ff is illusory.
Moreover, for Taylor some goods and moral intuitions are judged better and more 
significant -  and the moral demand to fulfil these goods exercise a powerful influence on us 
accordingly. Goods, such as “respect for the life, integrity, and well-being [or] flourishing 
o f others” as well as the “affirmation o f ordinaiy life,” are “uncommonly deep, powerful,
38 Ibid., pp. 85-6.
39 Ibid., p. 86.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid., pp. 20-6, 33-5.
43 Ibid., p. 27.
44 Ibid., p. 27.
11
and universal”.45 Those moral reactions which the naturalist would call subjective 
projections, are actually an “assent to” or “affirmation o f a given ontology o f the human”.46 
Tensions may exist in our moral consciousness but this does not automatically mean we do 
away with strong evaluative distinctions o f goods.47 As “incomparably higher” than others, 
some goods or ends cannot be measured on the same scale o f ordinary goods, ends, and 
desires.48 These goods “stand independent o f our own desires, inclinations, or choices, that 
they represent standards by which these desires and choices are judged.” And further, “the 
goods which command our awe must also function in some sense as standards for us.” 49
Finally, if  these situating, value-constituted frameworks are unavoidable, it follows 
for Taylor that practical reason cannot be understood in a strictly procedural sense. Though 
procedural practical reason seeks to remain neutral towards the outcomes or ends o f  reason, 
it in fact presupposes both the primacy o f some goods over others, as well as a background 
understanding o f the incomparable goods concerned. Though an implicit adhesion to 
certain significant goods is present, procedural practical reason leaves us inarticulate about 
their value and meaning. The underlying impetus o f naturalist explanation and procedural 
conceptions o f reason is a variety o f moral sources which are ironically obscured by the 
vehement denial o f that source’s existence.50 As Taylor states,
Impelled by the strongest metaphysical, epistemological, and moral ideas o f  the 
modem age, these theories narrow our focus to the determinants o f action, and then 
restrict our understanding o f these determinants still further by defining practical 
reason as exclusively procedural. They utterly mystify the priority o f the moral by 
identifying it not with substance but with a form o f reasoning, around which they 
draw a firm boundary. They then are led to defend this boundary all the more 
fiercely in that it is their only way o f doing justice to the hypergoods which move 
them although they cannot acknowledge them.51
For Taylor, rejecting the procedural account is important to make space for a type o f 
“articulating” reason which understands how crucial qualitative distinctions are inevitable 
parts o f practical thinking and action.
Ultimately the naturalistic tendency to hive off its situating moral frameworks leads 
to a dilemma: Taylor concludes that “[tjhose who flaunt the most radical denials and
45 Ibid., p. 4.
46 Ibid., p. 5.
47 Ibid., p. 23.
48 Ibid., p. 19.
49 Ibid., p. 19.
50 Ibid, p. 88.
51 Ibid, p. 89.
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repudiations o f selective facets o f the modem identity generally go on living by variants o f 
what they deny. There is a large component o f delusion in their outlook.”52 I argue that 
this same irony and delusion can also be applied to contemporary critiques o f the standard 
model: on one hand there is an anxiety about the predominant role o f instrumental reason 
within our lives and how this may constrict our moral vision, yet on the other hand 
presenting an alternative is palpably difficult given contemporary philosophers’ reluctance 
to distance themselves from the entrenched naturalist temper within the discipline. There is 
anxiety over the moral costs o f  a subjectivist conception o f instrumental reason, yet the lack 
o f awareness and even endorsement o f the underlying source o f that subjectivism precludes 
proper confrontation o f that anxiety.
To address this dilemma Taylor tries to adopt a balance between two narrow readings 
o f modernity with the hope o f  illuminating, rearticulating, and retrieving the underlying 
moral and spiritual sources animating the significance that instrumental reason has for us 
today.53 These sources have been eclipsed by, on one side, the naturalist temper which 
embraces as all-important the standard model o f practical action, and on the other side, by 
critiques o f modernity which reject wholesale the pervasiveness o f instrumental reason 
throughout the modem age.54 “We have read so many goods out o f our official story, we 
have buried their power so deep beneath layers o f philosophical rationale, that they are in 
danger o f stifling,” Taylor writes. “Or rather, since they are our goods, human goods, we 
are stifling.”55
I am deeply sympathetic to Taylor’s diagnosis o f how these moral sources have 
become obscured because o f the predominant naturalistic temper, leaving us with a scaled 
down model o f practical agency. I share Taylor’s opposition to the assumption that 
broader, moral orientating frameworks can be done away with at will without incurring 
severe moral costs. Indeed, my thesis emphasises the importance o f awareness o f  how 
certain views are philosophically situated.
However, I am less optimistic about Taylor’s attempts at retrieving these obscured 
moral sources o f instrumental reason within the philosophical tradition. One might argue 
that in reappropriating the historical conceptions o f practical reason a richer tradition o f 
moral thinking is being uncovered by critics o f the standard model. But I disagree with this 
reading: I believe that the process o f retrieval is much more difficult than Taylor
envisages, as evidenced precisely by contemporary reappropriations o f historical thinkers.
52 Ibid., p. 504.
53 Ibid., p. 520.
54 See for instance Leo Strauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), 
also On Tyranny, revised ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2000).
55 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 520.
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As I explore in my thesis, opponents o f the standard model typically enlist 
Aristotle’s, Hume’s or Kant’s conception o f practical reason in support o f their normative 
projects but rope off their broader frameworks o f qualitative distinctions because o f the 
metaphysical commitments they entail. This move may be self-conscious or not.56 On one 
hand these deep-seated worries about metaphysical claims and a priori arguments are 
understandable. Taylor accurately points out the multilayered source o f these worries — i.e. 
a commitment to freedom and affirmation o f ordinary life, a rejection o f moral or societal 
elitism, the ubiquity o f natural science explanation.
On the other hand, like Taylor, I believe that we run into numerous problems if  these 
worries dictate our moral vision -  as they do within current attempts at retrieval. The move 
to discard the original philosophical frameworks situating these historical views reveal how 
a number o f contemporary critics o f the standard model are themselves guilty o f 
subscribing to what Taylor deems a “stripped-down ontology”. This lies at the heart o f the 
dilemma o f instrumental reason as I have articulated it -  namely the tendency to collapse 
back into the underlying subjectivism o f the standard model despite the genuine unease 
surrounding the role and nature o f the instrumental reason in moral and political 
philosophy.
The rejection o f certain philosophical frameworks may speak o f  how difficult it is to 
relieve oneself o f the pressure exerted by the naturalistic temper. But if  certain 
metaphysical commitments are genuinely unavailable to us today, resort to truncated 
versions o f historical positions is questionable and incurs costs we may not wish 
acknowledge.
First, we compromise the philosophical fidelity o f past ideas. Issues o f  textual 
exegesis are not my main concern however: even more o f a worry is how we become 
unaware o f our own philosophical situatedness within moral frameworks -  a particularly 
damaging price to pay if  Taylor is right about how these latter frameworks function as 
moral orientations for the self. Taylor is absolutely correct to say that examination o f the 
past and the different historical traditions is incredibly important.57 But this examination 
must acknowledge the philosophical situatedness o f current and past views -  how these
56 For instance, John Rawls is more upfront about how he is discarding Kant’s metaphysics, whereas 
others such as Christine Korsgaard are not. And as we see in Chapter 8, this is a conscious move by 
Bernard Williams.
“The very fact of this self-definition in relation to the past induces us to re-examine this past and 
the way it has been assimilated or repudiated. Very often, understanding how this has in fact come 
about gives us insight into contemporary views which would not be otherwise available. In 
understanding our differences from the ancients, we have a better idea what our assimilation of their 
paradigms of self-rule actually amount to for us; and in looking more closely at the ‘traditions’ 
which our Enlightenment thought supposedly repudiated, and at the forms that repudiation took, we 
may come to see the difference between the two opposed terms in a new light, and consequently to 
take a new view on contemporary philosophy.” Taylor, Sources o f the Self, pp. 103-4.
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frameworks provided a moral orientation for past philosophical ideas and how some 
comparable but dissimilar framework orientates us ourselves. When we fail to recognise 
the philosophical situatedness and constraints o f past conceptions o f instrumental reason it 
translates into an unawareness o f the situatedness and relevant constraints o f contemporary 
conceptions. We end up endorsing the position we are trying to avoid. As this thesis will 
show, it is this lack o f reflective awareness -  evident in the disjunctive between the 
philosophical minimalism and the unexamined but necessary orientating framework -  
which then causes those opponents o f the standard model to collapse back into a species o f 
moral subjectivism they seek to evade.
IV  Outline o f  the Thesis
Thus my thesis claims that the “uncovering [of] buried goods” is more challenging 
than Taylor imagines as evidenced by the truncated re-appropriations o f historical authors 
in contemporary debates about instrumental reasoning. To establish this point, my thesis 
focuses on Aristotle, Hume and Kant, as each are thought to provide a different but viable 
philosophical tradition o f practical reason.58 Each chapter on Aristotle, Hume, and Kant 
provides, first, an interpretive analysis o f instrumental reason as situated within their 
original philosophical frameworks which stipulate objective human ends. Second, I 
critically examine prominent contemporary authors who — like m yself -  are anxious about 
the pre-eminence o f the standard model, but are unsuccessful at their attempted retrieval o f 
historical conceptions o f  practical reason. My strategy shows how the philosophical 
framework o f historical models helps avoid moral subjectivist conclusions; in doing away 
with such normative objective frameworks, its truncated versions by contrast collapse back 
into a form o f moral subjectivism.
Chapters 2 and 3 begin with Aristotle for two reasons. First, Aristotle marks the 
beginning o f an influential tradition o f virtue ethics and practical reasoning which will help 
explicate my reading o f Hume in subsequent chapters. Second, the objective framework o f 
Aristotle’s function argument specifies universal human ends which situate his account o f 
practical wisdom (which is reasoning o f ends as well as means), cleverness (which is akin 
to the standard model) and the practical syllogism. The subjectivism o f the standard model 
is kept at bay precisely by this broader philosophical framework.
By contrast, the prominent neo-Aristotelian approach o f Martha Nussbaum cannot 
help collapsing back into a species o f moral subjectivism. Within contemporary debates 
about practical reason neo-Aristotelians believe that their approach occupies a middle
58 See, for instance, the volume of essays within Gaut and Cullity, Ethics and Practical Reason, 
which surround a debate about practical reason between these three thinkers in particular.
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ground between the standard and Kantian model: they share the Kantian’s anxiety over the 
subjectivism o f the standard model yet wish to avoid the abstraction and formalism o f the 
Kantian response. This sought philosophical middle ground is partly justifiable given the 
reading I provide o f Aristotle’s practical syllogism in Chapter 3. However, Nussbaum 
minimises Aristotle’s metaphysical framework in order to incorporate value 
incommensurability and pluralism into her conception o f Aristotelian practical reason, thus 
weakening the objectivity o f  Aristotle’s philosophical framework.
Chapters 4 to 7 discuss Hume and Kant. Both philosophers are typically understood 
as philosophical opponents in terms o f the role accorded to practical reason. Though 
commonly understood as the historical source o f the standard model, Chapters 4 and 5 
dispute the sub-Humean reading o f practical motivation which mistakenly attributes to 
Hume a similar naturalistic and moral subjectivist position. Humean instrumental reason is 
situated within a broader framework comprised o f qualitative distinctions about human 
virtue, character development, and intersubjective judgements, thus showing a degree o f 
continuity with Aristotle.59 I argue that Hume’s philosophical framework provides a 
substantive and integrated account o f human beings as sociable and sympathetic agents, 
thereby articulating which ends and virtues are considered appropriate given that 
definitional account. This framework helps expose the Kantian presuppositions o f a 
prominent sceptical interpretation o f Hume in Chapter 5 and provides an appropriate 
segueway into the discussion o f Kant in Chapters 6 and 7.
If  Hume is seen as the historical progenitor o f the standard model, Kant is seen as his 
moral counterpart. Among contemporary Kantians, such as Rawls and Korsgaard, Kant is 
thought to provide a “moralised” conception o f instrumental rationality and conversely, a 
“non-moralised” conception o f moral reasoning. This strategy is achieved primarily 
through hiving off Kant’s dualistic and metaphysical philosophical framework to produce a 
radically anthropocentric understanding o f practical reason. But in so doing, as Chapter 6 
and 7 argues, both Rawls and Korsgaard cannot avoid the subjectivist implications o f the 
standard model. I show there how Kant’s metaphysical framework is crucial to appreciate 
the full demandingness and objectivity o f moral reason which provides the situating 
framework constraining our prudential use o f reason.
The guiding thesis uniting this dissertation is that there are genuine philosophical 
costs incurred once situating frameworks are done away with, clouding both our 
interpretive engagement with historical ideas, and more importantly, our awareness o f how 
our own ideas are situated within a moral framework which is constituted by its own 
constraints and underlying ethical interests. As I have described it, the ambivalence
59 This point needs to be qualified. Hume’s framework can be called “intersubjective” which differs 
from Aristotle’s objectivist framework defined in terms of human function.
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surrounding the standard model o f instrumental reason attests to this “clouding” in both 
respects. Critics o f the standard model find themselves in a rather intractable philosophical 
situation because o f their own adhesion to a number o f naturalist claims. My thesis argues 
that the current attempts at retrieval as o f yet have not been successful, and may be much 
more daunting than we might envisage. The original claim o f this dissertation is twofold: 
first, it contributes to our understanding o f the role and central problematic surrounding 
instrumental rationality in contemporary moral and political philosophy, o f which requires 
an approach that differs from the dominant “re-appropriation” strategies deployed by both 
adherents and detractors o f the standard model. Second, my thesis contributes to debates 
surrounding the work o f  Aristotle, Hume and Kant, arguing that their central philosophical 
claims are deeply ensconced within their respective metaphysical, philosophical 
frameworks. I claim that these frameworks should be preserved regardless o f  how they 
may seem outdated from our modem, liberal perspective.
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2 Aristotle and Means-End Deliberation
And so it is clear that prudence and virtue go together, and that these complex states are 
states o f one in whom prudence and virtue are not combined, and the Socratic saying that 
nothing is stronger than prudence is right. But when Socrates said this o f knowledge he 
was wrong. For prudence is virtue and not scientific knowledge, but another kind of 
cognition. [Eudemian Ethics, 1246b32-4]1
I begin with Aristotle in part because he marks the beginning o f an influential 
tradition o f virtue ethics and practical reasoning which will help explicate my reading of 
Hume in subsequent chapters. However, the objective philosophical framework of 
Aristotle’s function argument also specifies universal human ends which situate his account 
o f practical wisdom (which includes reasoning about ends as well as means), cleverness 
(which is akin to the standard model) and the practical syllogism. The subjectivism o f the 
standard model is kept at bay by this broader philosophical framework.
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the standard model o f instrumental reason 
displays several general propensities: including, first, the view o f means-end rationality as 
independent o f metaphysical commitments; second, the idea that practical reason demands 
consistency between desires and belief rather than the complex judgement, articulation and 
evaluation o f moral practices and constitutive ends. These general tendencies promote an 
allegedly less problematic account of practical reason. But these contemporary 
philosophical trends do not resonate with Aristotle.2 First, for Aristotle prudential reason 
(phronesis) participates in the discovery and articulation o f moral value, specifically, o f the 
constituents o f  a naturally prior end. Those committed to a contemporary procedural 
account o f instrumental reason, would find it difficult, moreover, to accept the 
metaphysical philosophical framework implied in Aristotelian practical deliberation. 
Indeed, for Aristotle instrumental reason cannot be isolated from a broader moralised 
philosophical discussion o f human practices or values. Neither can practical instrumental 
reasoning be discussed without understanding its context o f human desiderative, 
perceptual, and psychological faculties which collaborate with our cognitive, rational 
capacities, and collectively shape and cultivate our moral dispositional character. Practical 
deliberation encompasses our growth and development as moral agents, who are capable of 
ethical evaluation and rational activity in promotion o f eudaimonia.
1 All references to Eudemian Ethics (hereafter abbreviated EE) are to the translation by J. Solomon 
in The Complete Works o f Aristotle Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Bames (Princeton: UP, 1980).
2 Aristotle’s conception of practical deliberation incorporates the other-regarding good in a 
significant respect, as shown in his account of the political good and friendship. Though these are 
incredibly important, for the purposes of these chapters, I focus on how Aristotle departs from the 
standard model in the two aforementioned ways.
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Over the next two chapters, my purpose is to give a reading o f Aristotelian means- 
end reasoning which considers these complex factors. My argument is divided into two 
parts: the first part, outlined in this chapter, is that Aristotle’s ideal form of prudential 
deliberation requires the moral evaluation o f ends; the second part o f the argument will 
show that this kind o f means-end deliberation is irreducible to a scientific, deductive 
framework. That said, I am not claiming that Aristotle thinks it impossible for one to 
reason instrumentally towards an immoral or vicious end.3 The focus in this chapter, 
however, will be on Aristotle’s definition o f deliberation in Book III o f the Nicomachecm 
Ethics (hereafter EN). There, Aristotle defines deliberation as always about the means 
rather than the ends [1112b 12-20]: moreover, deliberation o f means should emanate from a 
character o f moral virtue [1114a 1-7]. Different interpreters have disputed whether, in Book 
VI, Aristotle changes or widens his definition o f prudential reason to include deliberation 
o f ends. In his influential paper, “The Practical Syllogism”, D. J. Allan observes a conflict 
between the Book III and VI accounts o f deliberation, and ultimately concludes Aristotle 
must have altered his view. On this reading, Aristotle’s more considered remarks on 
practical reasoning come to include the rational assessment o f  ends in Book VI, in contrast 
to the restricted account given in Book III.4 Others, David Wiggins among them, have 
disputed Allan’s interpretation, and instead argue that, presupposed in Book III and more 
explicitly discussed in Book VI, is a wider explanation rather than a wider conception of 
deliberation.5 According to Wiggins, Aristotle never restricts practical deliberation to 
finding the best means to an end; rather deliberative tasks include the evaluation o f worthy 
ends constitutive o f eudaimonia. Like Wiggins, this chapter argues against Allan’s view: 
Aristotle does not confine practical reasoning exclusively to the determination of 
appropriate means. The Book III account o f deliberation will be shown to be consistent 
with the account given in Book VI. Ultimately, Aristotelian means-end rationality 
encompasses the moral appraisal o f ends and the habituation o f dispositional character.
In the first instance, Allan’s reading o f Book III is resisted because of exegetical 
disagreement: Allan assumes that the discussions o f practical deliberation in Books III and 
VI have little continuity, whereas I believe both sections advance a broader, consistently 
unified conception, particularly in light o f the intervening books on moral virtue. 
Secondly, and perhaps more importantly for the purposes o f this chapter, I wish to avoid
3 This is implied in Aristotle’s discussion of cleverness, which I discuss below.
4 D. J. Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” in Autour d ’Aristote: recueil d ’etudes de philosophie 
ancienne et medieval offert a Mgr. A. Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1955) p. 338.
5 David Wiggins, “Deliberation and Practical Reason,” in A. O. Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics (Berkeley: University of California, 1980) pp. 221-40.
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the logical trajectory o f Allan’s reconstruction6: namely, if  at any point Aristotelian means- 
end deliberation is confined solely to the determination o f means, irrespective o f an end’s 
moral worth, such an account could accommodate reductivist accounts o f instrumental 
reason that presuppose a stance of ethical neutrality towards one’s ends and/or means. In 
other words, we need to reject interpretations like Allan’s partly to avoid its resultant 
impression that Aristotelian means-end deliberation is indeed comparable to the 
problematic standard model o f instrumental reason. Contra these contemporary 
conceptions, Aristotle’s practical deliberation implies that instrumental reason actually can, 
and indeed often does require the specification and moral assessment o f ends. Positive 
evaluations o f an end must likewise influence the deliberative choice o f means, in which 
case the means will simultaneously possess value o f their own. This view fundamentally 
challenges two assumptions presupposed in, and characteristic of, the standard model of 
instrumental reason: the first is the repudiation o f both metaphysical and ethical content, 
while the second is the evaluative detachment between deliberated means and desiderative 
ends. For Aristotle, neither set of assumption is attractive, let alone plausible: admirable 
practical deliberation relies on not just good causal inference or efficiency between means 
and ends, but substantive ethical content -  namely the transmission o f worthy ends to 
equally praiseworthy means, all emanating from a morally virtuous character.
The second part o f the argument, more directly addressed in the next chapter on the 
function o f the practical syllogism, will distance Aristotle even further from contemporary 
accounts o f  instrumental reason, specifically the latter’s commitment to reductive 
naturalism. Here I will dispute Allan’s second claim that Aristotle’s discussion o f the 
practical syllogism in E N  Book VI and VII intends to draw close parallels between 
practical reason (phronesis) and theoretical reason. For Aristotle, disparities between the 
demonstrative and practical syllogisms, in terms o f function and structure, likewise suggest 
clear divisions between practical and theoretical rationality. Extended over two chapters, 
the argument will thus emphasise Aristotle’s unique conception o f instrumental reason, 
distinctive from modem reductivist accounts. Ultimately, the combined chapters forge an 
interpretive middle ground that avoids both the attribution to Aristotle o f a contemporary 
reductively naturalistic conception of instrumental reason, as well as the appropriation of 
Aristotelian practical reason for contemporary normative purposes. Both this chapter and 
the first parts o f the next chapter address the issue o f attribution; the issue o f appropriation 
will be discussed more directly in the latter sections o f the second chapter. At root, both 
interpretive moves stem from tendencies to import foreign philosophical dilemmas into
6 It should be noted that this is not Allan’s own conclusion, but merely the next logical step that 
would follow from his interpretation.
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Aristotelian practical reason and suspend his more questionable metaphysical 
commitments, in order to make his theory amenable to both contemporary predilections.7
Aristotle’s robust metaphysical realism, the moral evaluation requisite to practical 
deliberation, and his resistance to a scientistic deductive paradigm, are all significant 
constraints on interpretation and appropriation. But an important question then arises: if we 
respect these historical constraints, what is the practical payoff o f Aristotelian means-end 
reasoning? Respect for the gulf in worldview may ultimately restrict the straightforward 
applicability o f Aristotle’s conception o f practical deliberation. This does not imply, 
however, that such an approach has no relevant practical advantages. To sever Aristotle 
from his historical moorings, with all its associated metaphysical baggage ignores how 
certain philosophical moves remain unproblematic to him. This may mean practical reason 
in Aristotle’s sense is not easily retrievable. But considering means-end deliberation in 
light o f these historically contingent assumptions nonetheless gives us vital normative 
distance from the predominant modem conception, allowing for the articulation o f its 
limitations with greater coherence and force.
The structure o f this chapter is as follows: Section I provides a brief exposition of 
Aristotle’s metaphysical views and its impact on his ethics. Section II argues that Allan’s 
reading o f deliberative choice as restricted to means cannot be sustained. There I argue that 
the appraisal and specification o f ends is presupposed in Aristotle’s conception o f means- 
end deliberation, as demonstrated in the analogy between the doctor’s technical skill and 
the practical reasoning o f the phronimos. Deliberation over complex ends leads to the 
appreciation o f some means as intrinsically valuable goods, as opposed to an intermediate, 
merely instrumentally valuable step towards an external end. Section III provides the 
substance to that conception o f deliberation. I claim that the habituation and acquisition of 
the moral virtues exemplifies those types o f deliberatively chosen means to an end which 
are simultaneously appreciated as intrinsic goods, worthy ends in themselves.
I. A B rief Introduction to Aristotle’s Metaphysical Realism and Human Function
It is important to provide a very brief overview o f Aristotle’s metaphysical 
framework, in particular that which informs his account o f human function (ergon) and the 
rational soul. In this section we will see that these metaphysical concepts are not so easily 
suspended, since they operate on a normative as well as descriptive level for Aristotle and 
form the basis o f praiseworthy, admirable practical reason. Aristotle’s metaphysical 
commitments constrain the extent to which we can draw comparisons between the standard
7 See, for instance, Martha Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” in R. Bruce Douglass et al, 
eds., Liberalism and the Good (New York: Routledge, 1990) pp. 202-52.
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model o f instrumental reason and his account, as well as apply his theory as a solution to 
our current moral dilemmas.
Notwithstanding their divergent normative aims, both these interpretive tendencies 
are united in their suspension o f the metaphysical claims implicated within Aristotelian 
human function. The function argument, outlined in E N  I, is understood as a justification 
o f ethics wholly internal to humans: ethical practices reflective o f human function as 
rational soul remain confined to cultural conventions and the anthropomorphic standpoint.8 
No reference is made to objective moral facts that are prior to, or independent of, the 
human perspective. From this point o f view Aristotle’s ethical and practical thought may 
appear metaphysically neutral. Unlike the problematic idealism o f Platonic Forms, the 
function argument seems to suggest that Aristotelian morality is obtained and corrected 
within the limits o f anthropocentricism. Given its metaphysical neutrality, Aristotle’s 
practical reason can therefore be compared to contemporary conceptions o f the role o f 
instrumental reason and adapted to current normative concerns with relative ease. This 
anthropocentric account also assumes a deep methodological divide between dialectic and 
scientific knowledge, as well as between Aristotle’s commitment to objective facts in his 
metaphysics and the empirically derived, contingently valid practical content in his ethics.9
Admittedly, there is a strong intuitive appeal to an Aristotelian theoiy that is easily 
divorced from the thick metaphysical realism conventionally associated with the 
predominant strands o f the classical tradition.10 But some crucial overlap between 
Aristotle’s metaphysics and ethics cannot be easily overlooked and minimised. Contained 
within the function argument are concepts such as essence and end -  terms which originate 
in Aristotle’s metaphysics.11 At the very least, terminological continuity is enough to 
suggest that his ethical and practical theory must be related to his metaphysics in some 
limited way. This casts some doubt on the possible suspension o f Aristotle’s metaphysical 
commitments. Moreover, various parallels can be drawn between the scientific and the
8 See Martha C. Nussbaum, The Fragility o f Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and 
Philosophy (Cambridge: UP, 1986) pp. 291-4 and John McDowell, “Eudaimonism and Realism in 
Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Robert Heinaman, ed., Aristotle and Moral Realism (London: UCL, 1995) pp. 
201-18. On one extreme Aristotle would be a champion of tradition or an uncritical acceptance of 
parochial values.
I do not dispute the existence of a methodological divide and the subsequent departmentalization of 
the sciences; to an extent I also subscribe to the view that the content and structure of ethical and 
scientific knowledge is different (as will be much clearer in the next chapter’s discussion of the 
practical syllogism). However, I don’t think this difference for Aristotle is an unbridgeable gulf. 
Those who adopt Aristotelian practical deliberation for contemporary normative purposes usually 
maintain a very strong methodological difference, whereas I hold a weaker version of this divide. 
For a strong view, see Nussbaum, “Saving Aristotle’s Appearances,” in Malcolm Schofield and 
Martha Craven Nussbaum, eds., Language and Logos; Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy 
Presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge: UP, 1982) pp. 267-94.
101 am thinking mainly of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic traditions.
11 C. D. C. Reeve, Practices o f Reason: Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) 
p. 137.
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ethical inductive method through which we are said to arrive at first principles, though 
these principles are relevant to each discrete sphere o f inquiry.12 We should therefore be 
hesitant about concluding that no objective, mind-independent first principles relevant to 
the ethical domain can be discovered in Aristotle. All these considerations should constrain 
the wholesale adoption o f Aristotle’s conception of practical deliberation.
If  this is correct, then Aristotle’s function argument implies metaphysical views 
which commit him to something beyond an exclusively anthropocentric theory. 
Specifically, the concept of ergon or function must define, capture, and explain some 
enduring characteristic summarising the placement o f  species-kind within a natural, 
hierarchical order (see Physics 2). So defined, ergon draws on Aristotle’s metaphysical 
explanations about how substance imparts form on material components: to fulfil one’s 
function is to actualise one’s constant, unchanging eternal form, where definitional form is 
impressed onto changing materiality. Essence must therefore articulate universal 
definitional qualities that stem from naturally prior principles.13 As Terence Irwin claims, 
“substantial properties o f a subject tell us what it is; for these are the properties that provide 
knowledge.”14 Similar to Irwin, C. D. C. Reeve’s interpretation o f ergon preserves the 
metaphysical underpinnings o f Aristotle’s ethics. Function, on Reeve’s reading, is 
“essence activated” and “to say that the good for an F is to best achieve its essential end is 
to say something that is at least a candidate for truth.” 15 In other words, the definitional 
property o f ergon schematically orders all acts or processes towards an objectively true, 
overarching end o f natural priority. According to Aristotle, for all animals the relevant 
criterion o f substantive essence is fulfilled by the soul which has endurance and priority 
over its material (bodily) components. In the Metaphysics Aristotle writes:
Therefore the parts which are o f the nature o f matter and into which as its matter a 
thing is divided, are posterior; but those which are parts o f the formula, and o f the 
substance according to its formula, are prior, either all or some o f  them. And since 
the soul o f animals (for this is the substance o f living beings) is their substance 
according to the formula, i.e. the form and the essence o f a body o f a certain kind (at 
least we shall define each part, if we define it well, not without reference to its 
function, and this cannot be without perception), therefore the parts o f the soul are 
prior, either all or some o f them, to the concrete animal, and similarly in each case of 
a concrete whole; and the body and its parts are posterior to this its substance, and it
12 Ibid., pp. 56-7.
13 M. F. Bumyeat, “Aristotle on Understanding Knowledge,” in Enrico Berti, ed., Aristotle on 
Science: The 'Posterior Analytics’ {Padova: Editrice Antenore, 1981)p. 111.
14 Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, p. 202.
15 Reeve, Practices o f Reason, p. 128.
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is not the substance but the concrete thing that is divided into these parts as its 
matter. [1035bl 1-21]16
The purposive, teleological movement o f animals serves as manifest evidence that their 
soul is substance; Aristotle can maintain this claim because, unlike the Cartesian soul, the 
soul as form and essence needn’t be also an introspectible, transparent mental state.17
But unlike animals, human souls possess reason. The function argument in NE  I
states:
[I]f we assume that the function of man is a kind o f life, namely, an activity or series 
o f actions o f the soul, implying a rational principle; and if  the function o f a good man 
is to perform these well and rightly; and if every function is performed well when 
performed in accordance with its proper excellence: if  all this is so, the conclusion is 
that the good for man is an activity o f the soul in accordance with virtue. [1098al3- 
17]
Human function as rational soul features an important act /  result ambiguity:18 this 
ambiguity specifies the kind o f activity or practice required to actualise an essential result 
or end, and both components o f ergon -  the act and result -  impose conceptual, reciprocal 
demands on each other. In other words, Aristotle associates human definition with 
engagement in particular forms o f rational activity. Crucially, these activities exhibit the 
best human qualities and moral virtues. Here it is important to note that the distinctiveness 
o f humans for Aristotle resides in our capacity to engage in practical deliberation and moral 
action. The “result” component o f ergon implies, however, that rational activity must be 
directed towards an ultimate, species-wide end; the distinctively human good cannot be 
based on contingent wants -  conditional upon what individuals or cultural groups 
themselves happen to deem desirable. Rather, the best rational activity must reflect and 
express the essence and end o f one’s species being.19 Should we adopt the former, less 
metaphysically committed view, substance is apparently derived from  human contingent 
practices. In the latter this argument is reversed: human contingent practices presuppose 
and should be derived from objective substance. The contingent particularities are meant to
16 All quotations from the Metaphysics are from the translation by W. D. Ross in The Complete 
Works o f Aristotle, Vol. 2.
17 T. H. Irwin, “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Rorty, ed., 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 41-3.
18 Ibid., pp. 123-4.
19 Ibid.
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actualise those enduring objective first principles imprinted onto the substantive essence of 
our very species-being.
For Aristotle, the ultimate end o f eudaimonia meets the criteria o f objectivity and 
universality in relation to humans; an essential descriptive property o f the human rational 
soul is its aspiration towards the naturally prior, final end o f eudaimonia through rational 
activity.20 What begins initially as a precognitive, pre-reflective aim undergoes a phase of 
explicit, rational articulation, if  one is fortunate enough to be well habituated, in possession 
o f virtues and trained with good deliberative skills. One step further is the cognitive, 
theoretical reflection on how different moral goods and virtues, used in practical and 
theoretical activity, architectonically comprise the overarching telos o f eudaimonia. This 
person, who would be called wise in ethics, therefore possesses a cognitive understanding 
o f those objective first principles defining the essence and telos o f  their being.21 As Reeve 
states, “someone who has mastered ethics or biology [...] will simply be able to see that 
first principles -  however complex and impenetrable they may seem to someone less 
experienced -  are intrinsic necessities, that they could not be otherwise.”22 Reeve’s reading 
portrays Aristotle’s ethical and scientific views as a cohesive whole: in both spheres 
Aristotle is a realist who is committed to the existence o f objective facts.23
In the ethical domain these facts are always weighed against the phainomena 
(appearances) and endoxa (opinions o f the wise and reputable) to ensure their overall 
coherence; as evidence, however, both phainomena and endoxa are not necessarily 
coextensive. Especially among those who are wise and reputable, language functions as a 
“repository o f truth,” attesting to those recurrent ideas which orientate humans towards 
objective truth.24 Endoxa may conflict with the phainomena, or the common opinions of 
that phainomena, resulting in a dialectical puzzle. But the solution, Aristotle thinks, does 
not necessarily favour the phainomena, since endoxa o f the wise and reputable have the
20 EN 1097b22- 1098a 18. See also Reeve, Practices o f Reason, p. 123-38.
21 See John J. Cleary, “Phainomena in Aristotle’s Methodology,” International Journal o f 
Philosophical Studies Vol. 2:1 (1994): 61-97.
22 Reeve, Practices o f Reason, p. 64.
23 See David Charles, “Aristotle and Modem Realism,” in Heinaman, ed., Aristotle and Moral 
Realism, pp. 135-172.
24 Cleary, “Phainomena,” p. 71. Indeed, this view makes sense if we interpret endoxa to be referring 
to the opinions of the wise and not simply common opinion. The person who is practically wise has 
gained enough experiential material to inductively reach first principles and is in a position to 
theorise in a more general, global sense involving knowledge of human function and the rational 
soul which go beyond the particularistic nature of practical ethics. Aristotle and the Greek view 
more generally idealises the wise as opposed to common person; it is the wise person who is the 
practical, normative standard. See also John M. Cooper, “Aristotle on the Authority of 
‘Appearances,’” in his Reason and Emotion; Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology and Ethical 
Theory (Princeton: UP, 1999) p. 285. Andrd Laks, “Commentary on Annas” in Proceedings o f the 
Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Vol. IV (1988): 185.
25
antecedent authority o f residual, objective truth.25 For Aristotle, wisdom has two 
dimensions: the first is mastery o f practical reason and its focus on the complex 
determination o f the human good, while the second implies the mastery o f theoretical 
reasoning and its comprehension o f a priori connections and teleological explanations. 
Though theoretical wisdom does not necessarily imply practical wisdom, the full exercise 
o f practical reason will appeal to theoretical concepts o f teleological relations, human 
nature and the soul. The two intellectual virtues are thus connected by a common 
explanatory system which, in Aristotle’s mind, is enough to ensure objectivity in the moral 
domain, and confers on human linguistic judgements an aspect o f  realism and truth.26
This twofold aspect o f wisdom leads Reeve to conclude that human function is, in 
part, shared with the divine. Aristotle’s explanatory scheme o f natural priority points to an 
objective order not solely restricted to human life. For the completion or actuality o f our 
ergon, humans are meant to aspire to theoretical nous or intellection, characteristic of the 
highest beings in the natural hierarchy. Reeve states, “god’s function is completed in a way 
that ours is not. Unlike us, god is eternally engaged in study, but we cannot engage in 
study without him. For his activity is the final cause o f ours. We share god’s function, to 
be sure, but that just makes us god-like, it does not make us god.”27 God, who is full 
actuality and permanently engaged in theoria, occupies the pinnacle o f the natural, 
functional hierarchy. Thus the best human life requires the exercise o f reason, not simply 
because our actuality demands it; but rather because rational activity encapsulates certain 
characteristics which correspond to the definition o f what is best and fu lly  actual}* 
Through exercising the rational soul, humans attempt to actualise their species-being by 
achieving the telos o f eudaimonia: this process expresses human attempts to mimic and 
approximate -  albeit restrained by certain inescapable anthropomorphic limits29 -  the best
25 Cooper, “Aristotle on the Authority o f ‘Appearances’,” p. 289.
26 Charles, “Aristotle and Moral Realism,” p. 170.
27 Reeve, Practices o f Reason, p. 149. This conclusion is also drawn by Allan Gotthelf, “The Place 
of the Good in Aristotle’s Natural Teleology” in Proceedings o f the Boston Area Colloquium in 
Ancient Philosophy Vol. IV (1988): 127-31.
28 Gotthelf, “The Place of the Good,” p. 129. Aristotle states in Book Lambda in Metaphysics: “And 
thought in itself deals with that which is best in itself, and that which is thought in the fullest sense 
with that which is best in the fullest sense. And thought thinks itself because it shares the nature of 
the object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in coming into contact with and thinking 
its objects, so that thought and object of thought are the same. For that which is capable of receiving 
the object of thought, i.e. the substance, is thought. And it is active when it possesses this object. 
Therefore the latter rather than the former is the divine element which thought seems to contain, and 
the act of contemplation is what is most pleasant and best. If, then, God is always in that good state 
in which we sometimes are, this compels our wonder; and if in a better this compels it yet more. 
And God is in a better state. And life also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and 
god is that actuality; and god’s essential actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore 
that God is a living being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong 
to God; for this is God.” [1072b 18-31]
29 For example, we need a measure of external goods (wealth, leisure, luck, friends); we are subject 
to change and decay. We also cannot engage in contemplation all the time.
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kind o f life that is maintained by god’s full actuality, and in turn approach a comparable 
etemality o f being as a species.30
The full implications o f the function argument’s metaphysical background will 
become more evident in the final section o f the next chapter. As the discussion so far 
indicates, appropriating Aristotelian practical reason in support o f current liberal intuitions 
about value pluralism would be interpretively suspect. However, a more immediate 
concern arises as to whether my preferred reading o f the function argument implies that 
practical deliberation is restricted solely to the means, since the ultimate human end of 
eudaimonia is already established. Reeve, for example, concludes rather oddly that if the 
end o f eudaimonia is naturally given as a first principle, cognisable through theoretical 
reason, then humans deliberate only about the means, not about their ends.31 Reeve writes,
Current dominant economic models o f rational choice conceive o f rationality as 
applicable only to means, not to ends. We are rational, on these models, if we take 
the best or most efficient means to our ends, whatever those ends happen to be, but 
our ends themselves are beyond rational appraisal [...] On the interpretation that I 
have defended, phronesis has something in common with these models o f practical 
rationality. It, too, fails to apply to our ultimate end.32
Since eudaimonia is not chosen, but pre-established as our descriptively valid end, Reeve 
thinks practical reasoning is confined to the means, making Aristotle’s practical 
deliberation analogous to current standard models o f instrumental rationality. Given that 
both are restricted to deliberating means, causal efficiency takes priority over the moral or 
evaluative assessment o f ends. He goes on further to say that “ [t]his is bound to disappoint 
the growing number o f philosophers who look to Aristotle for a conception o f practical 
reason that might be used to correct these economic models precisely by giving us an 
account o f rational deliberation about ends.”33
30 It is important to note that, while all species have a certain eternal dimension (form is 
perpetuated), humans are more capable of participating in the divine due to the fact that we possess 
reason and have the potential for theoretical, philosophic contemplation.
311 have great sympathy with Reeve’s reading in general, with the exception of this point.
32 Reeve, Practices o f Reason, pp. 192-3.
33 Ibid., p. 193. This claim hinges on how one interprets eudaimonia -  whether it is primarily in the 
contemplative life or a composite of intrinsic goods. Reeve ultimately understands eudaimonia in 
the former sense, which makes comprehensible why he concludes practical reason does not 
deliberate about ends (since the definition of eudaimonia is already substantively given as “study” 
for Reeve). Yet it is not always clear that Aristotle privileged the contemplative life over the 
political life, where Book X of EN fundamentally conflicts with the preceding books which outline 
the necessary virtues required to be a good statesman or participant in the polis. If we understand 
eudaimonia in the composite sense, it changes the complexion of practical deliberation and certainly 
indicates a large divergence between Aristotle and contemporary economic models of instrumental 
rationality.
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Reeve’s comparison between Aristotle and modem accounts o f instrumental reason is 
misguided however. At the outset, comparing the underlying scientific views which inform 
both conceptions o f practical reasoning is a questionable interpretive move. Contemporary 
economic models o f rational choice aspire to a scientific status, distilled o f metaphysical 
content or ethical presuppositions. By contrast, Aristotle’s practical reason draws on 
notions o f human teleological functioning towards eudaimonia, and is therefore riddled 
with metaphysical assumptions and moral content that even sympathetic contemporary 
philosophers find problematic.34 Reeve does not suspend these metaphysical commitments 
until he discusses what, if  any, normative conclusions can be drawn from Aristotelian 
practical reason. At this point he himself discards the metaphysical framework o f 
Aristotelian practical deliberation so as to highlight its similarities to contemporary 
reductivist models o f rational choice
Why Reeve draws this conclusion is rather perplexing and perhaps not fully 
explicable, given his careful exegetical consideration o f the metaphysics behind Aristotle’s 
scientific commitments. However, D. J. Allan arrives at the same conclusion when he 
exposes an alleged rift between Aristotle’s discussion o f deliberation in Books III and VI in 
NE. I will not try to second-guess the reasons for Reeve’s eventual suspension o f 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, but will instead focus on Allan’s exegesis which leads him to 
interpret practical deliberation as limited primarily to the choice o f means. In the 
remainder o f the chapter I argue that the intervening books on the moral virtues help unite 
as a coherent whole the Book III and VI discussions o f practical deliberation -  ultimately 
this should help undermine Allan’s claim that Aristotle’s means-end deliberation is isolated 
to choice o f means rather than the evaluation of complex ends.
II. Is Deliberation Limited to the Means?
According to Allan, Aristotle’s first position in isN Book III maintains that practical 
deliberation is concerned merely with the choice o f means. Allan writes, “ [Aristotle] 
regards [deliberation] as a process whereby we discover means to attaining to an end, select 
one chain o f means in preference to another, and so forth; and since it is preceded by wish 
for the end it is followed by desire for the means.”35 Therefore, “all choice follows upon 
deliberation, and all that deliberation is concerned with the selection o f means”; one’s 
chosen means are moreover separated from the adopted end in a mechanical, causal
34 For example, Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue; A Study in Moral Theory 2nd ed. (London: 
Duckworth, 1985) pp. 196-9. See also Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy 
(London: Collins, 1985) chapter 2, who says Aristotle’s worldview makes his theory unavailable to 
us modems.
35 Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” pp. 328-9.
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procedure.36 Recognising the limitations o f this mechanical model o f means-end 
deliberation in Book III, Aristotle “subsequently widens his view o f the procedure of 
choice” meaning that “the connection between ‘choice’ and ‘deliberation’ [...] is loosened 
from the sixth book onwards”.37 This loosened connection leads to two emerging patterns 
o f action in Book VI and VII’s discussion o f the practical syllogism: 1) action that follows 
the means-end pattern explicated in Book III; and 2) action governed by a rule.38 The first 
can be considered a traditional consequentialist chain between means and ends; by contrast 
the latter acknowledges the intrinsic value o f actions (actions that are “for its own sake”).39 
(For my purposes in this chapter I focus on the first pattern o f action, and leave the latter 
for the next chapter). On Allan’s reading, in Books III and VI the accounts o f deliberative 
choice are discontinuous and inconsistent: in Book III choice that is confined to the means 
is upheld as the paradigmatic model o f practical action, whereas in Book VI this becomes 
only one o f two types o f procedures of deliberative choice. Allan says further, “the result is 
that Aristotle, in speaking o f choice, uses expressions which are at least verbally 
inconsistent with his first account o f its nature.”40 Book V i’s extended account o f rational 
choice nonetheless leaves intact Aristotle’s theory o f practical deliberation, which, at its 
heart, is limited to the intellectual determination o f means for a desired end.41
Contra Allan, I will show below that Aristotle’s Book III discussion already points to 
an account o f practical deliberation which departs from a causal pattern o f reasoning. But 
interpretations like Allan’s are partly understandable, given Aristotle’s explanatory 
treatment o f practical reasoning as an overall genus. Some interpreters complain that 
Aristotle fails to give an account o f moral reason separate from practical reason as a whole, 
and for this reason find more philosophically compelling Kant’s clear delineation between 
a more technical conception o f instrumental reason and the morality o f pure practical 
reason. Morality makes distinctive demands which, for Kant, preclude a simple means-end 
rational model. By contrast, Aristotle considers practical reasoning as a whole: practical 
deliberation towards the end o f eudaimonia and deliberation towards external or technical 
ends are all under the same explanatory scheme. In other words, different species of
36 Ibid., p. 338.
37 Ibid.
381 will deal with the practical syllogism more directly in the next chapter.
39 Ibid., pp. 338-40.
40 Ibid., p. 338.
41 To be fair, Allan does think the broader account of choice which does include intrinsically 
valuable means should be the authoritative definition (see ibid., pp. 339-40). My main interpretive 
quibble is that Allan reads a conflict between the Book III and Book VI accounts that leaves the door 
open for quite a restricted reading of Aristotelian practical deliberation. As this chapter will show, it 
is not clear to me that Aristotle’s definition in Book III is as Allan claims, nor that the Book VI/VII 
account of the practical syllogism indicates rule-governed behaviour.
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practical reason -  i.e. technical /  craft or moral reasoning -  are more generally classified 
under one broader genus by virtue o f their shared means-end deliberative pattern.42
Initially, Allan’s reading o f deliberation as restricted to means gains support from the 
type o f means-end action characteristic o f purposive animal movement. In De Anima 9 and 
10 Aristotle rejects a rationalist account o f movement, as he says, “neither can the 
calculative faculty or what is called thought be the cause o f such movement; for mind as 
speculative never thinks what is practicable, it never says anything about an object to be 
avoided or pursued, while this movement is always in something which is avoiding and 
pursuing an object” \DA 432b26-28].43 Theoretical knowledge can never be the original 
source o f movement; such a rationalist account would be unable to explain akratic or 
incontinent behaviour, where an individual acts according to their appetite, contrary to their 
knowledge o f the best good. Yet “appetite too is incompetent to account fully for 
movement” [433a7]. Converse to the rationalist account, an overly appetitive account of 
intentional movement is incapable o f explaining enkratic or continent behaviour, in which 
an individual acts in favour o f thought contrary to their appetites. In his own theory o f 
purposive action Aristotle therefore seeks to minimise the asymmetry between intellectual 
thought and appetite, while providing enough conceptual space to incorporate the 
phenomena o f akrasia and enkrasia. Both thought and desire must collaborate in order for 
purposive movement to occur. As he continues in De Anima:
Both o f these then are capable o f originating local movement, thought and appetite: 
thought, that is, which calculates means to an end, i.e. practical thought (it differs 
from speculative thought in the character o f its end); while appetite is in every form 
o f it relative to an end; for that which is the object o f appetite is the stimulant o f 
practical thought; and that which is last in the process o f thinking is the beginning o f 
action. [433al3-179]
Here Aristotle wants to make a further distinction between practical inference (practical 
thought) and theoretical, speculative thought. Practical thought is comprised o f particular 
specifications which translate into action [434al7-21]; it is the rational faculty that infers 
from means to an end, and is instigated by an object or end sought by the desiderative 
faculty. All general knowledge remains divorced from practical action without this 
intermediate inference provided by instrumental reason or practical nous.
42 John M. Cooper, Reason and Human Good in Aristotle (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986) p. 1.
43 All references to De Anima are translated by J. A. Smith in The Complete Works o f Aristotle Vol. 
1.
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So far then the De Anima account appears to be a relatively straightforward, 
instrumentalist picture o f purposive action: an object is desired, we reason and infer (or, in 
non-deliberative animals, perceive) the means to attain this object, and movement is 
initiated accordingly. Aristotle reinforces this thought in De M otu Animalium : “‘I have to 
drink,’ says appetite. ‘Here’s a drink,’ says sense-perception or phantasia or thought. At 
once he drinks” [701a32-3, hereafter abbreviated M A \44 Elsewhere in the context o f EN  
Book III Aristotle seems to evoke a strict division between the determination o f an end -  
which is the object o f wish -  and the determination o f means -  which is properly the 
domain o f choice and deliberation {proairesis) [also EE  1226a 17]. According to the moral 
psychology outlined in Books II and III, ends are formed by a wish for either true or 
apparent goods found to be pleasurable. Aristotle writes, “the object o f wish is the good, 
but for the individual it is what seems good to him; so for the man o f  good character it is 
the true good, but for the bad man it is any chance thing” [EN 1113a24-27].45 If pre- 
cognitive and pre-reflective desire determines our ends, practical reason seems to just 
consider the best means to achieve that desired aim through the provision o f salient 
technical information. Thus, the account of purposive action in De Motu and De Anima 
appears to support Allan’s main interpretive claim: that Aristotelian deliberative choice is 
restricted to the theoretical determination of the most expedient, best, and possible means 
towards an end.46 Like a simplified Humean conception o f  instrumental reason,47 personal 
interests, pleasures, or ends are not necessarily subject to any rational evaluation. Consider 
the Humean echoes when Allan writes that for Aristotle the process o f mean-end 
deliberation “is intellectual and is not a distinctive operation o f the practical reason.”48
Fortunately, this reading is an oversimplification o f Aristotle’s view. Comparisons 
between Aristotle and Hume are not altogether inaccurate: both philosophers minimise the 
motivational role o f theoretical reason, both insist upon the presence o f the desiderative 
faculty to generate purposive movement.49 In De Anima 9 and 10 and De Motu Animalium , 
Aristotle asks rather broadly, “where does animal movement originate” in order to uncover 
its necessary and sufficient psychological constituents. But in his ethical works Aristotle
44 All references to De Motu Animalium are translated by Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: UP, 
1978), hereafter abbreviated to MA.
45 All references to Nicomachean Ethics are translated by J. A. K. Thomson (London: Penguin, 
2004), hereafter abbreviated EN.
46 A similarity that has been noted by numerous commentators; for a relatively full account, see 
Terence Irwin, “Aristotle on Reason, Desire, and Virtue,” The Journal o f Philosophy 72:17 (1975): 
567-78, also his Aristotle’s First Principles, p. 333. In both Irwin mentions some important caveats 
to similarities we may be tempted to draw between Aristotle and Hume.
47 In Chapters 4 and 5 I argue that this view of Humean instrumental reason is also inaccurate.
48 Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” p. 328.
491 will show in my chapters on Hume that his scepticism of the motivational power of theoretical 
reason does not entail a similar scepticism of practical reason, as has frequently but mistakenly 
attributed to him.
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builds upon and supplements this account in order to do proper justice to the complex 
nature o f human rational agency; discussion o f human desire and perception fill in some 
important gaps which appear in the initial, more general explanation o f animal movement. 
Aristotle’s theory o f practical agency ought therefore to be understood in light o f how 
agents acquire their desires, what it means to be a rational, and by implication ethical, 
perceiver, which together leads to the assignment o f evaluative worth and desirability to 
specific goods. It is crucial to keep in mind that Aristotle’s own distinction between the 
rational and non-rational constituents o f means-end deliberation does not correspond neatly 
to the stricter modem delineation between the two.50 First o f all, Aristotle divides desire 
into three categories: epithumia (appetite), thumos (spirited impulse), and boulesis (rational 
wish). The first two are non-rational impulses while the latter, boulesis, is the term for an 
impulse reason itself generates; it is essentially “rational desire” that is “focussed on the 
final good” . As such “ [t]his appetitive part o f the soul is therefore rational in the fullest 
sense.51 Other non-rational dimensions o f the soul -  epithumia and thumos -  are also 
receptive to reason “in the sense that a child pays attention to its father” [EN 1103a4].52 
These constituents and their interplay, all embedded within human practical deliberation, 
introduce a level o f complexity which goes beyond a simple desire-belief model o f 
instrumental reason. Reason is not just an intermediary, informational faculty, subordinate 
to an impetuous appetitive or desiderative drive. For Aristotle, humans have desires that 
are properly rational {boulesis originating in reason), and even the emotional and perceptual 
assessments o f the non-rational part o f the soul are responsive to reasoned judgement.53
50 John Cooper, “Some Remarks on Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” The Southern Journal o f 
Philosophy 27 Supplement (1988): 29-33. Indeed, Aristotle inherits the Platonic assumption that 
reason is a motivating force. It is therefore highly anachronistic to read into Aristotle questions of 
motivational scepticism, which is a largely modem concern. Aristotle’s correction of the asymmetry 
between thought and desire in De Anima should not be understood, then, as ultimately doubting the 
motive power of reason. Indeed, it is also questionable that this dualism between cognitive and non- 
cognitive faculties applies as broadly in the modem era, as we will see in my discussion of Kant in 
Chapter 7.
51 Cooper, “Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” p. 30.
52 It is important to note, as Cooper rightly does (ibid., pp. 31-2) that even these irrational parts of 
the soul deploy what modems would consider rational concepts. That is why Aristotle thinks thumos 
can have thoughts about a situation that is ultimately misinformed. In cases that appetite is 
mistaken, they can be properly understood as pursuing only an ‘apparent’ good. The fact that 
appetite considers it a good implies the use of concepts, further that irrational appetite can be swayed 
by reason reveal that these concepts or value-terms are commensurable with the conceptual thought 
of reason for Aristotle, though they may not rational in the sense that boulesis is. Hence the 
importance to not anachronistically read into Aristotle our rigid modem distinction, in which case 
that the conative and cognitive are fundamentally different ‘languages’ which do not permit 
transmission between the two. See for instance the distinction between directions of fit between 
desire and reasons in Michael Smith, “The Humean Theory of Motivation,” Mind 96 (1987): 36-61 
(especially pp. 50-61).
53 The fact that Aristotle maintains a permanent sphere of irrational desires and appetites within the 
soul provides further support to the view that he acknowledges a vulnerable dimension to human 
practical action. There will be times the phronimos will act from those non-rational appetites that 
will be fully fitting to the circumstance, and Aristotle would claim that it would be praiseworthy
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The fact that the desire-belief model fails to capture the components o f Aristotelian 
practical action should already hint that his conception o f deliberation could not be limited 
strictly to the determination o f “means”. The contemporary English understanding of 
“means” evokes the necessary causal step towards an external end. However, to begin 
with, the conventional translation o f the Greek expression, “ f a r  pros ta tele”, as “means” 
tends to be an oversimplification. The original expression encompasses, not only the 
determination o f instrumental means, but also that which is “constitutive”, “contributes to”, 
“promotes”, or “has a positive bearing on” an end.54 Rendered as such, Aristotle’s 
language diverges from the more limited sense o f ‘means’ used in current philosophical 
terminology: practical deliberation o f Aristotelian ‘means’ implies working out what 
activities consist in and contributes to an end.55
This provides us with a clue as to how to interpret a difficult passage from isiVTII:
We deliberate not about ends but about means. A doctor does not deliberate whether 
to cure his patient, nor a speaker whether to persuade his audience, nor a statesman 
whether to produce law and order, nor does anyone else deliberate about the end at 
which he is aiming. They first set some end before themselves, and then proceed to 
consider how and by what means it can be attained. If it appears that it can be 
attained by several means, they further consider by which it can be attained best and 
most easily. [ 1112b 12-17]
Here Aristotle seems to confine practical deliberation to the means; yet this first sentence 
should be approached with some caution. Practical deliberation may not determine the 
ends o f the doctor, speaker, and statesman, for these ends can be described as overarching 
ends which are internal to their various functions (doctor-health, speaker-persuasion, 
statesman-law and order). Following Wiggins, the plural form o f “ends”, used in the first
since it exhibits the appropriate emotional sensitivity to that situation. If the phronimos experiences 
excessive grief it may be the case that he cannot be called eudaimon but not morally vicious. See 
also the criticisms in Magna Moralia of the Socratic elimination of an irrational sphere of the soul, 
which results in “doing away also both with passion and character” [1182b 15-23], See further 
Cooper, “Aristotle’s Moral Psychology,” p. 36. Nussbaum has a very good analysis of this in The 
Fragility o f Goodness, pp. 318-72 but tends to overemphasise the role of luck and contingency 
which weakens her overall interpretation.
54 Cooper, Reason and Human Good, p. 19ff, Anthony J. Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory o f the Will 
(London: Duckworth, 1979) p. 149; W. F. R. Hardie, Aristotle’s Ethical Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1968) p. 256; see also Irwin, “Aristotle on Reason,” pp. 570 n. 4 on the ambiguity of the Greek 
phrase.
Wiggins, “Deliberation,” pp. 221-40; also see Nussbaum, The Fragility o f Goodness, pp. 290-317. 
I believe Nussbaum overstates the vulnerability inherent in practical deliberation to passional, 
emotional disruptions in favour of a larger thesis of value plurality or “saving the appearances” 
[phainomena]. For this more metaphysically committed reading of Aristotle’s realism and ergon 
argument, see Reeve, Practices o f Reason and Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles', also Charles, 
“Aristotle and Modem Realism,” pp. 135-72.
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sentence o f 1112b 12, can be understood distributively, and is meant to contain the 
subsequent examples cited by Aristotle. Thus, the singular form o f “end” can be taken as 
the authoritative usage.56 In this passage, Aristotle’s examples are o f “internal” ends -  ends 
that are already fixed by a particular state or condition. If this is right, it makes sense that 
Aristotle says we do not deliberate about our ends, given these specific examples. The 
person who is already a doctor doesn’t need to deliberate about the overarching end o f 
health: it is an end fitting to his function qua doctor; this telos is presupposed and inscribed 
in the very definitional form o f “doctor”. Practical deliberation is restricted to determining 
the means towards eudaimonia in a similar way: like the doctor qua doctor presupposes the 
end o f health, humans qua human presuppose an end suitable to that function, which is 
eudaimonia, the end “we always choose it for itself and never for any other reason” 
[1097bl]. As Section I established, the substantive essence o f our species predetermines 
our functional overarching telos, which schematically structures the basic activities of 
anthropomorphic life. Aristotle distinguishes non-deliberated external ends from naturally 
given ends which are internal to our function but are nonetheless too broad or vague to be a 
realistically practicable end. Eudaimonia would be a prime example o f  the latter.
Moreover, the fact that eudaimonia is a naturally predetermined end for humans does 
not automatically preclude practical deliberation about what constitutes that global end. In 
Book III, Aristotle likens this deliberative process to the geometer who is also involved in 
some pre-requisite search or investigation prior to making any viable practical applications 
[1112b22].57 The geometry example here is apt. The form o f a triangle is universally valid 
-  its constituents, however, can be broken down and, with different specifications, will 
yield a distinctive kind o f triangle. The geometer dissects the three sides and may alter 
their length accordingly to fit the particular situation (or, in the case o f  an architect 
constructing a house, will employ different kinds o f triangles).58 The appropriate 
specification o f a triangle’s constituents allows its universal form to accommodate the 
requirements o f each unique circumstance. Thus, that particular construction which is 
apposite to the situation becomes a “universal particular” o f a triangle: it still preserves its 
universal form (three sides) despite the adjustment o f its components.
56 Wiggins, “Deliberation,” p. 226.
57 Here I differ from Wiggins, (ibid., p. 28) who argues that Aristotle’s example of the geometer 
tends to “go lame”, particularly considering that we may be required to specify our practicable end 
numerous times prior to initiating the means-end connection. However, I believe that the example of 
geometry may admirably incorporate this aspect.
58 Or another way the geometry example could be construed is that the geometer searches among his 
knowledge of universal shapes and his deliberation concludes when he recognises through his 
perception that a triangle is the correct shape to use in a specific situation. This would follow 
Cooper’s claim that the particular premise of the practical syllogism needn’t refer to individuals or 
personal pronouns, but to particular types, see Reason and Human Good, pp. 34-46. I will have 
more to say on this point in the next chapter on the practical syllogism.
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Similarly, a human being must discover the “universal particulars)” that are 
constitutive o f their telos. Just as a triangle can be specified in different ways depending on 
the circumstance, it is up to our practical deliberation to determine what comprises o f an 
end and how this end can be actualised in the situational particular. But the predetermined 
end o f eudaimonia never changes its substantial form, though its specification may be 
apposite to a potentially unrepeatable circumstance. “For the man deliberating deliberates 
if  he has considered, from the point o f view o f the end,” Aristotle writes in EE, “what 
conduces to bringing the end within his own action, or he at present what can do towards 
the object” [1227a20, emphasis added]. “Conduce” -  the operative word here -  suggests 
deliberation not only about the possible means by which we can realise an end through 
action, but also about that which contributes to, or counts as partial components of that 
overarching end. This is more fully supported when Aristotle continues, “But the object or 
end is always something good by nature, and men deliberate about its partial constituents” 
[1227a22]. He cites the example o f whether the doctor ought to give a drug to a patient.59 
Taken in conjunction with Book III o f NE, we can say that the doctor qua doctor aims for 
health. On one level, to give a drug would be a proper means to that global end. Yet on 
another level -  depending on who the specific patient is -  that drug may in fact be a 
constituent o f his overall health; in Wiggins’ words, it is what would qualify as “an 
adequate and practically realizable specification” o f the end o f health.60 Suppose the doctor 
is attending to a patient who has a debilitating case o f asthma -  this condition prevents the 
patient from participating in normal activities that comprise a healthy life (i.e., exercise). 
The doctor who administers or prescribes a suitable drug would then be a contributory 
factor or partial constituent to a healthy life, not simply a “means” in the limited sense o f 
the word. Giving the drug actually comprises part o f the end o f the patient’s health. On 
this reading then, the doctor not only deliberates about the means, answering practical 
questions more directly related to the intermediate causal steps to a practical end (such as 
“what is the best drug to give to this patient” and “how often does he need to take it”). But 
more importantly, he will deliberate about how this end o f drug-taking will contribute to 
the overarching good of health for the asthmatic patient. This thought is confirmed in the 
Metaphysics when Aristotle says the starting point o f health or healing is “the production o f 
warmth, and this the physician produces by rubbing. Warmth in the body is either a part o f  
health or is followed (either directly or through several intermediate steps) by something 
which is a part o f  health; and this, viz. that which produces the part, is the last step, and so
59 Aristotle draws important analogies between the technical knowledge of medicine and practical 
wisdom of ethics. For more on this, see Wemer Jaegar, “Aristotle’s Use of Medicine as a Model of 
Method in His Ethics,” The Journal o f Hellenic Studies 77:1 (1957): 54-61, also G. E. R. Lloyd, 
“The Role of Medical and Biological Analogies in Aristotle’s Ethics,” Phronesis 13 (1968): 68-83.
60 Wiggins, “Deliberation,” p. 228.
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are, e.g., the stones a part o f the house, and so in all other cases” [1032b25-29, emphases 
added]. In this case, the physician deliberates about the constituents o f health; warmth in 
the body is subsequently determined as a partial component which contributes to that 
overall end. Only after that is specified (warmth is part o f health) can a more 
straightforward causal means-end relationship be initiated (the end o f warmth can be 
produced through the means o f rubbing the patient; the doctor will rub the patient).
One may counter my reading and say that the analogy between the doctor’s technical 
skill and prudence {phronesis) is unsustainable. The practical skill o f  the doctor falls under 
technical or craft-knowledge and is therefore clearly distinct from the practical deliberation 
o f the phronimos [EN 1112bl-8]. This objection needs to be considered: if this analogy 
between the two is inapplicable, the argument that Aristotelian deliberation should be 
understood as strictly limited to determining the means to an external end that is pre-given 
by a desiderative state external to our reason becomes all the more plausible. The objection 
considered here hinges on the distinct status o f technical and prudential ends. “For 
production aims at an end other than itself,” writes Aristotle, “but this is impossible in the 
case o f action, because the end is merely doing w e ir  [1140b4-5], Production is therefore 
subordinate to the kind of practical deliberation directed towards eudaimonia, mainly 
because, in the case of the former, the end is external and finite: “production is different 
from action [...] so that the reasoned state that is capable o f action is also different from 
that which is capable o f production” [1140al, 4-5]. Unlike those who are technically 
competent, the prudent have “calculated successfully with a view to some serious end 
(outside the sphere o f art)” [1140a32]. In technical skill, deliberation is about achieving an 
end or product that is external to its actual making or production, and the action concludes 
once that object comes into being.61 We do not deliberate about an end product such as a 
table, but do employ technical skill to produce that object. Moreover, without that end the 
means has no significance; it is for the sake o f that table we act and deliberate about the 
best technical means to employ. Thus, our actions are conditional upon the end craft or 
product, and conclude once this object comes into being. For “every art is concerned with 
bringing something into being, and the practice o f an art is the study o f how to bring into 
being something that is capable either of being or o f not being, and the cause o f which is in 
the producer and not in the product” [1140all-14]. The means-end causal chain is 
typically more clear-cut in this kind of technical deliberation, and is therefore different 
from the evaluative and procedural intricacies characteristic o f phronesis.
It is important to clarify the distinction between technical deliberation and phronesis, 
mainly because one could potentially argue if technical reasoning is the paradigmatic
61 See Reeve, Practices o f Reason, pp. 74-5.
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model o f practical rationality, then the claim that it must include the deliberation and 
evaluation o f complex ends is undermined. All that can feasibly be expected from an. 
account o f means-end deliberation is the discernment o f appropriate causal means towards 
an external end; the only value of one’s means is their causal efficacy to an end product. In 
The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt eloquently articulates the repercussions arising from 
the modem propensity to conceive o f instrumental reason strictly in this technical sense:
Man, in so far as he is homo faber , instrumentalizes, and his instrumentalization 
implies a degradation o f all things into means, their loss o f intrinsic and independent 
value. [...] The issue at stake is, o f course, not instrumentality, the use o f means to 
achieve an end, as such, but rather the generalization o f the fabrication experience in 
which usefulness and utility are established as the ultimate standards for life and the 
world o f men.62
Here, Arendt describes the potent combination o f practical reason understood in a purely 
technical sense, and the resultant devaluation o f our surroundings. If  the analogy between 
the technical skill o f the doctor and the practical deliberation o f the phronimos does not 
hold, rather worryingly Aristotle would then appear to accommodate these deeply 
problematic implications that emerge out o f the standard model.
Though there is some textual justification for the above objection, the distinction 
between the kind o f deliberation involved in craft-knowledge and ethics is nonetheless not 
as straightforward as implied, given Aristotle’s treatment o f practical deliberation as an 
overall genus.63 Moreover, adherence to that division tackles insufficiently the difference 
between ends achieved independently o f the means and those ends achieved simultaneously 
to the means. The former evokes the evaluative separation between means and ends in 
modem conceptions o f instrumental deliberation; in the latter, however, the realization of 
an end is inseparable from the action or means itself. Importantly, to classify these two 
forms o f deliberation into separate categories does not necessarily correspond to Aristotle’s 
division between technical reasoning and phronesis. To return to the earlier examples, if 
the doctor stopped prescribing or administering the necessary drug, the condition o f the
62 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Garden City: Doubleday, 1958) p. 137.
63 Aristotle’s conception of techne is conventionally understood as a two-way power -  meaning that 
the exercise of technical skill can used for contrary ends (the actual good or what only appears as 
good, and is consequently bad). On this understanding techne is purely instrumental in function and 
can be used for ends contrary to the actual good; however, as J. E. Tiles identifies in light of the 
Platonic context, “‘Techne’ and Moral Expertise,” Philosophy 59 (1984): 49-66, there is a level of 
ambiguity as to whether Aristotle consistently maintains techne as a two-way power. Tiles at p. 54, 
n.14 mentions that in EN Book VI. 4, Aristotle classifies techne under the genus hexis, and hexis is 
considered a one-way power in Metaphysics. This would imply techne is primarily employed for an 
end that is actually, not apparently, good.
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asthmatic patient would deteriorate, or if the doctor stopped rubbing to produce warmth, 
health would not be achieved. In both these cases, the means or activity o f the doctor is 
conjoined to the end o f health. Here the doctor’s craft knowledge and its associated 
activity do not cease once the end is obtained; both are constitutive o f the end. The way to 
get around the above objection is to realise that, for Aristotle, the more relevant distinction 
is not between technical and moral ends with different forms o f practical reasoning 
respectively, but between productive ends and ends that are comprised o f  activity.64 The 
former are para  ends -  or those ends that conclude with a product that is external to its 
actual production -  and the latter alio ends -  or those ends that are “other than, but not over 
and above, the doings whose ends they are”.65 A para  end would be the production o f a 
chair. All actions terminate once the chair comes into existence; the means are causally 
related to an external end and have a specific instrumental value. According to this 
definition, then, the physician’s craft is not towards a para  end, despite its classification as 
a techne. The example o f the doctor’s actions o f warming or prescribing a drug indicate 
that the means-end deliberation required here is towards an alio end, where it seeks to 
specify the constituents and activities that comprise its overall end. As a result o f this 
deliberation, the doctor realises the end o f health is often a concurrent state to the actions or 
means employed; the means therefore possess an intrinsic and not merely instrumental 
value. Health lasts only so long as the patient is actively warmed or getting administered 
the necessary drug.
Thus, Aristotle’s example o f the doctor provides a helpful analogy between the 
practical deliberation of technical skill and ethical action. In particular, this analogy 
undercuts the troubling contemporary assumption that deliberation towards technical ends 
is, and must remain, evaluatively neutral, where all means contain only instrumental rather 
than intrinsic value. The metaphysical and ethical neutrality o f practical reason, aspired to 
by today’s reductive naturalists, diverges in significant respects from the Aristotelian 
vision. For Aristotle, important subtleties exist even in technical deliberation, as 
demonstrated in the technical skills o f the doctor. And common to the doctor’s techne and 
phronesis is an intrinsic reliance upon the proper investigation o f complex ends. This 
deliberative process -  where we probe and specify the proper constituents of what may be a 
vague meta-end -  is what allows instrumental reason to even get off the ground in the first 
place.66
If  this is true even o f some forms o f technical knowledge like medicine, it is highly 
likely it obtains in our prudential deliberation which is aimed towards eudaimonia, “the
641 am indebted to Reeve’s discussion, Practices o f Reason, pp. 103-5.
65 Ibid., pp. 104-5.
66 Wiggins, “Deliberation,” p. 228.
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first principles, since everything else that any o f us do, we do for its sake; and we hold that 
the first principle and cause o f what is good is precious and divine” [1102a3-4].67 
Elsewhere in Posterior Analytics [hereafter APo], Aristotle states that, by nature universal 
first principles remain more remote from the contingent, enmattered realm of humans.68 If 
eudaimonia is by nature the final end all humans seek, and yet as a first principle is 
characterised by a large degree o f imprecision, it follows that practical deliberation in the 
ethical domain {phronesis) would necessarily include further reflection on the constituents 
o f eudaimonia. According to the metaphysical teleology outlined in Section I, the 
potentiality to achieve eudaimonia involves the intermittent participation with the divine 
through first philosophy. But recall also our contemplative intellect is restricted by 
anthropomorphic limits which prevent the unceasing philosophic theoretical activity o f the 
gods: these limitations alone indicate that contemplation is not the only activity which 
comprises and defines eudaimonia. We can be god-like, but we cannot be gods. Our 
potentiality rests in the rational soul -  but the soul contains the potential for both episteme 
and phronesis, and humans alone have the unique capacity for moral, noble action which 
deploys the latter intellectual virtue. The constraints on our philosophical contemplation, 
coupled with the distinctively human potential for practical, moral action in a political 
context, imply that ethical, practical constituents o f eudaimonia need to be more precisely 
specified and evaluated. It is insufficient, for Aristotle, to say, since happiness is our first 
principle and final end, phronesis simply needs to specify the means. The remoteness o f 
this principle means that without first exploring its best specification we cannot even 
formulate means. And it is part o f Aristotelian means-end reasoning to actively respond to 
our multiple searches: the means-end relationship may collapse from a deficiency in 
practical awareness or deliberation o f those constitutive ends. As a result, instrumental 
rationality requires a large degree of responsiveness to those potential pitfalls which 
emerge from prior investigations o f our overarching telos. The exploration o f our global 
end we may not always get right, and this will dictate the effectiveness o f our means-end 
deliberation more generally. There is no reason to believe this kind o f deliberation of 
complex ends and o f their constituents is somehow less necessary or elemental than the 
means-end paradigm; indeed, it may simply be the case, as I take Aristotle to be saying that 
the latter in fact requires and encompasses the former kind o f deliberation.69
61 EN 1095al5ff., 1097a25-1097b21.
68 Posterior Analytics 71b29-72a6, especially 3-6.
69 See EE 1226b 10-30.
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III. The Inclusion o f  Moral Virtue in Mecms-End Deliberation
The previous section established that means-end deliberation often requires the 
specification and assessment o f constituent ends, and therefore cannot be restricted 
exclusively to means. The analogy between the technical reasoning o f the doctor and 
phronesis helped illuminate how working out the means to one’s end presupposes this kind 
o f concurrent appraisal o f constituent ends. The substance o f this theory will be filled in 
below. More specifically, this section argues that Aristotle would be deeply critical of the 
moral neutrality sought by scientific models o f rational choice. For Aristotle the 
deliberation o f the practically wise reflects an excellent moral disposition and displays 
moral virtue. A flawed conception o f means-end reasoning divorces moral content from 
our appraisal o f an individual’s practical deliberation -  both o f their ends and chosen 
means. Indeed, the cumulative discussion o f deliberation in Book VI intimates that the 
means-end deliberative process will often result in the recognition of intrinsically valuable 
goods, like the moral virtues. Thus, this section claims that praiseworthy means-end 
reasoning is heavily bound up with the development o f a moral disposition. For practical 
reasoning to be admirable, both means and ends should be imbued with moral value.
That Aristotle assigns a broader, more evaluative function to practical deliberation 
gains further support in £7VBook VI:
[I]t is thought to be the mark o f a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about 
what is good and advantageous for himself; not in particular respects, e.g. what is 
good for health or physical strength, but what is conducive to the good life generally. 
A sign o f this is the fact that we call people prudent in particular respects when they 
have calculated successfully with a view to some serious end (outside the sphere of 
art); so that in general also the man who is capable o f deliberation will be prudent. 
[1140a26-33, emphasis added]
Initially, remarks like this in Book VI seem to represent a number o f changes from the 
Book III account o f choice and means-end deliberation. On Allan’s view Aristotle 
eventually recognises, by Book VI, how some choice o f means can have intrinsic value. 
Book VI therefore extends Aristotle’s account o f deliberative choice beyond the limited 
consequentialist scheme characteristic of the discussion in Book III. We need to make 
sense o f the alleged disparity between the accounts o f deliberative choice in Books III and 
VI in order to support my criticisms against Allan’s reading. In Book III Aristotle gives a 
succinct overview of choice, defining it as the deliberation o f means to actualise our wish 
(iboulesis) [1113al4]. But in the same sentence Aristotle also says this is merely an
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“outline account”, implying that these are preliminary remarks which will be expanded 
upon later. Book III is followed by a more detailed discussion o f the moral virtues and 
their mean states. Then in Book VI Aristotle’s definition o f choice incorporates 
accordingly the preceding books on moral virtue and the development o f good character, as 
he states:
Pursuit and avoidance in the sphere o f appetition correspond exactly to affirmation 
and negation in the sphere o f intellect; so that, since moral virtue is a state 
involving choice, and choice is deliberate appetition, it follows that if  the choice is 
to be a good one, both the reasoning must be true and the desire right; and the 
desire must pursue the same things that the reasoning asserts. [1139a22-26]
Aristotle continues: “Now the origin o f action (the efficient, not the final cause) is choice, 
and the origin o f choice is appetition and purposive reasoning. Hence choice necessarily 
involves not only intellect and thought, but a certain moral state; for good conduct and its 
contrary necessarily involve thought and character” [1139a32-35, emphasis added]. 
Whereas Book III simply defines choice as the ability to actualise our wish (and carry out 
the means to our end), Book VI involves a much fuller account, incorporating our character 
and moral states. If  one rejects Allan’s interpretation, how is one to explain the alleged 
discrepancy between these two accounts?
First o f all, I certainly agree with Allan that Aristotle recognises that means are often 
chosen, not just for their causal efficiency, but also for their intrinsic value. But contra 
Allan, rather than introduce a wider or altogether different conception o f deliberative 
choice, Book VI represents a deeper account o f an already established definition. Here it is 
helpful to consider how the intervening books between III and VI explicate the moral 
virtues. The moral virtues are paradigmatic examples o f deliberatively chosen means 
because o f their intrinsic value independent of an end; yet they simultaneously constitute 
the final good o f eudaimonia. Even if  we were to assume Allan was right -  that Book III 
discusses means-end deliberation in a highly limited sense -  it seems he would still need to 
answer how the acquisition and display o f moral virtues fit substantively in that scheme. 
The benefit o f how I have interpreted the Book III account o f means-end reasoning is its 
resultant coherence with Aristotle’s discussion o f moral virtue: both in Book III and VI, 
practical deliberation accounts for how the moral virtues function as both means towards, 
as well as intrinsically valuable, constituent goods o f eudaimonia.
In the books preceding E N V I, Aristotle reveals how the training and guidance o f the 
desiderative part o f the soul is temporally prior to the acquisition o f the intellectual virtues,
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(such as the deliberative virtues that result in choice or decision).70 An appetitive 
dimension, associated with pleasure and pain experience, is fundamental to all purposive 
animal (and therefore human) movement. For example, in De Motu desire is called the 
“first mover” [MA 700b35]71 which initiates meaningful action towards an object. As a 
result, in its barebones all animal behaviour can be classified under a means-end structure. 
Animals apprehend an object o f pleasure -  a real or apparent good -  and follow through 
with the appropriate action. Animal perception is responsive to the constraints imposed by 
the world, and ensures the possibility o f achieving an object o f desire -  such perception is 
necessary for desire to be motivating.72 Images formed from sense-perception inform the 
soul whether an object should be pursued or avoided accordingly, and whether it is possible 
to act in accordance with appetite. An object need not be within our immediate purview 
but can be simply the product o f phantasia (imagination) as a result o f previous perceptual 
experience [DA 43 lal-19]. For Aristotle, phantasia in some instances is closely related to 
the perceptual faculty and at other times is likened to thought. It is “sometimes by means 
o f the images or thoughts which are within the soul,” writes Aristotle, “just as if  it were 
seeing, it calculates and deliberates what is to come by reference to what is present; and 
when it makes a pronouncement, as in the case o f sensation it pronounces the object to be 
pleasant or painful, in the case it avoids or pursues; and so generally in the cases o f action” 
[431b6-9].
Similarly, the acquisition of moral virtue stems from a similar hedonistic foundation. 
Drawing upon Aristotle’s psychological generalisations about animal movement, moral 
habituation through praise and blame corresponds to pleasure and pain respectively.73 The 
animalistic emotional, perceptual, and appetitive motivational tools at our disposal are 
receptive to moral habituation and form the basis o f a settled dispositional character. But 
unlike animals, humans further possess deliberative phantasia -  or the capacity to unite 
separate images and calculate in light o f that unity [433b6-ll]. Habituation refines this 
aspect o f  deliberative phantasia, so we learn to pursue and desire the right things, and 
calculate according to that evaluation. Crucially, the preceding adjective to human 
phantasia -  we are rational perceivers possessing deliberative phantasia -  illustrates how,
70 Hence why children, the mentally ill, or animals do not deliberate or choose, see EN 111 lb8-10.
711 set aside the debate about whether Aristotle has a goods-based or desires-based view of the first 
mover. See Irwin, Aristotle’s First Principles, p. 332 for a desire-based view and Henry S. 
Richardson’s criticisms and a goods-based view, “Desire and the Good in De Anima,” in Martha C. 
Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, eds., Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992) pp. 
381-99.
72 See Nussbaum, The Fragility o f Goodness, p. 277.
73 Aristotle also says we all possess a natural potential to receive the virtues but their full 
development is achieved only through habituation. See NE 1103a24-28.
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for Aristotle, habituation is also an “intellectual process, not a merely mechanical one.”74 
In honing the natural psychological, appetitive responses needed to interpret accurately a 
situational particular, an individual is in fact gaining the kind o f practical insight and 
knowledge that is crucial to the good practical reasoner o f noble disposition.75
Thus, the intervening books between E N  III and VI hint that, for means-end 
deliberation to be praiseworthy, the acquisition o f moral virtues is required. The 
phronimos synthesises all o f the rational and desiderative dimensions which comprise of 
means-end deliberation: he is well-habituated -  his proper interpretive phantasia and 
emotions form the basis o f a good dispositional character. Consequently, he will act nobly 
whether he acts from these features or from reason. Aristotle’s account o f means-end 
reason encompasses this fundamental insight: the quality o f one’s settled character -  
whether or not one has acquired the virtues -  will dictate the quality o f one’s practical 
deliberation. If  the ends are determined by one’s habituated wishes or desires, the ability to 
practically reason from a telos which is truly good (as opposed to a merely apparent one) 
will differentiate the deliberation o f the phronimos from the merely clever, incontinent, or 
continent person. Without good habituation and all its implied abilities -  such as the right 
interpretive lens and the gradual accumulation o f morally salient practical knowledge -  we 
would lack the deliberative skills needed to arbitrate between the conflicting appetites 
which are ubiquitous to us, as agents with a sense o f time [DA 433b5-13].76 And it is the 
acquisition o f the moral virtues through the training o f our psychological, appetitive animal 
features that, even in the pre-reflective stage o f our lives, we can ensure our end or aim is 
an evaluatively worthy one [EN 1103 a 14-26].77
Chronologically, it therefore makes sense that Aristotle’s account o f choice and 
means-end deliberation becomes more complex in Book VI, mainly to incorporate his 
discussion o f the moral virtues. Although the virtues are still technically “means” towards 
a eudaimdn life, they are also intrinsically valuable activities or alio ends which are done
74 Reeve, Practices o f Reason, p. 71. As Reeve points out, it is part of the inductive process of 
ethical knowledge towards first principles.
75 EN 1103al4-18.
76 The incontinent man also cannot arbitrate between reason and appetite. I will discuss this 
temporal dimension to human desiring and its relation to human function in more detail in the next 
chapter.
77 Magna Moralia 1185b36: “it is not possible to achieve excellence or vice without pain and 
pleasure. Excellence then has to do with pleasures and pains.” (Translated by St. G. Stock in The 
Complete Works o f Aristotle, vol. 2.) Although the authenticity of Magna Moralia is still questioned 
by some scholars, (D. J. Allan, ilMagna Moralia and Nicomachean Ethics,” Journal o f Hellenic 
Studies 77 (1957): 7-11; C. J. Rowe, A Reply to John Cooper on the Magna Moralia,” American 
Journal o f Philology 96 (1975): 160-72) I use the work assuming that it is a genuine work by 
Aristotle, although the main thrust of my argument does not rely on the work but simply bolsters my 
main interpretive claims in this chapter. For those who argue for the authenticity of this work, see J. 
M. Cooper, “The Magna Moralia and Aristotle’s Moral Philosophy,” American Journal o f Philology 
94 (1973): 327-49.
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for their own sake. “The full performance o f man’s function depends upon a combination 
o f prudence and moral virtue,” writes Aristotle, “virtue ensures the correctness o f the end at 
which we aim, and prudence that o f the means towards it” [EN 1144a6-8], He continues 
that the good man executes action in a specific state o f mind, whereby his fine and just acts 
are done from choice and “for the sake o f the acts themselves” [1144a20]. So when we 
engage in morally virtuous action, we actualise the means towards eudaimonia, in the sense 
that doing them constitutes and contributes to the good life. At the same time, these virtues 
are goods in themselves. Understood this way, Books III and VI should be taken as a 
unitary and cumulative discussion o f practical deliberation. As has been shown above, 
Aristotle’s statements in Book III do not, by themselves, preclude the deliberation o f ends; 
nor do they imply a simple causal means-end chain. Wiggins therefore argues correctly 
that Book VI signifies a broader discussion rather than an altogether new definition of 
practical deliberation. In Book VI, Aristotle asserts in more positive terms how the 
deliberative engagement o f phronesis results in the articulation o f intrinsically valuable 
goods -  like the moral virtues. These goods are “means” in the sense that they are 
substantive constituents o f the final end of eudaimonia. Initially, they are goods that we 
come to some pre-cognitive, hazy awareness through praise and blame. Greater intellectual 
precision is acquired only through deeper rational engagement (via phronesis) at a more 
mature stage in our lives; at that point our rational articulation o f goods improves. We are 
consequently in a better position to appreciate how such goods we should choose fo r  their 
own sake; we acquire a sound awareness o f how these fit in the temporal structure o f a 
flourishing human life. “For choice is not simply picking but picking one thing before 
another;” Aristotle writes in EE, “and this is impossible without consideration and 
deliberation; therefore choice arises out of deliberate opinion” [1226b7-9, emphasis added].
Aristotle’s distinction between the person who is merely clever as opposed to 
practically wise provides further evidence that prudential deliberation encompasses the 
correct evaluation o f an end. In Book VI, he describes cleverness as the faculty “capable of 
carrying out the actions conducive to our proposed aim, and o f achieving that aim” [EN 
1143a25-6]. But this clever ability -  to follow through with actions appropriate to our end, 
to instantiate a causally effective instrumental connection in action similar to what is 
required by the standard model -  is not in itself praiseworthy. Anyone can execute means 
fitting to one’s end; it is not a characteristic exclusive to the morally virtuous. Indeed, even 
individuals with vicious characters can be called clever, “which is why we call both prudent 
and unscrupulous people clever” [1144a29]. But one is prudent -  as opposed to merely 
clever -  when the chosen ends are morally praiseworthy. To be judged prudent or 
practically wise depends entirely on the value or nobility o f the agent’s aim. Instrumental 
cleverness the prudent person will necessarily have, but she will utilise it for the
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achievement o f praiseworthy ends, worthy o f a morally virtuous character. Aristotle is 
emphatic that we “cannot attain to this state [of prudence] without virtue” [1144a31]. He 
goes on further to say:
For practical syllogisms always have as their starting-point ‘Since the end or supreme 
good is such-and-such (whatever it may be; for the sake o f the argument it can be 
anything). Now only a good man can discern this, because wickedness distorts the 
vision and causes serious error about the principles o f conduct. Thus it is evident that 
one cannot be prudent without being good. [ 1144a32-1144b 1 ]
Yet, even if  the correct aim is achieved, the chosen means must also be praiseworthy in 
order to be judged a good deliberator (euboulia). Aristotle writes again:
But the outcome of successful deliberation is generally assumed to be something 
good; because the sort o f correctness in deliberation that constitutes resourcefulness 
is that which tends to secure something good. But it is possible to achieve even 
this by false inference: that is, to achieve the right end, but not by the right means, 
the middle term being false. So this sort o f correctness, through which we attain to 
the right end, but not by the right means, still does not constitute resourcefulness. 
[1142b21-26]
The kind o f resourcefulness or good deliberation implied in phronesis requires that our 
conclusive choice demonstrates goodness o f both aim as well as means. This implies a 
reciprocal relationship between the determination o f valuable ends and the deployment o f 
appropriate and praiseworthy instrumental means. Deliberative excellence {euboulia) 
entails both instrumental cleverness as well as a consistently virtuous character: the latter 
makes both the end and means morally praiseworthy while the former ensures that, given 
the opportunity, the right consequences are achieved. More specifically, the means will be 
praiseworthy due to the acquisition of the intellectual virtue o f phronesis. As an 
intellectual virtue, phronesis involves a rational, cognitive recognition o f the intrinsic value 
o f admirable means like the virtues; it represents not simply an automatic procedure, but a 
conceptual acknowledgement and understanding o f how certain goods possess a broader 
significance in light o f eudaimonia. The person o f vicious character may deliberate 
correctly and efficiently in a logical causal structure, he may still produce the right 
consequence even with the false inference or wrong intentions. But on Aristotle’s view,
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this person certainly does not practically reason or deliberate well.™ They do not rationally 
appreciate how some means -  such as courageous, temperate, magnanimous, just acts -  
possess value in and o f themselves, and as a result, the intellectual virtue o f phronesis is 
absent.
Conclusion
Above I have claimed that the Book III and VI accounts o f deliberation are consistent 
with one another; thus, Allan’s understanding o f choice as restricted to the means is 
unfounded. On the interpretation given here, instrumental reason in Aristotle involves 
substantive moral evaluation and specification o f complex, global ends. The paradigmatic 
example o f this is the global, species-wide end o f eudaimonia. As I have suggested above, 
to determine the means to an end involves strong evaluation and articulation o f goods, as 
well as a general discrimination o f how these different pieces or goods fit in the envisaged 
contours o f one’s life. Desired ends will be evaluated according to our human function. 
Aristotle therefore challenges two claims which are characteristic o f currently standard 
models o f instrumental rationality: namely the evaluative detachment between means and 
ends, and the repudiation o f ethical or metaphysical frameworks. Clearly Aristotelian 
means-end reasoning cannot be assimilated to or aligned with such modem conceptions of 
rational choice and instrumental reasoning. This will help situate my discussion o f the 
practical syllogism in the next chapter, where I argue Aristotle resists the modem 
propensity to reduce human purposive behaviour to the level o f scientific prediction or 
deduction. The flexibility towards the perceived circumstance required o f phronesis is 
uncodifiable and lacks scientific certitude; in fact, such standards are unattainable in 
practical matters. Both this and the next chapter aim to provide an intermediate reading 
between those commentators who enrich means-end reasoning with the deliberation of 
constituent ends in order to ascribe to Aristotle a thesis o f value incommensurability, and 
those who claim Aristotle’s means-end deliberation follows one single, reductive metric, 
where the perplexities o f practical life are rendered into scientifically codifiable rules. Both 
o f these readings I argue against in the next chapter. Ultimately the normative options are 
not exhausted by these two extreme conclusions.
78 See Ronald D. Milo, Aristotle on Practical Knowledge and Weakness o f Will (The Hague: Mouton 
& Co., 1966) p. 31.
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3 Aristotle’s Practical Syllogism
The reading in the previous chapter established how the objectivist framework o f 
Aristotle’s teleological naturalism, combined with the function o f  phronesis as engaging in 
the evaluation and articulation o f ends helps Aristotle evade the subjectivist and reductivist 
tendencies o f the standard model o f instrumental reason. But in Books VI and VII, 
Aristotle’s supposed formulation o f practical deliberation in a syllogistic structure calls this 
interpretation into question. For many commentators it is ambiguous whether Aristotle 
means to draw analogies or disanalogies between the practical syllogism and 
demonstrative, theoretical science.1 Initially Aristotle’s syllogistic project appears 
amenable to a kind of explanatory reductivism which is conducive to predicting human 
action. If  means-end reasoning only requires formal structural consistency akin to 
theoretical demonstration, the separation between practical deliberation and theoretical 
reason would be minimised and moral, qualitative distinctions should have no necessary 
bearing on practical deliberation. On this possible reading, Aristotle’s practical syllogism 
imposes an almost deterministic, rule-like pattern to practical deliberation, hence leading 
some to draw an inaccurate parallel with scientific deduction. Implicit in this view is the 
belief that in order for practical instrumental reasoning to qualify as rationality proper, it 
should aspire to resemble or at least be continuous with its more privileged theoretical 
scientific relative.2 The answer to the interpretive questions surrounding Aristotle’s 
syllogistic project will have implications for the extent to which his account of instrumental 
reason compares with the standard model.
But on a more defensible interpretation, this chapter argues that the practical 
syllogism does not imply a deductive model o f instrumental reasoning which renders 
human behaviour predictable in accordance with rules. Aristotle’s aim is not to reduce the 
actual practical deliberative process to the form of the syllogism, but rather to elucidate its 
two distinct functions. First, the practical syllogism links the kind o f complex means-end 
deliberation outlined in the previous chapter to action; second, it confers some explanatory 
precision to our practical action. In its first function the practical syllogism should not be 
equated with actual means-end reason. Rather, it is a quasi-perceptual, intuitive capacity 
adjacent to the actual deliberative process, which translates decision -  the end result of 
means-end deliberation -  into conclusive action. The second function may not be called 
“practical” in the strictest sense, but is more an explanatory device meant to render
1 Milo, Aristotle on Practical Knowledge, pp. 50-6; Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” p. 329.
2 For an incisive critique of this view, see John McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist 68 (1979): 
331-50, especially pp. 336-7; also see his paper, “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical 
Imperatives?” Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society Supplement (1978): 13-29.
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purposive action comprehensible.3 Aristotle is able to maintain two functions o f the 
practical syllogism -  one explanatory and one perceptual that is contiguous to deliberation 
proper, all without its amalgamation into scientific knowledge -  mainly because he is not 
afflicted with the contemporary worries regarding gaps between thought and action, nor 
sceptical doubts about the motivational power o f reason itself.
Two broader issues are therefore at stake here. First, as implied above, I want to 
illustrate how Aristotle’s conception o f practical deliberation is irreducible to a formula, 
which presents our rational choices as ordered solely in accordance with standards o f 
consistency and coherence. Although the objectivist framework within the theoretical 
scientific domain situates and places conceptual pressure on practical reason’s articulation 
o f the human good (as shown in the previous chapter), the practical and theoretical, 
scientific modes o f explanation are nonetheless relatively discontinuous. To clarify this 
point, theoretical reason is capable o f cognising and understanding the metaphysical claims 
underlying an objective account o f human function. But while this prepares space for the 
articulation o f the human good by practical wisdom, it does not mean our explanations o f 
practical action adhere to the deductive ideal o f theoretical reason. Distinctions between 
the practical and theoretical syllogism provide support for a more complex account of 
human practical action, which retain all the complexities and particularities o f practical life. 
This is consistent with the previous chapter’s claim that practical deliberation inevitably 
involves the moral evaluation and specification o f complex ends.
The second issue concerns the limited success o f historical retrieval as a possible 
critical strategy against the standard model. Recent neo-Aristotelian normative philosophy 
has typically looked to Aristotelian practical reason as a much sought after middle ground 
between deontological Kantian ethics and the subjectivism o f the standard model. While 
the differences between the practical and theoretical syllogisms (and therefore between 
practical and scientific reason) lends a degree o f support for this presumed middle ground, 
their normative agenda cause contemporary Aristotelians to suspend the objectivist 
metaphysical philosophical framework situating Aristotle’s theory. According to Martha 
Nussbaum the divergence between the two syllogisms represent an implicit attack on the 
commensurability o f values, against any unitary form o f  scientific measurement to assess 
those goods. She thus concludes that Aristotle’s conception o f practical reason defends a 
thesis o f value incommensurability and plurality, which can then be utilised to criticise, as
3 For the practical dimension of the practical syllogism, I draw from Cooper, Reason and Human 
Good, pp. 46-58; for the explanatory dimensions, see Martha C. Nussbaum’s essay “Practical 
Syllogisms and Practical Science,” in her De Motu Animalium (Princeton: UP, 1978), pp. 165-220 
and von Wright’s distinction between first- and third-person practical inferences, “The Practical 
Inference,” The Philosophical Review 72:2 (1963): 159-79.
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well as supplement, contemporary debates about the standard model and liberalism.4 On 
Nussbaum’s account, Aristotle presents a metaphysically neutral account o f practical 
reason that can readily accommodate divergent and conflicting conceptions o f the good life, 
rendering it amenable to non-foundationalist liberal intuitions. But, as I show in the latter 
part o f this chapter, Nussbaum’s partial retrieval o f Aristotle in turn weakens the 
objectivism o f his philosophical framework, leading her to advance a relatively thin 
account o f practical reason which has some similarity to the indeterminate, subjectivism of 
the standard model and therefore has little critical bite against the latter.
Throughout this chapter I will continue to engage with Allan’s interpretation. Based 
on his inaccurate comparison between practical and theoretical reasoning, he concludes that 
the account o f the syllogism in Books VI and VII articulates a rule-governed procedure of 
choice. The first two Sections claim that constituent differences produce structural 
differences between the practical and demonstrative syllogism. If  the two syllogisms are 
indeed dissimilar, this implies a fundamental distinction between practical and theoretical 
rationality. Section III outlines how, in its practical function, the syllogism should be 
understood as an adjunct to the actual process o f practical deliberation. This reading o f the 
practical syllogism reinforces the argument that means-end deliberation should not be 
understood in term o f the perfunctory application o f a rational formula or procedure. To 
apply Taylor’s distinction, Aristotle represents a substantive rather than procedural 
conception o f practical reason. Yet this alternative reading to Allan’s need not lead to 
Nussbaum’s normative conclusion that Aristotle’s theory o f practical deliberation promotes 
value incommensurability and plurality, as shown in Section IV. Compared to Aristotle’s 
moral realism and conception o f functional essence, Nussbaum assumes a very thin 
conception o f rationality that cannot qualify as the conditions o f Aristotelian moral and 
practical deliberative choice. These crucial differences render questionable her attempted 
reappropriation o f Aristotelian phronesis as a critical response to the standard model.
/. Distinctions Between the Practical and Demonstrative Syllogism
According to Allan’s interpretation, the practical syllogism discussed in Book VI and 
VII points to analogies between the function o f practical wisdom (phronesis) and 
contemplative, demonstrative knowledge. On his reading, the practical syllogism evokes a
4 Nussbaum, “Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach,” in Midwest Studies in Philosophy 
13 (1988): 32-53; “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” pp. 203-52; and see especially “The 
Discernment of Perception: An Aristotelian Conception of Private and Public Rationality,” in Love’s 
Knowledge: Essays on Philosophy and Literature (Oxford: UP, 1990) pp. 54-105. I should make 
clear that I am generally sympathetic to some of Nussbaum’s exegesis -  particularly of the practical 
syllogism -  but do not think the normative implications she draws are supported by that exegesis.
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different mood o f the demonstrative syllogism and therefore points to a clear affinity 
between practical and theoretical reasoning.5 Allan states that there is
an analogy between the internal structure o f the reasoning o f theoretical science, 
which starts from self-evident principles and ends with the demonstration o f the 
properties o f its subject, and that o f the phronimos who starts from the highest 
practical principle, namely the good apprehended by him and converted into an End, 
and who brings his reasoning down to the particular.6
In the context o f Book VIPs discussion o f incontinence, the practical syllogism appears 
because “an analogy between the two intellectual virtues [theoretical and practical reason] 
is part o f  the plan o f the treatise.”7 Allan controversially assumes a close parallel between 
theoretical and practical reason: both intellectual virtues aim at truth, and both possess a 
similar internal, syllogistic structure which confers comparable logical necessity to their 
conclusions. Allan minimises the different constitutive contents o f the practical and 
demonstrative syllogisms, and instead focuses on a presumed structural similarity between 
the two. Implicit in this view is a conception o f content as having no bearing on the 
structure o f reasoning. It does not matter that the content o f the practical syllogism is 
perceptual, discursive, and experiential; resemblances in structure are sufficient to establish 
how demonstration o f premises leads to conclusive action in a practical syllogism. Allan is 
thus led to conclude that in some contexts the practical syllogism refers to “actions [that] 
are subsumed under intuition under general rules, and performed or avoided accordingly.”8 
In other words, the practical syllogism represents a deliberative procedure by which 
particular acts are codified under a set of rules, resulting in rationally necessary practical 
action.
Two questions should be raised in relation to Allan’s reading o f the practical 
syllogism: first, is it textually accurate to subsume the practical syllogism under 
demonstration; more specifically, does Aristotle’s account o f a practical syllogism even 
follow his own criterion for a demonstrative syllogism? If we suppose that the answer to 
these questions is a firm no, any presumed analogy between the two disappears: dissimilar 
content implies dissimilar syllogistic structure. Second and more fundamentally, does the 
practical syllogism represent the deliberative process itself, or does it articulate a process 
adjacent to means-end reasoning? The deductive structure o f the syllogism prompts an 
analogy between practical and theoretical reason because Allan mistakenly assumes that the
5 Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” p. 329.
6 Ibid., p. 329, emphasis added.
7 Ibid., pp. 329-30.
8 Ibid., p. 336.
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syllogism and deliberation are identical with one another. I will address the first question 
below and discuss the second concern in Sections II and III.
Traditionally, a syllogism is said to consist o f two premises followed by a conclusion. 
As Kenny points out, those two premises follow a subject-predicate form, corresponding 
respectively to the minor and major premise.9 Aristotle is conventionally said to follow this 
pattern in De Motu Animalium  (hereafter MA):
1) a) Every man should take walks;
b) He is a man;
c) At once he takes a walk.
2) a) No man should walk;
b) He is a man;
c) At once he remains at rest. [701 a 12-16]
3) a) I should make something good;
b) A house is something good;
c) At once I make a house. [701al5-17]10
In the Prior Analytics Aristotle specifies that a syllogism must be comprised o f both 
definite and indefinite propositions in order to generate a demonstratively valid conclusion. 
Among interpreters it is standard to equate Aristotelian definite and indefinite articles with 
universal or major and particular or minor premises respectively. So defined, the basic 
syllogistic form o f major-minor premise apparently operates in the examples above. The 
internal structure is relatively similar: the premises in 1(a), 2(a), and 3(b) refer to a 
universal premise, and combined with a particular premise, the conclusion logically 
follows.
But Aristotle then adds two further stipulations: a demonstration is an invalid 
deduction if, first, the syllogism is comprised solely o f  indefinite, particular propositions, or 
second, if  it contains more than two premises [Prior Analytics, 42a30-39]. Already 
Aristotle’s own definition o f a demonstrative syllogism in Prior Analytics fails to 
correspond to his examples o f the practical syllogism, where the permitted number o f 
premises appears to be flexible and variable.11 These usually contain more than two 
premises, with more complexity than the straightforward subject-predicate sentence
9 Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory o f the Will, p. 112.
10 All references to De Motu Animalium are translated by Martha C. Nussbaum (Princeton: UP, 
1978).
11 Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory o f the Will, p. 122.
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structure that traditionally defines the demonstrative syllogism. For instance, multiple 
premises are included in the cloak example from De M otu:
4) a) I need a covering;
b) A cloak is a covering;
c) I need a cloak;
d) What I need I have to make;
e) I have to make a cloak. [701al7-23]
In addition to the multiple premises, as Kenny points out, all o f the propositions in 
the cloak example would be considered indefinite and therefore particular premises.12 The 
absence o f a universal premise and the multiple particular premises mean that, by 
Aristotle’s own definition, this practical syllogism would not be considered a valid 
demonstrative syllogism or theoretical argument. On one reading the syllogistic project 
could be construed as an unnecessarily rigid or deterministic construal o f instrumental 
reason. Yet the fact that Aristotle does not limit himself to a certain number o f premises in 
accordance with his own stipulations on theoretical deduction in APr -  and is even invalid 
according to his rules o f demonstration -  should already signal a move away from the 
model o f scientific demonstration in order to integrate an element o f situational, 
particularistic complexity within the practical syllogistic structure itself. Indeed, Aristotle 
recognises the logical, linguistic oddity o f determining practical action in the syllogistic 
form.13
The “universal” premises o f the practical and demonstrative syllogism need to be 
further distinguished based on the different methods by which their content is derived. In 
scientific demonstration the universal premise is comprised o f unqualified first principles 
known simpliciter, and are both necessary and eternal. These self-evident, unconditional 
first principles permit deduction: we reason theoretically from  universal first principles to 
generate unconditionally valid scientific knowledge [APo 75b21], However, such 
unconditional, universal premises are absent in the practical sphere. In the practical domain 
“we must be content with a broad outline o f the truth,” Aristotle writes, “that is, in arguing 
about what is for the most part so from premises which are for the most part true we must 
be content to draw conclusions that are similarly qualified” [EN  1094b21-23]. Although 
still valid in a dialectical sense, universal premises o f the practical syllogism are 
comparative generalities or rules which obtain only for the most part. They do not have the 
unconditional status o f self-contained universal propositions functioning within the
12 A. J. Kenny, “Practical Inference,” Analysis 26:3 (1966): 66-7.
13 von Wright, “The Practical Inference,” p. 165.
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demonstrative syllogism; they cannot therefore advance our deductive knowledge in a 
particular theoretical sphere. The first principle o f eudaimonia -  the end which human 
functional essence aspires to achieve -  may be the only premise that qualifies as 
unconditional and universal in ethics. But, as established in the previous chapter, this first 
principle requires detailed specification in order to be practically realisable; the constituents 
o f eudaimonia are not deduced from similarly unconditional first principles known 
simpliciter, but are generalities that result from an inductive process through the 
accumulation o f practical experience. For Aristotle, practical and moral inquiry is by 
nature distinct from the demonstrative sciences, primarily due to the universal, deductive 
nature o f the latter, as opposed to the general, “true for the most part”, dialectical 
ingredients o f the former.14 The practical syllogism reflects the contingent and complex 
nature o f practical life, while at the same time conferring a degree o f rational cohesion upon 
our explanations o f human teleological action. Unlike the intuition bound up with 
theoretical demonstration which has “as its objects the primary immutable terms”, “the 
intuition that operates in practical inferences [is...] concerned with the ultimate and 
contingent” and it is “from particular instances that general rules are established” [1143bl- 
6].
But what does “ultimate” mean in this context? How this relates to action will 
become clearer in Section III. For my more immediate purpose, however, some 
preliminary remarks are in order. The term “ultimate” should be understood with reference 
to Aristotle’s metaphysical views on generic division or order, whereby one descends from 
the highest genera to the lowest species. At the ultimate or last step what is apprehended is 
not an individual item but its species or genus.15 Applied to the context o f the quotation 
above, the ultimate in the practical syllogism refers to “kinds o f things” that are grasped 
with an intuitive understanding, expressed in the instantaneous apprehension o f the 
possibility o f enacting one’s deliberative means in a specific context.16 But importantly, 
these types or kinds o f things are not perceived as stand-alone eternal truths (as is the case 
with objects o f theoretical demonstration); rather they are intrinsically bound to a particular 
problem or situational context.17 The “ultimate” represents an inductive accumulation o f 
empirical experience which allows one to see that the specific kind o f means chosen in 
means-end deliberation is possible given the context or practical problem. Intuition of an
14 This is not to say that humans cannot obtain ethical first principles; as made clear in the previous 
chapter, these objective principles bear on the moral practical life, but these principles in no way 
make practical action reducible to universal rules. Dialectic and “true for the most part” endoxa can 
generate objective first principles, but they are nonetheless distinct from the simpliciter relations 
between the first principles entailed within scientific demonstration.
15 Cooper, Reason and Human Good, p. 188.
16 Ibid., p. 39-43.
17 This important point is highlighted in ibid., p. 40, n. 49.
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ultimate, or kinds o f things, may not boast any mathematical exactitude or eternal scope, 
but nonetheless possesses scientific validity appropriate to the fundamentally contingent 
nature o f practical matters.
Thus, for Aristotle dissimilarity in propositional constituents points to an analogous 
disjuncture between the kind o f rational, logical argumentation possible in either theoretical 
demonstration and practical syllogism. The nature o f the premises dictates the degree o f 
precision, exactitude, and necessity o f the ensuing conclusion.18 In other words, the 
difference in content -  and the method by which we acquire that content -  implies a 
corresponding difference in structure. Throughout APo Aristotle makes clear that the 
deductive conclusions o f a demonstration are necessarily valid on the basis o f their eternal 
and necessary propositions. Given the enduring nature o f its propositional content, the 
conclusions will be likewise both unqualified and eternal [EN 1139bl8-36; APo 74b6-12, 
especially 75b21]. Moreover, the irreducibility o f its content bears on the stringency o f the 
inferential structure, making it amenable to an equally necessary, logical deduction. Yet 
this kind o f unqualified inference, characteristic o f demonstration, is impossible in the 
practical syllogism: its “universal” or “ultimate” premises obtain only for the most part, 
representing generalities usually derived from the accumulation o f practical, empirical 
experience in the particular. An approximate conclusion -  that also obtains for the most 
part -  is all that the practical syllogism can aspire to, given the conditional nature o f its 
premises.19 Whereas the premises o f demonstration are universal postulates that promote 
deduction, the premises o f the practical syllogism are derived from the process of empirical 
induction, which confers upon its conclusion a measure o f contingency and laxity o f form 
accordingly. In contrast to the stringency o f demonstration, the content o f the practical 
syllogism confers flexibility onto its structure.
18 See APo 75al-20 on how a demonstrative conclusion from necessity requires constituents that are 
also necessary, as opposed to accidental constituents which will not yield demonstrative knowledge. 
Further, in Parts o f Animals Aristotle draws a distinction between the necessity of demonstration and 
that of natural science, of which art or technical knowledge would be a species of (since it deploys 
knowledge of natural processes): “For there is absolute necessity, manifested in eternal phenomena; 
and there is hypothetical necessity, manifested in everything that is generated as in everything that is 
produced by art, be it a house or what it may. For if a house or other such final object is to be 
realized, it is necessary that first this and then that shall be produced and set in motion, and so on in 
continuous succession, until the end is reached, for the sake of which each prior thing is produced 
and exists. So also is it with the production of nature. The mode of necessity, however, and the 
mode of demonstration are different in natural science from what they are in the theoretical sciences 
[...] For in the latter the starting-point is that which is, in the former that which is to be. For since 
health, or a man, is of such and such a character, it is necessary for this or that to exist or be 
produced; it is not the case that, since this or that exists or has been produced, that of necessity exists 
or will exist. Nor is it possible to trace back the necessity of demonstrations of this sort to a starting- 
point, of which you can say that, since this exists, that exists.” [639b24-640a9, trans. W. Ogle in 
The Complete Works o f Aristotle, vol. 1, ed. Jonathan Bames (Princeton: UP, 1980)]
19 This is hinted at in Aristotle’s exclusion of non-universal and perishable propositions (or in other 
words, dialectical propositions that “will sometimes be and sometimes not be”) from generating 
demonstratively valid deductions in APo 75b25-30.
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Already this casts doubt on Allan’s reading o f the internal structure o f the practical 
and demonstrative syllogisms as analogous. This should make equally suspect the 
interpretive unification o f practical and theoretical reasoning. Allan incorrectly concludes 
that Aristotle’s practical syllogism simply represents an application o f theoretical reason, 
though a separation between the two is already implicit in De Anima, where Aristotle 
excludes theoretical, speculative thought as a potential source o f movement in order to 
precisely make distinct philosophical space for practical thought.
I I  The Explanatory Function o f  the Practical Syllogism
One could argue on Allan’s behalf, if  the components o f the practical and 
demonstrative syllogisms differ, and if  the conclusion is meant to be action as opposed to 
truth respectively, why would Aristotle attempt to construct means-end deliberation in a 
syllogistic structure in the first place? Aristotle’s equivocation in this direction seems to 
justify M ilo’s charge that Aristotle does not adequately or successfully distinguish between 
the practical and demonstrative syllogism, between practical and theoretical reason.20 
While Milo may have a point, I nonetheless believe Aristotle’s analogy should be taken in a 
very limited sense. Aristotle intends us to understand the practical syllogism in two ways, 
depending on whether we are referring to a first-person or third-person intentional act. In 
the former sense equating the syllogism with the actual process o f means-end deliberation 
is deeply questionable (this will be explained in more detail below). However, the latter 
sense o f the syllogism does indeed evoke some commonalities with theoretical reason. 
When describing a third-person intentional act, the practical syllogism grants a degree of 
logical coherence to our teleological, sometimes retrospective explanations of human 
behaviour, but does not necessitate or dictate practical action.21 This explanatory function 
becomes clearer if, in the first place, we recognise that it is misleading to impose the 
theoretical, deductive framework o f the demonstrative syllogism onto the language o f the 
practical syllogism. As Kenny correctly points out, for Aristotle the practical syllogism 
encompasses something broader and more complex than the traditional deduction in the 
simplified form (as quoted from Kenny), ‘All xs areys; a is an x; therefore a is a y ’.22 The 
Greek term used by Aristotle more literally translates as a “for-the sake-of-which” 
explanation o f purposive action, the “account one would give o f what one was doing if  one
20 Milo, Aristotle, p. 50. By contrast, G. E. M. Anscombe is more convinced that Aristotle 
differentiates between the two. See her Intention (Oxford, Blackwell, 1957) p. 59.
21 Nussbaum, De Motu, p. 180ff.
22 Kenny, Aristotle’s Theory o f the Will, p. 112.
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was asked for the sake o f what one was doing it” .23 This more accurate rendering evokes 
the search for an account o f practical action which extends beyond a mere efficient causal 
explanation. It permits a sequence of third-person question and answer in order to discover 
the first cause and telos of a particular action; it allows the agent to render her action 
intelligible by working back from  the action to its starting-point or end, through an 
imagined dialogue. Aristotle’s examples in MA distinguish between a teleological 
explanation o f instrumentally complete activity from the perspective o f a third-person, and 
the first-person process which concludes in action.24 Examples 1 and 2 indicate the former 
explanation while 3 and 4 indicate the latter.
Hence the loosely drawn theoretical-practical analogy in Aristotle’s discussion o f the 
practical syllogism represents his attempt to distinguish between the ascription o f a 
logically plausible inference from the third-person -  which makes no subsequent demands 
o f  practical necessity on the agent carrying out that action -  and the logical, linguistic 
peculiarity o f the kind o f practical inference that does result in action. Represented in von 
W right’s words, “it is logically or necessarily true that if A  wants to attain x  and will not 
attain it unless he does y, then he must do y. But it does not follow that he will do y.”25 In 
other words, the inference drawn from the practical syllogism in such third-person cases is 
a logically valid statement but does not necessitate action. Indeed the linguistic 
presentation matters a great deal: in the third-person the practical syllogism would arguably 
have the kind o f straightforward subject-predicate propositional sentence structure 
evocative o f (but certainly not equivalent to) a conventional, demonstrative syllogism.26 In 
those cases, the practical syllogism would be more naturally understood as theoretical and 
explanatoiy as opposed to practical. But we risk misunderstanding the relation between 
action and the practical syllogism itself if we make too much o f this loose parallel. Part of 
the function o f the practical syllogism is to serve as an explanatory tool o f teleological 
action, to provide the conceptual resources to explain and make comprehensible possible 
action from a third-person perspective. “For wisdom is not irrational,” writes Aristotle, 
“but can give a reason why it acts as it does” [EE 1247a 14].27 Any similarities between the 
practical syllogism and theoretical or scientific demonstration should not be regarded as 
reducing practical reason and our subsequent actions to the level o f scientific deduction (of 
the form, ‘All xs are ys; a  is an x; therefore a  is a y ’). Rather, it is as an explanatory tool
23 Ibid., p. 114. Also, those passages that Aristotle discusses the necessary conditions of animal 
purposive movement in De Motu Animalium are usually translated as “that for the sake of which”. 
See both the Oxford translation by A. S. L. Farquharson and Nussbaum’s translation.
24 von Wright, “The Practical Inference”.
25 Ibid., p. 165.
26 Ibid., pp. 168-9. This adheres most closely to the traditional syllogism identified by Kenny, 
Aristotle’s Theory o f the Will, p. 112.
27 Aristotle continues that those who cannot give an account of the reason why they act the way they 
do would fall under the sphere of art [EE 1247al5].
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that makes perspicuous the necessary and sufficient factors which contribute to teleological 
explanation o f human action.
In other words, any conflation o f Aristotle’s demonstrative and practical syllogism is 
symptomatic o f the failure to recognise the latter’s dual function: it is, on one level, giving 
an account o f “for-the-sake-of-which” action, whether or not the action takes place. If it 
does occur, it begins with the action and moves towards the discovery o f the goal. Aristotle 
means as much when he writes in NE  III, the “first cause [...] is the last order of discovery 
(because the process o f deliberation by the method described is like the investigation or 
analysis o f a geometrical problem” [1112b20-22]. But we can still ascribe a connection 
between a person’s end and the necessary means, whether or not the corresponding action 
occurs. From the positive form o f “A desires p; A must do y  if he wants p, therefore A 
must do y ” comes the equally valid negative form o f “A desires p; he must do y  and if  not, 
he will not obtain p; therefore without y  A  will not obtain /?”. As von Wright shows, in our 
linguistic, verbal usage the counterfactual statement logically follows from the positive 
form, implying that even the absence o f action would be explicable in this form. But 
though the practical syllogism in the third-person form acquires an explanatory, theoretical 
hue it does not automatically evoke parallels with a demonstrative syllogism. One needs to 
keep in mind the clear propositional discrepancy between the two -  demonstrative ones 
being “speculative” about “unchanging objects” [MA 701a6-25], whereas practical 
syllogisms contain propositions that are more often specific to the appetitive, desiderative 
circumstance, and refer to possible action. The explanatory aspect o f the practical 
syllogism may not conclude in action -  its aim may be some form o f logical validity -  yet 
its subject matter and subsequent structure remain practically orientated and situationally 
contingent, and therefore clearly demarcated from a demonstrative syllogism.
Thus, in some respects the practical syllogism in an explanatory function has some 
similarities with the explanatory aspirations o f the standard model. But it is important to 
note that the reductivist tendencies o f the latter are avoided in Aristotle’s clear distinction 
between the practical and demonstrative syllogism. Whereas the standard model takes its 
cue from the rise and general acceptability o f the scientific mode o f explanation within the 
domain o f practical philosophy, Aristotle does not. Although the objectivist account of 
function imposes conceptual pressures and limits on the specific articulation o f substantive 
human goods, standards o f theoretical wisdom do not determine the mode o f explanation 
since theoretical and practical modes o f inquiry are comparatively distinct from each other 
in terms o f content and structure.
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I II  The Practical Function o f  the Syllogism
The confusion surrounding Aristotle’s theoretical-practical distinction is partly 
understandable given their divergent functions depending on whether we refer to the first- 
or third-person in the practical syllogism. From one direction, the practical syllogism leads 
to the “starting-point” or the end which an agent’s actions are aimed towards in order to 
render those instrumental acts (or inaction) comprehensible from a third-person 
perspective. On this level the practical syllogism in its theoretical mode makes logical, 
explanatory sense o f our means-end action, within the context o f our normal linguistic 
usage and propositional structure, and is reminiscent o f (but not analogous to) the 
traditional subject-predicate rendering o f the demonstrative syllogism. From the opposite 
direction, the syllogism concludes with the initiation o f  appropriate action or the means 
toward an end; this first-person perspective refers to the second sense in which the 
syllogism is practical. Aristotle says cryptically in E N  III, “it seems that not every 
investigation is a kind o f deliberation, e.g. those o f mathematics are not; but eveiy 
deliberation is an investigation -  and the last step in the analysis is the first in the process)” 
[1112b23-24]. The practical syllogism in its theoretical function evokes a logical model to 
give an account o f teleological action (deliberation will therefore discover the first cause or 
“for the sake o f which”), but this does not exhaust the function o f practical inferences. It 
also can be the case that inferences derived from means-end deliberation result in the first 
step in the process -  namely practical action. The practical syllogism’s second function 
offers an action guiding, intuitive process which allows us to perceive the possible means 
towards an end.28
If  all o f this is plausible, an important question emerges: namely, how and where 
exactly does the syllogism fit within the means-end deliberative process? In the previous 
chapter I claimed that Aristotle’s account o f practical deliberation points towards an 
intricate process o f assessment and evaluation o f constitutive ends, and is therefore not 
limited to a strictly causal means-end paradigm. In the case o f complex, global ends, 
instrumental reason could not even be initiated without this kind o f prior exploration. But 
at times, Aristotle’s discussion of the practical syllogism appears to undercut this thesis, 
particularly since immediate action is supposed to be the syllogism’s conclusion in its non- 
explanatory, practical mode. This has led Allan to conclude inaccurately, but 
understandably, that Aristotle upholds a “deterministic psychology o f action,”29 and in its 
syllogistic form the means-end paradigm seemingly indicates a model o f predictable human 
action that generates rules o f conduct. But if Allan’s mistaken conclusion is rightfully
28 Cooper, Reason and Human Good, pp. 46-58.
29 Allan, “The Practical Syllogism,” p. 333.
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challenged, we need to answer the following questions: in what way does the first-person 
form of the practical syllogism represent a deterministic account o f action, and what does 
Aristotle mean when he says action is the necessary conclusion o f the practical syllogism? 
Moreover, to what extent are particular acts reducible to inscribed, codified rules of 
conduct? Let me address the first question, as the answer will put us in a better position to 
respond to the second.
Periodically Aristotle indicates necessity in a strong sense. When discussing 
incontinence he writes:
The universal premiss is an opinion, while the other is concerned with particulars, 
which fall within the scope o f sensation. When the two are combined, in one kind of 
reasoning the mind must affirm the conclusion, but in the practical syllogism it must 
immediately act on it. [1147a25-29]
At first glance Aristotle is drawing a confusing analogy between deductive necessity, 
characteristic o f demonstration, and the practical syllogism. But the language o f necessity 
here may be misleading: the claim that action “must immediately” conclude the practical 
syllogism is further qualified by, “if he has the power and is not prevented” [1147b31], 
Thus Aristotle includes caveats that allow for temporal, physical, and passional disruptions. 
Aristotle’s account provides the general cognitive and desiderative ingredients required for 
practical action, but he nonetheless leaves enough conceptual space for possible obstacles 
to our action, and for both akratic and enkratic agency.30 But this still does not explain 
away sufficiently why Aristotle nonetheless says action must “ immediately” follow the 
practical syllogism.
To make sense o f Aristotle here the actual process o f practical deliberation -  
discussed in the previous chapter -  and the practical syllogism need to be separated. The 
structure o f our practical deliberation does not have to adhere slavishly to the practical 
syllogism; indeed, following John Cooper, the syllogism actually falls outside o f means- 
end reason proper.31 In other words, once a decision or choice is reached by means-end 
deliberation, the practical syllogism describes an intuitive, perceptual process that instigates 
action; it essentially links deliberative choice with the specific act. Aristotle points to a 
relationship between the syllogism’s quasi-perceptual process and deliberation proper in 
two opaque passages:
30 See Gerasimos Santas, “Aristotle on Practical Inference, the Explanation of Action, and Akrasia,” 
Phronesis 14 (1969): 176-89.
31 Cooper, Reason and Human Good, pp. 43-6.
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It is obvious that prudence is not scientific knowledge, because it apprehends the last step, 
we have said, since the thing to be done is o f this nature. Thus it is opposite to intuition; 
for intuition apprehends the definitions, which cannot be logically demonstrated; and 
prudence apprehends the ultimate particular, which cannot be apprehended by scientific 
knowledge, but only by perception -  not that o f objects peculiar to one sense, but the sort 
by which we perceive that the ultimate figure in mathematics is a triangle; because there 
too there will be a halt. But this is perception rather than prudence, although it is another 
kind o f perception. [1142a24-30, emphasis added]
[T]he intuition that operates in practical inferences being concerned with the 
ultimate and contingent, i.e. the minor premiss. For these are the starting-points for 
arriving at the end, because it is from particular instances that general rules are 
established. So these particulars need to be perceived; and this perception is 
intuition. [1143b3-6, emphasis added]
As implied here the syllogism makes patent an intuitive, recognitional capacity that is an 
adjunct to our actual prudential deliberation; it articulates our perception o f the particulars 
or means already decided upon through preceding instrumental reasoning, and we 
subsequently “arrive at the end” -  meaning practical action. In other words, only with that 
perceptual, intuitive recognition bound up with the syllogism do chosen means get 
instantiated in action. As shown in the preceding chapter, choice or decision (proairesis) 
concludes the complex process of practical deliberation -  where constitutive ends and 
appropriate means are considered. It is only after a decision is conclusively reached that 
the practical syllogism comes into the picture in order to link that specific decision with the 
act itself.
Let me explain this using one o f Aristotle’s examples o f the syllogism. He writes, 
“all sweet things should be tasted, and x, one o f the particulars <forming a class>, is sweet” 
(1 147a29-30]; the person should then immediately taste x. Perhaps the agent has the 
practical knowledge that sweet things should be tasted; perhaps they are the means to some 
other end, for my purposes here imagine that it is good for the telos o f health. Hence, 
through deliberation we know that sweet things are a means to the end o f health. The agent 
then makes a decision {proairesis) to eat sweet things but at that very moment o f decision 
nothing sweet is within his immediate purview. The agent recognises nothing that he 
knows o f which falls under the class o f sweet things, so he does not act upon his 
deliberative decision to eat sweet things. The intuitive perception, implied in the practical 
mode o f the syllogism, shoulders precisely the responsibility o f accurately identifying the
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ultimate: namely that a particular item (referred to above as the minor premiss) belongs to a 
broader class o f kind or species.32
Aristotle confirms elsewhere this recognitional perception which results in immediate 
action:
But as sometimes happens when we ask dialectical questions, so here reason does not 
stop and consider at all the second of the two premises, the obvious one. For 
example, if  taking walks is good for a man, it does not waste time considering that he 
is a man. Hence whatever we do without calculating, we do quickly. For whenever a 
creature is actually using sense-perception or phantasia or thought towards the thing 
for-the-sake-of-which, he does at once what he desires. [MA 701a26-31]
Although here Aristotle appears to provide cases whereby no deliberation occurs prior to 
action, that is clearly not always the case. For instance, in the statement, “taking walks is 
good for man” we imagine prior deliberation has already taken place -  about the 
constituents o f what is good for man, and how walks contribute to that good. Only once 
such deliberation has occurred (and the person possesses the desire to obtain the good for 
man, does our perception o f the situational particular allow us to intuit that at this time, at 
this place, it is an appropriate time to walk, and as a result we do so immediately. 
Presupposed in any action is a pre-existing desire or conscious deliberative choice on the 
agent’s part; thus evidence o f instantaneous action should not suggest means-end 
deliberation is reduced to the level o f predictive necessity. Aristotle’s use o f the terms 
“must” or “immediately” may simply apply to those practical examples where the situation 
is interpreted or perceived as an appropriate instance to instantiate one’s choice in action.33 
Indeed, the ability to recognise the times or occasions it is fully appropriate to act is part 
and parcel o f humans possessing deliberative phantasia. To return to my earlier example, 
upon seeing an apple (and thus exercising a recognitional capacity) an agent acts right 
away. On Aristotle’s view, that immediate act isn’t the result o f scientific or deductive 
necessity. Rather, it represents the person’s accurate perceptual capacities o f the ultimate 
and contingent (she recognises this thing is an apple, and fruit is further classified under 
sweet things) which mediates between action and desire or deliberative choice (“sweet
32 This clarifies what Aristotle means when he says that intuition here is concerned with the 
“ultimate and contingent” -  it must have a degree of understanding of the “ultimate” in order to even 
make sense of the contingent (that what I perceive in the particular falls under a broader 
classification). The analogy of perceiving a triangle is a case in point: the geometer who perceives 
that a geometrical problem can be solved by the construction of a triangle, and accordingly draws the 
shape. The perception in question, then, recognises that the puzzle has been ultimately solved 
through the figure of a triangle; see ibid., pp. 39-40.
33 Santas, “Aristotle on Practical Inference,” p. 176.
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things are a good means towards health”).34 But the converse is also true: not to act when 
the means are unavailable or absent would not indicate a lack o f deliberation. The decision 
may be delayed in action -  perhaps the particular means are not perceived and the decision 
will have to be tucked away for a more appropriate time, when the agent actually intuits the 
possibility o f enacting that choice. Having a temporal dimension to our deliberative 
phantasia  means we are not strictly bound to the immediacy o f the present as are other 
animals, but possess the capacity for long-range planning. I will have more to say on 
deliberation and its temporal significance in the final section. But suffice to say here the 
practical syllogism represents a perceptual bridge between practical deliberation and action. 
This bridge features crucial temporal awareness, capable o f recognising constraints on the 
immediate implementation o f chosen means which need not occlude its potential future 
enactment. Clearly, in no sense does this replace or represent an alternative form of 
practical reasoning.
Thus, if there is any degree o f necessity to the practical syllogism, it is insofar that 
the immediate presence o f means or the availability to act is intuited through perception. 
This necessity is not the essence o f practical deliberation itself, but is characteristic o f the 
perceptual addendum, expressed in the practical syllogism. A dimension o f necessity to the 
syllogism does not compromise the complexity and substantive, evaluative nature o f 
practical deliberation, primarily because Aristotle does not conflate but in fact differentiates 
instrumental reasoning from the perceptual, intuitive faculty. Therefore Aristotle is in no 
way committed to a thesis o f strong determination or reductionism in his actual conception 
o f means-end reason. That Aristotle does not have in mind a strong sense o f necessity, 
where action must follow from deliberation, is already implicit in the explanatory function 
o f the practical syllogism. Recall that in the positive form o f “A desires p\ A must do y  if 
he wants p , therefore A must do y” is the negative form o f “A desires p; he must do y  and if 
not, he will not obtain p\ therefore without y  A will not obtain /?”. In cases where practical 
action has not immediately followed deliberation, the adjunct function o f practical 
syllogism allows us to explicate reasons why he failed to act, making transparent perceptual 
factors which may have gone awry.
Aristotle further confirms this view in his explanation o f incontinent action. Akrasia 
represents a failure in our perceptual intuition o f the particular. The formal structure o f the 
practical syllogism permits us to conclude that, due to contradicting desires or emotions, 
the incontinent agent has failed to adequately grasp the perceptual knowledge that is crucial 
to link proper deliberation with action [EN 1147bl-18]. The incontinent person is 
“exercising his knowledge o f the universal but not his knowledge o f the particulars;
34 In this sense, von Wright is correct to say that the action conclusion of the first-person, practical 
syllogism is both voluntary and determined. “The Practical Inference,” p. 166.
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because the things that we have to do are particulars” [1147a2-3]. Aristotle goes on to give 
an example: ‘“ Dry food is good for every man’, and ‘I am a man’ or ‘This sort o f food is 
dry’; but whether this particular food is the right sort he either does not have the knowledge 
or is not using it” [1147a5-7]. The incontinent person, under the influence o f appetite or 
emotion, is akin to “a drunken man quoting Empedocles” [1147b 13] and, consequently, 
does not truly understand or possess knowledge o f the particular. Bound up with the 
immediacy o f our perceptual, intuitive faculty is the capacity to properly utilise and grasp 
our practical knowledge.
Thus, even in such cases where an agent fails to act, their rational decision would still 
be explicable through the practical syllogism. The process o f deliberation may have gone 
according to plan -  it may contain beliefs and desires that can be accurately ascribed to the 
agent.35 But the syllogism provides the conceptual tools needed to extrapolate reasons why 
action was successfully or unsuccessfully executed -  without touching the deliberative 
process at all -  and focus on problems with the perceptual, intuitive faculty. When means- 
end reason concludes, Aristotle says we “arrive at the first cause, which is the last order o f 
discovery” [1112b21]; this refers to the perceptual, intuitive bridge between practical 
deliberation and action. The accurate perception o f the feasibility or immediacy o f the 
particular situation falls upon this intuitive capacity represented by the practical syllogism. 
Without that bridge, a deliberative choice may be unfulfilled -  a given situation may be 
perceived impossible so a decision cannot be performed. For Aristotle, the failure to 
immediately act needn’t necessarily be attributed to any malfunction within the deliberative 
process.
The interpretation o f the practical syllogism as falling outside o f means-end 
deliberation means one should not worry that Aristotle provides philosophical space for 
deliberative decisions which are not immediately enacted, nor that this may confer on 
practical choice a more theoretical hue, evocative o f what post-Kantian philosophy now 
classify as theoretical reason. In fact, the tendency to remove any space between rational 
reflection and action is symptomatic of a contemporary misapprehension about the power 
o f practical reason to motivate. The motivational question informs both critics and 
proponents o f the standard model and is a problem which informs their reading o f Aristotle, 
manifested in, first, sceptical doubts regarding the power o f practical reasons to motivate 
and second, a clear segregation between abstract thought and practical reason. But it is 
unlikely that Aristotle had this particular worry about reason’s motivational power. First, 
the motivational power o f practical reason is never called into doubt; what is questioned 
specifically is whether theoretical knowledge, such as eternal truths and Platonic Forms, are
35 Santas, “Aristotle on Practical Inference,” p. 177, n. 11.
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sufficiently engaged with the enmattered realm of humans to be motivating. Second, we 
cannot assume that Aristotle’s distinction between practical and scientific knowledge 
implies that phronesis is incapable o f abstraction. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre 
underscores the immediacy o f action in the practical syllogism, removing any gaps between 
thought and action in order to dispute the misguided emphasis on theoretical reason 
endemic in modern conceptions o f instrumental reason. He writes:
Aristotle takes the conclusion to a practical syllogism to be a particular kind o f 
action. The notion that an argument can terminate in an action o f course offends 
Humean and post-Humean philosophical prejudices, according to which only 
statements [...] can have truth-values and enter into those relationships o f consistence 
and inconsistence which partially define deductive argument. But statements 
themselves only possess these characteristics in virtue o f their capacity to express 
beliefs; and actions can o f course express beliefs as certainly, although not always as 
clearly and unambiguously, as utterances can. It is only because and only because o f 
this that we can be puzzled by the inconsistency between a given agent’s actions and 
his statements.36
MacIntyre is right to suggest that the Aristotelian theory o f practical deliberation does not 
correspond to the modern prioritisation o f theoretical reason at the expense o f practical 
reason.37 However, this does not, and should not, close off the possibilities represented by 
the practical function o f the syllogism: namely, cases where perception informs us that it 
would be unrealistic to enact our decision, given the particular circumstances, so one holds 
off acting. Aristotle is not committed to saying that the decision itself is flawed -  it may 
very well be a good decision that simply requires the right situation. But if read in light of 
modem worries, this conjecture is plainly incomprehensible. The sceptical or internalist 
view underlying the standard model would deem this as evidence that practical reasons -  or 
reasons in general -  are fundamentally non-motivating or external to the agent’s subjective 
motivational set.38 Or, as implicitly reflected in MacIntyre’s quotation, these reasons are 
not properly practical but merely the result o f inactive theoretical, cognitive thought.
But these views about reason ignore the subtlety involved in Aristotle’s distinction 
between the theoretical and practical, and between deliberation proper and its adjacent 
intuitive-perceptual faculty. More forcefully put, this perceptual intuitive faculty represents
36 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue; A Study in Moral Theory 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985) p. 
161.
37 But that said, I believe it deeply questionable for Hume’s conception of reason to be classified 
under the sceptical view. This will be apparent in Chapter 5.
38 Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” pp. 101-13.
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a kind o f moral or practical discernment. Recall that habituation involves the honing o f our 
appetitive, pathological dimensions as well as the acquisition o f practical knowledge which 
culminates in wisdom. Through admirable perception, the phronimos may discern that it is 
inappropriate to act on his deliberative choice in this situational particular. For Aristotle, 
what would be deemed on the modem picture as the failure o f reasons to motivate or the 
situational absence o f practical deliberation could in fact be something to be praised 
because it nonetheless displays the impeccable dispositional character o f that person not to 
act in that instance. Theoretical, scientific knowledge (episteme) apprehends data that is 
altogether different from the practical knowledge acquired in habituation, yet the latter is 
still capable o f abstract knowledge o f a practical and enmattered nature. The distinction 
between the practical and scientific knowledge needn’t automatically imply the complete 
foreclosure o f abstract thought in the practical domain. On these grounds, Aristotle can say 
that conclusive action can be post-facto to practical deliberation; the choices and decisions 
that conclude means-end deliberation can be applied later and it still would not undercut his 
division between speculative and practical reason.
IV  Incommensurability and Aristotelian Deliberation
Let me briefly tie together the extended argument outlined in the previous chapter 
and above. The first chapter argued that, unlike the subjectivism o f the standard model, 
Aristotle situates instrumental reason in an objectivist moral framework that necessarily 
impinges on the determination o f both means and ends. If mapped onto Taylor’s 
distinction, this illustrates that Aristotle would have a substantive as opposed to procedural 
conception o f practical reason, in large part because the conceptual pressure exerted by his 
metaphysical framework requires further specification and evaluation o f the goods 
constitutive o f that framework. In the Aristotelian sense o f phronesis, deliberation results 
in the recognition and articulation o f intrinsically valuable goods, which simultaneously 
function as means towards the ultimate, species-wide end o f eudaimonia. This will involve 
both the correct moral shaping o f one’s character and the evaluation and articulation of 
complex ends. Praiseworthy deliberation {euboulia) requires choice that represents the 
harmonious collaboration between all o f these deliberative ingredients, ensuring 
“correctness in estimating advantage with respect to the right object, the right means and 
the right time” [1142b27-8].
The current chapter has further distanced Aristotle from the standard model by 
resisting the practical syllogism’s assimilation to a reductivist explanatory framework 
which favours scientific, i.e., deductive reasoning. Aristotle’s objectivist framework makes 
further demands on the proper cultivation o f the intuitive-perceptual adjunct to means-end
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deliberation, as illustrated by the practical syllogism. Specifically, Aristotle’s arguments 
exert tremendous pressure on this kind o f intuition in the pursuit o f eudaimonia. As 
mentioned before, eudaimonia as an unconditional end is far too expansive to be 
realistically actualisable in practical life without further deliberation or articulation o f its 
constituents. Once those particular constituents or means are determined, it is up to the 
perceptual, intuitive faculty, articulated in the practical syllogism, to recognise an 
appropriate moment to instantiate our deliberative choice. Only with the rational 
perception implied in practical wisdom does one possess the ability to extrapolate and 
interpret the moral salience o f a unique situation; a person comes to recognise and 
intuitively perceive the possibility o f actualising the universal at that particular moment. 
This does not mean that universal, eternal knowledge is generated or reached through 
means-end deliberation, nor does it mean that the rational procedure somehow take priority 
over substantive content.
Thus, my argument has presented Aristotelian means-end reasoning as, first, both 
participatory and responsive to thick ethical evaluation o f  ends, and, second, opposed to a 
predictive formula which treat human agency as reducible to rule-governed behaviour. 
Ultimately, Aristotle cannot be aligned with the standard model o f instrumental rationality. 
What normative implications can we then draw from the combined argument o f both 
chapters?
One possible but arguably misguided option comes from Nussbaum’s attempt to 
retrieve Aristotle for contemporary normative purposes. Nussbaum concludes that the 
articulation o f constitutive goods o f an end, as well as the clear divide between theoretical 
demonstration and the practical syllogism, between scientific knowledge or theoretical 
reason (episteme) and practical wisdom {phronesis), culminate in a moral theory' that 
endorses plural goods and incommensurable values. Because Aristotelian means-end 
reason requires and implies a more detailed specification o f an end, resulting in the 
recognition o f  goods valuable in themselves, Nussbaum suggests it is the necessary 
condition o f deliberative choice that no objective criterion exists whereby one virtue can be 
deemed to be o f greater value, or one specification o f  a eudaimon life can be rationally 
privileged over another. Instead, the requisite evaluation o f ends will lead to reflection on 
the tragic tensions that exist between different values comprising the good life. For 
example, as intrinsically valuable constituents o f eudaimonia the moral virtues would be 
entirely distinct and separate goods from one another. Nussbaum writes, “ [a] rational 
Aristotelian adult will have a reasonably good understanding o f  what courage, justice, 
friendship, generosity, and many other values are. He or she will understand how in our
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beliefs and practices, they differ from and are noninterchangeable with one another.”39 The 
separateness o f these intrinsic goods therefore suggests that no common metric can unify or 
judge between them, and subsequent tensions are “not to be mitigated without a loss in 
richness in life.”40
On the one hand, Nussbaum’s reading takes issue with the evaluative and explanatory 
reductivism which the standard model adheres to; on the other hand, she ultimately takes 
her cue from certain liberal intuitions regarding the social reality o f value pluralism. 
Aristotle’s ethical views are accordingly made to support a form o f value 
incommensurability that accommodates liberal intuitions about in the plurality o f values 
and the separateness o f persons.41 Nussbaum states this much more explicitly in the 
following extended passage:
The liberal view about Aristotelianism is that it always involves opting for a single 
conception o f good rather than a plurality, and that in the process it tells people what 
they should be, asking them [...] to live the life that a supremely wise man thinks 
would be best for them. This is actually to remove their moral autonomy, and thus, 
from the liberal’s point o f view, to treat them unequally. There is no issue to which 
the Aristotelian should be more sensitive than this one, since her ability to convince 
contemporary citizens o f the merits o f her view depends very much on the way these 
charges are answered. The first thing she must insist on is that her conception o f the 
good, while thick is in fact vague. That is, it is designed to admit o f plural 
specifications, in a number o f different ways.42
Clearly Nussbaum is trying to reappropriate Aristotle’s conception o f practical reason so as 
to establish a philosophical middle ground in contemporary liberal theory between Kantian 
universalism and abstraction and the subjectivism o f the sub-Humean ethical position. 
Nussbaum supports her normative agenda by roping off Aristotle’s metaphysical 
framework; Aristotelian practical reason “is [not] a theory peculiar to a single metaphysical 
or religious tradition”.43
She defends this claim through an exclusively anthropocentric reading o f the function 
argument. Human function means “the life we choose must be [...] a life that we, as we
39 Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” p. 60.
40 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” p. 213.
41 Nussbaum, Fragility, pp. 240-317, especially pp. 297-312; “The Discernment of Perception,” pp. 
54-105, especially pp. 56-66; also “Shame, Separateness, and Political Unity: Aristotle’s Criticism of 
Plato,” in Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 395-436.
42 Nussbaum, “Aristotelian Social Democracy,” p. 234. She further claims on p. 217 that liberals 
should not be worried that Aristotle represents a single, metaphysical tradition.
43 Nussbaum, “Aristotle’s Social Democracy,” p. 217.
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deliberate, can choose for ourselves as a life that is really a life for us, a life in which there 
will be enough o f what makes us the beings we are for us and to be said to survive in such a 
life.”44 Notably this account puts heavy emphasis on individual choice, and suspends the 
metaphysics underlining Aristotle’s naturalism which is conventionally understood to 
support his claims o f human ergon and the rational soul.45 Instead, Nussbaum equates 
human function with a thin conception of practical rationality and deliberative choice, a 
move which weakens the objectivity o f Aristotle’s philosophical framework.46 She writes, 
“the really rational way to choose, says Aristotle with great plausibility, is to reflect on and 
acknowledge the special contribution o f each item, and to make the understanding o f that 
heterogeneity a central part o f the subject matter o f deliberation.” She then concludes 
succinctly, “[ejvasiveness is not progress.”47 According to Nussbaum, accommodation of 
vast cultural differences and value specifications lies at the heart o f this metaphysically 
neutral conception o f human function. In fact, function supports the notion o f cultural 
divergence, value plurality, and the reality that some heterogeneous values will be both 
incomparable and incommensurable as a normative ideal. Such plurality o f goods are often 
agonistic, as Nussbaum explicitly says, “this is what it means to judge that something is an 
end, not simply a means to an end; there are no trade-offs without loss.”48 On Nussbaum’s 
picture o f human nature, Aristotle’s theory o f practical reasoning can be appropriated and 
utilised unproblematically as a relevant normative corrective to the reductivist tendencies of 
the standard model, particularly since it corresponds well to contemporary liberal values 
which emphasise the variegated individual and cultural conditions o f human choice.
Nussbaum’s retrieval o f Aristotle is initially appealing particularly if one is 
concerned about the reductivism and subjectivism characteristic o f standard model: it 
would appear that Aristotle provides an ideal counterweight to the standard model and even 
accommodates well certain widespread liberal intuitions. Yet I remain sceptical that 
Aristotle’s texts do indeed endorse any o f these claims and am generally unconvinced that 
one can sever Aristotle from both his historical moorings and metaphysical commitments 
so easily, as implied by Nussbaum. Indeed, two troubling implications emerge from her 
view: first, it is one thing to maintain that an underspecified objective end requires
44 Nussbaum, Fragility, p. 293.
45 See Irwin, “The Metaphysical and Psychological Basis of Aristotle’s Ethics” in A. O. Rorty, ed., 
Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berkeley: University of California, 1980), pp. 35-54 and his Aristotle’s 
First Principles,; Reeve, Practices o f Reason. MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 148-57, Bernard 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), especially pp. 43-52. Both 
MacIntyre and Williams explicitly depart from Aristotle, as they both claim that his metaphysical 
biology makes Aristotle’s views untenable in light of contemporary scientific knowledge.
46 Andr6 Laks makes similar criticisms of Julia Annas’ paper, “Naturalism in Greek Ethics,” which 
can apply to Nussbaum as well. See Annas’ paper and Laks, “Commentary on Annas,” both in 
Proceedings o f the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy Vol. IV (1988).
47 Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” p. 60.
48 Ibid.
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evaluation and specification o f its constituents through practical deliberation, but entirely 
another to say that the trajectory o f this kind o f deliberation will be the promotion o f an 
agonistic, plural specification o f the good. Nussbaum essentially conflates these two 
separate claims. Second, Nussbaum misrepresents Aristotle’s conception o f human nature 
in order to make his theory practically amenable to our contemporary predilections, as 
reflected in the perceived desirability o f evaluative and metaphysical neutrality in light o f 
the social reality o f value pluralism. This, in turn, weakens the scope, complexity, and the 
robust objectivity o f his means-end deliberation. Nussbaum’s partial retrieval o f Aristotle’s 
conception o f practical reason therefore fails to establish a substantively different and 
critical alternative to the subjectivism of the standard model; instead, she retreats to a 
position which ironically endorses the presuppositions o f the subjectivist and reductivist 
view she is trying to avoid. These issues are enough to doubt the success o f Nussbaum’s 
partial reappropriation o f Aristotelian means-end deliberation in support o f Nussbaum’s 
normative enterprise. Let me address these two points in turn.
First, it remains unclear how Nussbaum’s interpretation manages to bridge the claim 
that Aristotelian practical deliberation represents the process by which we come to 
articulate and evaluate constitutive goods -  and in some cases recognise their intrinsic 
value -  with the entirely separate claim that Aristotle’s practical reason actually accounts 
fo r , and indeed endorses, the objective, normative moral value o f irreducibly separate and 
plural goods. The former claim is incapable o f bearing the full weight o f a normative moral 
theory constructed by the latter view. As Andre Laks points out, any conceivable 
normative theory in the latter sense would need, not simply to acknowledge the existence o f 
plural ends and goods, but the stronger claim that all these goods are o f equal value.49 
Aristotle may recognise the existence o f plurality, o f conflicting choices between goods and 
ends, but this is not something to be celebrated or upheld as a normative ideal o f practical 
reason -  such conflict is a problem to be eradicated or minimised so that choice can be 
exercised without major impediment. In other words, awareness o f conflict is not 
synonymous with defining it as the ideal normative conditions o f deliberative choice.50
Aristotle’s propensity to reduce conflict in practical deliberation is clearly illustrated 
in his discussion o f the virtues. At the outset, the cumulative discussion o f deliberation and 
the virtues from EN  Book III-VI points to a reciprocal -  not plural or conflictual -  account 
o f the virtues.51 Though each specific virtue and mean state outlined in Book III should be 
understood as intrinsically valuable, Book IV’s discussion o f justice unifies these virtues, 
calling justice “not a part o f virtue but the whole o f it” [1130al0]. In other words, to
49 Ibid.
50 Laks, “Commentary on Annas,” p. 184.
51 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 157.
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conduct oneself with justice already presupposes the architectonic reciprocity o f the virtues 
[1137a5-25] and “is the active exercise o f complete virtue; and it is complete because its 
possessor can exercise it in relation to another person, and not only by him self’ [1129b30- 
33]. The virtue o f justice therefore naturally invites the use o f other virtues, simply to 
describe and define what it means to be just. For instance, one’s just character could be 
defined only in relation to other virtues like intelligence, amiability, reliability, temperance, 
and magnanimity. It is not the case, as Nussbaum suggests in the quotation earlier, that 
courage is inherently separate from justice or generosity. In fact we cannot remotely 
understand the significance o f one virtue unless it implies another; otherwise the context o f 
the virtue is lost and as a result, so is its richness and potency. For a virtue or intrinsic good 
to stand alone -  much less than reinforce the value o f that virtue -  it must be trivial enough 
not to imply some hierarchical arrangement or connection with others.52 Or the other 
alternative is the individual lacks the requisite coherent rational articulation needed to 
cognitively understand how one virtue fits with another.
For argument’s sake let us provisionally grant Nussbaum the view that the virtues or 
values composite o f eudaimonia are relatively separate and equally worthy depending on 
the variable context. Nussbaum’s may argue that the recognition o f separate goods is 
needed for the virtue o f justice; that is why Aristotle thinks the Lesbian rule -  malleable to 
the particular, and receptive to the situational and dispositional context -  should be used to 
judge another’s deliberative choices in meting out praise and blame. In principle, in 
judging other citizens, the person o f a just disposition recognises how unfortunate 
circumstances led to the moral conflict between separate goods, which subsequently bore 
on this person’s deliberative choice. This just individual will then accordingly inflict a 
more moderate punishment. The justness o f the moderate punishment stems from the 
praiseworthy recognition o f separate and incommensurable goods through deliberation; in 
other words, the nature o f the values or goods themselves confer upon practical reasoning 
the moral reality o f plurality and incommensurability. But this reverses the actual process 
Aristotle describes. For Aristotle, the conditions o f  practical deliberation i ts e lf-  where we 
judge values and goods -  cannot be riddled with such indeterminacy. The individual with a 
just character may acknowledge an apparent clash o f goods, but she is in a position to 
judge in the first place because she has shown to others her possession o f deliberative 
excellence, meaning she is capable o f assessing conduct in light o f  a harmonious good. She 
will be sensitive to the particularities, but she will praise and blame through the rational 
application o f law in order to orient others towards that good.
52 This point is powerfully described by Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f Good (London: 
Routledge, 2001) pp. 55-6.
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This leads to my second objection against Nussbaum. Nussbaum depicts Aristotelian 
rationality in a fairly minimal, thin sense: it cannot concretely arbitrate between conflicting 
goods without loss; indeed the successful exercise o f one’s deliberation will lead one to 
acknowledge our inability to rationally measure and decide between distinct values. This 
presupposes a thin notion o f what it means to actualise human ergon and essentially 
weakens Aristotle’s own robustly objectivist conception: how an individual achieves full 
human functioning remains undetermined and open to a myriad o f divergent, often 
conflicting choices.53 In other words, this construal o f practical reason and value 
incommensurability vis-a-vis Aristotelian function can lead to conflict in functional roles 
themselves. Nussbaum gives an example where one is required to make a choice between 
playing music and helping a friend, and no neat practical rational resolution can be had in 
this decision, given the equal and incomparable value o f each.54 Implicit here is perhaps an 
even stronger claim: Nussbaum wants to say that these both can be meaningful 
specifications o f human function -  function o f man as a musician qua musician in pursuit 
o f artistic excellence, or as a friend qua friend engaged in other-regarding virtues -  and 
therefore illustrate how diverse functional roles comprising the overall function o f man can, 
and indeed frequently do, clash. Human function may be realised in both our functions as 
musician or as friend, and both would be equally valid definitions or combinations o f what 
it is to be human. Even if I am right that, when one deliberates well, intrinsically valuable 
goods, like the virtues, imply one another in some fashion, could Nussbaum be correct to 
pinpoint the possibility for conflict between different functional roles?
Nussbaum’s example suggests that human function as musician or friend can be a 
partial and irreplaceable component that comprises human functioning, and a weaker theory 
o f practical rationality follows. But this thin conception o f function and practical reason 
contradicts Aristotle’s statements in E N  1.7:
If  we take a flautist or a sculptor or any artist -  or in general any class o f men who 
have a specific function or activity -  his goodness and proficiency are considered to 
lie in the performance o f that function; and the same will be true o f man, assuming 
that man has a function. But is it likely that whereas joiners and shoemakers have 
certain functions or activities, man as such has none, but has been left by nature a 
functionless being? Just as we can see that eye and hand and foot and every one o f 
our members have some function, should we not assume that in like manner a human 
being has a function over and above these particular function? [1197b25-34]
53 See Laks, “Commentary on Annas,” pp. 181-2.
54 Nussbaum, “The Discernment of Perception,” p. 59.
71
The quotation here indicates something significantly different from Nussbaum: Aristotle 
says joiners, artists, and shoemakers all have a specific function, and it therefore follows 
that we can say humans likewise have a function that is distinct from these.55 It is not the 
case that the function o f man admits plural, diverse, equally valuable (and therefore 
sometimes contradictory) functional roles. Two options will actualise human function: 
either the political or contemplative life.56
Moreover, this discrete function involves specific metaphysical notions o f the 
rational soul as an objective form, substance, and essence. However ambiguous and 
tenuous this connection, it nonetheless suggests Aristotle attempts to minimise conflict in 
deliberative choice by indicating a singular choice o f life capable o f actualising 
anthropomorphic function and essence, and therefore indicates the conferral o f a common 
measure or objective property onto seeming disparate values via one’s practical 
deliberation. Ultimately Aristotle gives us two options: the contemplative or political life -  
and depending on one’s reading, the latter may even be secondary to the former. This gets 
to the crux o f the argument presented over these two chapters: Aristotle clearly maintains a 
discrete sphere for practical and theoretical reasoning: the former is limited by the complex 
and contingent nature endemic to the situational perplexities o f practical life; whereas the 
latter is concerned with universal, enduring truths. These differences are crucial to keep in 
mind, but nonetheless an explanatory scheme unites the two: both employ teleological, a 
priori relations that confer upon practical reason a degree o f moral objectivity and realism, 
independent o f cultural or subjective hedonistic reactions.57 Constituent means can be 
evaluated and measured against one another according to a determinate, singular vision o f 
human function {ergon) and our ultimate end. Aristotle believes all humans aim roughly 
towards that naturally prior end, even when one’s abilities to rationally arbitrate between 
conflicting goals are still relatively crude.58 Even when eudaimonia is only implicit in the 
precognitive phase and one is not mature enough to rationally articulate such a goal, a wiser 
observer could still make rational sense o f their behaviour by eliciting a species-wide desire 
for the ultimate end. In its explanatory role, the practical syllogism conveys this kind o f 
self-conscious, retrospective activity in search o f a reasoned, conceptual articulation o f the 
overarching value (the “for the sake o f that”) underlying human intentional acts. For the 
person o f practical wisdom and moral virtue this will eventually lead to a theoretical
55 See Laks, “Commentary on Annas,” p. 181.
56 For my purposes I do not need to take a clear stand on which life Aristotle conclusively endorses. 
But for more on this see Timothy D. Roche, “Ergon and Eudaimonia in Nicomachean Ethics I: 
Reconsidering the Intellectualist Interpretation,” Journal o f the History o f Philosophy 26:2 (1988): 
175-194; W. F. R. Hardie, ‘The Final Good in Aristotle’s Ethics,’ Philosophy 40 (1965): 277-95, 
also J. L. Ackrill, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia,'’ in Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, pp. 15-33.
57 See especially Charles, “Aristotle and Modem Realism,” pp. 135-72.
58 Irwin, “The Metaphysical,” p. 48.
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exploration o f human ergon or function -  the naturally prior, schematic organisation of the 
constituents which contribute to our species’ overall flourishing. In contrast to the 
subjectivism pervasive in both the standard model and contemporary liberal stance -  
whereby subjective, interior self-ascriptions and subjective choices over one’s life are 
primary -  Aristotle says that whether an individual says to herself she desires and adopts 
this ultimate end is unimportant, given the objective context o f the rational soul and 
functional essence.59 In other words, it is unimportant that an individual cannot articulate 
the reasons for their action in terms of the only choice o f life worth having (one that is 
eudaimdri); it just is the case that when those actions are observed by others who possess 
rational wisdom, they will be understood in light of this singular -  not pluralistic -  choice 
o f life or end, applicable species-wide. Without this orientating framework an individual’s 
rational choices and means-end actions may be misconstrued as disconnected and 
unintelligible.
Even the temporal dimension to human desire and choice supports this view. Recall 
that the human sense o f time, whereby seemingly incompatible present and future desires 
are encountered, appears to make means-end deliberation and practical action patently 
unpredictable and sometimes capricious. Aristotle says human “appetites run counter to 
one another, which happens when a principle o f reason and a desire are contrary and is 
possible only in beings with a sense of time (for while thought bids us hold back because of 
what is pleasant and good, without condition in either case, because o f want o f foresight 
into what is farther away in time” [433b5-10]. On one superficial understanding we could 
say, unlike animals that have no temporal awareness and have appetites they pursue 
immediately, humans are capable o f desiring both immediate and future goals and these 
could fundamentally conflict with one another. However, the flip side o f this temporal 
dimension is also the deliberative capacity to integrate a long-range view o f our goals and a 
rational understanding o f the way different goods or ends do and should fit at different 
phases o f our lives. Temporal awareness in deliberation should ultimately grant 
consistency to one’s choices and moral character. As Irwin acutely puts it,
[i]f [a person] has no view of what would be preferable in the future, or if his view is 
quite inconstant from one occasion to another, he is ill equipped to make a sensible 
choice; either he does not know how to evaluate the future effects o f an action, or he 
may well change his mind about them later, and so has no reason to take his present 
views seriously.60
59 Ibid., p. 47.
60 Ibid.
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The capacity to rationally arbitrate practical options and measure them according to human 
functional end -  rather than function o f man as a musician or as a friend -  is to have 
consistency with the present and future self. Indeed, this is the kind o f sophisticated 
arbitration and appraisal envisaged in phronesis. To simply say it is the nature o f intrinsic 
values to be incommensurable, and the condition o f means-end rationality is subsequent 
immobilisation by tragic conflict between two equally viable options, would indicate 
flaw ed  means-end deliberation rather than reflect ethical reality for Aristotle.61 The 
inability to compare values and assess different possible courses o f action is endemic to the 
person who either has not moved beyond the precognitive phase, or possesses habitual 
faults with their practical reasoning.
In sum, contrary to the normative conclusions drawn by Nussbaum, the practical 
means-end deliberation that matters ultimately to Aristotle must reflect the universal and 
natural function o f humans, whereby the self is a temporal manifestation o f a kind o f being 
in a natural hierarchy. Our functional placement within this hierarchy grants us with an 
objective measure or common property to examine seemingly conflicting practical 
possibilities, and provides us with an objective end to our lives. The means-end 
deliberative process o f phronesis cannot remotely be instigated if  the overarching telos of 
eudaimonia is absent from view, by which a myriad o f activities or options are judged, 
structured, and harmonised in light o f that aim. Characteristic o f the person who 
deliberates well is this very capacity to compare and weigh different values, assess the 
impact o f their present choice on their future selves and circumstances, and visualise 
whether this best actualises their ultimate end, in light o f their function as a being with a 
rational soul.62 And importantly, this objective measure or common property will not lead 
to a thin conception o f practical rationality and certainly resists the tragic contingency of 
choice emphasised in Nussbaum. The existence o f enduring definitional features, 
contained within human function, imparts similarly enduring qualities to the means-end 
reason o f one who is practically wise. The phronimos is not an exemplar o f practical 
wisdom because his deliberation values or reflects the plurality and tension o f the ultimate 
telos, but because his high degree o f deliberative sophistication appreciates the complex 
unity o f activities that eventually culminate in his telos and actualisation o f species 
function, regardless o f the circumstance [ 1100b31 -1101 a3 ].
The difficulties inimical to practical, moral life do not minimise how Aristotle 
incorporates a number o f rational, emotional, and psychological devices at the agent’s 
disposal to resolve potential conflict between multiple desires and ends. Nussbaum 
overlooks how these rational and non-rational aspects in the phronimos are potential tools
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., p. 45.
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in instances o f value conflict, and allow him to measure, through means-end deliberation, 
what goods or means are appropriate at that time o f his life, and in light o f his future self. 
That values may not be codifiable with complete scientific exactitude and certainly does 
not entail the moral neutrality aspired to by contemporary liberal political philosophy. But 
Aristotle nonetheless utilises the notion o f human ergon and its correspondingly substantive 
conception o f human reason, in order to provide an objective measure according to which 
intrinsically valuable goods are negotiated and mitigated against one another. Like other 
contemporary value-pluralists, Nussbaum’s reading implies any conflict between two 
equally desirable means or ends will simply result in a toss-up or a tragic impasse; but that 
is not the kind o f arbitrary deliberation paradigmatic o f phronesis. Aristotle’s conception 
o f means-end reason ultimately acknowledges that humans -  as emotional, receptive beings 
who are responsive to others and the world around us -  are vulnerable to misfortune or 
inner turmoil. However, the possession of a consistent moral character, manifested in 
instrumental deliberative excellence -  which admirably synthesises our irrational and 
rational facets to engage in rational activity fitting to our ergon -  provides a dynamic 
coping stone for such upheavals in the course o f one’s life.
Conclusion
The argument extending over these two chapters has been twofold: First, I claimed 
that the combined result o f Aristotle’s metaphysical background to human function, the 
necessary specification and evaluation o f ends in practical reasoning, and the non- 
reductivist nature o f the practical syllogism suggests that the standard model cannot be 
ascribed to Aristotle. Moreover, even if Aristotle’s conception o f cleverness is akin to the 
standard model, it is not of the freestanding nature o f the latter since it is situated within a 
broader conception o f substantive practical deliberation which demands the articulation of 
moral value and objective human goods. The distance between Aristotelian practical 
reason and the standard model was important so as to illustrate the crucial function carried 
out by Aristotle’s objectivist philosophical framework in evading the subjectivism of the 
standard model. Second, the objectivity o f this very framework is weakened in 
Nussbaum’s partial reappropriation o f Aristotle in order to make his moral theory more 
amenable to our liberal and naturalistic proclivities towards the accommodation o f value 
plurality and metaphysical neutrality. Aristotle strikes a decidedly intermediate position 
between those who claim our moral conduct can be reduced to a formal procedure of 
universal validity and those who uphold a subjectivist view o f moral evaluation and
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practice.63 It is precisely this balance Aristotle strikes that Nussbaum finds so attractive. 
But her attempts at retrieval is unsuccessful: in suggesting that Aristotelian reason cannot 
arbitrate between incommensurable values according to an objective metric or criterion, 
Nussbaum ends up roping o ff the framework which makes Aristotle avoid the subjectivism 
and reductivism o f  the very model she rejects. For Aristotle practical rational complexity 
can co-exist with a determinate definition of human life, all without necessarily committing 
oneself to the claims o f liberal agonism, explanatory reductivism, or ethical subjectivism. 
Ultimately, Aristotle’s objective account o f human function will commit us to metaphysical 
views we simply cannot endorse today but we should be weary o f hiving off the very 
framework which prevents the subjectivism critics find so problematic in the standard 
model. As we will see in the subsequent chapters, this dilemma is not isolated to neo- 
Aristotelian attempts at retrieval.
63 Here G. E. R. Lloyd’s observation that “our moral excellences may be determinate without being 
invariable constants” is apt. See Lloyd, “Medical and Biological Analogies,” p. 76.
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4 The Naturalism of Humean Instrumental Reason
Wee, sleekit, courin’, tim ’rous beastie,
Oh what a panic’s in thy breastie!
Thou needna start away sae hasty,
W i’ bick’ring brattle!
I wad be laith to rin and chase thee 
W i’murd’ring pattle!
I ’m truly sorry man’s dominion 
Has broken nature’s social union,
And justifies that ill opinion 
Which mak’s thee startle 
At me, thy poor earth-born companion,
And fellow mortal!
- Robert Bums, “To A Mouse”
In A Treatise o f  Human Nature Hume writes, “Reason is, and ought only to be the 
slave o f the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey 
them” [p. 415].1 As we saw in Chapter 1 the standard model takes this to mean that reason 
has only an informational, theoretical function, and action is motivated by natural human 
passions or desires. Moreover, the relationship between reason and the passions evokes 
analogies with Aristotelian means-end deliberation: an appetitive or desiderative state, such 
as wish (boulesis), provides an agent’s end; reason determines the means to achieve those 
ends. These similarities between what the standard model takes Hume to mean and 
Aristotle are superficial however: Chapters 2 and 3 showed that Aristotelian instrumental 
reason differs from the standard model insofar as phronesis implies a commitment to an 
objectivist philosophical framework, evidence in Aristotle’s function argument, which then 
imposes demands on the articulation and evaluation the goods and ends constitutive o f that 
framework. Despite contemporary normative appeals to Aristotelian means-end 
deliberation as a possible corrective to the standard model’s subjectivism and reductivism, I 
argued that these metaphysical commitments are an integral part o f Aristotle’s account of 
practical reason. Given the current dominance o f the scientific viewpoint and related 
reluctance to engage a metaphysical perspective, such retrieval projects are o f limited 
success.
Unlike the evident ancient-modern cosmological gulf facing (and restricting) neo- 
Aristotelian retrievals, Hume’s background Newtonian view o f nature comports well with
1 David Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, 2nd edn., L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., with textual notes by 
P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978). All quotations from Hume’s Treatise refer to this 
edition, hereafter abbreviated T.
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to the predominant naturalistic temper in contemporary philosophy which in turn justify 
current retrievals o f Hume’s views in debates about practical motivation. Indeed, as noted 
in the introduction, Hume is widely considered the historical ancestor o f the standard model 
for three reasons. First, Hume examines human nature in a more experimental fashion, thus 
aligning the human sciences with the natural sciences. Much like the aspired metaphysical 
neutrality o f current naturalistic temper, Hume’s critique o f rationalism rejects all 
metaphysical assumptions that are incompatible with a scientific, experiential approach to 
the study o f human nature. Second, Hume is known for giving a conativist account o f 
motivational action: natural desiderative and passional human features are more important 
than cognitive rational capacities in the explanation, motivation, and guidance o f human 
practical action. Indeed, the causal origin o f practical action can be traced to individual 
desiderative states or pro-attitudes. Reason has no role in evaluating and articulating the 
substantive worth or moral value o f conatively determined ends, but merely provides 
empirical content; reason has no motivational force independently o f its association with 
subjective preferences. Finally, these desires or passions reflect subjective reactions and 
preferences o f individuals -  no objective framework determines the value o f these conative 
reactions. I f  there are non-subjective standards o f  reason, these pertain to the structural 
consistency between (rather than substantive content of) contingent desires and beliefs. 
Hume’s conativist account o f motivation seems amenable to the explanatory aspirations o f 
the standard model while the subjectivist nature o f human desire responds well to the 
evaluative and metaphysical neutrality sought among contemporary adherents o f the 
standard model.2 In short, Hume’s reputation as a naturalist, a  conativist, and an ethical 
subjectivist appears to verify the standard model’s Humean heritage.3
Despite these superficial similarities, I argue in this chapter that comparisons 
between Hume’s conception o f instrumental reason and the standard model are misguided 
for two crucial reasons. First, proponents o f the standard model underestimate the depth o f 
Hume’s scepticism in his naturalist commitments. This leads to a mistaken assumption that 
Hume’s reason has a purely information function which avoids problematic metaphysical 
claims bound up with a normative objectivity. In short, instrumental reason allegedly falls 
firmly on the “fact” side o f the fact/value divide. But for Hume, when negative, sceptical 
arguments combine with more positive, naturalist claims the epistemic certainty -  the “fact 
status” -  assumed by modem science is in fact questioned. Hume’s highly provocative
2 Hence Hume is sometimes portrayed as a descriptive utilitarian. John Bricke, “Hume, Motivation 
and Morality,” Hume Studies 14 (1988): 7.
3 See Jean Hampton, “Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?” Hume 
Studies 21:1 (1995): 57-74; Elijah Millgram, “Was Hume a Humean?” Hume Studies 21:1 (1995): 
75-93; Christine Korsgaard, “Scepticism About Practical Reason,” The Journal o f Philosophy 83:1 
(1986): 5-25.
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naturalist stance restricts what humans can objectively know o f the external world and by 
default what humans can know of themselves as participants within that world. Constraints 
on theoretical rational knowledge therefore create positive space for reason in a practical 
function .4
Second, Hume resists rather than endorses the ethical reductivism and subjectivism 
o f the standard model; his account o f practical reason is substantive rather than 
proceduralist in its basic conception. The idea o f an objective normativity valid for all 
humans is still operative in Hume’s approach, and he thinks o f reason as responsive to that 
normativity. More important than the coherence and consistency o f preferences and beliefs 
is the actual substantive content constitutive o f our instrumental deliberation. Like 
Aristotle, Hume’s conception o f instrumental reason incorporates qualitative content about 
the good: his naturalistic framework posits the value and worth o f human sociality which 
then necessitates the articulation and cultivation o f those admirable traits and virtues best 
able to promote human sociality.5 I show in these two chapters that evaluative content -  
like the moral worth o f society’s promotion and benefit -  impinges on an individual’s 
reasons and beliefs, and subsequently influence the direction o f his or her practical conduct. 
Unlike the freestanding nature o f the standard model, Hume’s conception o f instrumental 
reason is firmly situated within this crucial intersubjective framework.
Disregard for Hume’s philosophical framework not only leads to a mistaken 
association with the standard model, it also encourages others to assume that Hume has no 
conception o f instrumental reason at all so as to support a particular normative, critical 
agenda against the standard model. As I explain in the next chapter, the sceptical 
interpretation o f Korsgaard, Hampton, and Millgram claim that Hume does not have the 
philosophical tools needed to support a practical conception o f reason. According to these 
interpreters instrumental reason must contain normative premises which are suppressed by 
the standard model: proponents o f the latter are wrong to suggest that the normative status 
o f practical reasons is reducible to concerns about motivation, particularly since 
hypothetical imperatives o f instrumental reason -  or the means to an end -  are in fact 
prescriptive, normative reasons for action. Standards o f instrumental reason presuppose a 
categorical rational norm. If  this is true, Korsgaard, Millgram, and Hampton doubt that an 
agent’s actions can be evaluated according to any rational norms in a Humean theory of
4 This move on Hume’s part anticipates Kant’s claim about the primacy of practical reason.
5 Hume regards this as a natural fact about human beings, much like how classical thinkers presume 
humans are by nature co-operators and communicators. Hume would be quick to note that this is 
explicable in a science of man, but nonetheless it does presuppose a very particular vision of human 
nature. This is true if we compare Hume to a Hobbesian naturalist account, where the latter 
presumes a much more atomistic vision of humans.
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motivation.6 Either Hume must have a normative conception o f instrumental reason -  
therefore contradicting his own account o f the is/ought gap -  or he must be a 
thoroughgoing sceptic about instrumental reason. Sceptical readings maintain that Hume 
must be the thought o f as committed to the latter view -  that he does not believe there to be 
such a thing as practical reason -  since he presumably would reject the suppressed 
normative premises entailed in an account o f instrumental reason.7
In the next chapter I claim that, despite its critical agenda, the sceptical reading 
shares with the standard model an adherence to the fact/value gap, resulting in a 
proceduralist understanding o f practical reason that is misguidedly attributed to Hume.8 
Like the standard model, the sceptical reading is guilty o f disregarding Hume’s 
philosophical framework. As a result, it fails to appreciate Hume’s much more substantive 
conception o f  instrumental reason. Ultimately, Hume does not have to resort to a 
proceduralist account o f reason in order to make philosophical space for quasi-objective 
reasons with both motivational and normative authority. Specific questions o f motivation 
and normative justification in Humean instrumental reason will be addressed in the next 
chapter.
Resisting both contemporary standard models’ re-appropriations and Kantian 
critiques o f Hume allows us to see how Hume’s naturalistic framework demands evaluative 
and qualitative distinctions in relation to the non-subjective, specifically intersubjective, 
human good which constitute and situate his account o f instrumental reason. Standards of 
instrumental reasoning are judged according to collectively affirmed, broader social, moral 
(and ultimately natural) values. Hence, proponents o f the standard model are wrong to say 
that a naturalist account o f instrumental reason requires us to hive off normative 
frameworks and focus on motivational questions instead. Yet the Kantian critique is 
equally mistaken when it seeks to invalidate Humean instrumental reason through the 
imposition on it o f categorical norms typically associated with proceduralist conceptions of 
practical reason. For Hume, the social tapestry offers a crucial motivational and normative 
backdrop, that is part and parcel o f reason’s practical function o f ethical judgement guided 
by communally shared demands upon individual character. Thus, the norms or standards of
6 Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, “Introduction,” in Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut, eds., Ethics and 
Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997) p. 9. See also Christine Korsgaard, “The Normativity 
of Instrumental Reason,” in ibid., pp. 220-234; Hampton, “Practical Reason” pp. 66-9.
7 However, some Humeans would agree with these criticisms of the instrumental norm. It is 
generally acknowledged that Hume’s principles are only a point o f departure, and are subsequently 
enhanced with what Humeans see as more philosophically defensible claims. See James Dreier’s 
“Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality,” in Cullity and Gaut, eds., Ethics and 
Practical Reason, p. 96.
81 say Kantian in the constructivist sense (and use Kant as a point of departure) as opposed to a more 
textual, exegetical approach. This distinction will become much more important in Chapters 6 and 7 
on Kantian instrumental rationality.
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instrumental reason assess the character o f a person — whether they exhibit admirable traits 
and virtues beneficial to society and common life -  not discrete actions. Some striking 
similarities between a Humean and Aristotelian account o f instrumental rationality will 
become more evident throughout this and the next chapter.
The interpretation provided in these two chapters therefore emphasises the broader 
framework o f human sociality which situates what Hume would deem as admirable 
instrumental reasoning. This shows how and why he avoids the subjectivism that is 
implicit within contemporary debates about the standard model. The focus o f this chapter 
in particular is to illustrate why Hume’s naturalist framework differs from that which 
informs the current standard model: in positing certain natural, non-subjective human ends 
that situate Hume’s much richer conception o f practical reason cannot be considered the 
historical ancestor o f the standard model.
To argue against the alignment between Humean and the standard models of 
instrumental reason, I will pinpoint their discrepant accounts on nature and the role 
assigned to morality in the instrumental use o f reason. To do this, the current chapter 
provides a very cursory but necessary survey o f  Hume’s scepticism and naturalism. 
Section I establishes the divergent naturalist commitments o f contemporary and Humean 
models o f instrumental reason. I show that modem theories presuppose a “strict, reductive” 
naturalism, based on the possibilities o f scientific investigation to yield genuine knowledge 
about objects in the external world. This contrasts with Hume’s epistemic justification o f 
natural belief. In Section I I I  go on to show how different underlying conceptions o f nature 
also leads to contrasting ideas about the function o f reason. I argue that, for Hume, reason 
becomes subsumed under natural belief; this implies a specifically practical rather than 
theoretical function, which resonates with the Aristotelian distinction between practical and 
speculative thought.
/. Contemporary and Humean Naturalism
Both Hume and the standard model seek to eradicate metaphysics from their 
philosophical accounts o f instrumental reason. Both adopt a scientific approach to human 
nature. In the Introduction to the Treatise, Hume writes, “ ’Tis evident that all the sciences 
have a relation [...] to human nature” [xv]. He continues, “as the science o f man is the 
only solid foundation for the other sciences, so the only foundation we can give to this 
science itself must be laid on experience and observation” [xvi]. It is, however, unwise to 
assume that their underlying naturalism and the aims o f their methodological approach are 
one and the same.
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The contemporary naturalistic temper makes specific assumptions about the scientific 
status o f empirical facts impinging on human reason that differ in important respects from a 
Humean model. Indeed, these substantial differences tend to go unappreciated -  a 
consequence o f contemporary readings favouring either Hume’s sceptical or naturalist 
strands at the expense of the other.9 Yet as Kemp Smith and Stroud both point out, Hume’s 
scepticism and naturalism need to be seen as mutually supportive in Hume’s philosophical 
system to properly understand one or the other. It is necessary to outline the scientific 
realism underlying the standard model’s naturalistic framework in order to understand how 
it differs in substantial respects from that of Hume’s.
Underlying the standard model’s reading is what Strawson calls “reductive or strict 
naturalism” which is committed to a broader epistemological claim.10 The benefit o f 
Humean reason so defined is that it sidesteps any problematic metaphysical or normative 
claims. As a freestanding, information-processing faculty, reason will have an influence on 
our practical action in solely providing the means-end, causal information needed to obtain 
a desired end. For one particular strand o f the standard model in the philosophy of science, 
the standard model’s implicit reductive naturalism is conducive to their broader 
epistemological agenda geared towards legitimising the nature o f scientific discovery.11 
Through the adoption o f instrumental rationality a naturalist position can avoid the 
trappings o f metaphysical realism, a common but undesirable feature o f traditional 
epistemological justification. Thus, the standard model seemingly coheres with the 
naturalist’s rejection o f a priori, transcendental arguments or synthetic justification.12 
Though deeply critical o f this view, Harvey Siegel explains,
[ajccording to this sort o f naturalism, we can scientifically investigate the 
instrumental value that beliefs, cognitive processes and scientific methodologies have 
in achieving our ends; insofar as they have instrumental value, we can say that such
9 For an exception, see Barry Stroud, “The Constraints of Hume’s Naturalism,” Synthese 152 (2006): 
339-51.
10 This epistemological claim is that the scientific way of conceiving of the world, stripped of pre- 
scientific, orientating frameworks containing our moral perspectives, is superior -  and indeed, more 
real -  than a standpoint which incorporates moral, evaluative qualities. This scientism encourages us 
to do one of two things: it urges us to either doubt the reality of conscious experience, or demote 
phenomenal qualities and moral judgements to the non-scientific, non-descriptive sphere of 
subjective reality. See P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties; The Woodbridge 
Lectures 1983 (London: Methuen, 1985), p. 68.
11 See Larry Laudan’s papers, “Normative Naturalism,” Philosophy o f Science 57 (1990): 44-59; 
“Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly 24 (1987): 19-31; “Aim-less Epistemology?” Studies in History and Philosophy o f  
Science 21 (1990): 315-22; Ronald N. Giere’s work, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized,” 
Philosophy o f Science 52 (1985): 331-56; “Scientific Rationality as Instrumental Rationality,” 
Studies in History and Philosophy o f Science 20 (1989): 377-84.
12 Laudan, “Aim-less Epistemology?” pp. 315-22.
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beliefs and methodologies are rational. On this view rationality is instrumental, 
naturalistic and fully normative.13
Moreover, “the judgments o f instrumental efficacy require appeal to empirical evidence 
concerning the efficacy as established by such evidence, we have good instrumental reason 
to utilize the means established by that evidence as efficacious for the realization o f those 
ends, in so far as we embrace them as our ends.”14 For R. N. Giere and Larry Laudan, the 
reductive naturalist position is inevitably linked to an instrumental model o f reason, since 
the efficacy o f the means / end calculus can be justified through appeal to empirical 
evidence. As such, instrumental reason possesses solid scientific credentials: it does not 
require any a priori claims or justification through mysterious metaphysical norms external 
to the instrumental reasoning process itself. For these reasons, the standard model 
functions as a feasible methodological rule for scientific investigation. Giere states:
If  there were autonomous principles o f justification, they would provide standards 
o f what is often called categorical, or unconditional, rationality. But there is 
another, weaker, form o f rationality which is conditional, or instrumental. To be 
instrumentally rational is simply to employ means believed to be conducive to 
achieving desired goals [...] [T] here is also a more objective sense o f instrumental 
rationality which consists in employing means that are not only believed to be, but 
are in fact conducive to achieving desired goals. This latter, objective, sense of 
instrumental rationality provides the naturalistic theorist o f science with ample 
means for making normative claims about science. These claims, however, are not 
autonomous but are grounded within science itself. It requires empirical research 
to determine whether a particular strategy is in fact likely to be effective in 
producing valuable scientific results.15
In the same paper Giere goes on to suggest that instrumental ly normative judgements are 
“for the naturalist [...] the only kind o f normative judgment anyone can legitimately make. 
There is no ‘higher rationality’.”16 Moreover, the standard model’s inclusion o f established 
empirical knowledge views instrumental reason as capable o f progressively verifying and
13 Harvey Siegel, “Instrumental Rationality and Naturalized Philosophy of Science,” Philosophy o f  
Science 63 Supplement (1996): 116.
14 Ibid., p. 118.
15 Giere, “Scientific Rationality,” pp. 379-80.
16 Ibid., p. 382. Crucially, the espousal of a reductivist account of instrumental reason is a point of 
convergence between science and economics. See D. Wade Hands, “Blurred Boundaries: Recent 
Changes in the Relationship Between Economics and the Philosophy of Natural Science,” Studies in 
History and Philosophy o f Science 25 (1995): 751-72.
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generating known objective facts about the natural environment. The scientific content of 
instrumental reason incorporates information that has withstood previous empirical tests, 
and is therefore “grounded within science itself’. As methodological rules o f science, 
hypothetical imperatives o f instrumental rationality “are a part o f empirical knowledge, not 
something wholly different from it.”17 More specifically, instrumental reasons are “simply 
claims about relationships in the world: relationships that can be empirically investigated in 
the same way that science would investigate any other claim about relationships in the 
world.”18
Ultimately, the standard model as applied in the philosophy o f science promotes 
naturalist theoretical aims o f improved general scientific knowledge o f brute, natural facts; 
these aims are achieved through instrumental reason by upholding empirical standards like 
expected utility, avoidance o f error, or high probability.19 Presupposed in the standard 
model is therefore a robust conception o f nature. Nature describes the sum-total of objects 
as these exist independently o f the human perspective, and which are progressively 
explicable through scientific empirical investigation, facilitated through the standard model. 
If one were to map out which side o f the traditional practical / theoretical divide o f reason 
this account would fall, it would be firmly under the latter. Somewhat ironically the 
practical function o f instrumental reason is minimized, even as reductive naturalists claim 
that the standard model must be the only scientifically viable model capable o f promoting 
certain desirable results -  epistemic or practical.20 The priority shifts towards whether 
epistemic standards o f theoretical knowledge -  constituted by causal laws and concrete 
scientific facts -  are adhered to. As Giere explains, a naturalist framework o f instrumental 
reason results in a “constructive realist” position: scientific models are “humanly 
constructed abstract entities”. However, the realism o f these theories derives from the 
claim that a similar structure, obtains between models and real systems, “without imposing 
any distinction between ‘theoretical’ and ‘observation’ aspects o f reality.”21
Hume’s combined sceptical and naturalist commitments have a rather different, more 
modest aim. His conception o f natural belief reflects serious doubts over the possibility o f 
any epistemic model to produce genuine theoretical knowledge about the external world, 
and, crucially, this would rule out instrumental reason o f a kind just outlined. In effect, 
Hume’s scepticism about theoretical reason restricts its reach to the level o f human 
experience. In the Dialogues concerning Natural Religion claims o f objective knowledge
17 Laudan, “Progress or Rationality?” p. 241.
18 Laudan’s position as articulated by Hands, “Blurred Boundaries,” p. 767.
19 Laudan, “Aim-less Epistemology?” p. 317.
20 See ibid., pp. 315-22. Siegel also identifies this problem, and tries to distinguish between 
epistemic rationality and instrumental reason as practical inference. See “Instrumental Rationality,” 
pp. 166-24.
Giere, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized,” p. 346.
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o f nature are equated with specious declarations about reason’s speculative power. Hume 
writes:
These words, generation, reason, mark only certain powers and energies in nature, 
whose effects are known, but whose essence is incomprehensible, and one o f these 
principles, more than the other, has no privilege for being made a standard to the 
whole o f nature. [...] In this little comer o f the world alone, there are four principles, 
reason, instinct, generation, vegetation, which are similar to each other, and are the 
causes o f similar effects. What a number o f other principles may we naturally 
suppose in the immense extent and variety o f the universe, could we travel from 
planet to planet and from system to system, in order to examine each part o f this 
mighty fabric? [...] Reason, in its internal fabric and structure, is really as little 
known to us as instinct or vegetation; and perhaps even that vague, undeterminate 
word, Nature, to which the vulgar refer everything, is not at bottom more explicable. 
[Part vii]22
Hume calls into question what humans can objectively explain or know of our surrounding 
natural environment. To speculate on the causal principles governing natural processes is 
to overstep those epistemic tools nature has provided us.
It is highly unlikely that Giere would concur with Hume’s view about the 
inexplicability o f nature here. As Giere writes,
Neither empiricists nor rationalists could see how to get beyond their subjective 
experience or intuitions. This led to the familiar philosophical views that the world is 
nothing more than the sum total of our sense experience or that it is totally 
unknowable. In fact, we possess built-in mechanisms for quite direct interaction with 
aspects o f our environment. The operations o f these mechanisms largely bypass our 
conscious experience and linguistic or conceptual abilities. Thinkers struggling to 
understand the nature o f other own knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries may be forgiven for not appreciating evolutionary theory o f contemporary 
neurobiology. A century after Darwin a similar lack o f appreciation is less 
forgivable.23
22 David Hume, Dialogues concerning Natural Religion, ed. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed. (London: 
Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1947) p. 178. All quotations are from this edition, hereafter abbreviated 
D.
23 Giere, “Philosophy of Science Naturalized,” p. 340.
|
I
I
85
For Giere, the content o f instrumental rationality is consonant with a scientific explanation 
o f nature; brute facts are theoretically comprehensible through empirical research. Granted, 
throughout the Treatise and Enquiry Hume makes ambiguous remarks regarding human 
natural beliefs about the permanence o f objects and their interaction, all broadly classified 
under “matters o f fact”; yet this is not indicative o f commitment to a robust method of 
scientific research, capable o f explicating real systems, objective causes or relations in 
nature. If  we were to follow Giere’s reductive naturalism, the assertion that we simply 
“believe” cause-effect relations to obtain between objects would be insufficient. Rather, on 
Giere’s account, the scientific method can establish that the cause-effect relation in 
instrumental reason does “/«fa c t” obtain, i.e., that the relation corresponds to a property or 
law governing objects and their interaction. When Giere writes that instrumental reason 
employs “means that are not only believed to be, but are in fa c t  conducive to achieving 
desired goals”, his view contrasts directly with Hume’s description o f our beliefs as 
“fictions” . Stroud is correct to expose the problematic nature o f  Hume’s view. He writes, 
“this attribution o f ‘fictions’ to all human beings [...] gives Hume’s version o f naturalism 
its peculiar character and its distinctly provocative air. And whatever exactly he means by 
‘fictions’ -  whether or not he means that they are all strictly false -  that is what makes it so 
hard to accept his naturalistic explanations.”24 Giere would presumably agree with 
Stroud’s assessment o f Hume. A crucial requirement in the standard model is an 
epistemically knowable conception o f enduring or interacting objects -  and though 
philosophers o f science are explicit about this requirement, it is implicit in the model’s 
application within moral and political philosophy as well. But such a requirement is 
notably absent in Hume’s naturalist explanation.25 As Stroud writes, for Hume the “public 
world o f independently existing physical objects that all human beings inevitably come to 
believe in plays no role at all in the naturalistic explanation o f how human beings come to 
believe in such a world.”26
In sum, “nature” for the standard model means to uphold the methodological primacy 
o f science and to understand how instrumental reason is continuous with the scientific 
mode o f explanation. It implies one can have certain knowledge o f brute facts about the 
external world and interacting objects -  a degree o f certainty underwritten by a 
corresponding model o f instrumental rationality.27 By contrast, “nature” for Hume means 
that we must accept certain givens about human nature, and we must therefore accept the
24 Stroud, “The Constraints,” p. 347.
25 Ibid., pp. 339-51.
26 Ibid., p. 345.
271 use the term “brute” here purposely: Giere believes in a “constructive” realism and distinguishes 
his view from classical empiricism, which would limit knowledge to observable facts. See Giere, 
“Constructive Realism,” in Paul Hooker, ed., Images o f Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism 
(Chicago: UP, 1985) pp. 75-98.
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inherent limitations o f our beliefs and rational knowledge which necessarily impede our 
capacity to objectively know anything. As we will see in the next section, Hume’s 
negative, sceptical arguments are mitigated by his more positive naturalist arguments, and 
both strands contain residues o f a more classical vision. This is not to deny his adherence 
to Newtonian science; however, scepticism and natural belief for Hume are discussed more 
in the spirit o f ancient sceptical attitudes towards rational speculation, and is tied to nature’s 
function as a guide to practical life. The examination o f nature has benefit, not because it 
leads to certainty about brute natural facts but because it has special relevance for our 
human endeavours as practical and moral agents.28 In other words, the objectivity o f 
natural beliefs is from its moral and practical applicability and therefore moves us away 
from the scientific realism and theoretical bias underlying the standard model.
II. Hume and Natural Belief
For Hume, scepticism in the theoretical sphere makes room for a distinctly practical 
sphere. Hume, like the ancient Pyrrhonian Sceptic, argues that one cannot make dogmatic 
claims about the real objective order o f things.29 But for Sextus Empiricus -  one o f the 
main adherents to Pyrrhonian Scepticism -  the presence o f sceptical doubts, o f 
contradictions in our beliefs and rational arguments regarding the true reality o f things, 
means one must refrain from having any beliefs. By means o f this attitude o f epoche -  
where one suspends beliefs or judgements altogether -  the ideal state o f ataraxia (freedom 
from disturbance) can be achieved. As a practical model, Pyrrhonian Scepticism involves 
living in detached acquiescence to societal conventions. Hume agrees with Sextus that one 
must refrain from dogmatic claims; however, he finds the Pyrrhonian arguments for the 
elimination o f belief unconvincing, and thinks o f this suspensive state as a practical 
impossibility. Thus, scepticism for Hume is not as global as the Pyrrhonians, whose 
scepticism extends even to the sphere o f ethics.30 Indeed, unlike the Stoic or Epicurean, 
“the Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the 
mind: or if  it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society.” Hume continues in the
28 Thomas M. Olshewsky, “The Classical Roots of Hume’s Skepticism,” Journal o f the History o f  
Ideas 52:2 (1991): 283-4. Olshewsky draws interesting parallels with the scepticism of Cicero and 
Hume, and argues convincingly that Hume’s scepticism has important Ciceronian remnants.
29 For more on the historical importance of ancient Scepticism in early modem philosophy, and on 
Hume particularly, see Richard Popkin, “David Hume: His Pyrrhonism and His Critique of 
Pyrrhonism,” Philosophical Quarterly 1 (1951): 385-407 as well as “David Hume and The 
Pyrrhonian Controversy,” Review o f Metaphysics 6 (1952-3): 65-81. See also David Fate Norton’s 
section on Pyrrhonian Scepticism in David Hume; Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical 
Metaphysician (Princeton: UP, 1982) pp. 255-69.
30 For more contrasts between ancient and modem scepticism, see Julia Annas and Jonathan Barnes, 
The Modes o f Scepticism; Ancient Texts and Modern Interpretations (Cambridge: UP, 1985) p. 165.
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same passage, if  one lived the life o f Pyrrhonian scepticism, “all human life must perish 
[...] all discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, 
till the necessities o f  nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence” [E, p. 160, 
first emphasis added].31 Total epoche results in a kind o f practical immobility that would 
undermine ordinary life and common society. In the end, the Pyrrhonian would be forced 
to admit that even their philosophical speculation confirms the workings o f nature, as 
“nature is always too strong for principle” [ibid.]. Hume’s own scepticism therefore 
occupies a more intermediate position between the rationalist and the extreme sceptic, and 
attempts to do the same work as Aristotle’s separation o f the sciences. Namely, in rejecting 
the view that logically necessary rules -  discovered through theoretical reason -  somehow 
determine human action, Hume creates positive space for a distinctly practical sphere o f 
human activity and ends which orient and direct our rational faculty. This he does through 
his positive naturalist claims.
In essence, Hume’s unique naturalism avoids the impracticality o f Pyrrhonian 
epoche,32 The extremes o f Pyrrhonian doubt can be averted by natural belief: nature 
mitigates even the most extreme form of scepticism in order to point to beliefs humans 
cannot know with certainty but must nonetheless retain in order to survive. Nature implants 
these beliefs in us because o f their intrinsic utility for our ordinary, everyday endeavours. 
Hume writes:
Nature, by an absolute and uncontroulable necessity has determin’d  us to judge as 
well as to breath andfeel, nor can we any more forebear viewing certain objects in a 
stronger and fuller light, upon account o f their customary connexion with a present 
impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or 
seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad 
sunshine. Whoever has taken the pains to refute the cavils o f this total scepticism, 
has really disputed without an antagonist, and endeavour’d by arguments to establish 
a faculty, which nature has antecedently implanted in the mind, and render’d  
unavoidable. [T, p. 183, first and third emphases added]
Hume suggests that nature bestows upon us an instinctual process o f belief-formation, as 
well as beliefs with specific content. Beliefs about causality, about the endurance o f the
31 David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles o f  
Morals, 3rd edn., L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., with textual notes by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: UP, 1975). 
All subsequent quotations from Hume’s Enquiry are from this edition, hereafter abbreviated to E.
32 For a good exposition of Hume’s understanding of Pyrrhonism, see Popkin, “David Hume: his 
Pyrrhonism” and “David Hume”. M. F. Bumyeat argues Sextus Empiricus can answer Hume’s 
criticisms of Pyrrhonian scepticism. See his “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?” in Myles 
Bumyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley: University of California, 1983).
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self and external objects may be fictional from some non-anthropocentric, God’s eye view. 
However, our nature as human beings makes it necessary that we take these potentially 
fictional accounts as true in order to function in our natural environment. These beliefs are 
“two operations o f the mind [...] equally natural and necessary in the human mind” [p. 
266].33 In the Enquiry he states even more provocatively:
Here, then, is a kind o f pre-established harmony between the course o f nature and 
the succession o f our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former 
is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, 
we find, gone on in the same train with the other works o f nature. Custom is that 
principle, by which this correspondence has been effected; so necessary to the 
subsistence o f our species, and the regulation o f our conduct, in every circumstance 
and occurrence o f human life [.E, pp. 54-5, emphasis added]
Nature itself has therefore equipped humans with cognitive tools necessary to the 
successful navigation o f practical life.
At their root natural beliefs derive from sense impressions which arise as responses to 
our natural environment. Hume writes, “An impression first strikes upon the senses, and 
makes us perceive heat or cold, thirst or hunger, pleasure or pain o f some kind or other” [T, 
p. 8]. The impressions are always prior to any mental conception o f it in the idea. 
Thoughts, or the ideas and beliefs o f objects, cannot even exist unless their origin is an 
impression experienced by sensory perception. Customary association by means o f 
memory turn ideas or complex impressions into beliefs, and causal beliefs are formed by a 
combination o f “both an impression o f the memory or senses, and o f the idea o f that 
existence, which produces the object o f the impression, or is produc’d by it” [p. 84]. 
Beliefs -  and the reasoned inferences we draw as a result (this I discuss in greater detail 
below) -  are cognitive psychological states with an experiential root: present impressions 
generate associative ideas that imitate the vividness and forcefulness o f the impressions o f 
an original object or event. Since beliefs approximate our original experiences in vivacity, 
we come to some idea about the unobserved which, in turn, can have a mediate influence 
on our passions.34 Hume says further, “belief consists merely in a certain feeling or 
sentiment; in something that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain
33 Cf. in D, Cleanthes states, “The declared profession of every reasonable sceptic is only to reject 
abstruse, remote and refined arguments; to adhere to common sense and the plain instincts of nature; 
and to assent, wherever any reasons strike him with so full a force, that he cannot, without the 
greatest violence, prevent it.” [p. 154]
4 David Owen, Hume’s Reason (Oxford: UP, 1999) pp. 163-5. See also Annette Baier, A Progress 
o f Sentiments; Reflections on Hume’s Treatise (Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1991) p. 159.
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determinate causes and principles o f  which we are not masters” [p. 624, emphasis added]. 
As humans we are naturally constituted to have some beliefs that do not originate from our 
own rational construction; rather our commonly held beliefs are, in some ways, imposed or 
determined by nature:
It is more conformable to the ordinary wisdom o f nature to secure so necessary an act 
o f the mind, by some instinct or mechanical tendency, which may be infallible in its 
operations, may discover itself at the first appearance o f life and thought, and may be 
independent o f all the laboured deductions o f the understanding. As nature has 
taught us the use o f our limbs, without giving us knowledge o f the muscles and 
nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which 
carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to which that which she has 
established among external objects; though we are ignorant o f those powers and 
forces, on which this regular course and succession o f objects totally depends. [E, p. 
55]
Unlike the Pyrrhonian, the presence o f sceptical arguments does not entail the complete 
suspension o f all beliefs. We can (and should) remain noncommittal about the rational 
truth o f the objective order o f things, but this does not mean that we are not necessarily 
committed to the certainty with which we hold our beliefs. This necessity is not
attributable to a rationalist, metaphysical source o f belief, but to instinctive psychological
mechanisms natural to all humans.35
Even more important is what gives our beliefs epistemic warrant. As stated in 
Section I, the reductive naturalism underlying the standard model suggests that our beliefs 
are scientifically verifiable. By contrast, for Hume mechanisms o f memory and 
imagination make a belief worthy o f epistemic consideration, and strength o f feeling  or 
sentiment counts as sufficient evidence for the validity o f a belief. In other words, our 
beliefs are epistemically grounded on nothing but a feeling generated by customary 
experience, and certain psychological instincts effectively bridge the gap between 
experience and thought.36 Unlike the “loose reveries o f the fancy”, those beliefs we think 
are true will affect us with greater force than those presumed to be false; they will be 
attended by a “feeling or sentiment” [p. 48], Again he writes, “The difference between 
fiction  and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling [that] must be excited by nature, like all 
other sentiments; and must arise from the particular situation, in which the mind is placed 
at any particular juncture” [p. 48]. (The relationship between feeling, sentiment and true
35 See Bumyeat, “Can the Skeptic Live His Skepticism?” p. 118.
36 Barry Stroud, Hume (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977) pp. 132-3.
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beliefs has important implications for the motivational question o f reason, which I leave for 
a fuller discussion in the next chapter). That sentiment and feeling give our beliefs 
sufficient epistemic warrant affirms that the truth value o f our cognitive beliefs and reasons 
is relevant only for their practical value, for their ability to guide us in human activity. 
Crucially, true belief -  and how we verify its truth -  shares a common root with the main 
motive source o f practical action, namely sensation and sentiment.
In sum, then, natural beliefs are epistemically confirmed by sentiment and memory, 
and these beliefs do not have to adhere to an actual property in the world in order to still 
have some important impact on human practical life. What actually or truly exists 
independently o f human beings, and what we psychologically believe to be true about the 
independent existence o f objects, are distinct questions; belief in the latter sense does not 
necessitate belief in the former sense. Indeed, the former question is closed off altogether 
from human inquiry, but this does not diminish the practical utility o f holding those beliefs. 
For example, nature imposes a belief in enduring personal identity. “The sceptic [...] must 
assent to the principle concerning the existence o f body, though he cannot pretend by any 
arguments o f philosophy to maintain its veracity,” Hume writes. He continues, “
Nature has not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteemed it an affair o f  too 
great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. We 
may well ask, What causes induce us to believe in the existence o f  body? but ‘tis 
vain to ask, Whether there be body or not? That is a point which we must take for 
granted in all our reasonings” [T, p. 187, first emphasis added].
The permanence o f  the self may or may not be an objective fact, but out o f psychological 
necessity we have this belief because o f its practical usefulness to human activity. And for 
Hume this practical sphere emerges when nature subsumes and guides our human cognitive 
faculty.
i) Causality and Probable Reason
As explained so far, for Hume natural beliefs are ones that we hold instinctively: they 
do not advance our knowledge in a theoretical sphere, but rather facilitate human practical 
and common life. A similar argumentative strategy justifies our belief in causal relations 
between objects. Objects become conjoined from previous experience, and memory is a 
valid epistemic consideration for causal beliefs. But the opposite is also true: without 
firsthand experience, ideas o f cause and effect -  o f the succession o f  objects or events -  are 
impossible. In the Enquiry Hume claims that the mental operation which conjoins relations
91
between objects -  such as flame and heat, snow and cold -  is “a species o f  natural instinct, 
which no reasoning or process o f thought and understanding is able, either to produce, or to 
prevent” [.E, pp. 46-7, emphasis added]. Hume also refers to this natural mental process of 
customary object association as causal or probable reasoning.
Though the many ways in which Hume uses the term “reason” are a matter of dispute 
among interpreters, it is relatively uncontroversial to say that he refers to both 
demonstrative and probable reason.37 Hume is deeply sceptical that demonstrative reason 
can reveal intrinsic properties of, or necessary connections between, ideas or objects.38 
According to demonstrative reason, relations between ideas or objects are deemed self- 
evident according to the laws o f non-contradiction and deductive logic; epistemic 
justification would be through formal deductive argumentation.39 This preoccupation with 
formal justification, however, is not the concern o f causal inference. Inferences stem, not 
from a priori properties o f ideas, but from experience; no necessary relations between 
inferred ideas are rationally discovered since these necessary connections between 
impressions -  the source o f our propositions and ideas -  are never empirically observed in 
the first place.40 In confining demonstration to the sphere o f mathematics, Hume 
effectively rejects the rationalist view of reason as a divinely inspired faculty which 
functions independently o f custom and experience. By contrast, the causal story that 
originates in experience and natural belief is all that our reason can discover.41 The 
amplified role o f experience within probable reason specifically challenges the Cartesian 
objectification o f experience, where rational disengagement from sensory experiences 
enables the mechanical unification o f disparate ideas or impressions to produce a superior 
whole. For Hume this strategy fundamentally confuses the sequential order between 
experience and ideas: thought or cognitive belief is always posterior to, and inseparable 
from, sensory experience.
Like the idea o f personal identity, causal beliefs force  themselves upon individuals, 
as “experience may produce a belief and a judgement o f causes and effects by a secret 
operation, and without being once thought o f ’ [T, p. 104].42 Causal reasoning is the 
posterior reflection o f past or immediate experiences, which allows hypothetical 
correlations to be drawn between certain events with certain effects. Experience is 
composed o f disparate sensory impressions o f constant flux and change which only become
37 David Fate Norton identifies at least five ways Hume uses the term reason; see David Hume, pp. 
96-9, n. 4. For my purposes here I focus on the demonstrative and probable forms of reasoning, and 
set aside prospective ambiguities between reasoning as a calm passion for the next chapter.
38 This is with the exception of mathematical propositions and quantities (see E, p. 25).
39 Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy o f David Hume (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1966). p. 
99.
40 Stroud, Hume, p. 45.
41 Owen, Hume’s Reason, p. 63.
42 Stroud, Hume, p. 76
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conjoined or constant by some natural cognitive mechanism. As a part o f this natural 
cognitive faculty, probable reasoning will use those natural beliefs, especially of causality, 
generated through custom, memory, and habit. Whereas Giere’s naturalist view suggests 
that cause and effect are properties o f interacting objects in nature, for Hume causal 
relations are part o f a natural psychological propensity o f ours, rendering probable 
inferences no more than subjectively valid, though in an enlarged sense o f “subjective” -- 
i.e. valid for us as humans.43 These causal connections may indeed obtain in the objective 
world independent o f anthropomorphic experience; however, to claim to know this is to 
overstretch our epistemic capacities. Our principal interaction with the external world is 
composed o f disparate impressions, passions, and ideas, processed through the influence of 
custom and habitual experience.
Probable reasoning further presumes that the unobserved will imitate what we have 
experienced. Hume’s uniformity principle states: “If  reason determin’d us, it would 
proceed upon the principle, that instances, o f  which we have had no experience, must 
resemble those, o f  which we have had experience, and that the course o f  nature continues 
always uniformly the same” [p. 89]. The purpose o f the uniformity principle is ultimately 
to, first, differentiate the focus  o f both demonstrative and probable forms o f reasoning and, 
second, affirm probable reason’s incorporation o f inductive belief which originates from 
our natural constitution. In probable reasoning the focus has shifted from the problem of 
epistemic justification to the actual process o f proper belief production that is guided by 
associative, inductive principles instinctive to us.44 Hume clearly expresses this in the 
Treatise:
To consider the matter aright, reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible 
instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train o f ideas, and endows them 
with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations. This 
instinct, ‘tis true, arises from past observation and experience; but can any one give 
the ultimate reason, why past experience and observation produces such an effect any 
more than why nature alone shou’d produce it? Nature may certainly produce 
whatever can arise from habit: Nay, habit is nothing but one o f the principles o f 
nature, and derives all its force from that origin, [p. 179]
43 Norman [Kemp] Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume (I),” Mind 14, no. 54 (1905): 173.
44 For a very good, concise discussion of the uniformity principle, see Kieran Setiya, “Hume on 
Practical Reason,” Philosophical Perspectives, 18, Ethics (2004): p. 369; also David Owen’s 
interpretation, Hume’s Reason (Oxford: UP, 1999) chap. 6. For a good overview of debates over 
Hume’s (supposed).scepticism over induction and his own detailed interpretation, see Don Garrett, 
Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Psychology (New York: Oxford UP, 1997) pp. 76-95.
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Thus, probable inferences about the future are bestowed on us, not by speculative 
determinations o f reason, but by virtue o f past experience and custom.
Nature delimits and determines our reason in a similar way as it determines our 
legitimate beliefs through natural psychological mechanisms. Hume effectively inverts the 
relationship o f priority between reason and nature: whereas the rationalist claims that 
reason elevates humans above the determinism o f nature, for Hume reason must function 
within nature, and any rational judgements must be derived from some psychological 
mechanism natural to humans. Nature has equipped us with beliefs in personal identity and 
permanent external objects which are necessary for our ordinary human practical 
endeavours; the causal inferences rooted in experience and drawn by probable reasoning 
are similarly necessary for our practical purposes. Reason is posterior to, not the progenitor 
of, our natural belief; and, given the original natural source o f belief, probable reasoning 
would likewise be “nothing but a species o f sensation” [p. 103]. Naturally given beliefs 
therefore delimit and subsume our deployment and exercise o f reason.45 To function within 
the constraints o f natural beliefs means reason cannot overstep their circumscribed 
boundaries in hopes o f supporting an unjustifiable speculative framework. But importantly 
this means an overarching natural framework must situate and delimit instrumental reason, 
particularly if  probable reasoning is associated with the instrumental connection between 
means and ends. For Hume, human reason fundamentally adheres to purposes concordant 
with, not contrary to, nature. In recognising nature’s imposed limits on our reason, Hume 
conversely affirms that reason’s only function is to interpret our general natural beliefs fo r  
their practical implementation.
Hence probable inference more broadly describes the underlying cause-effect relation 
which provides the basis o f the means-end connections in instrumental reasoning. The 
determination o f the appropriate means to an end relies on an accurate grasp o f how one 
can bring about a certain effect, based on customary experience. Causal beliefs and 
probable inferences, the process by which we conjoin objects together, are therefore 
practically applicable in a way that demonstrative relations are not. Particular ideas that are 
habitually conjoined or gain some constancy are natural beliefs o f  practical salience; 
likewise, our possession o f certain substantive beliefs leads to an instinctive exercise o f 
reason in a practical capacity. We require an idea o f personal identity in order to attribute a 
source o f practical agency. We need to have an idea o f permanent objects in order to 
provide us with external reference points for our practical pursuits. We must possess ideas 
o f causality in order to effect change on the environment around us. The practical
45 Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume (I),” p. 169.
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importance o f instrumental reasoning emerges with this latter point: without hypothetical 
correlations o f means-end deliberation, humans would be ineffective as active agents.
The result o f  sceptical constraints on our theoretical reason -  on our objective 
knowledge o f the natural world -  is the emergence o f reason’s natural, practical function. 
Importantly, in its legitimate practical sphere the content o f reason will have particular 
relevance to the common practical endeavours o f humans. Like Aristotle’s criticism of 
Platonic Forms, for Hume supposedly a priori logical relations between objects are 
disconnected from experience as we know it. This is implied in his arguments against 
rational proofs o f immaterial, eternal substance. “We have no perfect idea o f anything but 
o f a perception. A substance is entirely different from a perception,” Hume writes, “[w]e 
have, therefore no idea o f substance” [p. 234]. His claim against the rational proof o f God 
follows a similar argumentative vein:
We in reality affirm, that there is no such thing in the universe as a cause or 
productive principle, not even the deity himself; since our idea o f that supreme Being 
is deriv’d from particular impressions, none o f  which contain any efficacy, nor seem 
to have any connexion with any other existence, [p. 248, first emphasis added]
Rational speculation about God’s existence can never find confirmation in actual 
experience. Thus, the postulation o f eternal substances, a claim so abstract and far removed 
from our known experiences and contingent existence, has no possible effect on our 
practical agency; indeed, even i f  these immaterial substances existed, knowledge o f them 
would be unnecessary to practical life.46 Its contingent and substantive content makes 
instrumental reason distinct from the formal, logical validity o f theoretical demonstration.
Hume’s sceptical doubts over the motivational force o f demonstrative reason should 
be understood as similar to Aristotle’s practical/theoretical divide. As opposed to a 
theoretical faculty capable o f discovering objective knowledge o f reality, reason is a natural 
guide to human practical life when properly subsumed under the demands o f natural belief. 
As Norman [Kemp] Smith writes:
46 This is explicitly confirmed when Philo states in D: “Let us become thoroughly sensible of the 
weakness, blindness, and narrow limits of human reason: Let us duly consider its uncertainty and 
endless contrarieties, even in subjects of common life and practice: Let the errors and deceits of our 
very senses be set before us; the insuperable difficulties, which attend first principles in all systems; 
the contradictions, which adhere to the very ideas of matter, cause and effect, extension, space, time, 
motion; and in a word, quantity of all kinds, the object of the only science, that can fairly pretend 
any certainty of evidence. When these topics are displayed in their full light, as they are by some 
philosophers and almost all divines; who can retain such confidence in this frail faculty of reason as 
to pay any regard to its determinations in points so sublime, so abstruse, so remote from common 
life and experience?” [p. 131]
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Hume is thus no sceptic as to the powers o f reason, but quite positive that its sole 
function is practical. The question that has to be decided is not how the fundamental 
characteristics o f experience are to be rationally explained, but what kind o f role 
rational insight can have in our lives. That can only be discovered by observation o f 
the facts derived from experience. And this will point to humans as essentially active 
and moral beings.47
The positive argumentative strategy o f Hume’s naturalism establishes how nature itself 
directs human beings towards practical action. By discrediting demonstrative reason 
conceptual space is created for instrumental reason (probable inference) as it pertains to 
human practical life. But the crucial question is how does probable reason have a practical 
function? Giere and other proponents of the standard model elevate the theoretical and 
informational faculty o f reason, because the assertion that reason has a normative force on 
human practical conduct is deemed by them question-begging from a scientific perspective. 
The question that emerges is whether Hume’s scepticism about reason as a faculty capable 
o f generating genuine theoretical knowledge entails a similar scepticism about practical 
reason. Hume’s claim that “reason is, and ought to be the slave o f the passions” is read by 
many to suggest not only that reason cannot ground belief, but also that it has no normative 
and motivational influence on intentional action. The next chapter will argue more directly 
against this broader sceptical reading but for my purposes here I will establish that the 
extension o f Hume’s positive arguments for natural belief explain how instrumental reason 
has a practical function by virtue of its substantive content.
III. Instrumental Reason
Hume refers to instrumental reason in the section “O f the influencing motives o f the
will”:
[a] ‘Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect o f pain or pleasure from any object, 
we feel a consequent emotion o f aversion or propensity, and are carry’d to avoid or 
embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction. ‘Tis also obvious, that this 
emotion rests not here, but making us cast our view on every side, comprehends 
whatever objects are connected with its original one by the relation of cause and 
effect. Here then reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our 
reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation, [b] But ‘tis evident in
47 Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume (I),” p. 155.
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this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. ‘Tis from 
the prospect o f pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects o f that object, 
as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It can never in the least 
concern us to know, that such objects are causes, and such others effects, if  both the 
causes and effects be indifferent to us. [p. 414]
Several important issues arise with this quotation. First, our rational faculties are entirely 
subordinate to impulse and seemingly incapable o f motivating agents contraiy to existing 
conative states; this is the motivational problem o f reason. Second, this quotation gives the 
impression that Humean practical reason does indeed adhere to standard economic or 
naturalist interpretations: an appetitive, desiderative state gives rise to an end and our 
rational deliberation subsequently determines the most effective means. Thus our rational 
reflection is restricted to the determination o f causal efficiency; no broader moral 
assessment o f the end, or of the value o f the means themselves, is warranted. This second 
point implicitly exposes a lack, not only o f motivational force, but also o f  normative 
authority to our practical reason.48 Both these issues are interrelated and stem from debates 
over whether motivating and normative reasons can be prised apart. I must nonetheless set 
aside the first issue for closer examination in the following chapter, where I explain 
Hume’s implicit arguments for reason’s power to motivate, influence, and change our ends. 
This requires deeper discussion o f both Hume’s sympathy mechanism, a tool which 
enlivens rational judgements, and the important role assigned to general rules o f society in 
normatively judging and guiding our practical rational agency. But in the present chapter, 
the issue o f evaluative neutrality remains the more salient issue for my argument against 
the standard model reading o f Humean instrumental reason.
Recall that the standard model adopts a stance o f evaluative neutrality: instrumental 
beliefs are only causally connected, but no necessary evaluative relation is said to obtain 
between them. The working assumption is that the adoption o f an end stems from a 
subjective desire or preference. The presence o f a desire itself is sufficient indication its 
corresponding end is worthy o f pursuit; the desire is thus the main evaluative source o f the 
end. As an informational faculty, reason comes into the picture only once an individual has 
some desire or appetite. Desire can evaluate the subjective value o f ends -  “subjective” 
now in the narrow, personal sense — as it pertains to a specific agent. Reason will not 
second-guess this initial appetitive evaluation because o f its subordinate role to desire. In
48 I recognise that some philosophers, such as Michael Smith in “The Humean Theory of 
Motivation,” think the motivational and normative issues are two separate questions, but for many 
adherents of motivational intemalism they can be conceived also as one and the same.
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other words, no evaluative exchange occurs between desiderative and rational cognitive 
states about the substantive value o f subjective ends. Since the evaluative work is done 
prior to our use o f reason, all that is further required is causal information -  not normative 
assessment -  o f how to achieve this end. This comes in the form of some causal, probable 
inference between means and ends. Causal relations determine its internal formal structure 
while there is no place in the instrumental deliberative process for the examination o f the 
evaluative relation between the content constitutive o f means and end. In short, structural 
coherence determines good means-end reason -  not the moral value o f its constitutive 
content.
Though some kind o f appraisal is unavoidable in means-end reasoning, it is 
evaluation that is nonetheless very minimal and undemanding. Ends are judged on the 
basis o f their subjective desiderative appeal or motivational grip and are completely relative 
to different agents. Desires as the origins o f the means-end reasoning process may indeed 
incorporate evaluation based on hedonistic or maximising considerations, but they are only 
subjectively valid and have no robust defence against accusations o f relativism and 
arbitrariness. But while subjective ends potentially conflict, their underlying justification is 
deemed unproblematic: evaluation stems from presumed natural psychological facts about 
humans rather than rational deliberation articulating the substantive moral worth o f certain 
ends above others. On such an account, practical reason has no say on whether the content 
o f subjective ends, preferences or desires are morally or socially valuable -  reason has no 
evaluating, articulating function.49 Means-end rationality can therefore sidestep 
contentious moral or ethical determinations o f thick, objective values or goods. When 
instrumental reason does enter the picture it is meant to inform the agent o f relevant causal 
connections, but it is altogether silent on whether the content o f the end -  or the means for 
that matter -  are intrinsically valuable or moral. It cannot determine whether these 
subjective ends have either “moral weight or social importance.”50
Hume is typically attributed with a conception o f reason that is presumed 
independent from substantive moral content and the appraisal or articulation o f value. As 
mentioned in Chapter 1, according to Michael Smith’s influential standard model reading, 
Humean instrumental reasoning articulates the necessary conditions o f motivation 
(subjective desires or conative states) yet is silent on the normative requirements of 
reason.51 The metaphysical connotation associated with normative justification -  a 
common naturalist worry -  ultimately underlies this separation. As Onora O ’Neill 
describes this position:
49 See Onora O’Neill, “Four Models of Practical Reasoning,” in her Bounds o f Justice (Cambridge: 
UP, 2000).
50 Ibid. p. 17.
51 Smith, “Humean Theory,” p. 41.
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[I]f ends are subjective, reasoned action by different agents need not converge, so 
egoism, economic rationality and competition will be paradigms o f reasoned action. 
Ethics and social science are thereby set the tasks o f defusing and reducing or 
coordinating the Hobbesian implications o f a conception o f reason which is hostage 
to individuals’ desires or preferences, and their beliefs, which seems the inevitable 
corollary o f an empiricist and anti-metaphysical outlook.52
In line with O ’Neill’s description, Smith claims that, in denying to our reason a thick 
evaluating function -  and thereby limiting appraisal o f ends to the level o f subjective 
desires -  the Humean belief-desire model need not introduce “a state o f some further, 
mysterious, hybrid kind.”53 Questions about normative, ethical content are distinct from 
the inquiry into natural psychological facts about our instrumental motivation. This 
distinction alone may not be contentious; but the current naturalistic temper informing the 
standard model takes this to mean that a conception o f practical reason in an articulating, 
evaluating function, capable o f determining normative values or goods, is unfeasible in our 
scientific age given its associated metaphysical baggage. To separate the question o f 
motivation and normativity is to dispense with problematic questions about moral content, 
ethical value, sources o f normative justification, and their seemingly irrevocable links with 
supporting metaphysical, objectivist frameworks. Humean instrumental reason accordingly 
need not posit any mysterious normative source since evaluation only occurs at the level o f 
natural appetitive desires, based on no content other than hedonistic or maximising 
subjective impulses relative to each individual agent Others, unlike Smith, actually 
specify the substantive content o f motivating desires: as we saw in Chapter 1 the standard 
model as applied in economic theory go one step further than Smith and deem it a 
psychological fact that humans are self-interested individuals. In that case instrumental 
reason will be deployed towards explicitly egoistic or se^f-maximising ends.
Hume’s remarks above initially support these contemporary standard model readings. 
In [a] Hume associates reasoning with the probable, causal inference required to achieve an 
end given by some volitional, hedonistic impulse. It is because o f the “prospect of pain or 
pleasure from any object” that we avoid or pursue an end, and reason informs us o f the 
causal connections relevant to the pursuit o f these objects. Ultimately, the prospect o f 
pleasure from an object will initiate the instrumental process. In [b] Hume says, not reason, 
but the impulse and promise o f pleasure or pain will begin the exploration o f the causal
52 O’Neill, “Four Models,” p. 15.
53 Smith, “Humean Theory,” p. 58.
99
means towards a hedonistic end. Unless they relate to our subjective impulses, these causal 
connections or probable inferences will have no impact on us.
Thus, the subjectivist and proceduralist reading o f Hume endorsed by proponents o f 
the standard model is at the very least explicable. But I have argued so far that this 
interpretation misunderstands his naturalist framework, leading to the misconstrual of 
Hume’s intentions at a fundamental level: contra standard naturalist interpretations, Hume 
does not think instrumental reason can be severed from evaluative or normative content,54 
and therefore means and ends are not linked solely by some causal relation. For Hume, the 
standard model’s focus on the coherence or causal structure o f instrumental reason would 
be deemed a misguided generalisations o f human action.55 Reason’s starting point will 
always be some natural basis -  crucially, that means naturally formed beliefs bearing 
specific content which impacts on human practical life. Hume wants to establish how at 
their core both reason and morality share a common natural framework. Moral and rational 
judgements are not “queer facts”56 since both are subsumed under Hume’s specific 
conception o f nature; neither are they different “languages” which automatically preclude 
the interchange o f moral and rational propositions.57 As a result, in Hume’s naturalist 
framework evaluative, substantive ethical content frequently impinges on our instrumental 
reason. To understand this, we need to ask: what does Hume think is pleasurable and 
painful for humans; are our desires as undetermined or subjectivist as the standard model 
suggests? How do we develop these desires, on what grounds are they evaluated? In short, 
how does the substantive content of desires impinge on our instrumental reasoning? The 
answers to these crucial questions will demonstrate that moral content constitutive o f his 
naturalistic framework is important to the practical function o f reason for Hume which in 
turn avoids the subjectivism characteristic of the current standard model.58
54 The question of what this normative content that judges our instrumental use of reason will be 
more fully discussed in the next chapter. But it is important to understand that this is not rational 
normativity in the Kantian sense, which evokes a categorical imperative to legislate the form of our 
rational maxims. Hume’s normative principle is built more upon his common sense views, and by 
implication has a very different normative framework than Kant.
55 It is important to note Hume’s historical context. Though I partly disagree with his criticisms of 
Norman Kemp Smith’s naturalist reading, Norton provides a very good comprehensive exposition of 
the worry over Hobbesian moral scepticism during Hume’s period. See David Hume, pp. 21-54.
56 See Mackie, Ethics, pp. 38-42. As will be explained further below, I disagree with Mackie’s claim 
that Hume maintains that evaluation involves “the postulating of value-entities or value-features of 
quite a different order from anything else which we are acquainted, and of a corresponding faculty 
with which to detect them” (p. 40).
57 This relates more to the issue of the is/ought distinction. I discuss this in more detail in the 
following chapter.
58 Simon Blackburn, Ruling Passions; A Theory o f Practical Reasoning (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998) 
p. 239.
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i) Pleasure and Pain, and the Desiderative Origins o f  Instrumental Reason
In the earlier quotation, pleasure and pain are described as the origin o f the means- 
end deliberative process; wholly natural impulses direct our use o f reason towards an object 
that is deemed pleasurable. However, Hume’s supporting naturalist framework discredits a 
simplistic hedonistic interpretation. This becomes evident in his description o f pleasure 
and pain in the Treatise:
[a] There is implanted in the human mind a perception o f pain and pleasure, as the 
chief spring and moving principle o f all its actions. But pain and pleasure have two 
ways o f making their appearance in the mind; o f which the one has effects very 
different from the other. They may either appear in impression to the actual feeling, 
or only in idea, as at present when I mention them. ‘Tis evident the influence o f 
these upon our actions is far from being equal. Impressions always actuate the soul, 
and that in the highest degree; but ‘tis not every idea which has the same effect, [b] 
Nature has proceeded with caution in this case, and seems to have carefully avoided 
the inconveniences o f two extremes. Did impressions only influence the will, we 
should every moment o f our lives be subject to the greatest calamities; because, tho’ 
we foresaw their approach, we should not be provided by nature with any principle o f 
action, which might impel us to avoid them. On the other hand, did every idea 
influence our actions, our condition would not be much mended. For such is the 
unsteadiness and activity o f thought, that the images o f every thing, especially o f 
goods and evils, are always wandering in the mind; and were it mov’d by every idle 
conception o f this kind, it would never enjoy a moment’s peace and tranquility, [c] 
Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium, and has neither bestow’d on every idea o f 
good and evil the power o f actuating the will, nor yet has entirely excluded them 
from this influence, [p. 118]
Broadly speaking, Hume claims that pleasure and pain, and its influence on human 
conduct, is simply part o f our natural constitution. Yet this is not the entire picture: in [a] 
Hume says our hedonistic impulses are internalised through impressions or ideas. 
Impressions, according to Hume, are derived from firsthand experience, unmediated by 
rational thought or ideas. Impressions, like human passions and volitions, are “original 
facts and realities, compleat in themselves” [p. 458]. Like the immediacy o f the passions, 
impressions are non-representational and are therefore not subject to standards o f matters of 
fact -  even according to Hume’s minimal process o f epistemic verification. By contrast, 
ideas are “copies” or representations o f original impressions and contain propositional
101
content. These cognitive ideas, however, cannot discriminate between or give rise to the 
feelings and volitions accompanying our original impressions, and are therefore practically 
“impotent”. Compared to ideas, impressions are more practically efficacious because of 
their close proximity to our experience of pleasure and pain, and sometimes Hume even 
suggests this immediacy makes them akin to, or a species of, sensation. Thus, in [a] Hume 
claims that pleasure and pain are absorbed through impressions or ideas, where impressions 
are more effectual in a practical sense. But crucially Hume also says, “’tis not every idea 
which has the same effect”: the converse meaning some ideas are indeed capable of 
actuating the will. (What ideas those are will become clearer in the next chapter, which 
discusses morality’s impact on instrumental reasoning.)
As the main wellspring o f human intentional action, the experience o f pleasure and 
pain is carefully balanced between ideas and impressions because nature “has proceeded 
with caution” to “avoi[d] the inconveniences o f two extremes”. Though impressions are 
more practically efficacious given their closer proximity to original experiences, on their 
own they would render human actions capricious, absent o f principled foresight, and would 
subsequently be o f little value to our ordinary practical endeavours. On the other hand, 
ideas o f pleasurable and painful ends (“goods and evils”) are equally unsteady and subject 
to the itinerant wanderings o f the mind. Indeed, the speculative strivings o f our human 
reason lead to constant unrest and lack o f tranquility.
Though pleasure and pain are always mediated by some impression or idea, these 
hedonistic impulses are practically efficacious only when they represent the combined 
effort o f both. The claim in [c] is that practical action is initiated once this natural balance 
is achieved between hedonistic impressions and ideas. Ideas allow us to generate principles 
to guide our action -  for instance, we believe in some causal connection between heat and 
fire, and generate an idea or principle o f action, “don’t touch the fire to avoid the pain of 
getting burnt”. What Hume seems to be saying in [c] is that impressions are always 
practically effective in a way that ideas aren’t necessarily; impressions give us an 
appreciation o f the particular situation, but need to be supplemented by some general 
principle provided by ideas. Conversely, cognitive judgements and general principles 
require awareness o f the situation as provided by impressions in order to be relevant and 
applicable. I f  ideas were the sole source of practical activity, good and evil would lack the 
requisite awareness o f the circumstantial particular. In other words, impressions provide 
the applicable focus  for rational ideas or principles o f action, and only through this 
collaborative effort does our pleasure and pain gain practical force and authority. The 
dictum “don’t touch fire to avoid the pain of getting burnt” would have no practical 
importance if  the situation we found ourselves in didn’t require such useful information. In 
other words, as the primary motivational source o f intentional action, pleasure and pain
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cannot be either unprincipled or situationally inappropriate. This brings to mind 
Aristotle’s characterisation o f the means-end deliberative process as determining the 
universal particular. For Aristotle, to instrumentally reason in a praiseworthy manner one 
must have an accurate perceptual lens o f the situational particular and adapt one’s conduct 
accordingly; all the while some more general or global end/principle needs to be within 
purview. It is this dynamic between the particular and universal, the malleable and 
structured, that distinguishes admirable instrumental reason from the simplistic, mediocre 
sort.
To minimise the collaboration o f impressions and ideas in our hedonistic impulses 
would be to disregard those aspects o f Humean instrumental reasoning which presuppose 
both the givenness o f some substantive content and principles o f its evaluative appraisal. 
The reference to nature in [c] helps illustrate this latter point. By nature the collaborative 
effort o f hedonistic impressions and ideas will have practical effect; by nature some ideas 
o f good and evil, o f  pleasure and pain, will have authority and influence on our intentional 
action. In other words, it is our nature to discriminate some cognitive ideas as having 
distinct practical, not epistemic, content and value for us. Rationalists like William 
Wollaston, John Balguay and Samuel Clarke think that the intrinsic truth value o f ideas or 
beliefs imbues them with corresponding practical value; by contrast Hume maintains that 
the distinct practical value o f ideas is a function o f the relevance o f their substantive 
content is to human practical ends.59 Hume’s evocative use o f the term “nature” in the 
above passage calls to mind classical views o f nature as a benevolent entity, capable of 
ensuring the instinctual connection between the certain beliefs or activities required for 
tranquillity o f mind and the survival and flourishing o f the human species.60 “We are 
conscious, that we ourselves, in adapting means to ends, are guided by reason and design,” 
Hume writes, “and that ‘tis not ignorantly nor casually we perform those actions, which 
tend to self-preservation, to the obtaining pleasure and avoiding pain” [p. 176]. th u s  
nature will orientate what we instinctively find pleasurable and painful so that these 
impulses will be adapted to our natural environment, conducive to particular kinds of 
activities best suited to human survival.61 More specifically, those reasoned ideas and 
impressions that give us pleasure and pain should naturally orient us towards ends that are 
amenable to sociality and communal life. Unlike the indeterminate subjective desires o f
59 P&ll S. Ardal, “Some Implications on the Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume’s Treatise,” in 
Donald W. Livingston and James T. King, eds., Hume: A Re-Evaluation (New York: Fordham UP, 
1976) p. 95.
60 That said, I am not at all suggesting Hume’s conception of nature is something akin to Stoic 
cosmological nature; indeed, Hume is deeply critical of this view. However both similarly think 
submission to nature also leads to an acknowledgement of our natural constitution. For the Stoics, 
the latter would imply the human use of right reason; for Hume it is to acknowledge our sentimental 
and sensible way of experience, cognition, and moral valuing.
61 Ardal, “Virtue of Reasonableness in Hume’s Treatise,” p. 101.
103
the standard model, for Hume nature has implanted within us practically efficacious content 
to particular ends geared towards the promotion o f society and participation in common 
life.
Hume’s unique conception o f nature, with its classical residues, provides the 
supporting framework to instrumental reason. Because o f this naturalist framework, the 
hedonistic origins o f means-end rationality already presuppose the substantive content of 
what should -  and indeed for Hume is -  a naturally pleasurable good or end that is worthy 
o f pursuit. And it is precisely when this starting point is misguided -  for example, in the 
individual who desires only egoistic or selfish ends -  that evaluative judgements of 
instrumental reason become so crucial. As we will see in the next chapter, it is for this 
reason that Hume incorporates a developmental account o f our pleasure and pain instincts 
which benefit from social nurturing.
Conclusion
To conclude, once the power o f speculative reason is curtailed we will have a 
conception o f natural instrumental reason which will better support, sustain, and promote 
the practical and moral activity o f human beings. Hume wants to draw a positive 
conclusion from the potentially dispiriting denial o f rational exceptionalism to human 
nature. To do this he adapts the classical assertion that virtue and happiness is achievable if 
one follows nature.
At the end o f Book I o f the Treatise Hume’s famous description o f philosophic 
melancholy illustrates firsthand how nature restores balance through a reorientation 
towards practical activity and the society o f others. As Hume describes this dilemma, to 
maintain a position o f scepticism, to accept the imperfection o f human demonstrative, 
theoretical reason, leads to “the most deplorable condition imaginable, inviron’d with the 
deepest darkness, and utterly depriv’d o f the use o f every member and faculty” [p. 269]. 
But Hume continues, “ [m]ost fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of 
dispelling these clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me o f this 
philosophical melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent o f mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression o f my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras” [p. 
269]. The pleasurable activities deemed appropriate cures are social in nature; it is to 
engage in common life and the society o f men.62 “Here then I find myself absolutely and
62 Also, Pamphilus states in D, “Any question of philosophy [...] which is so obscure and uncertain, 
that human reason can reach no fixed determination with regard to it; if it should be treated at all; 
seems to lead us naturally into the style of dialogue and conversation. Reasonable men may be 
allowed to differ, where no one can reasonably be positive: Opposite sentiments, even without any 
decision, afford an agreeable amusement: And if the subject be curious and interesting, the book
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necessarily determin’d to live, and talk, and act like other people in the common affairs of 
life,” Hume writes, “may, nay I  must yield to the current o f  nature, in submitting to my 
senses and understanding: and in this blind submission I shew most perfectly my sceptical 
disposition and principles” [p. 269]. Reason must confirm practical experience and “limit 
our enquiries to common life”.63 Nature duly restricts the mind from fanciful imaginings 
that would render us practically inert;64 it also saves humans from the contradictions which 
emerge through our speculative strivings and extreme sceptical doubts. Even if sceptical 
philosophy o f the Pyrrhonian strand were to be taken to such extremes as to “undermine the 
reasonings o f common life, and carry its doubts so far as to destroy all action, as well as 
speculation [...] Nature will always maintain her rights, and prevail in the end over any 
abstract reasoning whatsoever” [E p. 41]. The current o f nature therefore saves us from the 
extreme ideational wanderings of our reason and bestows upon us certain beliefs or 
cognitive ideas to guide us in our practical endeavours.
Similar to Aristotle’s critique o f Plato, Hume’s negative sceptical remarks against 
demonstrative reason combine with a positive naturalist strand to establish the significance 
o f practical reason or knowledge, capable o f guiding humans in their interactions with one 
another, and fostering common life. To “follow nature” therefore involves the recognition 
o f how nature has supplied humans with certain substantive ends that affirm our everyday 
endeavours. If  reason is to have a positive role in human life, at the outset its use must be 
naturalised, reflecting ordinary experiences and customs; second, it must be directed 
towards participating in and actualising ends that are social in nature. Reason thus cannot 
lift us out o f natural determinism, but is situated within nature. Underlying the previous 
rationalist, more Cartesian ideas is the view that human reason can be seen as a redemptive 
force against passional disruptions or natural attachments that are part and parcel o f our 
animal natures. This rational core helps distance humans from the natural or social world, 
and functions as proof o f the human potential for autonomous mastery over the natural 
world we necessarily inhabit.65 By contrast, to uphold nature as a guide means humans 
must function within the confines and dictates of our natural -  indeed social -  environment. 
The force o f natural beliefs and the natural use o f instrumental reason will subsequently 
lead to a more engaged, “determin’d” stance towards those conventions or customs held in 
common.
carries us, in a manner, into company, and unites the two greatest and purest pleasures of human life, 
study and society” [p. 128].
63 Cf. D, p. 134, 205
64 Olshewsky, “Classical Roots,” p. 285.
65 See Terence Penelhum, “Hume’s Moral Psychology,” in Themes in Hume; The Self, the Will, 
Religion (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003) p. 154.
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It is in this unique sense that we should understand Hume’s naturalism, particularly 
when compared with the scientific realism informing the naturalism o f the current standard 
model. For Giere, factual cause-effect relations, established by cumulative empirical 
knowledge, should ground and justify the means-end connection in instrumental rationality. 
This underlying causal belief makes certain claims about real world systems that are 
cognised through scientific investigation and experimentation. Hume would be very 
hesitant to say that belief in causal relations, and the rational inferences we draw out, are 
rooted in some scientific, descriptive fact. Associated psychological mechanisms like 
imagination, feeling, and sentiment are epistemic warrants that justify one’s beliefs and 
inferences. And these underlying natural cognitive instincts are sufficient to yield one’s 
intended results simply because their evaluative content corresponds to some natural 
objective human ends.
In this chapter I outlined the naturalistic framework situating Hume’s instrumental 
reason, as this was necessary to establish important differences from the contemporary 
naturalistic temper o f the standard model. More specifically a connection was made 
between Hume’s naturalism, instrumental reason and the value o f certain natural and 
objective anthropomorphic ends -  such as the promotion o f practical activity and common 
society. The substantive content o f this framework illustrates explicitly how Hume averts 
the evaluative neutrality and procedural emphasis on rational structure characteristic of the 
standard model. While this chapter resists the standard model reading o f Hume, the next 
chapter highlights the limitations o f those who reappropriate Hume with the intention of 
arguing against the standard model, found in what I call the sceptical reading. Ultimately, I 
argue that even though the sceptical reading has a broader normative agenda aimed towards 
criticising the standard model’s resistance to categorical norms, when examined more 
closely they in fact share the same proceduralist presumptions o f the latter. This, I claim, 
manifests itself clearly in the misguided imposition o f a (constructivist) Kantian framework 
onto Hume.
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5 Hume’s Social Standards of Practical Rationality
Human reason is a tincture infused in about equal strength in all our opinions and ways, 
whatever their form: infinite in substance, infinite in diversity.
- Montaigne, “O f custom”1
According to this short and imperfect sketch o f human life, the happiest disposition o f mind 
is the virtuous; or, in other words, that which leads to action and employment, renders us 
sensible to the social passions, steels the heart against the assaults o f fortune, reduces the 
affections to a just moderation, makes our own thoughts an entertainment to us, and 
inclines us rather to the pleasures o f society and conversation, than to those o f the senses.
- Hume, “The Sceptic”2
The previous chapter examined how Hume’s combined sceptical and naturalist 
strands leave space for reason with a practical, not theoretical, orientation. I claimed that 
Hume’s non-reductive naturalism differs from contemporary reductive naturalist claims 
underlying the standard model in two important respects: first, Hume does not maintain a 
scientific realist position; what we perceive does not necessarily correspond to nature as it 
really is. Rather, our cognitive faculties are naturally attuned to perceive nature as fit for us 
as practical agents. Second, natural beliefs concern the practical utility o f causality, 
personal identity, and the permanence o f external objects. These beliefs also endorse moral 
sentiments and evaluative judgements conducive to common life and sociality. I argued 
that this leads to an emphasis on the actual content o f  beliefs over any formal causal 
structure in instrumental reasoning. Humean instrumental reason does not share the 
standard model’s demand for neutrality towards substantive ethical content.
My reading so far may indicate that Hume’s conception o f instrumental reasoning is 
not o f the freestanding and subjectivist nature o f the standard model but I still have not yet 
outlined the substantive content o f this framework, nor how  reason exerts any motivational 
or normative force over our practical conduct. Arguably, any philosophical account of 
practical reason needs to explain reason’s authority over human conduct, without which 
reason would have a merely theoretical, not practical, function. Since Hume expresses 
deep scepticism about reason’s authority in relation to human action, some interpreters 
argue that Hume is a thoroughgoing sceptic o f practical reason in all its forms, including an 
instrumentalist account. His sceptical polemic against “philosophical” reason -  the
1 Michel de Montaigne, “Of custom,” in The Complete Essays o f  Montaigne, trans. Donald M. 
Frame (Stanford: UP, 1965) p. 80.
2 David Hume, “The Sceptic,” in Essays Moral, Political and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller 
(Indianapolis: Liberty, 1987) p. 168.
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cognitive faculty that generates empirical facts or mathematical propositions -  is taken to 
dispute the existence o f practical reason.
Oddly enough, both sceptical and standard model interpretations read Humean reason 
as a theoretical, information-processing faculty, though for different reasons.3 According to 
the standard model interpretation o f Hume described in the previous chapter, if 
instrumental reason is seen as simply processing relevant empirical data, then problematic 
metaphysical or normative claims can be sidestepped accordingly. By contrast, the 
sceptical reading -  represented mainly by Kantian constructivist interpreters -  attributes to 
Hume a theoretical conception o f reason precisely in order to challenge the standard 
model’s eschewal o f categorical normativity in their conception o f human agency. 
Sceptical interpreters hope through their challenge to evade the problematic implications of 
a morally neutral account o f practical reason. Where connections between moral and 
practical rationality are loosened or even severed, we may be led to endorsing as practically 
rational the pursuit o f ends -  the pursuit of which we might nonetheless wish to question on 
moral grounds. Thus, what standard model interpretations o f Hume see as a virtue o f his 
account -  its evaluative neutrality -  sceptical readings construe it as a limitation o f his 
approach. What both approaches share in common is the assumption that Hume’s 
conception o f practical reason is (or can be made to be) evaluatively neutral with regard to 
chosen ends.
The sceptical reading claims that Hume cannot have a conception o f instrumental 
practical reason since all accounts o f practical reasoning, including instrumental practical 
reasoning, must presuppose some categorical rational norm. I am sympathetic to the 
sceptical reading’s broader normative agenda; however, believe theirs to offer a misguided 
interpretation o f Hume. When examined in detail, the sceptical interpretation can be shown 
to share several presuppositions with that o f the standard model. Most prominently among 
these is the rejection o f a substantive conception o f practical reason in favour o f a 
proceduralist account: the sceptical interpretation tries to show that the authority of 
practical reason has primacy over subjective desires, but nonetheless takes on board 
contemporary naturalists’ worries about positing substantive moral values. Thus, despite 
its critical intentions the sceptical reading, like the standard model which it seeks to 
repudiate, presupposes a very specific historical tradition o f practical reasoning. This 
manifests itself in philosophical concerns surrounding the motivational and normative 
authority o f reason
But Hume sits much more comfortably in an alternative but equally valid historical 
tradition o f substantive practical reason which focuses on the development o f dispositional
31 will have more to say on this point in Section II.
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character and the articulation o f human values. Like Aristotle, Hume suggests that both the 
conative and cognitive components o f instrumental reason engage in strong, qualitative 
distinctions about moral value; moreover, this value-laden content is both motivational and 
normative. The fact that this has become obscured in contemporary readings is 
symptomatic o f the current tendency to discard the original frameworks that situate 
historical conceptions o f instrumental reason. Hence, by disentangling Hume from the 
strong hold o f proponents o f proceduralism in contemporary philosophy -  who include 
both the advocates o f standard model and their Kant-inspired critics -  I want to highlight 
Hume’s unique understanding o f naturalistic, intersubjective, practical normativity which 
frames and situates instrumental rationality. This framework ultimately helps Hume evade 
the evaluative reductivism and subjectivism characterising both sides o f the contemporary 
debate about instrumental reason. An alternative, substantive conception o f reason comes 
to the fore: Hume’s practical reason is responsible for the articulation o f the qualitative 
distinctions and values constituting its overarching intersubjective, naturalistic framework.
The challenge o f this chapter is that Hume’s philosophical works offer no clear 
systematic treatment o f practical reason: the term “reason” alludes to speculative thought 
rather than practical deliberation. To complicate matters further, Hume often conflates 
practical reason with calm passions or “strength o f mind”, all referring to developed, 
habitual character.4 Despite these difficulties, the chapter contends that a conception of 
practical reason can be found in Hume. His combined epistemological scepticism and 
naturalism establishes a naturalist framework o f reason; ultimately this framework orients 
us towards the reasoned articulation and affirmation o f human practical activities and moral 
values. Instrumental reasoning therefore cannot be divorced from the evaluation o f ends; 
rather, it encompasses the acquisition o f moral character and virtues which imply 
developed, socially valuable desires.
The structure o f the chapter is as follows. Section I provides an outline o f the 
sceptical interpretation. I show that this reading imports some anachronistic dilemmas into 
its understanding o f Humean practical reasoning. Section II offers a reinterpretation of 
Hume’s famous is/ought distinction in order to highlight prevalent presumptions which 
unite both sceptical Kantian and standard model readings o f Hume. According to these 
shared presuppositions, the adoption of a formal reasoning procedure ensures the 
objectivity o f descriptive and ethical judgements alike. I argue that these presumptions 
need to be set aside in order for Hume’s own conception o f practical reason to be 
appreciated in its own right. The purpose o f the is/ought passage is to incorporate into 
practical reason an explanatory function which articulates moral value, implicit in our
4 See Jane L. Mcintyre, “Strength of Mind: Prospects and problems for a Humean account,” Synthese 
152 (2006): 393-401.
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everyday moral understanding, as shown in Section III and IV. Section V explains how 
instrumental reason requires natural human sympathy to connect third-person, evaluative 
judgements with first-person motivation. This shows that Hume is capable o f responding 
to sceptical worries concerning the normative and motivational authority o f practical 
reason.
/. The Sceptical Reading
Hume writes that “reason, in a strict and philosophical sense, can have an influence 
on our conduct only after two ways: Either when it excites a passion by informing us o f the 
existence o f something which is a proper object o f it; or when it discovers the connexion of 
causes and effects, so as to afford us means o f exerting any passion” [T, p. 459]. According 
to the sceptical reading, this passage states two things: first, reason has no motivational 
force and is only causally implicated in practical action. Second, the dictates o f reason are 
not normative because reason possesses no special, intrinsic authority that we necessarily 
ought to obey. As discussed in Chapter 1, in contemporary debates the motivational and 
normative questions can be separated -  reason can be normative without being motivational 
or vice versa.5 However, it is common to link normative reasons with the motivational 
structure o f an agent through an internalist requirement. Regardless o f how normative 
reasons are linked to subjective motivation, both reductive naturalist and rationalist theories 
o f practical reason claim that an adequate theory o f practical reason must explain how 
reason has a motivational and/or normative grip on an agent, and therefore has the power to 
guide intentional action.6
In the passage above, Hume seems explicitly to deny that reason has any 
motivational or normative authority over an agent. His scepticism about reason’s epistemic 
reach seems to extend also to the realm o f practical reason. Scepticism about practical 
reason includes not only substantive models that connect standards o f practical deliberation 
with moral rightness and obligation, but also the standard model o f instrumental reason. 
According to this sceptical interpretation, Hume is miscast as the historical progenitor o f an 
instrumental model o f practical reason. Hume seems untroubled by the prospect o f an 
agent who lacks motivation or interest in the instrumental means necessary to achieve a
5 See Smith, “Humean Theory,” pp. 36-61.
6 Of course, this could be done in different ways. Those influenced by Williams would want to say 
that reason has motivational and normative authority because it corresponds to an individual’s 
subjective motivational set. Other rationalist readings would want to say that it is because reason 
has some quasi-ontological property of “oughtness” or obligation. Both posit a link between the 
normative and motivational questions, but their response differs because they disagree on reason’s 
normative source.
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desired end.7 Irrational behaviour appears removed from criticism. If  “’[t]is not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction o f the whole world to the scratching o f my finger” [p. 416] 
the failure to enact the means to an end would not be called “irrational” or “mistaken”. 
Indeed, on these grounds Jean Hampton argues that a Humean view o f reason
does not provide us with a normative standard by which to judge action. So someone 
who fails to act so as to achieve his ends, in a situation where he has no desire to 
perform the actions required to achieve those ends, does nothing wrong. He violates 
no rational standards o f action; and indeed, that’s the point o f this Humean view -  
there are no rational standards o f  action.8
In the same vein Elijah Millgram states, “ [t]he conclusion o f [Hume’s] argument [...] is 
evidently not that all practical reasoning is instrumental, but that there is no such thing as 
practical reasoning at all.”9
To say irrational or mistaken behaviour cannot be judged according to any rational 
standard would violate what Hampton sees as a necessary claim in all theories of 
instrumental reason: “an action is rational to the extent that it furthers the attainment o f an 
end.”10 Accounts o f means-end reasoning must incorporate the prospect o f “irrationality”, 
exhibited in the behaviour o f the agent who is unmotivated to take the means to their 
desired ends. As such, the possibility o f irrationality implies our practical reasons have 
prescriptive and motivational authority to our practical reasons; this authority, moreover, 
appeals to universal norms o f rationality. To say the same thing a bit differently, a 
categorical norm o f reason must be invoked in order for a theory o f instrumental reason to 
be able properly to account for irrational action. The normativity o f instrumental reason 
therefore presupposes non-instrumental justification; its foundation hinges on an objective 
norm o f rationality.11 According to proponents o f the sceptical reading, therefore, the 
intelligibility even o f instrumental practical reasoning presupposes some kind o f categorical 
norm o f reasoning, notwithstanding its proponents’ claims to the contrary.
But unlike his latter-day followers, Hampton claims that Hume in fact acknowledges 
this requirement upon the normativity o f instrumental reason: his response is to reject the 
very possibility o f practical reasoning. Hampton writes:
7 Korsgaard, “Scepticism About Practical Reason,” pp. 12-15.
8 Hampton, “Practical Reason,” p. 68.
9 Millgram, “Was Hume a Humean?” p. 77.
10 Hampton, “Practical Reason” p. 66, emphasis added.
11 Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” p. 21.
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Hume abandons the idea that there is practical reason, and thus the idea that actions 
can be condemned as irrational, because he understands, better than many 
contemporary proponents of instrumental reason, that even this (seemingly minimal) 
understanding o f practical reason is still positing a kind o f normativity that will be 
problematic for any naturalist. To say that the curmudgeon should have acted to 
secure the means to his end, no matter what his occurrent desires were, is to say that 
he is governed by an authoritative reason.12
Hampton’s primary target is contemporary naturalists and moral sceptics who uphold the 
standard model o f instrumental reason as the only conception o f rationality a scientific 
worldview can plausibly accommodate. But though Hume is more aware o f the objectivist 
connotations o f normativity underlying an instrumental model, she alleges that ultimately 
he makes a mistake similar to contemporary naturalists when he discusses the artificial 
virtues in the Treatise. Hume states:
There is no passion [...] capable o f controlling the interested affection, but the very 
affection itself, by an alteration o f its direction. Now this alteration must 
necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since ‘tis evident, that the passion is 
much better satisfy’d by its restraint, than by its liberty. [T, p. 492]
Hampton exploits the ambiguity of the statement, “must necessarily take place”. Hampton 
writes:
One gets the feeling he means that such an alteration “ought” to take place, and yet 
that would mean recognizing the authority o f something like the instrumental norm 
(understood to be partially constitutive o f reason) [...] I suspect Hume “slips” here 
because the way in which we normally understand reason includes the idea that it 
necessarily has authority over action when it supplies accurate cause-and-effect 
information regarding action.13
In the case o f artificial virtues Hampton claims that Hume is unable to ascribe to reason a 
mere theoretical function and must acknowledge that reason exerts some normative 
authority. Though wiser than contemporary proponents o f the standard model, in the end 
Hume cannot justify other aspects o f his philosophy, like the artificial virtues, since the
12 Hampton, “Practical Reason,” p. 70.
13 Ibid., p. 71.
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reflective process by which these virtues are internalised, affirmed and renewed involves 
attributing a prescriptive force to our reasons.
The sceptical reading is, however, misguided in several important respects. First, to 
speak o f Humean “hypothetical imperatives” is misplaced, anachronistic terminology. It is 
highly questionable that Hume would describe instrumental reasons as “imperatives”. The 
imperatival form ascribes a property o f “oughtness” or obligation to reasons; already 
conformity o f action to norms o f rightness is the main theoretical focus, signalling that the 
sceptical reading begins with certain Kantian proceduralist presuppositions. (I will refer to 
Kantian proceduralism to denote the contemporary constructivist reading o f Kant as 
opposed to Kantianism, a reading that I will forward in the next two chapters). Hampton’s 
conclusion that “the Humean view does not count as an instance o f the instrumental theory 
o f reason as I have defined [...] because it violates [the] thesis [...] that ‘an action is rational 
to the extent that it furthers the attainment o f an end’” betrays a distinctly proceduralist - 
specifically Kantian bias in her use o f the term, “rational”.14 Thus the sceptical reading 
superimposes a quasi-Kantian conception o f instrumental practical reason onto Hume.15 
Yet it remains entirely unclear why theories o f practical reason should privilege this 
predominant -  yet very specific -  tradition to the exclusion o f other existing historical 
strands. Various remarks are “lifted out” o f Hume’s original philosophical framework in 
order to support the normative and critical agenda o f the sceptical reading. Hume’s own 
views become progressively obscured in consequence. But as will become clearer 
throughout this and the next two chapters, the modem constructivists’ partial retrievals of 
both Hume and Kant lack critical bite against the standard model given their own tendency 
to collapse back into versions o f the subjectivism and proceduralism they decry as 
objectionable in the standard model.
If  the two are properly disentangled, Hume’s unique conception o f practical reason 
becomes apparent. Hume’s naturalist framework may preclude categorical norms of 
rationality in the Kantian sense, but can nonetheless accommodate norms o f reason based 
on human content or value. This would suggest that Hume has a substantive conception o f 
practical reason. The authority o f reason is derived, not from some ontological property of
14 Ibid., p. 66. Cf. Kant, Grundlegung zer Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f 
Morals) trans. H. J. Paton (London: Routledge, 2003), hereafter abbreviated G: “Who wills the end, 
wills (so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) also the means which are indispensably 
necessary and in his power.” (45 [417])
151 use the term “quasi-Kantian” because I do not believe that these sceptical interpreters reflect an 
accurate interpretation of Kantian hypothetical imperatives. Though Kant can be seen to forward 
some of the formalist and proceduralist assumptions, he does articulate substantive ends of practical 
reason. These are obscured in current debates about practical reason mainly because the 
metaphysical commitments that are entailed are rejected as implausible given the current scientific 
age and naturalistic temper.
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“reasons”16 or from its formal objective procedures, but rather from its substantive practical 
content which itself derives from perceptions o f value, goodness, and rightness which are 
subjective in the large sense, i.e., common and natural to all humans. If Hume’s combined 
scepticism and naturalism is taken seriously -  a view argued for in the previous chapter -  
instrumental action is judged according to criteria generated from naturally held 
psychological beliefs which are conducive to our ordinary endeavours as socially engaged 
agents. Hampton is right to say that, for Hume, “there are no rational standards of 
action.”17 But as shown below, this is right because the criterion o f “rationality” departs 
from the predominant proceduralist conception.
I I  The Is/Ought Distinction
We need to examine more closely the philosophical agenda driving the sceptical 
reading’s interpretation o f Hume. This agenda rests on a widespread but mistaken 
interpretation o f the fact/value distinction. At root, this distinction is responsible for the 
predominant proceduralist conception o f practical reason adhered to by both sides o f the 
contemporary debate. Thus, though both the sceptical and standard model readings believe 
they are making diametrically opposed arguments, at their core they share the same 
commitment to a proceduralist account o f reason.
It is a common view that Hume exposes how “ought” cannot be deduced from “is”. 
“[0]ught> or ought n o f \  he writes, “expresses some new relation or affirmation, ‘tis 
necessary [...] that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how 
this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it” [T, p. 
469]. Orthodox readings o f this passage take Hume to be exposing the fact/value gap: 
supposedly taken from Hume, G. E. Moore famously argues that the naturalistic fallacy is 
committed when a natural property is taken as an ethical property. Descriptive facts cannot 
be invoked in order to explain moral statements, mainly because the former are distinct 
from ethical properties. Thus, philosophical attempts to bridge the “is” and “ought” 
effectively confuse one class o f statements with another.
Given what Hume is assumed to say about the fact/value gap, the sceptical reading 
attributes to Hume a non-cognitivist, ethical subjectivist position. Subjective, emotive 
states or reactions are all we can appeal to for moral justification, since Hume’s broad 
scepticism o f practical reason means that there can be no rational justification for any 
ought claims, be it instrumental or moral. Hampton writes:
16 A common view held by Hume’s rationalist contemporaries, but the sceptical reading does not 
make this particular mistake.
17 Hampton, “Practical Reason” p. 68.
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Hume’s famous dictum that you cannot derive an “ought” from an “is” has been 
forgotten by moral skeptics who believe, nonetheless, in the existence o f an 
instrumental practical reason. [...] The fashion for seeing moral imperatives as 
hypothetical rather than categorical has assumed that naturalists are able to 
accommodate the hypothetical ‘ought’ in a way that they cannot accommodate the 
categorical ‘ought’. But Hume implicitly understood that this is not so; even if 
hypothetical imperatives strike us as more congenial or more understandable by 
virtue o f their connection with desires, nonetheless, insofar as they generate 
authoritative reasons for action, which “apply” to us no matter what our occurrent 
desires, then their prescriptivity is just as “queer” and problematic from a naturalistic 
point o f view as the prescriptivity o f categorical imperatives.18
In other words, according to Hampton’s sceptical reading, Hume must in fact be a non­
naturalist about instrumental reason. By virtue o f its intrinsic prescriptivity, practical 
reason, whether it is moral or strictly instrumental, is problematic from a reductive 
naturalist point o f view.
Here Hampton could be understood as targeting the neo-Humean strand o f reductive 
naturalism, represented by Philippa Foot. Ironically, like Hampton’s non-cognitivist 
interpretation, these reductive naturalists presume that they are also forwarding a broadly 
Humean project. In varying degrees, they accept Moore’s analysis that the is/ought passage 
expresses Hume’s doubt that moral claims can be derived from descriptive statements.19 
As a response, they provide an account o f morality as instrumental rationality, an account 
which posits no metaphysical or objectivist source to reason. Foot argues that, at root, 
moral claims are reducible to subjective sentiments, so “ [t]he new element in a proposition 
[refers to] [...] nothing new in the object but in ourselves”.20 Morality as subjectively valid 
“hypothetical imperatives” is therefore more acceptable from a scientific point o f view, and 
“put[s] an end to the hunt for mysterious extra properties”.21 In other words, moral 
prescriptions avoid committing the naturalistic fallacy if they are framed conditionally and 
instrumentally, rather than unconditionally and categorically. Moral prescriptions 
characterise a change within the sentiments o f an agent rather than an actual property of 
goodness or o f the external natural world. Thus, the appropriate naturalistic response to the
18 Ibid., pp. 70-1.
19 Many try to avoid the naturalistic fallacy; Laudan is one exception, see his “Normative 
Naturalism,” pp. 45-6.
20 Foot, “Hume on Moral Judgement,” in Virtues and Vices (Oxford: UP, 2002) p. 79.
21 Ibid., 79. See also “Morality as Hypothetical Imperatives,” in ibid., pp. 157-73.
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is/ought gap is to adopt a subjectivist account o f morality that is based on a metaphysically 
neutral account o f instrumental rationality.
Moreover, Foot suggests that the naturalistic fallacy can be further avoided by 
recognising that moral argument already presupposes the use o f shared descriptive 
terminology which does not require or include a suppressed normative proposition. If 
determinations o f value are firmly located on the descriptive side o f the is/ought divide, 
they must therefore be truth-evaluable and justifiable through either scientific investigation 
or analytic argument. In the case o f behaviour that offends, “to accept as evidence the fact 
that behaviour causes a certain kind o f offence, he cannot refuse to admit R when O has 
been proved '?2
Despite their divergent philosophical agendas, both readings assume they are faithful 
to the spirit o f Hume’s is/ought passage. The former believes that Hume objects to all 
ought statements -  be they hypothetical or categorical -  and therefore must be a 
thoroughgoing sceptic o f all forms o f practical reason. The latter, by contrast, argues that 
naturalism o f a Humean stripe can accommodate prescriptive claims, so long as they 
remain conditional and analytic. On this view, Hume endorses the standard model o f 
instrumental reason.
Whether or not Moore’s description o f the naturalistic fallacy is plausible is not my 
main concern here.23 Rather, I am more interested in whether Moore’s view accurately 
represents Hume’s position. Both the sceptical and standard model readings abide by the 
supposedly Humean division between fact and value, between descriptive and prescriptive 
statements, said to originate from the elemental truth expressed in Hume’s is/ought 
distinction. But if this were our starting point Hume himself would violate the is/ought rule 
in his discussion o f justice. Obligations o f justice depend on existing descriptive concepts 
o f common interest; the “ought” in this case is explicable only through such presupposed, 
commonly agreed upon concepts.24 One could follow Hampton and say that Hume is 
inconsistent. But there are good reasons to reject this conclusion, even aside from the 
principle o f interpretive charity. If  Hume does not adhere to the presuppositions underlying 
the Mooreian reading, it seems that neither the proponent o f the sceptical reading nor the 
advocates o f the standard model can say that they are forwarding a broadly Humean view. 
Their shared understanding o f the fact/value gap also provides an important clue as to how 
both readings at root share a proceduralist conception o f practical reason -  one that is not 
shared by Hume. Should this be the case, the deeper implication is that both prevalent 
views o f Humean practical reason and motivation are misguided. The orthodox misreading
22 Foot, “Moral Argument,” in ibid., p. 105.
23 For arguments against Moore, see P. F. Strawson, Skepticism and Naturalism, pp. 3-8.
24 A. C. MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’,” The Philosophical Review 68:4 (1959): 457-8.
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o f the is/ought passage needs to be corrected in order to make interpretive space for a 
conception o f Humean instrumental reason in the first place, and more importantly, a 
conception that is attuned to and articulates qualitative distinctions about moral value and 
the good, where the substantive content o f practical reasoning is more important than 
formal justification and valid epistemic relations. Below I expose the presuppositions 
underlying the fact/value gap, and contest Hume’s presumed adherence to them. This will 
be helped if we examine how the sceptical and the standard model readings overlap.
Reveal ingly, both readings ascribe to Hume a reductivist account o f practical 
motivation and moral value. For the sceptical interpretation, Hume is positioned as the 
Kantian’s main philosophical interlocutor and opponent. But even as they criticise the 
standard model, if  probed further, proponents o f the sceptical reading begin with a 
surprisingly similar formal, abstract conception o f rationality, motivated by a latent 
epistemological and proceduralist bias, which I describe below. What they do with this 
presupposition may differ from the contemporary naturalist: different interpretive 
conclusions may be reached (i.e. Hume has no conception o f instrumental reason) and a 
radically divergent philosophical agenda may ensue (i.e. Kantian practical reason provides 
an account o f objective morality, whereas proponents o f the standard model eliminate the 
sphere o f moral practical reason altogether and thereby jeopardise morality’s objective 
scope and applicability).
But at their core, both readings share certain presuppositions which subsequently 
inform their response to the naturalistic fallacy. First, both implicitly adhere to current 
moral philosophy’s preoccupation with the justification o f our moral claims through a 
rational procedure. Let me call this the proceduralist bias. In other words, good, 
justifiable reasons for holding the moral beliefs or practices that we do are confirmed 
through the scrutiny and analysis by an objectively valid rational procedure. For Kantians, 
moral actions or duties are legitimated through an objective procedure o f practical reason; 
for the standard model, since ends are set by subjective preferences and desires, reason is 
there to ensure a certain degree o f coherence and consistency between beliefs and 
contingently held desires. The hope for the latter is that a plausible scientific account o f 
instrumental or theoretical reason can affirm the empirical plausibility o f some conceptions 
o f goodness. At root this bias assumes that the function o f reason is to resolve a conflict of 
moral views through an ideal rational procedure or form o f argument.
This leads to a second, subsidiary overlap between the two readings. The 
preoccupation with justification through procedure suggests a common goal among 
contemporary Kantians and defenders o f the standard model: namely, the attempt to obtain 
the truth. In short, the proceduralist bias implies an epistemological bias. This is a 
controversial claim, particularly considering that for Kant, ethics is sui generis -  unique o f
117
its kind and irreducible to other fields o f study. However, let me explain it this way: 
according to the proceduralist bias, both Kantian sceptics and advocates o f the standard 
model assume that the function of reason is to resolve conflict according to some objective 
procedure. Rational argument is needed to settle moral disputes -  preferably achieving a 
kind o f moral truth, or, if not truth, a kind o f objectivity which people can agree upon.25 
This moral truth or objectivity need not have a strong realist status that requires the 
provability or verification o f its descriptive propositions. For instance, a commitment to 
moral truth in a weaker sense is implicit in the Kantian constructivist conceptions of 
practical reason, which comes to the fore in some comments made by Christine Korsgaard, 
another sceptical interpreter o f Hume.26 Commenting on the analogies between the 
practical reason o f Kant and the constructivism o f Rawls, Korsgaard argues that moral 
language does indeed admit truth or falsehood, “for the correct conception o f a concept will 
be a guide to its correct application, and when a concept is applied correctly, what we get is 
truth.” She continues, “[b]ut what makes the conception correct will be that it solves the 
problem, not that it describes some piece o f external reality”.27 Though they may not be 
committed to the epistemologically driven aspirations o f proponents o f the standard model, 
Kantian sceptics transport the goal o f truth into the practical, moral domain. The formal 
procedures o f reason provide us warrant for constructed moral practices, assuring us of 
their validity and truth.
For those reductive naturalists who endorse the standard model, the preoccupation 
with justification manifests itself slightly differently and leads to claims about what kind  of 
arguments are valid. Specifically, arguments containing premises that have a necessary 
relation to their conclusions are upheld as the ideal form o f justification. Our moral beliefs 
are sufficiently supported only if  they are deductively related to the evidence, thus 
revealing how factual premises can entail moral conclusions.28 For example, we interpret 
certain descriptive words in a strong functional sense, so that functionality has an analytic 
connection to its goodness. “[S]ince ‘knife’ is a functional word in the strong sense”, Foot
• • • 29writes, “ ‘good knives cut well’ must be held to be some kind o f analytic proposition”. 
More emphatically, she states:
If someone should say that in the expression “a good root” “good” is not used 
“evaluatively” this would only increase the artificiality o f the notion o f “evaluation”
25 See Christine Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism in the Twentieth Century,” Journal o f 
Philosophical Research, Centennial APA Supplement (2003): 99-122; Joshua Cohen, “Truth and 
Public Reason,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 37 (2009): 2-42.
26 See Korsgaard, “Skepticism About Practical Reason,” 5-25.
27 Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism,” pp. 99-122,117.
28 Foot, “Moral Arguments,” p. 99.
29 Foot, “Goodness and Choice,” in Virtues and Vices, 135.
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as used in moral philosophy, and it would raise a number o f awkward problems as 
well. For if  the “good” in “good roots” is said to lack “evaluative meaning” because 
good roots are not things that we should have any reason to choose, then presumably 
“good claws” and “good fangs” are expressions which must be treated in the same 
way. But then we shall be in difficulties over examples such as “good eyes”, “good 
muscles” and “good stomachs”.30
Such deductive arguments are appealing because their procedure confers a degree o f 
objective validity onto our evaluative conclusions. A commitment to analyticity -  implicit 
in the formal mode o f argument -  can therefore guarantee the truth o f our claims. The 
endeavour is to demonstrate that transitions from “is” to “ought” need not fall short o f the 
deductive ideal. But should these transitions be invalid, it would be because their relation 
is, not one o f entailment, but o f some “looser”, more objectionable form o f inference.31 As 
MacIntyre writes, “underlying [this thought] is an assumption that arguments must be either 
deductive or defective.”32
More specifically, the standard model minimises the peculiar status o f “ought” 
practical judgements: these normative statements need to be assessed according to the 
requirements o f formal linguistic analysis, making them fit, as it were, into the 
proceduralist and epistemological paradigm o f deductive argument and scientific 
investigation. The sceptical reading appreciates that Hume does not adhere to the epistemic 
ideal o f deductive justification: precisely because o f its mysterious epistemic status, moral 
claims need to be isolated from ordinary descriptive discourse.33 Yet, the sceptics’ own 
latent adherence to the proceduralist bias causes them to import into the practical, moral 
domain a standard o f objective justification through a rational procedure. And as indicated 
above, deeper analysis o f the sceptical reading reveals that the epistemological bias has not 
remained confined to the theoretical domain, but has crept into the way standards o f 
practical reason are analysed and assessed. The distinct epistemological ring to the 
sceptical reading’s description o f categorical norms is no coincidence: overarching formal 
terms such as “mistakenness” and “wrongfulness” are invoked in order to criticise and 
correct the instrumental reasoning process.
Thus, both readings ultimately share a similar starting point, informed by the same 
biases. This leads them both to assume incorrectly that Hume believes reason to have an 
exclusively theoretical, epistemological function, and second, that practical motivation and
30 Ibid., 145-6.
31 This is R. M. Hare’s view, as articulated by MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’,” p. 454.
32 Ibid., 453.
33 Ibid., pp. 471-3.
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moral value is only subjectively determined. But these attributions are inaccurate for two 
reasons.
Firstly, in the is/ought passage Hume’s main worry is not about the pursuit o f moral 
truth, and he is unconcerned with the proper classification o f  descriptive and normative 
statements. The sceptical reading poses the question, does the normativity o f “hypothetical 
imperatives” stem from categorically binding norms of reason? But this concern tries to 
ensure the truth-value and objectivity o f our practices through a valid rational procedure; 
for Hume, however, this preoccupation with truth would be an issue that is entirely beside 
the point. In other words, both practical and descriptive statements require the same 
cognitive skills o f probable reasoning, imagination, and memory, but the latter tackle issues 
and concerns which are unlike those o f the former though equally legitimate and  
objective.34 Ultimately, Hume is suggesting that the substantive content o f practical reason 
is objective given its usefulness for, and our natural inclinations towards, practical and 
common life.
Second, in drawing attention to the fact that normative judgements require a different 
“cognitive orientation”35 Hume is not making the claim that because this (supposedly non­
natural) content has no truth-value or justification we need to adopt a formal rational 
procedure with norms that do. Since Hume does not share epistemological bias o f the 
orthodox Moore-inspired reading, he cannot be endorsing any particular ideal justificatory 
procedure, such as deductive proof. The traditional interpretation o f the is/ought passage 
mistakenly assumes that Hume is asking, “can moral rules be deductively derived from 
factual claims” and then proceeds to show how derivation rules disallow this transition. 
However, unlike its current association with logical entailment, Hume has a different 
notion o f “deduction” which denotes the type o f inference incorporated in inductive 
argument.36 More accurately, MacIntyre suggests that Hume’s question should be 
understood as, “how and if moral rules may be inferred from factual statements.”37 
Importantly, Hume validates our inductive beliefs because they rely on natural cognitive 
mechanisms a posteriori to experience, not a priori demonstrative arguments. Like 
inductive arguments, moral arguments cannot be rendered deductively.38 Thus, the is/ought 
passage asserts that prescriptive statements are not demonstratively valid, and therefore we 
need not worry that normative claims cannot be conclusively proved through some rational 
procedure such as deductive argument.
34 Ibid., p. 362.
35 W. D. Falk, “Hume on Is and Ought,” Canadian Journal o f Philosophy 6 (1976): 359-378, 362.
36 MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’,” p. 461.
37 Ibid., p.461, emphasis added.
38 Ibid., p. 454.
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The orthodox misreading o f the is/ought distinction helps explain why contemporary 
philosophers -  both those who endorse and those who criticise the standard model of 
instrumental reason -  are so preoccupied with the formal structure or procedure o f reason 
as well as the proper classification o f rational statements. Scepticism about is/ought 
transitions is to mistakenly privilege certain presumptions about the way epistemological 
and ethical arguments must proceed in order to be valid. Essentially this means we read 
Hume anachronistically in light of these historically recent concerns. By disentangling the 
two, my corrected reading makes interpretive space for a plausible, non-sceptical 
understanding o f Humean practical reason -  and one which follows a more substantive 
rather than proceduralist conception o f practical reason.
III. Humean Desire and the Good
Given how neither epistemological or proceduralist bias o f the sceptical and standard 
model readings are present in the is/ought passage, transitions between fact and value are 
possible through the naturalist framework common to both ethical content and practical 
deliberation. Illustrating how normative values for Hume are not problematic from a 
motivational point o f view by virtue o f its content is important to establish Hume’s more 
substantive conception o f practical reason.
For Hume, morality is not an autonomous sphere that is removed from our natural 
desiderative constitution.39 Similar to how “[n]ature, by an absolute and uncontrollable 
necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breath and feel” [T, p. 183], morality, as 
Hume says, “depends on some internal sense or feeling, which nature has made universal in 
the whole species” [.E, p. 173]. Hume’s unique naturalism maintains that concepts o f desire 
are meaningless without objective ends, relevant to us from our inescapable 
anthropocentric perspective. Objective standards are not the exclusive domain o f human 
reason, but a matter o f human nature -  which includes desires and passions as well as 
reason, and all fall broadly under the rubric o f individual character. Indeed, as Hume 
writes, “in each creature, there is a sound and a defective state; and the former alone can be 
supposed to afford us a true standard o f taste and sentiment.”40 Hume goes so far as to say 
that “[w]riters o f all nations and all ages concur in applauding justice, humanity, 
magnanimity, prudence, veracity; and in blaming the opposite qualifies.”41
In contrast, Hampton states, “[t]o say that the curmudgeon should have acted to 
secure the means to his end, no matter what his occurrent desires were, is to say that he is
39 Ibid., pp. 462-6.
40 “Of the Standard of Taste,” in Essays Moral, Political and Literary, pp. 233-4, emphasis added.
41 Ibid., p. 228.
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governed by an authoritative reason.”42 Hampton’s remarks should indicate that the central 
concerns motivating the Kantian sceptical reading -  concerns about moral objectivity and 
rational autonomy -  lead to the misrepresentation o f Hume’s intentions on a deeper level. 
According to the contemporary Kantian view, if our conception o f reason does not preserve 
a robust notion o f critical objectivity, we are trapped into a kind o f natural necessity and 
ethical relativism: what is desirable is too rooted in human contingent circumstances, and 
therefore cannot provide sufficient critical distance from existing practices in order to 
generate universal, absolute norms of morality or rationality. And without the latent 
epistemological and proceduralist bias, practical reason would be viewed as incapable o f 
outlining actions that are justifiable and valid for everybody. But this leads to some 
puzzling conclusions.
In the first place, Hampton is not clear why it would be morally desirable, or indeed 
rationally necessary, for someone to be committed to the means to their end “no matter 
what his occurrent desires were”. From an explanatory point o f view, such deep-seated 
commitment is inessential to making sense o f our purposive action. Even a morally 
substantive account o f practical reason like Aristotle’s would consider this odd. Aristotle 
stipulates that a person o f good character must be habituated towards ends o f the right sort, 
so both rational and non-rational impulsions within the soul are correctly orientated. This 
is what qualitatively distinguishes the phronimos from a merely clever person; indeed, that 
is precisely why cleverness does not have the freestanding nature o f the current standard 
model.43 Similarly, Hume would not want to say that a person o f good character has to 
pursue the means to an end regardless of their desires, especially since a virtuous character 
emanates proper moral feelings; ethical distinctions are grasped more with sentiment rather 
than discovered by reason [Y, p. 470]. Hume’s psychological hedonism involves the 
process o f critically shifting our evaluative point o f view, a process where the content and 
quality o f our desires or ends come to matter and can be moral orientations, just in the same 
way that our reasoned reflection and judgements can be. In Hume’s words, “reason and 
sentiment concur in almost all moral determinations and conclusions” [is, p. 172, third 
emphasis added]. Indeed, such thick, committed endorsement o f an end, required by the 
sceptical reading’s over-intellectualised instrumental principle, could actually deter us from 
behaving morally. Desiderative moral content, not disembodied rational principles, 
initiates purposive acts fitting o f a virtuous dispositional character. From Hume’s 
perspective, the Kantian view privileges impersonal rational norms that are irrelevant or 
even harmful to morality, given their abstraction from the unique situational context which
42 Hampton, “Practical Reason,” p. 470.
43 Aristotle would characterise someone acting according to reason despite his or her occurrent 
desires as an enkratic agent, characteristic of a poorly habituated person.
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grants our practical action apposite meaning and significance. Hume is not a relativist 
about value: even with the contextual nature o f social reason and morality, Hume has a 
standard of objectivity, just not o f a Kantian variety. Objectively valuable ends exist; such 
ends, however, cannot be found independently o f our natural condition as socially situated 
beings.
So far this captures some Aristotelian elements: as we saw in Chapter 2, praiseworthy 
action considers the circumstantial particular. But also part o f the task o f means-end 
deliberation is to evaluate whether an end is worthy o f pursuit in the first place. A 
straightforward causal connection can be rationally formulated only once this evaluative 
deliberation has already occurred. Thus, according to an Aristotelian account, openness to 
circumstantial and evaluative content is often required for instrumental reason to even get 
off the ground, and the positive assessment o f a decided end should also generate equally 
praiseworthy means. Importantly, evaluative content is acquired through the habitual 
development o f a moral dispositional character. The moral virtues are psychological 
dispositions that display the right deliberative orientation towards the right things: what is 
“desirable” is also morally and normatively good. The two can intersect because Aristotle 
deploys “bridge notions between ‘is’ and ‘ought’: wanting, needing, desiring, pleasure, 
happiness, health.”44
For Hume, evaluative judgements impact on desire in a comparable way.45 Hume 
likewise invokes “bridge notions”, particularly in the hedonistic origins o f instrumental 
reason, and this puts normative weight on the substantive content o f what is desired, 
wanted or needed. Hume believes that to be sceptical o f such transitions -  reflected in both 
the standard model and Kantian sceptical interpretations -  is to mistakenly privilege certain 
presumptions about the way epistemological and ethical arguments must proceed. The 
reductive naturalism underlying the standard model views nature as neutral brute data that 
can be grasped through human reason, a purely information-processing, cognitive faculty. 
Understood as such, nature (an “is”) cannot contain or generate any ethical content (an 
“ought”); subjective desire, however, is exempt from the is/ought distinction since, unlike 
ethical claims, these are deemed psychological facts about human nature. But frameworks 
demanding the rational articulation o f moral value -  or a substantive conception o f the 
good -  are problematic since they depart from numerous presuppositions o f the current 
naturalistic temper, requiring us to adopt both the proceduralist and epistemological bias in
44 Hampton, “Practical Reason,” p. 462.
45 In saying this, I am not claiming that Hume has an Aristotelian account of reason. Hume is 
notoriously critical of peripatetic schools of thought; however, his moral psychology has some 
Aristotelian elements, especially when we consider Aristotle’s account of moral habituation, bound 
up with certain hedonistic instincts. But the crucial difference is that, for Aristotle, practical wisdom 
is achieved only when an agent comes to rationally reflect on the moral virtues and end of human 
life; for Hume, one could live a relatively unreflective life and still be a virtuous, social agent.
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our conceptions o f practical reason. We see this illustrated precisely in the standard model 
and sceptical readings o f Hume, despite its divergent philosophical agenda.
Yet for Hume, the structure o f natural human desire is such that we unavoidably 
allude to the substantive good. Across different cultures and societies is a common insight 
about the nature o f human valuing: what is deemed pleasurable is not necessarily isolated 
from what is good, nor is good necessarily isolated from what is pleasurable.46 Consider, 
for instance, how Hume thinks pleasure and pain naturally appear to the mind: hedonistic 
ideas or impressions are necessarily accompanied by the notion o f “goods and evils”; 
indeed the “good” and “desirable” or “pleasurable” appear to be inseparable natural 
features o f human motivation. Moreover, the indispensability o f these reciprocal concepts 
means that our practical reasoning is bound by certain innate anthropocentric and 
perspectival limits; pursued ends and desires should and ought to be amenable to the 
society we inhabit. It is therefore from our inescapably human vantage point -  as natural 
culture-formers and social beings with a certain degree o f innate benevolence to our fellow 
beings -  that we reason about, appoint and articulate moral value to some goods or desires 
over others.
Though this may initially suggest a kind o f cultural relativism, Hume’s naturalist 
framework has a determinate idea o f what ends have motivational force and are also 
considered objectively “good” or valuable. For example, “[tjhough it is not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction o f the world to the scratching o f my little finger,” writes 
Kemp Smith, for Hume, “it is less ‘humane’ to do so, i.e. less in keeping with the 
sentiments which, as members of the human species, we naturally entertain.”47 Ends that 
are motivating and normative can be self-interested, but their transcendence, where we 
incorporate the broader social good, is equally possible and indeed morally praiseworthy. 
“Nature, by establishing a connexion between our feelings and certain objective ends, 
determines us to actions that completely transcend self-love.”48 Both sorts o f ends cohere 
with Hume’s unique naturalist stance.49 To “follow” nature, to be attuned to her direction
46 Hampton, “Practical Reason,” p. 463.
47 Kemp Smith, David Hume, p. 198.
48 [Kemp] Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume (II),” Mind 14:55 (1905): 338.
49 For instance, in Hume’s essay, “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature,” he writes: “Were 
our selfish and vicious principles so much predominant about our social and virtuous, as is asserted 
by some philosophers, we ought undoubtedly to entertain a contemptible notion of human nature. 
There is much of a dispute of words in all this controversy. When a man denies the sincerity of all 
public spirit or affection to a country and community, I am at a loss what to think of him. Perhaps 
he never felt this passion in so clear and distinct a manner as to remove all his doubts concerning its 
force and reality. But when he proceeds afterwards to reject all private friendship, if no interest or 
self-love intermix itself; I am then confident that he abuses terms, and confounds the ideas of things; 
since it is impossible for any one to be so selfish, or rather so stupid, as to make no difference 
between one man and another, and give no preference to qualities which engage his approbation and 
esteem. Is it also, say I, as insensible to anger as he pretends to be to friendship? And does injury 
and wrong no more affect him than kindness or benefits? Impossible: He does not know himself: he
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o f humans towards the practical common life, means that our explanations o f the good 
describe its “potential as a thing to be loved”.50 In other words, our discursive explanations 
will be intimately bound up with our practical valuations of, and motivation towards, moral 
goodness and activity. Motivation is therefore already embedded within the concept o f the 
good: this is what lies at the heart o f the is/ought passage. As Hume says, “when we 
consider how aptly natural and moral evidence link together, and form only one chain of 
argument, we shall make no scruple to allow that they are o f the same nature, and derived 
from the same principles” [p. 90].
IV  Social Purpose o f  Instrumental Reason and Character Development
Humean practical reasoning has less to do with the rightness o f discrete acts or the 
correctness o f procedure, and more to do with the practical assessment and communication 
o f both intersubjective moral facts and values, functioning as an evaluative mirror to 
society’s practical values. Though Hume may not explain our “practical rationality” in an 
explicit way -  particularly characteristic o f the Treatise more than the Enquiry -  I argue 
that it is implied in the inductive forms o f knowledge we gain from our implicit everyday 
moral learning and social habituation. Specifically, instrumental practical reason is used, 
first, in our acquisition and articulation o f practical, moral experience o f social norms; and 
second, in the merit judgements o f the character traits o f others and ourselves. These 
judgements are, in turn, a crucial prerequisite to the formation and correction o f moral 
sentiments.
Recall from the previous chapter that Hume’s unique naturalist framework orientates 
humans towards practical activity and common society with others. Humean practical 
reasoning is situated within a horizon comprised o f collective judgements, which are 
beneficial to “the peace and security o f human society” [E p. 102]. These judgements, 
along with “ [t]he great force o f custom and education mould the human mind from its 
infancy and form it into a fixed and established character” [.E, p. 86].51 These customary, 
educative appraisals -  essentially inferential, inductive knowledge -  aid the development of 
socially beneficial character traits, including a dispositional capacity to instrumental reason
has forgotten the movements of his heart; or rather he makes use of a different language from the 
rest of his countrymen, and calls not things by their proper names.” [pp. 85-6] In Hume, Essays 
Moral, Political and Literary.
50 Falk, “Hume on Is and Ought,” p. 373.
51 Cf. Hume, “The Sceptic,” pp. 170-1. Some interpreters like John Immerwahr think that none of 
the essays on happiness represent Hume’s considered view, see “Hume’s Essays on Happiness,” 
Hume Studies 15:2 (1989): 307-24. I disagree with this and follow Fogelin, who says the essay “On 
the Sceptic” closely follows Hume’s own style of writing and is consistent with his views in other 
philosophical works. See Robert J. Fogelin, Hume’s Scepticism in the Treatise o f Human Nature 
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985).
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in a way which reflects ease with our naturally appointed role as practical, socially engaged 
agents.52 Thus, common, everyday practical inferences represent an inductive 
accumulation o f practical experience and draw upon internalised, socially generated rules 
o f morality.53 Given that the cognitive orientation o f our reason is one o f practical activity, 
general rules will supervene on and correct subjective desires, tastes and sentiments, 
making these rules or facts “affect-related”.54
Hume outlines this process in the Enquiry. He first explains that “[t]he final sentence 
[...] which pronounces characters and actions amiable or odious, praise-worthy or 
blameable” and “that which renders morality an active principle and constitutes virtue our 
happiness, and vice our misery” is down to “some internal sense or feeling, which nature 
has made universal in the whole species” [pp. 172-3]. But he then continues: “in order to 
pave the way for such sentiment, and give a proper discernment o f its object, it is often 
necessary, we find, that much reasoning should precede, that nice distinctions be made, just 
conclusions, drawn, distant comparisons formed, complicated relations examined, and 
general facts fixed and ascertained” [ibid.]. Though reason does not influence our 
sentiments towards natural kinds o f beauty in particular, “ in many orders o f beauty [...] it is 
requisite to employ much reasoning, in order to fee l the proper sentiment, and a false relish 
may frequently be corrected by argument and reflection” [p. 173, emphasis added]. Hume 
finally concludes, “moral beauty partakes much o f this latter species, and demands the 
assistance o f our intellectual faculties, in order to give it a suitable influence on the human 
m ind ’ [ibid, emphasis added]. In other words, for Hume practical reason is a judgemental, 
cognitive faculty, whereby its explanatory and evaluative conclusions allow us to determine 
moral beauty and value, with a subsequent motivational influence on our sentiments. To 
say the same thing a bit differently, reason’s examination o f an object or end work, in 
tandem with the unique affective disposition o f the individual, in order to generate valid 
moral beliefs which contain practical content that is both motivating and normative.55 In 
Falk’s words, inferential practical judgement “bridge[s] the gap between understanding and 
sensibility by making object-knowledge available to impinge on our sensibilities.”56
To further make sense o f the above passage from the Enquiry, we have good textual 
warrant to assume that Hume is describing “practical reason” in an expanded sense, though 
the actual term is not mentioned. Causal inference is an assessing, judging, reflective 
process: in a practical, cognitive orientation, we observe, compare, and describe objects, 
fact-knowledge, and character traits, leaving us with socially-communicated moral values
52 Penelhum, “Hume’s Moral Psychology,” p. 154.
53 Cf. Philo, D, p. 134.
54 Falk, “Hume on Is and Ought,” p. 373.
55 Cf. Hume, “The Sceptic,” p. 169. See also Setiya, “Hume on Practical Reason,” p. 384.
56 W. D. Falk, “Hume on Practical Reason,” Philosophical Studies 27:1 (1975): p. 16.
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and motivating sentiments. Elsewhere, Hume notoriously discusses how moral good and 
evil are discerned by feeling rather than reason. However, he continues:
But these sentiments may arise either from the mere species or appearance of 
characters and passions, or from reflexions on their tendency to the happiness of 
mankind, and o f particular persons. [...] [B]oth these causes are intermix’d in our 
judgments o f morals; after the same manner as they are in our decisions concerning 
most kinds o f external beauty: Tho’ I am also o f opinion, that reflexions on the 
tendencies o f actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great 
lines o f our duty. [T  pp. 589-90, emphases added]
And when Hume describes the calm passions, they are not described as impetuous, 
pathological forces o f great intensity, but are closely related to commonsense notions of 
how it is to conduct oneself according to reason and admirable pragmatic reflection. 
Included in the calm passions are “every valuable quality o f the mind, whether o f the 
imagination, judgment, memory, or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice, 
integrity” [T, p. 279]. When a passion “pronounces its verdict” on an object’s value, it 
“considers not the object simply, as it is in itself, but surveys it with all the circumstances, 
which attend it.”57 Surveying all the circumstances attending an object evokes a causal 
inference, so the passions must involve some kind o f cognitive activity; without which 
object and circumstance remain disjointed isolates and the value o f an object cannot be 
determined. Similarly, in the essay “O f the Standard o f Taste” the incapacity to discern and 
be moved by beauty and virtue is attributed to an indelicate imagination -  namely a 
cognitive mechanism that is part and parcel o f the instrumental reasoning process.58 Thus, 
if  we took reason in a very exclusive sense -  as denoting a cognitive faculty which 
generates valid arguments conferred by its procedure -  we would be hard-pressed to 
comprehend the general meaning o f these textual passages. The words “reflexion”, 
“judgments”, “surveys” and all that comprises “valuable qualities o f the mind”, would 
suggest something rather trivial, incomplete, maybe even incoherent, if we did not think 
Hume was describing practical reason in a more expanded sense o f the term.
57 “The Sceptic,” p. 172.
58 “Many and frequent are the defects in the internal organs, which prevent or weaken the influence 
of those general principles, on which depends our sentiment of beauty or deformity. Though some 
objects, by the structure of the mind, be naturally calculated to give pleasure, it is not to be expected, 
that in every individual the pleasure will be equally felt. Particular incidents and situations occur, 
which either throw a false light on the objects, or hinder the true from conveying to the imagination 
the proper sentiment and perception. One obvious cause, why many feel not the proper sentiment of 
beauty, is the want of that delicacy of imagination, which is requisite to convey a sensibility of those 
finer emotions.” “Of the Standard of Taste,” p. 234.
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Humean instrumental rationality also includes qualitative judgements and 
assessments which transcend a simple calculative logic; the “practical” function of 
instrumental reasoning is not constrained exclusively to the first-person execution o f a 
means-end connection, but encompasses third-person, cause-effect appraisals o f individual 
character traits and virtues. Causal inference between objects is therefore only a partial 
dimension o f practical deliberation: more fundamental ground for instrumental reasoning’s 
practical significance is that it allows us to determine the consequences of specific 
character traits, and generate moral approval or disapproval accordingly.59 One may, 
however, object that though means-end deliberation includes substantive content in the 
form o f such qualitative judgements, it nonetheless eventually collapses into a form of 
ethical subjectivism. In other words, the content that bears on instrumental reason is 
motivating and influential only because o f its subjective benefit or usefulness to society. 
Unlike Aristotle or Kant, Hume cannot claim that these virtues are, in themselves, 
objectively valuable ends, o f which their intrinsic value is confirmed by deep rational 
reflection. Kantians endorsing the sceptical interpretation partly justify their rejection of 
Hume’s moral theory on these grounds. To some extent Hume has a utilitarian strand: 
some virtues -  particularly those that are artificial, such as justice and property -  are 
endorsed simply because they promote the good or usefulness o f the society one inhabits.60
But to acknowledge this utilitarian aspect o f Humean justice does not mean that it 
should also be seen as defining his account o f moral virtues and sentiments -  that he is a 
subjectivist about moral value. Hume in fact justifies many aspects o f good character and 
sociable virtues, such as benevolence, prudence, and other virtues beneficial to oneself (like 
patience, industry; qualities o f the mind like learning, courage, and integrity), irrespective 
o f their potential consequences or conditional utility for the individual. “Virtue in rags is 
still virtue,” Hume writes, and the love which it procures, attends a man into a dungeon or 
desart, where the virtue can no longer be exerted in action, and is lots to all the world.” He 
continues more emphatically, “where any object, in all its parts, is fitted to attain any 
agreeable end, it naturally gives us pleasure, and is esteem’d beautiful, even tho’ some 
external circumstances be wanting to render if altogether effectual. ‘Tis sufficient if every 
thing be compleat in the object itself’ [T, p. 584], Our esteem o f a person’s character does 
not seem to be based solely on their successful execution o f a means-end connection. 
Rather, virtuous character is valuable in itselfi there is quasi-objective merit to good 
character that transcends the straightforward consequentialist achievement o f ends or its 
benefit to the individual. Causal judgements o f instrumental reason permit the objective 
valuing o f certain traits from an observational, third-personal point o f view, and good
59 Penelhum, “Hume’s Moral Psychology,” p. 144.
60 See T, p. 501 ff.
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character that readily promotes the good o f society will impart evaluative worth and value 
to attempted means, even when the ends are not successfully achieved. In the case o f a 
person who is well respected for their admirable, sociable character, with good traits 
amenable to common life, it doesn’t matter that circumstances rendered ineffective their 
intended action. Their cause-effect connection may be unsuccessful, but we as observers 
effectively judge the person for the general tendencies or “rule” of action which displays a 
certain enduring quality or temperament; we know that in this instance their lack o f success 
is, as it were, “out o f character”. Or we realise that the person intended a good effect, and 
had the circumstances been right, they would have succeeded. Based on how we judge 
their character we render the means and ends complete even when they are not, by filling in 
the situational and dispositional gaps to the story. Hume confirms this in the Enquiry:
Where would be the foundation o f morals, if  particular characters had no certain or 
determinate power to produce particular sentiments, and if these sentiments had no 
constant operation on actions? And with what pretence could we employ our 
criticism  upon any poet or polite author, if  we could not pronounce the conduct and 
sentiments o f his actors either natural or unnatural to such characters, and in such 
circumstances? It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or 
action o f any kind without acknowledging the doctrine o f necessity, and this 
inference from motives to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct, [p. 90]61
In short, the practicality o f instrumental reason lies partly in those causal judgements which 
connect character with specific effects, and thereby facilitate the normative reflection and a 
quasi-objective determination o f virtues and vices.
The previous chapter established how Hume discredits reason’s theoretical or 
speculative aspirations to assert its practical utility; as indicated so far, the specification o f 
its “practicality” is far more expansive than the dominant proceduralist strand. To 
illustrate, for Kant (and his adherents in the sceptical interpretation) factual statements 
about the empirical world -  even if these relate directly to human life and experience -  
would not qualify as instances of practical reason. Alternatively, for the standard model, 
the sphere o f practical reason is eliminated altogether; practical normativity is reducible to 
motivating subjective desires and preferences, and the moral problem is confined to the 
logical analysis o f ethical statements. As previously explained, however, Hume’s 
scepticism about reason’s capacity to advance knowledge in a theoretical subject means 
that “factual” statements -  particularly if their content is relevant to the promotion o f social
61 Cf. T, p. 582.
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interaction and reciprocity -  are indeed “practical”. By virtue o f its content, by virtue o f its 
capacity to explain and articulate that content, reason has a practical, cognitive orientation.
In this context, the full import of correcting the is/ought passage now comes to the 
fore. We set aside entrenched philosophical prejudices about how objective rational 
argument must proceed -  as adhering to the epistemological and procedural biases in 
contemporary philosophy. Third-person character judgements illustrate precisely a 
dimension o f practical reason so often neglected in contemporary debates, namely practical 
reason as the explicit explanation, as the non-deducible, informal articulation o f normative 
human values as these are embedded in everyday practice and moral understanding. 
Practical reason is bound up with common linguistic idioms, common moral terminological 
distinctions, used in social communication. Humans are natural articulators o f value, and 
“we must allow that some part o f the seeming harmony in morals may be accounted for 
from the very nature o f language.”62 When Hume says that people usually attribute the 
existence o f similar sentiments to the “plain reason” o f the “abstract sciences”, he is 
referring to reason in the rationalist sense, where converging sentiments are viewed as 
evidence o f demonstrable, ontological truths cognisable by reason. Hume then claims that 
common sentiments are in fact due to the nature o f language and social communication.
One might say Hume means to draw a sharp distinction between reason and language 
here; if  that were the case, however, his definition o f language would be reduced to the 
superficial outward expression or utterance of instinct; human communication would be 
elementary, ad hoc pleasure and pain verbal outbursts. On these grounds, the 
reason/language dichotomy does not seem to capture his thought here. For Hume, language 
is intrinsically evaluative; it reflects a more general viewpoint that “must affix the epithets 
o f praise or blame, in conformity to sentiments, which arise from the general interests of 
the community” [p. 227]. Because language develops for more general use, the implicit 
evaluative content o f our moral vocabulary veers towards the benefit o f larger social 
interests. If, as Hume says elsewhere, “the intercourse o f sentiments, therefore, in society 
and conversation, makes us form some general inalterable standard, by which we may 
approve or disapprove o f characters and manners” [71, p. 603], it makes little sense to imply 
he is counterposing practical reason and language. There is no way we can discursively 
convey approbation or disapprobation if we are incapable o f making causal, reasoned 
judgements, connecting character traits with effects. Ensconced within a linguistic 
framework, invariably the development o f our individual character will imply an intimate 
acquaintance with broader discursive idioms of moral judgement and their implicit social 
value [.E, p. 174].
62 Ibid., p. 228.
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Practical reason is consequently a matter o f personal character and social 
development: it combines our natural hedonistic inclinations and feelings with evolving yet 
stable social conventions and linguistic artefacts; together they cultivate our natural moral 
sensibilities through time. Conceiving o f instrumental practical reason as such highlights 
the intersubjectivity and social valuing that contextualises human activity. It is this context 
that forms the crucial motivational and normative foundation o f Hume’s practical reason. 
We can better see how Humean instrumental reason evades both dominant readings when 
the reinterpreted is/ought passage is combined with this section’s description o f Humean 
practical reason. Instrumental reason will never be neutral or devoid o f substantive 
content: its exercise is not a function o f its structural form nor meant to be a procedure of 
critical detachment from our entrenched value perspectives. Thus, in itself, the fact that 
some desiderative or hedonistic state initiates means-end reasoning does not suggest that all 
substantive ends are deemed equally valuable, nor that they originate in an undeveloped, 
primitive psychology, absent o f integrated reasoned judgements o f some sort. Sub-Humean 
readings, such as Michael Smith’s, neglect these aspects and are guilty o f narrowing 
Hume’s actual picture o f human impulses. They disregard the role o f reasoned belief and 
the broader ethical significance o f a good, socially developed character.63 For this reason, it 
is mistakenly thought that Hume collapses prudential self-interest into practical reason, and 
thus ascribes to humans predominantly egoistic, self-maximising desires, reminiscent o f the 
standard model o f rational choice.64 But the sceptical reading, based on their proceduralist 
bias, is equally guilty o f narrowing the potential task o f practical reason. That practical 
reasoning can be about both a reflective articulation and explanation o f human value in 
addition to providing practical direction to individual behaviour is a possibility the 
predominant proceduralist conception o f practical reason simply cannot accommodate. 
They claim that unless the normative or motivational authority o f reason is explicitly and 
comprehensively justified, accompanied by a corresponding account o f categorical formal 
norms with universal appeal, no adequate account o f practical reason can be had.
At this point we may ask about Hume’s conception o f normativity: is Hume simply 
making the point that the type of categorical normativity sought by the Kantian is in fact 
reducible to motivation? As informed by the conventional Mooreian understanding o f the 
is/ought divide, contemporary philosophers display a strong tendency to isolate the 
normative sphere away from the question o f motivation, assuming a great distance between
63 My intuition is that the sceptical reading generally dictates the way reason is discussed (in terms of 
rational necessity and normativity) while the sub-Humeans dictate the way that desires are discussed 
(in a rudimentary dispositional way, where any supporting cognitive structure may be tangentially 
implicated inasmuch as it corresponds to a natural pathological disposition, but divorced from any 
developmental process).
641 will address this issue more comprehensively in the next section.
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the two. So far we have been exploring two possible responses to this view in 
contemporary philosophy: on one hand, the Kantian could say that regardless o f whether 
these reasons grip an agent’s motivation, they are normative. But the problem we then 
encounter is trying to account for the source o f this categorical normativity. In response, 
the proponents o f the standard model argue that this Kantian conception o f normativity is 
problematic from a scientific point o f view, particularly where subjective motivation 
diverges from normative reasons for acting. Thus, contemporary sub-Humean models try 
to do away with conceptions o f objective norms and focus instead on the features of 
subjective motivation: if  we want to understand normativity then we simply need to 
understand how humans are motivated by certain conative elements. On this view, if 
normativity entails reasons for doing something irrespective o f subjective motivation, then 
Hume has no conception as such.
But herein lies the importance o f correcting our reading o f the is/ought passage: if 
Hume, like Aristotle, believes that human motivation is inextricably linked to normative 
reasons for acting -  that the good is something to be loved or drawn to -  neither option in 
contemporary philosophy makes sense. Unlike the standard model reading, Hume does not 
believe we can effectively do away with normativity, reducing it all to questions about 
subjective motivation. Social, evaluative judgements about character and virtue are both 
reasonable and normative -  and this intersubjective content constrains, guides, and 
becomes integrated within subjective motivation. Unlike the more Kantian view, the space 
between normative reasons and subjective motivation is smaller: qualitative, moral 
judgements provide us reasons for acting but their link to subjective motivation is much 
closer given that the content o f our normative reasons has a naturalistic basis (the practical 
ends o f human sociality and common life).
We will see more precisely how this is possible through Hume’s sympathy 
mechanism in the next section. The generation o f appropriate moral sentiments presuppose 
the normative judgements determined through reason -  through cognitive mechanisms such 
as comparison, imagination, object distinctions, and causal inference. In the next section I 
want to focus more on how these cognitive processes can have a motivating role through 
the sympathy mechanism, whilst I address potential worries about Humean egoism and 
subjectivism.
V Sympathy, the Se lf and Egoism
At this point, one might argue that I have erroneously aligned Hume with Aristotle in 
order to avoid the Kantian predilections o f the sceptical interpretation. However, in saying 
that Hume has some vague Aristotelian elements, in no way do I claim that Hume adheres
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to an Aristotelian account o f practical reason. That would be blatantly incorrect: Hume has 
no conception o f an overarching, functional end, which we reason towards in Aristotle’s 
thicker, more demanding understanding on practical deliberation. Articulation o f value, for 
Aristotle, means a rational reflection o f objective values possessing species-wide validity. 
One cannot be practically wise in the Aristotelian sense if one does not in fact rationally 
evaluate and understand the intrinsic worth o f certain moral, intellectual virtues, within the 
context of the polis. For Hume, articulation o f value refers to a minimal level of 
assessment, implied within the natural use o f language, though these values vary from place 
to place. Deep reflection in the Aristotelian sense is admirable, but certainly not required 
for one to be virtuous in the Humean sense; in fact, should such reflection be carried too 
far, practical immobility and philosophic melancholy is the inevitable result.
Moreover, Hume’s implicit concern with philosophical egoism highlights crucial 
respects in which his account o f practical reason departs from Aristotle. The former 
attempts to respond to distinctly modem, post-Hobbesian / post-Mandevellian worries 
about egoistic self-regard, worries which do not necessarily arise in the latter.65 This 
section shows that Hume attempts to address and sidestep the spectre o f modem moral 
subjectivism and psychological egoism by appointing to sympathy a central normative, 
moral role. The way Hume addresses thoroughly modem worries through sympathy 
reveals his firm philosophical allegiance to a more sentimentalist, non-Hobbesian approach, 
whereby other-regarding virtues are viewed as beneficial to individuals.66 Moreover, as we 
will see, the sympathy mechanism allows Hume’s model o f instrumental reason avoid of 
the moral subjectivism o f the current standard model; if reason does not assure us of 
morality’s objectivity in terms o f its procedures, features o f human nature, such as the 
capacity to sympathise with another human being, become the objective standard o f moral 
conduct. Ultimately our use o f reason should be aligned with these natural features of 
humanity.
As we saw in the previous section, causal, probable inferences within instrumental 
reasoning have a twofold practical significance: first, they provide firsthand guidance to 
relevant means-end connections, object knowledge and comparisons; second they allow an 
observer to judge the effects and social worth o f specific character traits. Crucially, 
instrumental reason from the first-person standpoint and the more evaluative third-person 
perspective become linked through sympathy, a natural mechanism common to all humans:
65 See Norton, David Hume and Stephen Buckle, Natural Law and the Theory o f Property: Grotius 
to Hume (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) for more on how moral sense philosophy tries to address these 
worries.
66 For an opposing point of view, see Jean Hampton, “The Hobbesian Side of Hume,” in Andrews 
Reath et al, Reclaiming the History o f Ethics: Essays for John Rawls (Cambridge, Mass.: UP, 1997)
pp. 66-102.
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For besides the relation o f cause and effect, by which we are convinc’d o f the reality 
o f the passion, with which we sympathize; besides this, I say, we must be assisted by 
the relations o f resemblance and contiguity, in order to feel the sympathy in its full 
perfection. And since these relations can entirely convert an idea into an impression, 
and convey the vivacity o f the latter into the former, so perfectly as to lose nothing o f 
it in the transition, we may easily conceive how the relation o f  cause and effect alone, 
may serve to strengthen and inliven an idea. In sympathy there is an evident 
conversion o f an idea into an impression, [p. 320, emphasis added]
For Hume, sympathy is the natural, sensible identification with the situation or feelings o f 
others; it is through this natural instinct that moral beliefs or reasons can be activated and 
are motivational. Far from being a one-way motivational channel from impressions to 
ideas, cognitive mechanisms can “convert an idea into an impression”, conferring onto the 
former a vivacity and motivational force that the latter naturally possesses. Indeed, natural 
cognitive mechanisms such as resemblance and contiguity often aid our sympathetic 
responses to others, rendering our ideas o f another’s experience more immediate and 
dynamic. Thoughts o f another person’s situation, o f another person’s evaluative judgement 
o f character traits or moral values, are always fainter when compared to our firsthand 
experience, but sympathy enlivens these third-personal experiences to the point o f actually 
experiencing similar passions. Through sympathy an individual can see situational or 
emotional resemblances with another, thus enlivening otherwise impotent causal ideas and 
beliefs.
O f course, human sympathetic identification has a limited sphere, and to determine 
and eventually expand its boundaries requires a notion o f the self and its natural 
attachments. The idea o f the self, though fundamentally unstable and inchoate, has the 
capacity to aid the sympathetic activation o f ideas, but this naturally means that ideas and 
beliefs close to oneself are activated more than ones remote to our situation. Hume thinks 
we will consequently sympathise more with our family, friends, and countrymen. But the 
natural limitations to sympathy should not detract from its capacity to expand feelings and 
thoughts to ones beyond the self. Even the initial, more restricted sphere o f sympathy 
affirms the normative impact o f one’s broader socio-cultural context on self-identity, and 
affirms the evaluative purpose of practical reason.67 Hume writes in the Enquiry:
67 Charlotte Brown, “From Spectator to Agent: Hume’s Theory of Obligation,” Hume Studies 20:1 
(1994): 28.
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Now nothing is more natural than for us to embrace the opinions o f others in this 
particular; both from sympathy, which renders all their sentiments intimately present 
to us; and from reasoning, which makes us regard their judgment, as a kind of 
argument for what they affirm. These two principles o f authority and sympathy 
influence almost all our opinions; but must have a peculiar influence, when we judge 
o f our own worth and character. [£, pp. 320-1]
Our natural sympathetic inclinations help us to adopt and activate more general judgements 
about morality and virtue which are held by our larger discursive community. Personal 
development involves the internalisation o f moral judgements pronounced by others, and is 
fuelled by the desire to possess a reputation worthy o f praise. This affiliation with others, 
combined with the desire for their good opinion, allow us to be so passionally affected that 
we would voluntarily change our character. “Sympathy we sometimes carry so far,” Hume 
writes, “as [to] even be displeas’d with a quality commodious to us, merely because it 
displeases others, and renders us disagreeable in their eyes; tho’ perhaps we can never have 
any interest in rendering ourselves agreeable to them” [T’ p. 589]. The evaluative 
judgements and disapproval o f others, through sympathy, can have a motivating influence 
on future practical conduct. And since the substance o f the self is comprised o f assessable 
character traits, these appraisals inevitably affect one’s self-conception.
Hume clearly has in mind this sympathetic, evaluative process when he rather 
oddly refers to the self as “object” rather than the more common term, “subject”. When we 
speak in evaluative terms the self is referred to as an object rather than a subject;68 we 
identify ourselves as a “se lf’ only through another comparative stance.69 To refer to the 
self as “object” therefore suggests a change in the evaluative viewpoint, to a 
characteristically stable and intersubjective perspective. Ardal astutely writes that “ [m]oral 
approval always has a person as its object. We can morally approve or disapprove of 
actions only as having their source in a person or a group o f persons.”70 Moreover, 
perception o f the self as “object” involves taking a degree o f pride in oneself, especially 
when the judgements o f others reflect favourably upon us. Without a notion o f the self and 
its attending pride our ideas, beliefs, or reasons would remain inactive, yet without 
common social and linguistic references, these beliefs remain arbitrary and our identity 
would be fragmented. For its stability, the self therefore requires the mediation and
68 Robert S. Henderson, “David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions,” Hume Studies 
16:1 (1990): 35.
69 Hume does not have a solipsistic account of personal identity. The self is something we know of 
only indirectly: it gives vivacity to our ideas, it is implicated in our social relations; in fact we come 
to some vague notion of the self only through others. But we cannot “know” the self in the way a 
Cartesian would want to say we can.
70 Pdll S. Ardal, Passion and Value in Hume’s Treatise 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: UP, 1989) p. 123.
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reflection others provide, so that self-identity possesses greater significance than the 
trivialities commonly dominating individual choice. As Annette Baier notes, this comes in 
the valuing one’s public standing, reputation and character, as opposed to arbitrary or 
ephemeral desires.71 To ascribe identity to the self is to presuppose further what MacIntyre 
calls a “publicly-usable, third-person” perspective which attributes accountability and 
responsibility to the first-person.72
The shift from subject to object, moreover, is possible only within a landscape of 
common, existing moral terms and distinctions, and ultimately attests to the evaluative, 
articulating function o f practical reason. For Hume, instrumental practical reasoning is not 
restricted to the first-person question, “what are the means to this desire?” Nor is it 
restricted to the third-person evaluative standpoint asking, “what is the broader impact of 
this character trait on society?” Rather, sympathy’s subtle operation in practical reason 
shows how both stances mutually imply one another, meaning the first-person must, and for 
Hume, does ask, “how does this end reflect my character, and how will others judge me?” 
What doesn’t arise, however, (at least, from Hume’s point o f view) is the morally sceptical 
question, “why should I care about how others judge me”.
At this point, one may object that Hume’s emphasis on other people’s judgement 
compromises the moral basis o f the sympathy mechanism; instrumental reason is 
consequently all about fulfilling hedonistic self-interest and therefore his conception 
collapses into a subjectivism reminiscent o f the standard model. If  moral evaluation o f our 
self-identity, desires, and means and ends, relies on taking pride in other people’s 
judgement o f our character, if  earlier I was right that valid transition arguments between 
“is” and “ought” effectively blur the distinction between personal desire and normative 
judgements about the moral good, the question then arises whether Hume’s position is 
really that far removed from the standard model’s definition o f rational preferences. The 
sub-Humean alleges that instrumental reason hinges on subjective desires individual: an 
agent has reason to act in a way that promotes his individual desires that are not themselves 
subject to external evaluation.73 From this point o f view it is unclear what normative work 
is actually carried out by Humean sympathy: much less than extend the motivational source 
o f practical reason beyond self-interest, sympathy seems to merely confirm the truth of 
moral subjectivism and philosophical egoism. Perhaps another person’s pleasure or pain is 
simply a means to my own hedonistic ends; sympathy is just another way my own pleasure 
and prudential interest can be maximised. Moreover, to dispute the subjectivism and 
egoism o f the standard model seemingly substantiates the sceptical reading: in order to
71 Baier, A Progress o f Sentiments, pp. 142-3.
72 Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame: UP, 1988) p. 291.
73 Cullity and Gaut, “Introduction,” n. 15.
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avoid reason’s collapse into subjectivism, movement towards the other extreme -  namely 
towards a more critical, universal foundation for ethics and practical reason which renders 
irrelevant subjective desires and interests -  may be necessary and indeed preferable.74
So we are presented with a false dilemma: either Humean practical reason has the 
subjectivist framework o f the standard model, or Hume’s outright scepticism about 
practical reason provides no grounds to criticise imprudent behaviour. Against the latter 
claim, for Hume an individual’s imprudence can be criticised according to a more 
commonsense, ordinary understanding o f what constitutes reasonable conduct. In the 
Treatise he asks the question, “what character, or peculiar understanding, is more excellent 
than another?” His response:
‘Tis evident we can answer none o f these questions, without considering which o f 
those qualities capacitates a man best for the world, and carries him farthest in any of 
his undertakings. There are many other qualities of the mind, whose merit is deriv’d 
from the same origin. Industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigilance, 
application, constancy, with other virtues o f that kind, which ‘twill be easy to 
recollect, are esteem’d valuable upon no other account, than their advantage in the 
conduct o f life. ‘Tis the same case with temperance, frugality, oeconomy, resolution: 
As on the other hand, prodigality, luxury, irresolution, uncertainty, are vicious, 
merely because they draw ruin upon us, and incapacitate us for business and action.
[pp. 610-11]
Significantly, the prudential virtues are described, not as whimsical desires or pathological 
impulses, but as “qualities o f the mind”. These qualities refer to the common use of the 
term, “reasonable” or “unreasonable”. As suggested in the previous section, “reasonable” 
denotes an admirable character disposition comprised o f socially and individually 
beneficial calm passions. In order to make sense o f these prudential virtues, again we must 
assume that Hume uses practical reason in an expanded sense: for instance, to define 
“constancy” or “application” necessarily invokes functions o f practical reason, like good, 
effective causal inferences and its imaginative or recollective process, which likewise 
reflect accumulated practical experience. The term ‘’’reasonable” is, as Simon Blackburn 
describes, the “only currency o f evaluation”75 because its implicit standard encompasses
74 Worries over egoism latently inform and motivate a number of the sceptical interpretations, 
particularly Korsgaard’s critique of Hume via Kantian practical reason. See Sources o f Normativity. 
I criticise Korsgaard’s reading and misuse of Kant in the following two chapters.
75 Blackburn, Ruling Passions, p. 240. I partly disagree with Blackburn’s conclusion when he says 
that Hume is trying to “distinguish defects of input from ones of processing and hence output”. 
Blackburn rightly says that that how one responds to a situation is supposed to be a “dynamic
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various prudential virtues and calm passions that promote our natural cognitive orientation 
towards “business and action”.
Second, Hume thinks it unrealistic for philosophers to suggest that morality stems 
solely from pure, unmixed motives, for these may not even exist. We don’t need to deny 
altogether prudential or subjective interests in order to make space for other-regarding 
interests that can and do motivate our instrumental reasoning; actual human motivation is 
much more complex and mixed.76 He writes:
Where avarice or revenge enters into any seemingly virtuous action, it is difficult for 
us to determine how far it enters, and it is natural to suppose it the sole actuating 
principle. But vanity is so closely allied to virtue, and to love the fame of laudable 
actions approaches so near the love o f laudable actions for their own sake, that these 
passions are more capable o f mixture, than any other kinds o f affection; and it is 
almost impossible to have the latter without some degree o f the former.77
Importantly, in this essay “O f the Dignity or Meanness o f Human Nature” Hume expresses 
genuine unease with purely negative conceptions o f human nature. These conceptions 
reduce all human practical motivation to an egoistic level, making our instrumental 
reasoning mere instances o f self-projection.78 And like the sceptical reading, he finds 
troubling the morally destructive implications o f such pessimism.79 Our virtuous acts and 
friendship -  both o f which flourish with a healthy sympathy for others -  may produce 
incidental pleasure, but these acts are ultimately done for the sake o f a friend’s good, out of 
genuine, other-regarding affection for the person. Elsewhere in another essay, he says that 
a bad opinion o f human nature “extinguish[es] the social affections” and “prevent[s]
response”. But Blackburn limits this to our passionate and sensible nature. I think this minimises 
how much sympathy can activate our cool judgements and ideas. I argue that Hume shows how 
passions as well as sympathetically animated ideas, beliefs, and reasons form our practical 
responses, and does better justice to the depth of our dynamic responses.
76 This makes sense if we situate Hume within the natural law tradition of Grotius and Pufendorf, 
both of whom claim natural law is bound up with self-preservation, but this self-preservation reveals 
innate sociable tendencies. Thus, the promotion of society is the natural condition of our self- 
preservation. See Buckle, Natural Law.
7 Hume, “Of the Dignity or Meanness of Human Nature,” pp. 85-6.
78 Norton shows how Hobbesian moral scepticism is a spectre over Hume’s philosophy, of which the 
latter attempts to challenge in his moral sentimentalism. See David Hume, pp. 21-54.
79 As Frederick C. Beiser notes, the eighteenth-century debate between rationalism and 
sentimentalism differs from contemporary philosophical debates between cognitivism and 
emotivism or naturalism and prescriptivism. The former is more of a dispute about whether moral 
values are primary qualities, like rational or mathematical terms which don’t depend on human 
consciousness, or secondary qualities which are relative to human consciousness. See The 
Sovereignty o f Reason; The Defense o f Rationality in the Early English Enlightenment (Princeton: 
UP, 1996), pp. 313-4.
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remorse for a man’s own crimes; when he considers, that vice is as natural to mankind, as 
the particular instincts to brute-creatures”.80
These remarks indicate important respects in which Hume differs, not only from 
Aristotle, but also the moral sceptic and egoist. For Aristotle, the possibility o f defining 
human essence and moral motivation in egoistic terms is an anathema; those who do are 
either simpleminded or poorly habituated. This classical option is no longer available to 
Hume: any scientific account o f human nature must respond, in some way or another, to the 
spectre o f egoism and moral subjectivism -  a problem that perhaps originates in 
Augustinian theology and takes on a life o f its own after Hobbes. Hume argues that to do 
away with egoism altogether would be the wrong way to assuage philosophical unease over 
self-interested behaviour, particularly if  one hopes to provide a plausible, relevant moral 
system. He thus avoids the subjectivism o f the standard model by making the development 
o f admirable character the appropriate focus o f our natural egoism. Without proper social 
development o f  our mind’s disposition, without cultivating dignity in our taste and 
passions, it is entirely possible that the pride attending the self may lead to excessive vanity 
and a warped desire for glory. But this possibility is minimised if  we appoint to practical 
reason an evaluative, articulating function, best expressed in the third-person causal 
assessment o f both character and shared moral values. Good instrumental reasoning is not 
measured according to whether my subjective interests have been advanced. Rather, it 
must encompass a two-way, corrective process, whereby substantive, moral content -  
represented in socially communicated, practical human values -  is imparted to my 
subjective desires or ends. Without this reflexive process, my own desires can remain 
inert: for Hume, pride and humility -  the passions relating to the self -  are “unattended with 
any desire, and not immediately exciting us to action” [E p. 367]; by contrast desire attends 
the passions directed towards others (such as love and hatred). Hume thinks that our 
impressions o f the self are not necessarily accompanied by desire; instead, desire attends 
other-directed passions. Self-interested desire is never the sole cause for practical action; 
indeed, as we saw above, though we commonly praise long-term prudential planning in our 
ordinary use o f the term “reasonable”, in many instances people act contrary to their own 
personal advantage. Both moral and non-moral, disinterested and self-interested 
motivation exists, and their potential conflict requires sympathetic reconciliation.81
Humean sympathy illustrates the close connection between subjective motivation 
and normative reasons (which are constituted by qualitative, evaluative judgements); this is
80 “The Sceptic,” p. 173.
81 Nicholas Capaldi, Hume’s Place in Moral Philosophy (New York: Peter Lang, 1989) p. 6. This 
idea of mixed motives contrasts with Kant; however, many contemporary Kantians try to say that 
Kant has an account of mixed motives (which include the desire for happiness), in order to avoid the 
charge that his moral motivation is overly strict and unrealistic.
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clearly distinct from contemporary accounts o f normativity which favour a gap between 
motivation and normativity as based on the Mooreian understanding o f is/ought divide. 
Moreover, Humean sympathy also presents an important challenge to the subjectivism of 
the standard model o f instrumental reason, effectively situating instrumental reason within 
a normative intersubjective framework which has an objective naturalistic basis. As an 
intrinsic part o f the instrumental reasoning process, sympathy provides the necessary 
motivational link between third-personal, evaluative, reflective judgements and first- 
personal hedonistic desires, between societal values and self-identity. Our sympathetic 
affiliation with others’ evaluative judgements allows the general viewpoint to supervene on 
our individual, contingent tastes. The reasoned censure or approval o f the more general 
point o f view become integrated with the subjective passions; our self-interested motives 
evolve into genuine moral sentiment and change the direction o f our practical conduct 
accordingly. Thus, at its core the normativity o f instrumental reasoning encompasses the 
articulation o f valuable societal customs which naturally impinge on our individual actions 
and moral sensibilities. Because the stability o f our self-identity depends on others, 
because we can humanly relate to another’s judgements and respect their discretionary 
power, Hume can answer the sceptical reading’s question o f how and why evaluative 
normative reasons or beliefs become practically activated in the instrumental reasoning 
process.
Conclusion
The previous chapter outlined how standard model readings misunderstand Hume’s 
naturalistic framework and assume his conception is similar to the forms o f reductive 
naturalism realism informing what Taylor refers to as the current naturalistic temper. As a 
result, Hume is mistakenly thought to be the historical source for the current standard 
model. Yet the differences between Hume and current sub-Humean accounts o f the role o f 
instrumental reasoning are substantial enough to call into question the plausibility o f these 
partial reappropriations o f Hume who seek to align his position with that o f the standard 
model. What is more, and as I have argued more specifically in this chapter, the sceptical 
reading is just as guilty as the standard model o f suspending Hume’s philosophical 
framework and importing in its place its own Kant-inspired biases. Once removed from his 
philosophical framework Hume does appear to endorse a version o f ethical subjectivism 
and reductivism about human motivation. This then does render him susceptible to the 
charge o f scepticism raised against him by proponents o f Kantian proceduralism.
But the sceptical reading’s recruitment o f Hume as historical source of the standard 
model’s moral impoverishment is unsuccessful. Indeed, despite its critical agenda in this
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regard, the sceptical reading in fact shares with the standard model the same basic 
proceduralist and epistemological biases which then inform their accounts o f the function 
and normativity o f instrumental reason. This predominant view regards practical 
rationality as the formal capacity to follow a procedure that is divorced from substantive 
content and dispositional context. Good instrumental reasoning must invoke formal criteria 
that possess universal validity and application, freed from the qualitative distinctions 
constitutive o f our intersubjective values. This view is not unique to the sceptical reading -  
as we saw, standard model readings too have a conception o f practical reason as a 
freestanding, formal procedure which ensures the coherence between desires and belief, 
and is applied towards an open-ended, subjective outcome. Both sceptical and standard 
model readings are therefore suspicious o f the qualitative distinctions constitutive o f a more 
substantive conception o f practical reason. At root, this suspicion animates the suspension 
o f Hume’s philosophical framework in both readings, and it is for this reason both accounts 
attribute to Hume a form o f moral subjectivism.
Once we resist this methodological impulse to suspend Hume’s philosophical 
framework, it is apparent that Hume’s theory o f instrumental reason does not entail the 
subjectivism or evaluative reductivism of the standard model. Nor is Humean instrumental 
reasoning o f a freestanding nature. I have shown how Hume’s unique naturalistic 
framework outlines substantive human ends o f human sociality and practical action which 
then necessitates the intersubjective articulation o f moral value. These judgements, 
expressed in the causal judgements o f individual character, represent a crucial articulatory 
function to practical reason which is currently eclipsed by the predominant proceduralist 
conception at the forefront o f contemporary debates about instrumental reason.
Defined in Hume’s sense, reason’s importance stems, not from its objective 
procedures or norms but rather from its constitutive, qualitative content, whereby it is 
ensconced within the broader naturalist rubric o f societal norms. Instrumental rationality 
incorporates inductive forms o f understanding, manifested in socially articulated, collective 
principles, intersubjective discourse and evaluative judgements. Through sympathetic 
mediation, these forms o f understanding are absorbed into our dispositional character and 
motivational structure. Even with its pathological origin, it is the socially amenable content 
o f the means and ends that matter in practical reason; this is what makes character 
admirable and praiseworthy. Correcting presuppositions o f the supposed fact/value gap 
reveals how good causal inference implicate both motivational and normative reasons to 
fulfil the means-end connection -  not because it is required by some objectively justified 
norm, or because it follows from our blind obedience to our dispositional desires, but
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because we are unavoidably inculcated within linguistic community and a value
•  82 perspective.
At root, the fact that the sceptical reading shares core biases with the standard model 
explains its lack o f success as both a critique o f the latter as well as an interpretation o f 
Hume. It also illustrates well the inherent weaknesses and constraints o f current attempts at 
historical retrieval as a critical challenge to the subjectivism o f the standard model. I f  we 
find Hume’s provocative naturalist framework implausible, there are clear limitations on 
current retrievals o f his theory by both proponents and critics o f the standard model. The 
danger is that once we resort to truncated versions o f Hume’s thought, the collapse back 
into a version o f moral subjectivism inevitably follows. The next chapter shows that this 
collapse is not confined to the standard model reading o f Hume: it was implicit in the 
sceptical reading presented here and is more fully fleshed out when these same sceptical 
interpreters are understood in the context o f contemporary reappropriations o f Kant. Thus, 
the shared biases o f both the sceptical and standard model readings in Hume are 
particularly important to illuminate reasons why the partial reappropriations o f historical 
thinkers by critics o f the standard model tend to mirror the subjectivism they are trying to 
reject.
821 should clarify that it is not an expectation due to an overarching rational norm over society, but 
because the actions / motives which are approved are ones that are conducive and valuable to 
society’s renewal.
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6 Constructivist Interpretations of Kantian Practical Reason
“It is not as if  we chose the game.”
- Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty1
Kant defines instrumental reason in terms o f  hypothetical imperatives which 
recommend adoption o f  the means necessary to an agent’s given ends. More specifically, 
he states in the Groundwork o f  the Metaphysic o f  Morals that “ [hypothetical imperatives 
declare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment o f 
something else that one wills (or that one may will)” [414 (39)]. Hypothetical imperatives 
are analytic propositions, whereas the categorical imperative is an a priori, synthetic 
principle. This is meant to highlight the distinct normative source o f the moral law.
Despite this, the extent to which hypothetical imperatives share the same normative 
source as the categorical imperative is a source o f debate. Contemporary commentators 
often invoke Kant’s theory o f  hypothetical imperatives to pinpoint defects within the 
volitional picture o f agency provided by empirically based conceptions o f instrumental 
reason, such as that o f  Hume and the standard model. As we saw in the previous chapter, 
the sceptical interpretation uses its particular reading o f Hume to ultimately endorse a 
Kantian model o f practical rationality; the sceptical interpretation’s historical retrieval o f 
both Hume and Kant is therefore meant to function as a broader critique o f the freestanding 
and subjectivist connotations o f the standard model. Christine Korsgaard in “The 
Normativity o f Instrumental Reason”2 contends that Kantian hypothetical imperatives 
presuppose a form o f normative endorsement o f ends traditionally associated with the 
categorical imperative. She contends that hypothetical and categorical imperatives share a 
common normative source in human rational agency. Korsgaard wants to resist the 
standard model’s evaluative neutrality since according to it morally repugnant ends might 
be thought not to be subject to moral scrutiny and assessment. To avoid this possibility 
Korsgaard resorts to a moralised conception o f instrumental reason, effectively conflating 
the normativity o f both instrumental and pure practical reason.3 Thus, for Korsgaard as 
well as many prominent contemporary moral and political philosophers, Kant provides the 
most salient and plausible rejoinder to the standard model o f instrumental reason since he
1 Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969) p. 317.
2 In Cullity and Gaut, eds., Ethics and Practical Reason, pp. 215-54.
3 Though this conflation is not immediately self-evident, I will illustrate how this is implied in 
Korsgaard’s regress strategy.
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can explain how normative principles fulfil the internalist requirement through his 
conception o f human rational agency, yet still demand for the moral assessment o f ends.
But there are inherent problems with these contemporary applications o f Kant to our 
current worries about the standard model. Should Korsgaard’s interpretation be endorsed, 
we risk misunderstanding the categorical imperative and Kant’s defence o f  the 
distinctiveness o f pure practical reason more generally. This is particularly evident in 
Rawls’ account o f the categorical imperative procedure (hereafter Cl-procedure) in his 
Lectures on the History o f  M oral Philosophy, a reading o f Kant to which Korsgaard is 
clearly deeply indebted. According to Rawls, Kant’s conception o f the categorical 
imperative provides a procedural account o f  how moral principles are constructed out of 
our prudential maxims. Rawls -  like Korsgaard -  assumes that both prudential and moral 
maxims are united in human rational agency. With its anthropocentric grounding, the CI- 
procedure encompasses both the maxims o f instrumental and o f moral reason. In fact, the 
latter cannot be generated without the input o f the former: the categorical imperative is a 
normative procedure o f maxim testing which assumes the need for contextual knowledge 
and applies to both instrumental and moral willing. Specifically, the Cl-procedure begins 
when an agent adopts a prudential maxim, and concludes when this maxim passes a 
universalisation test. I f  a prudential maxim passes this test, it is deemed morally 
permissible. Though not his principal concern, Rawls’ account o f the Cl-procedure tries to 
present Kantian practical reason as essentially amenable to a secular, pluralistic point of 
view. Hence prudential, conditional -  not moral, unconditional — maxims are seen as 
initiating the Cl-procedure. On Rawls’ reading o f Groundwork, Kant’s practical 
philosophy can be read as continuous with the standard model’s repudiation of 
metaphysical commitments -  effectively avoiding the troubled waters o f moral realism or 
external reasons -  while still providing a conception o f objective rational normativity that is 
based entirely on a humanistic source.
The constructivist Kantian reading seems appealing initially: resulting from the 
unification o f both forms o f practical reasoning in their conception o f human rational 
agency is a moralised conception o f instrumental reason which does not compromise one’s 
naturalist and liberal commitments. But despite this, there are deep-seated problems with 
this perceived alternative to the standard model. The constructivist reading essentially 
empiricises the categorical imperative and pure practical reason in its bid to make Kant 
practically relevant to contemporary moral and political concern — in particular, to the 
concern to justify a metaphysically sanitised conception o f liberal autonomy that
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nonetheless responds critically to the current standard model.4 This empiricisation comes 
at a high normative cost: the principle o f pure practical reason becomes indistinguishable 
from principles o f instrumental rationality. Moralised Kantian instrumental reason takes on 
a freestanding character similar in certain respects to that o f the standard model. Moral 
reasoning no longer has the robust critical authority over and above (and separate to) 
instrumental reason as intended by Kant. Thus the constructivist retrieval o f Kant, though 
often proffered as an alternative to the standard model in fact faces many o f the problems 
associated with the latter. This dilemma is the natural consequence o f the method 
employed by the retrieval strategies under examination in this thesis: the constructivist 
reading eliminates Kant’s metaphysical, dualistic philosophical framework thereby 
rendering conception o f practical reason becomes amenable to the current naturalist 
philosophical temper. And like the other historical retrievals examined in previous 
chapters, the constructivist reading o f Kant ends up with a version o f  the subjectivist and 
unsituated account they seek to repudiate,5 thereby reinforcing the weakness o f this 
approach as a critical strategy against the standard model. This will become clearer in the 
following chapter when the constructivist reading is compared to my alternative 
interpretation o f Kantian instrumental and pure practical reason as situated within his 
dualistic philosophical framework.
This current chapter will explore and criticise these two prominent contemporary 
retrievals o f Kant’s instrumental and moral reasoning. Thus the argument here has a 
ground-clearing function in order to prepare for the reading presented in the next chapter. 
Sections I and II examine Korsgaard’s reading o f Kantian instrumental reason. I examine 
how her worry about motivational scepticism informs her agent-centred analysis o f rational 
principles, which consequently leads to several exegetical problems, including the 
misguided moralisation o f hypothetical imperatives. Sections HI and IV explore similar 
exegetical manoeuvres in Rawls’ account o f the Cl-procedure. The most significant among 
these is how his reading maintains a close connection between prudential and moral reason. 
Deeper reasons for this close connection stem from the desire to minimise the gulf between 
moral aspirations and natural human capacities, as shown in Sections V and VI. I argue 
that this is a misguided strategy which leads to a problematic conflation between 
instrumental and pure practical reason. Thus, these partial retrievals o f Kant take on the 
unsituated character o f the standard model despite their critical intentions.
4 See Jens Timmermann, “Value without Regress: Kant’s ‘Formula of Humanity’ Revisited,” 
European Journal o f Philosophy 14:1 (2006): 69-93.
5 This is more relevant for Korsgaard than Rawls: as we saw in Chapter 1 Rawls in A Theory o f 
Justice does adopt the standard model of rational choice to generate the two principles of justice. 
Korsgaard rejects the standard model much more explicitly.
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I. Korsgaard’s Reading o f  Kantian Instrumental Reason
According to Kant, the principles o f instrumental and moral reason take imperatival 
form. He writes,
All imperatives are expressed by an uo u g h f\  By this they mark the relation o f  an 
objective law o f reason to a will which is not necessarily determined by this law by 
virtue o f its subjective constitution (the relation o f necessitation). They say that 
something would be good to do or to leave undone; only they say it to a will which 
does not always do a thing because it has been informed that this is a good thing to 
do. Practical good, however, is that which determines the will by means o f 
representations o f reason, hence not by subjective causes but objectively, that is, from 
grounds that are valid for every rational being as such. [413 (37-38)]
Rational principles affect human agents through agents’ rational consciousness o f their 
“oughtness”, necessity, or “to-be-doneness”. Both hypothetical and categorical imperatives 
share this prescriptive quality. Conventionally -  and as the next chapter explains in more 
detail -  reason’s prescriptivity is explicated with reference to Kant’s dualistic philosophical 
system.6 Given that humans are only imperfectly rational and possess unavoidable 
desiderative features, principles o f practical reason do not in general exercise full control 
over the human will. Moreover, Kant stipulates that, though all imperatives share a kind o f 
practical necessity, those o f skill and prudence exert only subjective necessity, whereas the 
categorical imperative has objective necessity. The former are applicable to an agent given 
particular subjective ends, while those o f the latter pertain to all rational beings irrespective 
o f their particular subjective ends. The normativity o f instrumental and moral reason is 
both different and separate, based on the divergent character o f their necessity.7
Korsgaard’s interpretation departs from this conventional reading in significant 
respects. Korsgaard contends that moral practical reason grounds the normativity o f 
instrumental reason.8 She reaches this conclusion through two interpretive strategies, 
which I explain in more detail below. First, she focuses on the common practical necessity 
and motivational force o f the imperatival form; second, she emphasises how both 
imperatives are constitutive o f human autonomous, rational agency. At root, Korsgaard 
hopes to provide a moralised account o f instrumental reason that complements her
6 See Jens Timmermaim, Kant's Groundwork o f the Metaphysics o f Morals; A Commentary 
(Cambridge: UP, 2007) pp. 47-9.
7 In the next chapter I argue that instrumental reason is indeed separate from pure practical reason.
8 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 250.
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commitment to a liberal conception o f the autonomous agent. To make this clear, let me 
explain Korsgaard’s various interpretive steps in more detail.
First, for Korsgaard, Kant’s primary question in the Groundwork is how any 
imperative -  whether hypothetical or categorical ones -  motivates agents to act. 
Specifically, Korsgaard assumes that Kant tackles this question from the perspective o f one 
fundamentally concerned about motivational scepticism; his analysis o f all imperatives -  be 
they o f skill, prudence, or morality -  allegedly begin from an inquiry into how normative 
principles o f reason manage to ‘grip’ an agent. As explained in Chapter 1, Bernard 
W illiams’ influential version o f intemalism outlines how, in order for normative reasons to 
have motivational force, they must correspond to an agent’s subjective motivational set. 
These may comprise o f existing beliefs, desires, or conative components; independent o f 
these subjective elements normative reasons have no power to motivate an agent to act. 
Reasons are normative and have motivational force not by virtue o f their intrinsic 
‘rightness’, but because they become attached to an already existing set o f subjective 
commitments. Intemalism therefore appears to solve the problem o f  reason’s motivating 
force and normativity without invoking any metaphysical frameworks outside the 
individual agent. But in so doing, Williams argues that we would need to endorse the 
standard model’s sub-Humean -  rather than Kantian -  picture o f human motivation.
Korsgaard accepts the force o f the internalist position, but she is further preoccupied 
with deflecting the popular view that Kant has an externalist conception o f practical 
reason.9 Korsgaard argues that Kant ultimately adopts an internalist position so that he can 
challenge the empiricist’s scepticism about reason’s motivational force. But unlike 
W illiams’ more Humean version o f subjective motivational set, Korsgaard stresses that the 
normative principles o f Kantian reason have motivational force by virtue o f the necessary, 
constitutive features o f practical rational agency itself. More importantly, Korsgaard’s 
concern with the internalist /  externalist debate is motivated by a deeper concern with moral 
scepticism: namely, to show how moral principles are not external reasons, but part and 
parcel o f our everyday use o f instrumental rationality. Instrumental rationality is usually 
upheld as the paradigmatic example o f motivational intemalism, and as we saw in the 
Chapter 1, these reasons are commonly thought o f as requiring no special philosophical 
justification. For Korsgaard, Kant maintains that moral principles must be internal and 
motivating reasons, since they are presupposed in instrumental reasons.
For Korsgaard, to will or have a volition towards an end necessarily involves the self­
application o f some kind o f rational normativity. We are first-personally committed to an
9 Korsgaard, “Scepticism,” pp. 10-1, in particular her rejection of Frankena’s reading of Kant. See 
William Frankena, “Obligation and morality in recent moral philosophy,” in Kenneth Goodpaster, 
ed., Perspectives on Morality: Essays by William Frankena (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame, 1977) p. 63.
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end if  we will it; such willing necessarily involves the “inward, volitional act o f prescribing 
the end along with the means it requires to yourself.”10 In the case o f means-end reasoning 
we apply the instrumental principle -  the rational normative command that “if you will the 
ends, you must will the means”. Williams’ brand o f Humeanism would want to claim that, 
for an agent to be motivated by a reason, it needs to be connected to a subjective volitional 
commitment to an instrumental end; but an external, normative principle itself is not 
necessary. Korsgaard, by contrast, argues that essential to all practical motivation is the 
recognition o f how normative rational principles apply unconditionally to all agents (as 
well as oneself), in addition to volitional commitment.11 This acknowledgement is not 
simply a process o f self-application -  for self-application can be o f either o f internal or 
external reasons. To be consistent with the internalist requirement, Korsgaard believes we 
actively and subjectively endorse these normative, rational principles.12
This first-personal endorsement means that we confer substantive value or goodness 
on an end based on these principles we give ourselves. Specifically, Korsgaard interprets 
the instrumental principle as having substantive, evaluative content. This differs from 
Kant’s own abstract description o f hypothetical imperatives. Other than the recognition 
that humans employ instrumental reason towards broad ends involving technical skill and 
prudence, Kant remains silent on how individuals define goodness or value in terms o f 
specific ends. But for Korsgaard, to will an end implies that an individual does not simply 
desire or will an object, but actively examines and endorses the substantive value o f that 
end in accordance with a rational principle, where we can judge this end as a good thing to 
will. Korsgaard states, “the normative force o f the instrumental principle does seem to 
depend on our having a way to say to ourselves o f some ends that there are reasons for 
them, that they are good.”13
This leads to Korsgaard’s second main interpretive strategy. When we endorse as 
good an object o f our choice, when we see how this act o f choice involves our giving 
ourselves rational principles as relevant laws o f choice and action, we recognise that what 
we in fact value is our rational agency as that through which we determine the object’s 
goodness. For Korsgaard, the goodness o f the means is not analytically contained within 
the willing o f an end; rather, when we search for the means to an end, it leads to a regress 
to the normative features which are constitutive o f rational agency:
10 Ibid., p. 245.
11 R. Jay Wallace, “Normativity, Commitment, and Instrumental Reason,” Philosophers’ Imprint 1:3 
(2001): 7.
12 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 247. See Mark Schroeder, “The Hypothetical Imperative,” 
Australasian Journal o f Philosophy 83:3 (2005): 358.
13 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 251.
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[F]or the instrumental principle to provide you with a reason, you must think that the 
fact that you will an end is a reason for the end. It’s not exactly that there has to be a 
further reason; it’s just that you must take the act o f your own will to be normative 
for you. And o f course this cannot mean merely that you are going to pursue the end. 
It means that your willing the end gives it a normative status for you, that your 
willing the end in a sense makes it good. The instrumental principle can only be 
normative if  we take ourselves to be capable o f giving laws to ourselves -  or, in 
Kant’s own phrase, if  we take our own wills to be legislative.14
In sum, Korsgaard’s argument is as follows: the instrumental principle articulates how, 
when we are volitionally committed to an end we deem valuable, we are also committed to 
the means towards that end. But this lead us to a further regress from the act o f conferring 
normative value onto an end to the normativity and value o f self-legislative, autonomous 
rational agency. In willing the means to our end, we recognise that what we actually 
normatively endorse is the rational principle which expresses our self-legislating, rational 
agency.
In the Sources o f  Normativity, however, Korsgaard inverts the order o f this regress 
argument:
The hypothetical imperative tells us that if we will an end, we have a reason to will 
the means to that end. This imperative [...] is not based on the recognition o f a 
normative fact or truth, but simply on the nature o f the will. To will an end, rather 
than just wishing for it or wanting it, is to set yourself to be its cause. And to set 
yourself to be its cause is to set yourself to take the available means to get it. So the 
argument goes from the nature o f the rational will to a principle which describes a 
procedure according to which such a will must operate and from there to an 
application o f that principle which yields a conclusion about what one has reason to 
do.15
Here, Korsgaard begins with an analysis o f autonomous agency and rational will, to 
instrumental reasoning. When one examines further why we value rational agency, it is 
because we value our autonomy and how as rational agents we legislate and create laws for 
ourselves. Thus, the means to our ends are normative only insofar as they reflect the 
normativity o f what it is to be an autonomous rational agent. Based on how the will
14 Ibid., pp. 245-6.
15 Korsgaard, Sources o f Normativity, (Cambridge: UP, 1996) p. 36.
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functions, rational agents automatically choose and confer value upon subjectively chosen 
ends according to the criteria o f self-given laws.16
Regardless o f which argumentative strategy she ultimately endorses, Korgaard’s 
analysis o f instrumental reason leads to a focus on what she views as the constitutive 
features o f Kantian rational agency. Korsgaard contends that the application o f the 
instrumental principle does not come after the construction o f a maxim. Rather, maxims 
aim to conform to the instrumental principle by their very nature.17 This is because 
principles o f practical reason “do not represent external restrictions on our actions, whose 
power to motivate us is therefore inexplicable, but instead describe the procedures involved 
in autonomous willing”. Moreover, “they also function as normative or guiding principles, 
because in following these procedures we are guiding ourselves.”18 All practical principles 
-  and therefore hypothetical and categorical imperatives -  are at once descriptions o f the 
procedures o f our rational agency, as well as prescriptive standards o f how our rational 
agency should function. I f  this is true, instrumental reasons — and more importantly, moral 
reasons -  would be internal reasons, and both normative and motivational, since these 
reflect how it is to be a being that wills maxims as self-given laws. This autonomous self- 
government therefore describes and binds all agents and their endorsed ends, whether they 
are moral and objective, or instrumental and subjective.
Conventionally, Kantian autonomy is read as identical with the good will which 
accords with the moral law.19 Kant writes in the Groundwork
An absolutely good will, whose principle must be a categorical imperative, will 
therefore, being undetermined in respect o f all objects, contain only the form  o f  
willing, and that as autonomy. In other words, the fitness o f the maxim o f every good 
will to make itself a universal law is itself the sole law which the will o f  every 
rational being spontaneously imposes on itself without basing it on any impulsion or 
interest. [444 (95)]
If  Korsgaard accepts what Kant says here, her claim that the instrumental principle requires 
us to “give oneself a law”20 must mean that instrumental reasoning in fact necessitates 
individuals to behave in a morally autonomous sense as typically associated with 
categorical willing. Korsgaard’s interpretive analysis o f Kantian instrumental reason 
therefore appears capable o f responding neatly both to charges o f extemalism against
16 Timmermann, “Value without Regress,” pp. 70-1.
17 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 244.
18 Ibid., p. 219.
19 Timmermann, Commentary, pp. 15-21; also Beck, A Commentary, pp. 37-40.
20 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 245.
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Kant’s account o f practical reason and  to the threat o f moral scepticism. For even when we 
reason instrumentally, our capacity for legislative moral autonomy is engaged: on 
Korsgaard’s account the latter is simply a constitutive feature o f our rational agency in 
general. It is precisely this agent-centred focus and regress strategy which allows 
Korsgaard to make the claim that hypothetical imperatives require the legislative demands 
o f the categorical imperative.
In this, Korsgaard advances an intriguing but implausibly demanding account o f 
practical agency. The “mature Kantian view,” writes Korsgaard, “traces both instrumental 
reason and moral reason to a common normative source: the autonomous self-government 
o f the rational agent.”21 All choices -  be they instrumental or moral -  require normative 
endorsement in the form o f universal judgement; as Korsgaard sees it, the nature o f Kantian 
agency, o f the autonomy which is constitutive o f the will, implies that individual maxims 
are eo ipso willed as universal law. This suggests that, when Korsgaard discusses the 
normativity o f  reasons, she equates it with the norms o f  morality. “To say that moral laws 
are the laws o f autonomy is not to say that our autonomy somehow requires us to restrict 
ourselves in accordance with them,” Korsgaard writes, “but rather to say that they are 
constitutive o f autonomous action. Kant thinks that in so far as we are autonomous, we just 
do will our maxims as universal laws.”22 On this reading, the subjective necessity o f 
hypothetical imperatives is virtually indistinguishable from the objective necessity o f the 
categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is not a law that we may or may not 
apply; rather, Korsgaard’s reading suggests that the universality requirement is implicit in 
all maxim construction, for both instrumental and moral purposes. If  you are a sort o f 
being who acts on maxims, you are therefore a rational being that can always make, and act 
in accordance with, universal law.
The initial appeal o f Korsgaard’s account lies in her claim that humans must invoke 
universal moral principles (the categorical imperative) even in the non-moral pursuit o f  
subjectively desired ends. Moreover, the constitutive features o f unconditioned human 
autonomy respond neatly to the questions surrounding the normative and motivational force 
common to both instrumental and moral reasons. Korsgaard’s reading therefore appears 
overall as a promising strategy against the evaluative neutrality and freestanding nature o f 
the standard model. Nonetheless, her account is unconvincing both as an interpretation o f 
Kant as well as a critique o f the standard model. Her interpretation is weak in two ways: 
first, she misunderstands Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction; and second, she misguidedly 
conflates prudential and moral reasoning, thereby minimising the normative function o f the 
categorical imperative. As I show below, Korsgaard’s perceived alternative conception o f
21 Ibid., p. 220.
22 Ibid., p. 249, third emphasis added.
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instrumental reason comes to mimic the same unsituated and freestanding quality o f the 
standard model account. The first problem I will explain in this section; the second 
problem I will elaborate by examining how Korsgaard’s mistakes can be better understood 
if  we examine Rawls’ influential account o f the Cl-procedure in the following sections.
Korgaard’s agent-centred analysis o f hypothetical imperative rests on a generous 
understanding o f analyticity. Kant argues that hypothetical imperatives are analytic, “for in 
my willing o f an object as an effect there is already conceived the causality o f m yself as an 
acting cause -  that is, the use o f means; and from the concept o f willing an end the 
imperative merely extracts the concept o f actions necessary to this end” [417 (45)]. On a 
straightforward reading o f this passage, the means are analytically contained within willing 
the end. But Korsgaard adopts a different take: she extends the analyticity o f hypothetical 
imperatives to incorporate the constituents o f  “agency”. She alleges that the constituent 
features o f rational agency -  not the predicate, “willing the end” -  perform the analytic 
work in Kantian instrumental reason. I f  we analyse the constituents o f “rational agency”, 
we will be able to extract the claim “ought to ensure that if  she has an end she takes the 
necessary means to it” .23 Korsgaard states, “[t]o will an end just is to will to cause or 
realize the end, hence to will to take the means to the end. This is the sense in which the 
[instrumental] principle is analytic. The instrumental principle is constitutive o f  an act o f  
the will. I f  you do not follow it, you are not willing the end at all.”24 The normativity o f  
instrumental reason relies on what it means to be an agent who wills rather than what it 
means to will an end.25 In other words, Korsgaard understands the analytic claim, “if  you 
will the ends you necessarily will the means”, to be an essential part o f the analysis o f 
“rational agent”.26 Following from this analytic truth, Kant wants to suggest, that 
imperatives -  be they hypothetical or categorical -  apply unconditionally to all agents.
In order for this to make sense, we would have to grant Korsgaard a wider and non- 
Kantian notion o f analytic truth which claims “that it is analytic that any agent ought to do 
what rational agents do”.27 Korsgaard seems to have this non-Kantian account in mind, as 
she writes:
The model suggests that the normativity o f  the ought expresses a demand that we
should emulate more perfect rational beings (possibly including our own noumenal
23 Schroeder, “Hypothetical Imperative,” p. 363.
24 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 244.
25 Schroeder, “Hypothetical Imperative,” p. 363.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., p. 365.
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selves) whose own conduct is not guided by normative principles at all, but instead 
describable in a set o f  logical truths?*
She echoes this thought in Creating the Kingdom o f  Ends:
[S]ince we still do make choices and have the attitude that what we choose is good 
in spite o f our incapacity to find the unconditioned condition o f the object’s 
goodness in this (empirical) regress upon the conditions, it must be that we are 
supposing that rational choice itself makes its object good.29
Thus, if  we adopt Korsgaard’s conception o f analytic truth, it is possible to derive the moral 
law analytically. I f  we were to abstract from the material and conditional nature o f 
hypothetical imperatives, we would be left with the unconditional form o f  the categorical 
imperative, especially since both are united by an analysis o f the constitutive features o f 
autonomous rational agency.30 “Rationality, as Kant conceives it,” she writes, “is the 
human plight that gives rise to the necessity o f  making free choices -  not one o f the options 
which we might choose or reject.”31
I I  Problems with Korsgaard’s Reading
At root, Korsgaard’s account o f Kantian instrumental reason reflects her general 
desire to ground all willing -  whether hypothetical or categorical — in the moral 
requirements o f free rational agency. Korsgaard’s underlying worry seems to be the 
potentially morally indigestible consequences which may follow from a principle o f 
instrumental rationality that holds independently o f the universality requirements o f  the 
moral law, such as maintained by the standard model. To use an example given by G. A. 
Cohen, it would be like saying that the Mafioso who adopts an end to kill someone is in 
some way committed to carrying out the means.32 This action would be both normative and 
rational; and the Mafioso is not necessarily required to test their maxim for moral 
permissibility. Korsgaard’s moralising conclusion perhaps tries to avoid these harmful 
consequences: if  all rational principles lead to the constitutive features o f  morally 
autonomous rational agency, then the Mafioso who adopts this end would automatically
28 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 240, emphasis added, qtd. in ibid., p. 364.
29 Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom o f Ends (Cambridge: UP, 1996) p. 122.
30 Schroeder, “Hypothetical Imperative,” p. 361.
31 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 244.
32 G. A. Cohen, “Reason, humanity, and the moral law,” in Korsgaard, Sources o f Normativity, pp. 
183-4.
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will this maxim to kill as universal law, and would be subsequently required to abandon 
such an objectionable end.33 Conflating moral endorsement o f rational principles with 
volitional commitment seemingly avoids extreme detachment from the moral assessment o f 
our ends, and allows these moralised evaluations to be transferred from means to the end 
itself.34
But to address this worry o f detachment through Korsgaard’s strategy does seem 
problematic for several reasons. First, Korsgaard’s reading cannot make coherent sense o f 
the Groundwork's analytic-synthetic division; this should indicate that her account o f the 
normative source o f instrumental reason is mistaken at least by Kant’s lights. Second, her 
moralised conception o f instrumental reason ignores a range o f deliberative possibilities, 
such as akrasia. Finally, she reduces the full moral force o f the categorical imperative. 
The first two issues I will discuss in this section, the third problem I will explore through 
the subsequent discussion o f Rawls’ Cl-procedure.
First, we should be hesitant about adopting Korsgaard’s looser conception o f analytic 
truth. I take it that Korsgaard’s regress strategy relies on a notion o f analyticity as one o f 
logical entailment. This may cohere with some remarks Kant makes in the first Critique,35 
but it cannot be said to reflect Kant’s narrower definition o f analyticity in the Groundwork. 
There analytic truth is defined as strict logical containment: meaning that the predicate is 
contained in its subject. “Willing an end” contains the concept that one “ought to will the 
necessary means” ;36 the adoption o f an empirical end entails the means towards that end. 
This specifies that willing the means -  or a hypothetical imperative -  is analytically 
contained within willing the end. By contrast the categorical imperative is an a  priori, 
synthetic proposition that is “concerned, not with the reason for performing the act o f will, 
but with the cause which produces the object)” [417 (45)]. Thus, Kant’s instrumental 
principle is analytic insofar as it applies only i f  you have adopted an end; its applicability is 
conditional on an adopted end. By implication, the instrumental principle acquires its 
practical content entirely from the adoption o f a desired end, not from the meaning or 
constituents o f agency: without that end, the instrumental principle would have no 
evaluative, material, or practical content. And more importantly, the analyticity o f  the 
instrumental principle relies on one willing an end, whether or not its material content is 
judged good or bad from the perspective o f morality or self-legislating rational agency.
33 Korsgaard, Sources o f Normativity, pp. 256-8.
34 See Schroeder, “Hypothetical Imperative,” p. 367-8. At root, it seems that Korsgaard wants to 
claim that morality is rationality.
35 See KrV, A6-7, which reveals a notion of analyticity which includes logical containment as well as 
loose analyticity or entailment.
36 Schroeder, “Hypothetical imperative,” p. 365.
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Ultimately, it is doubtful that Kant shares any o f these contemporary worries about 
practical reason’s motivational grip on subjective agents, nor is he preoccupied with 
disproving moral scepticism.37 This already indicates that Korsgaard’s basic points o f 
departure are not ones shared by Kant.38 Kant’s main theoretical question in the 
Groundwork, and indeed throughout his practical philosophy, is to show how synthetic 
principles, such as the moral law, are possible since it cannot be derived from any empirical 
intuition. By contrast, as an analytic proposition, hypothetical imperatives are 
fundamentally less problematic to account for than the categorical imperative given their 
dependence on the empirical world for practical content.39 Hypothetical imperatives Kant 
seems to set as relatively straightforward, demanding no extra philosophical justification. 
The brunt o f the analytic work is shouldered by the adoption o f  a subjective end: meaning 
if  an agent pursues an object o f desire, then she ought to will the requisite means. Since 
hypothetical imperatives are analytic, instrumental reason must have a conditioned, as 
opposed to an unconditioned, normative source. This, as well as how instrumental reason’s 
normativity draws upon theoretical sources o f  cognition, I will explore in much more detail 
in the next chapter.
Second, Korsgaard’s highly demanding picture o f  instrumentally rational willing 
excludes a number o f deliberative options encompassed within our practical agency, such 
as akrasia. She states, “ [s]o the reason that I must conform to the instrumental principle is 
that if  I don’t conform to it, if  I always allow m yself to be derailed by timidity, idleness, or 
depression, then I never really will an end.”40 According to Korsgaard’s reading o f the 
instrumental principle, in willing an end we are committed to carrying out the means, even 
in the face  o f  opposing volitional commitments. In other words, Korsgaard presents us with 
a dichotomy in her conception o f the Kantian will: either all willing must reflect our 
autonomous rational agency, where we invoke universal normative principles, or we are 
passive, subject to the whims o f our desires and inclinations, and by implication, cease to 
be an agent.41
But Korsgaard fails to capture a range o f instrumentally rational possibilities between 
these two extremes. In saying that moral endorsement o f an end is an actual prerequisite to
37 This “response to scepticism” reading is very pervasive and likely originates from P. F. 
Strawson’s interpretation of Kant’s theoretical philosophy. See The Bounds o f Sense: An Essay on 
Kant’s Critique o f Pure Reason (London: Methuen, 1966). The main thrust of Korsgaard’s problem 
fails to have any resonance with Kant, since the paradigm operating during and prior to his time 
presumed that the interplay of cognitive and conative dimensions within instrumental reason were 
motivationally efficacious; its motivational power was never questioned but simply assumed.
381 will expand on this further in the next chapter.
39 Ibid., p. 362.
40 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 247.
41 For another take on this dichotomy, see Wallace, “Normativity,” p. 10.
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any volitional commitment, she cannot explain instances o f akrasia42 In these cases an 
agent adopts an end which may not be morally endorsable. The end that is pursued may be 
one that is bad outright in comparison to other options; and crucially, he or she is fully 
conscious o f the fact that a better one is rationally endorsable. Instrumental reasons are still 
normative in cases like these, insofar as even in one’s volitional commitment to a morally 
“ lesser” end, they must nonetheless formulate the means. Here the absence o f moral 
rational endorsement in the form o f universal law is unimportant: the akratic agent still 
follows through on the analytic connection between means and ends, but whether or not 
that end is, or should  be, morally-endorsable is immaterial.
To illustrate this point, let us take Korsgaard’s own example o f Timid Prudence, who 
claims to have an end to lead a more adventurous life, but consistently fails to take the 
necessary means. She regularly procrastinates about carrying out the means to this end, 
even when adventure knocks on her door.43 I f  I understand Korsgaard’s arguments 
correctly, she would conclude that Timid Prudence has violated the instrumental principle 
because she is not really willing  this end, since her normative and volitional commitments 
fail to coincide. But if  we instead considered her action as akratic, Kantian hypothetical 
imperatives can still explain this case. We could understand this example as one where 
normative and volitional commitments fail to correspond. So Timid Prudence may believe 
that leading an adventurous life is one that she normatively endorses -  she herself thinks it 
is the best end that she ought to adopt. She is, however, volitionally committed to a lesser 
end -  to leading a comfortable, less daring existence. On a less demanding picture o f 
Kantian practical agency, Timid Prudence would not necessarily be guilty o f violating her 
hypothetical imperative -  she takes the means to her lesser end which expresses her 
volitional commitment, but with the full awareness o f a better end that she herself 
normatively endorses. As R. Jay Wallace points out, absent in the case o f akrasia is the 
adoption o f the best or more preferable end, not o f instrumental rationality itself. The 
akratic agent will still take the means to an adopted end -  but the only difference is that this 
end will be one they consciously know to be in their lesser good (or one they do not 
normatively endorse). I agree with Wallace that Korsgaard would be hard pressed to 
describe cases like these as a breakdown o f instrumental rationality.44 Clearly the means- 
end connection is upheld, the only difference being the endorsable value o f that end. This 
shows that normative endorsement value o f an end, and volitional commitment to it, can be 
independent o f one another, without leading necessarily to the failure o f means-end 
rationality.
42 Ibid., pp. 1-26.
43 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 236.
44 Wallace, “Normativity,” p. 15.
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Ultimately Korsgaard’s interpretation is motivated by a desire to counter the standard 
model picture o f practical reason. Korsgaard is right to reject this picture, but in so doing 
she goes to the other extreme, where our normative reasons must coincide with rational 
volition. The example o f akrasia shows that we as agents are capable o f generating 
normative reasons for an action, and, crucially, can choose a course o f action that 
contradicts those reasons. I f  we really want to do justice to the complexity o f human 
rational deliberation, we need to recognise a wide spectrum o f rational actions which can, 
and indeed often do, diverge from both the endorsement o f a normative principle and 
requirements o f universality.45 Korsgaard’s all-or-nothing approach to instrumental reason 
cannot deal with these akratic cases where an agent is volitionally committed to an end 
with the awareness that they normatively endorse a better option. This weakens the 
plausibility o f Korsgaard’s alternative to the standard model since it forecloses a whole 
range o f deliberative possibilities in the complex picture o f practical agency. I f  we want to 
avoid this prevalent assumption that the standard model is the definitive account o f 
practical motivation and instrumental reason, it is more important, not to deny wholesale 
the possibility that this model functions in some limited capacity in our lives without us 
ceasing to be agents -  be it when we are akratic, egoistic, depressed. Rather, the focus and 
attention needs to be on the philosophical articulation o f its situating, broader framework 
that is composed o f more meaningful substantive values, and subsequently disproves the 
freestanding nature o f the standard model. For instance, we saw in Chapters 2 and 3 how 
Aristotle in his conception o f cleverness -  simply based on a something akin to the standard 
model -  can still accommodate and explain akratic agency. Similarly, a textually faithful 
account o f Kant is better equipped to grapple with akratic possibilities. Yet both Aristotle 
and Kant do not collapse into versions o f the standard model precisely because o f their 
overarching philosophical frameworks, which incorporate a conception o f normative 
objectivity and situate their accounts o f instrumental reason.
Although Kant never deals directly with the problem o f akrasia, he recognises how 
an agent’s volitional commitments can oppose morally endorsable ends. Unlike 
Korsgaard’s claim that in willing -  whether it be instrumental or moral -  we necessarily 
will our maxims to be universal law, Kant carefully distinguishes between pure 
autonomous willing, which is the moral law, and heteronomous willing. Heteronomous 
choice depends on how empirical, conditional objects affect our desiderative faculty; in 
short, it involves our volitional commitment to objects o f desire. Heteronomy subsequently 
requires the employment o f hypothetical imperatives to achieve these desired ends, while 
autonomy necessitates the categorical imperative; our ends are therefore legislated
45 Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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according to the universal requirements o f the moral law. This distinction between 
heteronomy and autonomy is important, as it signals that Kant believes that an agent can 
choose contrary to the categorical imperative, adopting instead a lesser good rooted in 
empirical grounds o f determination. Hence, we can choose and pursue an end that is 
recognisably bad, even though we may acknowledge that there is a better end that we ought 
to endorse according to the criteria o f morality -  and this would still qualify as 
instrumentally rational.
The case o f the akratic agent is implied when Kant discusses the conflict between the 
end o f duty and the end o f happiness in the Groundwork. He speaks o f  an individual who 
feels “a powerful counterweight o f his needs and inclinations, whose total satisfaction he 
grasps under the name o f ‘happiness’”. On the other hand, reason “commands 
relentlessly”, and with “disregard and neglect o f these turbulent and seemingly equitable 
claims”. Between the inclination towards happiness and the command o f duty by reason 
there emerges a “natural dialectic” or “a disposition to quibble with these strict laws of 
duty, to throw doubt on their validity, or at least on their purity and strictness, and to make 
them, where possible, more adapted to our wishes and inclinations” [405 (23)]. This 
suggests Kant does not conflate volitional commitment with the moral endorsement o f  ends 
in the instrumental principle. Indeed, he implies that our volitional commitments point 
regularly to the lesser good o f  happiness, even when we are conscious o f the demands o f 
the highest good, moral duty. It therefore seems that a more textually faithful reading of 
Kant demonstrates his philosophy capable o f grappling with other forms o f rational agency 
neglected in Korsgaard, such as akrasia. As we will see, his broader philosophical 
framework prevents his account o f instrumental reasoning from collapsing into a version o f 
the standard model.
III. Rawlsian Readings o f  the Cl-Procedure
Above I have presented various criticisms o f Korsgaard’s conception o f  Kantian 
instrumental reason, namely that it distorts Kant’s analytic-synthetic distinction and fails to 
account for a spectrum o f practical deliberative possibilities that could qualify as 
instrumentally rational. Should Korsgaard’s reading be endorsed, we risk 
misunderstanding the categorical imperative and moral reasoning, whereby the objective 
moral force o f the categorical imperative is curtailed. This moralised version o f 
instrumental reason then begins to resemble the freestanding character o f the standard 
model. By contrast, for Kant, moral duty and the categorical imperative are meant to 
remain somehow “above” instrumental reason: what it means to will autonomously remains 
normatively separate, for Kant, from mere choice so that the moral law can effectively be
158
applied to delimit and restrain those choices. There needs to be some space between 
spontaneous choice and law in order for this normative work to happen. Bad ends can be 
the result o f choice, but certainly not from the autonomous moral will. I f  these two 
elements o f volitional choice and normative endorsement are conflated, it does raise the 
question as to the extent to which moral autonomy or law can have normative authority 
beyond instrumental reasoning and guide our practical choices. Korsgaard inherits 
numerous exegetical moves from Rawls’ understanding o f the Cl-procedure; thus closer 
examination o f the Rawlsian Cl-procedure will enrich our understanding o f her account 
Kantian instrumental rationality.
Rawls distinguishes between the categorical imperative proper and its procedure as it 
applies to humans. The Formula o f Universal Law in the Groundwork, “Act on the maxim 
that can at the same time be made a universal law”, Rawls understands as the ‘strict 
method’ o f the categorical imperative. As the principle o f pure practical reason, the 
categorical imperative helps construct morally permissible maxims which guide our 
practical action. But according to Rawls’ interpretation, the reality o f our human neediness 
and finitude mean that the categorical imperative can be applied by human agents only 
once the Formula o f Universal Law has been rendered in the terms o f  the Formula o f the 
Law o f Nature, “Act as i f  the maxim o f  your action were to become through your will a 
universal law o f  nature” [421(52)]. “While this procedure is not the categorical imperative 
itself,” Rawls writes, “it does provide us with the most usable expression o f  the strict 
method based on zf.”46 In other words, the categorical imperative needs to be understood 
through the Cl-procedure in order for the principle to be applicable to human practical 
action.
Conventionally, the categorical imperative, as the supreme principle o f moral or pure 
practical reason, is thought o f as distinct from hypothetical imperatives, or principles of 
instrumental rationality.47 Qualitative differences -  such as particularity vs. universality, 
hypothetical vs. categorical, sensible vs. intelligible -  set apart empirical and moral 
principles o f practical reason. We will see the full impact o f Kantian dualisms on his 
conception o f instrumental and moral reasoning in the next chapter. By contrast, Rawls 
takes the Cl-procedure “to represent in procedural form all the requirements o f  practical 
reason (both pure and empirical) as those requirements apply to our maxims.”48 Thus, 
Rawls understands the Cl-procedure as encompassing both instrumental and moral 
reasoning. To support this, Rawls claims that Kant’s use o f the German word, verniinftig, 
includes what we commonly call “reasonable” and “rational”. According to Rawls,
46 John Rawls, Lectures on the History o f Moral Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 2000) 
p. 182, emphasis added.
47 See Timmermann, Commentary, pp. 73-6.
48 Ibid., p. 165.
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“reasonable” denotes “ ‘judicious,’ ‘ready to listen to reason,’ where this has the sense o f 
being willing to listen to and consider the reasons offered by others.”49 But vernunftig also 
includes “the narrower (often the economist’s) sense o f ‘rational’ to mean roughly 
furthering our interests in the most effective way.”50 Rawls continues, “Kant’s usage 
varies, but when applied to persons, vernunftig usually covers both reasonable and 
rational.”51 Rawls is not clear why just because human beings can be both reasonable and 
rational in their distinct meanings, it follows that moral reasoning must include the two 
meanings o f vernunftig. Nonetheless, for Rawls the broad sense o f vernunftig leads to the 
unity o f practical reason: the categorical imperative applies, not exclusively to pure 
practical reason, but also to the “economist’s” conception o f instrumental rationality.
According to Rawls, Kant outlines a four-step Cl-procedure which tests the moral 
permissibility o f existing maxims, and “enables us to regard ourselves as making universal 
law for a possible realm o f  ends.”52 At the first step, this existing maxim is typically a 
hypothetical imperative -  or a prudentially motivated maxim o f  action, which is “rational 
given the agent’s situation and the available alternatives, together with the agent’s desires, 
abilities, and beliefs.”53 The form o f the maxim would be, “I am to do X  in circumstances 
C in order to bring about an end unless Z.”54 In short, the first step determines whether our 
existing maxim is rational from the perspective o f instrumental reason. The second step o f 
the procedure generalises this agent’s maxim, resulting in a “universal precept that applies 
to everyone”, and “[w]hen this precept passes the test o f the Cl-procedure, it is a practical 
law, an objective principle for every rational being.”55 This second stage abstracts from the 
merely subjective validity o f the hypothetical imperative, so that the maxim becomes a 
universally applicable precept. The third step then transforms this universal precept into an 
“as-if ’ law of nature -  as if  such a practical law, which is valid for all rational beings, “was 
implanted in us by natural instinct.”56 Finally, the fourth stage connects this hypothetical 
law o f nature with the existing laws o f nature which then forms a readjusted “order o f 
nature”. We imagine what our world would look like according to this readjusted natural 
order. This describes an agent’s “legislative intention, an intention as it were to legislate 
such a world”.57
49 Rawls, Lectures, p. 164.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid., p. 200.
53 Ibid., p. 167.
54 Ibid., pp. 168-9
55 Ibid., p. 168. It is unclear at this point whether Rawls has an anthropocentric understanding of 
“rational being”. If he does, this reflects a clear departure from Kant’s use of the term.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., pp. 168-9.
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According to Rawls our maxims must satisfy two conditions if  they are to be morally 
permissible: first, “we must be able to intend, as sincere, reasonable, and rational agents, to 
act from that maxim when we regard ourselves as a member o f the adjusted social world 
associated with it”; second, “we must be able to will this adjusted social world itself and 
affirm it should we belong to it” .58 In other words, the Cl-procedure suggests that we are 
rationally committed to apply and act from practical maxims that create an adjusted social 
world. Otherwise, we cannot act on that maxim, even if  it is instrumentally rational’ in our 
particular circumstance. The two conditions embedded within the Cl-procedure therefore 
“reflec[t] the priority o f pure practical reason over empirical practical reason.”59 When we 
test and subject existing instrumentally rational maxims under the Cl-procedure, we 
eventually recognise how our practical reasons must solve certain moral dilemmas and 
effectively constructs an improved social and political reality.
Importantly, we can see how Rawls’ interpretation o f  the Cl-procedure informs 
Korsgaard’s reading o f the instrumental principle. Korsgaard clearly adopts three main 
concerns o f the Rawlsian reading. First, the Cl-procedure and the unity o f  practical reason 
imply a view o f the intrinsic value o f free, rational agency. Korsgaard’s regressive 
approach suggests that the principles o f practical reason -  including the instrumental 
principle -  eventually direct us to the objective valuing o f our anthropocentric rational 
agency in a legislative capacity, and this agency contains both content and value.60
Second, the categorical imperative provides a deliberative procedure that is directly 
applicable to practical action and can solve our immediate moral dilemmas.61 Korsgaard 
calls both Kant and Rawls “constructivists”, which means that “ [practical philosophy, as 
conceived by Kant and Rawls, is not a matter of finding knowledge to apply in practice. It 
is rather the use o f reason to solve practical problems.”62 The categorical imperative’s 
presumed applicability stems from how both Rawls and Korsgaard inject substantive 
material content into the categorical imperative. Specifically, their reading o f  rational 
agency is intended to provide an account o f the categorical imperative that “does not just
58 Ibid., p. 169.
59 Ibid., p. 169.
60 Echoing this point, Andrews Reath says of the categorical imperative, “[s]ince Kant is concerned 
with both content and validity, he must first give a characterization of rational agency that yields this 
principle and, in addition, guides its application.” See Reath, “The Categorical Imperative and 
Kant’s Conception of Practical Rationality,” in Agency and Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory; 
Selected Essays (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), p. 75.
61 I understand that Kant himself employs this language, particularly in the Groundwork. But 
constructivist meaning of “formula” seems to suggest that the Cl- procedure will provide a concrete, 
conclusive answer to our immediate moral dilemmas. I don’t understand Kant to be saying 
“formula” in this sense.
62 Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism,” p. 115.
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yield the basic principle, it will also figure in the application o f  the principle to concrete 
situations, and thus hold a substantive role in the moral conception that it grounds.”63
Finally, the application o f the categorical imperative ultimately helps construct a 
better social and political world. Korsgaard argues that the term “constructivism” implies 
that “our use o f the concept when guided by the correct conception constructs an 
essentially human reality -  the just society, the Kingdom o f  Ends -  that solves the problem 
from which the concept springs.”64 I f  we follow the Cl-procedure correctly Rawls believes 
that we can formulate a conception o f justice based on the moral status o f  each person, who 
each possess the “interests to realise and to exercise the two powers o f moral personality”.65 
These two powers include the “capacity for a sense o f  right and justice (the capacity to 
honour fair terms o f cooperation), and the capacity to decide upon, to revise and rationally 
to pursue a conception o f the good”.66 Thus, the two powers o f  moral personality 
encompass both meanings o f vernunftig (the “rational” and “reasonable”). For Rawls, the 
latter has regulative priority over the former so what we do construct o f the social or 
political must therefore have the voluntary acceptance and endorsement o f our moral 
personality.67
IV. Problems with Rawlsian Readings o f  the Cl-Procedure
At first glance the Rawlsian reading o f the Cl-procedure has intuitive appeal: the 
categorical imperative articulates an applicable formula which provides justification for the 
existence, transformation, and creative construction o f  certain moral or social practices. 
Moreover, as with Korsgaard, Rawls’ approach suggests that whether we reason 
instrumentally or morally, we regress to an appreciation and valuing o f the autonomous 
creative potential o f our rational agency. The Hegelian critique o f empty formalism is 
successfully deflated, since the Cl-procedure incorporates both material content and form.
If  my understanding o f the Rawlsian interpretation o f practical reason and categorical 
imperative is correct, it is nonetheless questionable whether this represents Kant’s own 
view. The Rawlsian interpretation is deeply problematic from both an exegetical and a
63 Reath, “Categorical Imperative,” p. 88, n. 20.
64 Korsgaard, “Realism and Constructivism,” p. 117.
65 Rawls, “Social Unity and Primary Goods,” in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., 
Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: UP, 1982) p. 165.
66 Ibid.
67 “[T]he two highest-order interests are the two main forms of moral motivation for the purposes of 
developing the content of the first principles of justice. Thus citizens in the well-ordered society of 
justice as fairness have both the capacity and the regulative desire to cooperate on fair terms with 
others for reciprocal advantage over a complete life. This in turn implies the desire on the part of 
individuals and groups to advance their good in ways which can be explained and justified by 
reasons which all can and do accept as free and equal moral persons.” (Ibid., p. 184).
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moral point o f view. I am interested in the Rawlsian departure from Kant, not simply 
because o f textual issues -  though I believe these are important. Rather, my concern is how 
the Rawlsian reading -  like Korsgaard’s -  effectively diminishes the full moral force o f 
pure practical reason, causing his account o f instrumental reason to emulate the 
freestanding character o f the standard model. By contrast, I want to retain the sense o f 
how, for Kant, pure practical reason -  reason free o f contingently given empirical content -  
has a separate, overarching moral force which situates, frames and constrains our 
instrumental use o f reason.
Despite the regulative priority o f “reasonableness” -  o f this sense o f right and justice 
-  over instrumental rationality, Rawls’ understanding o f the Cl-procedure nonetheless 
relies intimately on instrumental rationality and prudential maxims to provide the material 
content for public law-making. Rawlsian “reasonableness” is not equivalent to K ant’s 
categorical imperative or moral practical reason for two reasons. First, Rawls’ philological 
analysis o f vernunftig is misleading because within the original German text Kant rarely 
uses that term except in the context o f prudential reasoning about individual happiness. In 
the context o f moral reasoning persons are almost never characterised as vernunftig, likely 
because o f this term ’s prudential connotations. Instead, Kant usually refers to Vernunft 
(reason) and Gebrauch der Vernunft (use o f reason), or vernunftegabt (capable o f 
reasoning). Second, Rawls’ conception o f “reasonableness” as the capacity to listen to the 
reasons o f others so as to come to a mutually acceptable agreement, whereby personal 
agreement to the terms is conditional on another person’s agreement, would be a clear 
instance o f heteronomous reasoning for Kant. The injection o f material and conditional 
content into the categorical imperative is a major departure from Kant’s purely formal 
account which has problematic exegetical and normative implications, as we will see.
We can appreciate the full moral normativity o f pure practical reason if  the 
categorical imperative is understood through the lens o f  Kant’s dualisms. The categorical 
imperative can be thought o f  as expressing an important Augustinian dynamic, between 
pessimism about human natural abilities and inclinations, and the perfectionism and 
intellectualism o f Greek, specifically Stoic, thought. It points to the moral ideal for 
humans; however, our natural abilities fall short o f this ideal. A gap exists between the 
ideal we wish to attain and the ability to fulfil it.68 The fact that the law o f pure practical 
reason expresses itself in an imperatival form attests to this moral gap. According to Kant, 
divine or perfect wills do not reason instrumentally; only finitely rational beings such as 
humans do. The purpose o f our instrumental reason is to fulfil a natural desire for 
happiness and indeed in Religion Within the Boundaries o f  Mere Reason Kant calls this the
68 See John Hare, The Moral Gap; Kantian Ethics, Human Limits, and God’s Assistance (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997).
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development o f the “human predisposition” [6:26].69 Though Kant believes that humans 
will always have this psychological eudaimonism , the problem is when it takes priority 
over our moral duty.70 This suggests not a unitary, cooperative picture o f practical reason 
or the practical agent, but tension between the interests o f empirical and moral reason. The 
following chapter will draw out this dualistic picture in more detail, as well as its full 
impact on Kant’s conception o f hypothetical and moral willing. Suffice it to say here, the 
tension between our natural desire for happiness and the demands o f the moral law suggest 
that our natural inclinations and wishes cannot be the basis by which the moral gap can be 
closed. Something more akin to moral faith and hope is needed in order to overcome our 
natural prioritisation o f prudential and eudaimonistic interests.71
As John Hare points out, two temptations arise in relation to the moral gap: 
interpreters either inflate Kant’s conception o f natural, rational capacities, or minimise the 
demand o f the moral ideal. This lessens or eliminates altogether the gap between human 
capacities and the moral ideal; both tendencies appear in Korsgaard and Rawls and are 
symptomatic o f the general tendency to dismiss Kant’s philosophical framework. For 
instance, Rawls explicitly rejects Kant’s dualisms to justify his procedural understanding o f 
Kantian autonomy and the categorical imperative. He writes,
To abandon these dualisms as he understood them is, for many, to abandon what is 
distinctive in his theory. I believe otherwise. His moral conception has a 
characteristic structure that is more clearly discernible when these dualisms are not 
taken in the sense he gave them but recast and their moral force reformulated within 
the scope o f an empirical theory.72
In abandoning Kant’s dualisms, Rawls tries to minimise the gap between the moral law and 
our natural constitution. He claims that the relevant distinction is not between empirical 
and moral reason, but between the “strict” method o f the categorical imperative and the Cl- 
procedure. Similarly, Korsgaard tries to claim that all normative rational principles 
describe the condition and functioning o f our practical agency -  it “ju st is” the case that 
human agents will their maxims as universal law.
69 Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft (Religion within the Boundaries o f Mere 
Reason, hereafter abbreviated to R), ed. and trans. Allen Wood and George di Giovanni (Cambridge: 
UP, 1998). All page numbers refer to the Prussian volume and page numbers.
701 will have much more to say on this point in the next chapter.
71 This leads to certain intractable issues and debates into whether Kant’s rational religion is 
plausible. These I will not delve into, but it is worth keeping in mind that Kant attempts to 
reconfigure central Christian doctrines, such as radical evil, justification and sanctification, onto a 
rational grounding.
72 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, Revised Edition (Oxford: UP, 1999) pp. 226-7.
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Thus, the reading o f Korsgaard and Rawls does two things. First, human natural 
capacities are inflated in their interpretation o f Kantian practical reason; specifically, 
practical reason and rational agency lead to an anthropocentric account o f  morality. 
Kantian practical reason is read in light o f a strong voluntarist conception o f  the will in 
order to justify this interpretation. According to this reading, we are responsible for the 
active creation o f our own moral laws when we naturally exercise the human rational will; 
and somewhere in the causal story, our existing natural capacities contribute to the 
achievement o f the moral ideal. Second, the conflation between the principles o f 
instrumental and pure practical reason illustrates how Korsgaard and Rawls succumb to the 
temptation to lower the moral ideal. Both interpreters claim implicitly that moral, 
legislative laws are the expected outcome if  we use our instrumental rationality in the 
correct way; in this respect we see Korsgaard’s more generous understanding o f  analyticity 
also in Rawls. In other words, the priority o f  universal moral reasons will be revealed if  we 
are instrumentally rational; these moral reasons will be responsive to the material content o f 
our instrumental reasons. No gap or tension exists between the ends o f our instrumental 
and moral willing, particularly since both branches o f practical reason and their principles 
are unified in how our rational agency is naturally constituted.
The next two sections outline these two misguided interpretive tendencies. I f  we 
reject the reading o f Korsgaard and Rawls, we can better capture how pure practical reason 
and its independent normative source can delimit our prudential choices and instrumental 
rationality.
V Positive Morality and Voluntarist Will: Bolstering our Natural Capacities
We need to examine its underlying motivation if  we are to fully grasp both the 
exegetical and normative problems with the Rawlsian reading. Underlying this appeal to 
human, self-given freedom is a desire to find a historical precedent and Kantian 
justification for a liberal conception of autonomy.73 For both Rawls and Korsgaard, 
Kantian practical reason is highly appealing because it allegedly provides a creative 
account o f morality that is also justified on non-metaphysical grounds. These two 
interpreters, like defenders o f the standard model, believe the rejection o f  metaphysics is an 
appropriate response to the current scientific age and the fact o f value pluralism. Korsgaard 
appeals explicitly to a voluntarist conception o f the will to justify her interpretation. 
Though Rawls does not explicitly make the same move, the voluntarist will provides the 
implicit background to his account o f the Cl-procedure.
73 See O’Neill, Constructions o f Reason.
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On this reading, the Kantian will show how the application o f  its formulaic 
procedures creates justifiable, self-made laws. All rational procedures involve the 
recognition and valuing o f human autonomy, expressed through our active capacity to 
create the moral requirements o f practical reason. We see this in Rawls’ description o f the 
third and fourth steps o f the Cl-procedure. Rawls writes, “it is through the Cl-procedure 
that we can view ourselves as making universal law for a realm o f ends, and so as making 
law for ourselves as a member thereof.”74 For Rawls, the notion o f “good willing” falls 
away and is instead replaced by an emphasis on public law-making. Ethics is therefore 
confused with political morality. In a slightly different vein, Korsgaard states that 
“ [generalized to the Kingdom o f Ends, my own ends must be the possible objects o f 
universal legislation, subject to the vote o f all. And this is how I realize my autonomy.”75 
For Korsgaard, the emphasis is not necessarily on political morality, as it is with Rawls. 
Rather, she believes that the will’s constitutive autonomy means individuals necessarily 
will the morally-endorsable good; the will is therefore responsible for the positive creation 
o f our moral and practical obligation to value those moral goods for others and ourselves. 
But for both, the human will is understood in a thorough-going voluntarist sense: 
“thorough-going”, in this context, means that the will is not simply responsible for 
subsuming oneself under law out o f obedience to the objective demands o f pure practical 
reason, but in fact creates the actual demands o f pure practical reason.
One may be tempted to argue that, within the text, the Kantian will contains 
irreconcilable intellectualist and voluntarist elements.76 On one hand, the fact that pure 
practical reason is the free will expresses Kant’s voluntarist strand; on the other hand his 
belief in the non-contingent, objective moral law testifies to Kant’s intellectualism. 
Korsgaard and Rawls emphasise the voluntarist strand to gain the most philosophical 
mileage out o f Kant, particularly to find historical support for a liberal conception o f 
autonomy. But if  Kant maintains a tight connection between objective morality and the 
will, or pure practical reason and objective morality, we cannot, without contradiction, 
attribute to him a strong voluntarist position. Ultimately, Kant seems to depart from the
74 Rawls, Lectures, p. 206, emphases added. He states, “[0]ur making of law as we intelligently and 
conscientiously follow the principles of practical reason (as procedurally represented by the Cl- 
procedure) constitutes, or constructs, the public moral law for a realm of ends.” (p. 203)
Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom o f Ends, p. 193.
76 For more on the history of this tension between voluntarism and intellectualism, see Terence 
Irwin, The Development o f Ethics; A Historical and Critical Study; Volume I: From Socrates to the 
Reformation (Oxford: UP, 2007) pp. 653-725. In this context intellectualism’ refers to practical 
reason as a “source of non-positive morality” (Irwin, p. 175), not reason’s ability to provide some 
theoretical proof or ontological, moral truths. Also, see Schneewind, Invention o f Autonomy, pp. 
497-530. However, I disagree with Schneewind’s conclusion that Kant’s rejection of theological 
voluntarism means he eventually sides with an extreme form of human creative realism.
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intellectualist /  voluntarist dichotomy, where by he in fact straddles both traditions.77 
Discrete elements o f his account o f practical reason fit loosely with both strands: for 
instance, the more consistent reading o f categorical willing appears to favour the 
intellectualist strand, whereas hypothetical willing seemingly adheres to the voluntarist 
strand.
Ultimately, Kant preserves a close link between the idea o f  the free will, his 
conception o f pure  practical reason and the possibility o f morality; yet not all spontaneous 
willing expresses this link -  not all choices reflect moral autonomy. How do we reconcile 
these seemingly contradictory claims? Kant appears to be aware o f  this problem. He 
clarifies his position in later works by showing how the will as Willkiir represents the 
capacity for spontaneity or negative freedom, and Wille is the capacity for positive, moral 
freedom. Kant writes, “\f\reedom  o f  choice is this independence from being determined 
by sensible impulses; this is the negative concept o f freedom. The positive concept o f 
freedom is that o f the ability o f pure reason to be o f itself practical. But this is not possible 
except by the subjection o f the maxim o f every action to the condition o f  its qualifying as 
universal law” [MS' 6:213-4].78 Instrumentally rational actions are conditionally free from 
the point o f Willkiir, but fail to express the legislative will, Wille [6:213]. Spontaneous 
choice in terms o f Willkiir could, and often does, diverge from the demands o f  moral 
practical reason, in favour o f heteronomous or prudential considerations. The will here 
would be negatively free: it is undetermined by causal laws and is a source o f  spontaneous 
practical action, but it is not positively free. Positive freedom o f  the will — in terms o f  Wille 
-  is a strictly moralised conception o f freedom; it is w ill’s causality by the objective moral 
law. Positive freedom, Kant defines as the “pure will [...that is] based [on] unconditional 
practical laws, which are moraP’ [6:221]. Positive freedom occurs when Willkiir coheres 
with Wille', this self-agreement o f the will occurs when choice accords with the law o f the 
moral and noumenal good.
In light o f this distinction, the will as Willkiir can indeed be very loosely understood 
in a more voluntaristic spirit, if  only to highlight the contrast between instrumental and 
non-instrumental reasoning. But strictly speaking, instrumental reasoning does not adhere 
to traditional forms o f voluntarism, particularly since Willkiir in this case is determined by 
heteronomous considerations stemming from humanity’s sensible nature.79 No necessary
77 Mainly because, as interpreted within the framework of Hare’s moral gap, for Kant the human will 
is fallible and weak. It is unclear how this characterisation of the human will (as practically 
cognisant of the moral law, but consistently falling short of its moral aspirations) can fit neatly 
within the intellectualist / voluntarist dichotomy.
78 Der Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysic o f Morals), trans. and ed. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
UP, 1996), hereafter abbreviated to MS'. Pagination refers to the volume and page number of the 
Prussian Academy
791 will have more to say about this in the following chapter.
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link obtains between pure practical reason and the will at the level o f Willkiir. Kant writes, 
“ [f]or us [...] choice [Willkiir] is sensibly affected and so does not o f itself conform to the 
pure will [Wille] but often opposes it” [6:221]. But even if  Kant is marginally voluntarist at 
the level o f Willkiir, his definition departs from traditional, morally-neutral conceptions:
[Moral evil] is only possible as the determination o f a free power o f choice [ Willkiir] 
and this power for its part can be judged good or evil only on the basis o f its maxims, 
must reside in the subjective ground o f the possibility o f the deviation o f the maxims 
from the moral law. [...] We can further add that the will’s [Willkiir] capacity or 
incapacity arising from this natural propensity to adopt or not to adopt the moral law 
in its maxims can be called the good or the evil heart. [/? 6:29]
According to Kant, no necessary connection obtains between pure practical reason and 
spontaneous choice {Willkiir). Rather our Willkiir has two possible avenues to go: 
autonomous, pure practical reason or heteronomous, instrumental rationality; or even more 
starkly, either good or evil [see also R  6:44]. As Jean Nabert accurately describes,
In a doctrine like Kant’s, where reason and freedom are transposable, free choice 
(or the possibility o f acting against reason and against the moral law) belongs to us 
insofar as we are sensible beings. There is nothing positive in this possibility in 
respect o f the causality o f reason. What is free in our free choice does not derive 
from our power to act against reason but, on the contrary, from the faculty o f  acting 
in conformity to the law. And what there is o f free choice in our freedom merely 
testifies that the reason o f a being subject to sensuous incentives may deviate from 
unconditioned reason [...] The idea o f choice within reason is a mark o f  its 
weakness, for choice indicates that the mastery o f reason is not absolute. One can 
only make sense o f it in a being which, possessing both reason and sensibility, can 
introduce sensuous motives into the context o f its maxims. According to Kant, 
such is the free choice o f the human, with its ability to resist reason arbitrarily.80
While the will in terms o f Willkiir can be very loosely described as voluntaristic, this does 
not also commit Kant to an account o f self-created morality: the spontaneous choices o f 
Willkiir to decide whether it conforms to instrumental or moral reason does not 
automatically imply that we ourselves create the moral law. This is where the Rawlsian
80 Jean Nabert, L'experience interieure de la liberte (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1924), 
qtd. in Bernard Camois, The Coherence o f Kant’s Doctrine o f Freedom, trans. David Booth 
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987) p. 90.
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reading goes astray. Because they fail to consider the Willkiir /  Wille, negative / positive 
freedom distinctions, Rawls and Korsgaard assume that the voluntarist will o f Willkiir also 
commits us to a voluntaristic conception o f morality at the level o f Wille. M oral 
obligations are allegedly the active expression and creative product o f our will’s freedom. 
As we saw in Section I, Korsgaard subsequently places significant weight on our positive 
endorsement o f ends; particular empirical ends can be justified on moral grounds, by virtue 
o f the rational will’s free, voluntary endorsement.
By contrast, the Wille /  Willkiir distinction as I have explained it, illuminates the 
voluntarist and intellectualist dynamic we find in Kant: the space given to the voluntarist, 
spontaneous will, Willkiir, means that evil and prudential maxims can still be imputed to 
individuals. It expresses conditional, negative freedom but not the positive freedom o f the 
autonomous will [Wille]. Thus, we can still be held responsible for the way we exercise 
instrumental reason, particularly since the ideal o f pure practical reason is unchanged and 
indeed, independent o f human positive creation. The separate normativity o f  the 
categorical imperative reinforces how our empirical and instrumental choices often depart 
from the moral ideal. For Kant, our natural rational capacities cannot be so elevated as to 
create the demands o f morality; the human will cannot be the source o f untrammelled, 
autonomous creativity. According to the Collins notes to Kant’s lectures on ethics (1784- 
5), “nobody, not even the deity, is an originator o f moral laws, since they have not arisen 
from choice, but are practically necessary; if  they were not so, it might be the case that 
lying was a virtue” [27:282-83].81 Moreover, “the question o f morality has no relation at 
all to subjective grounds; it can only be framed on objective grounds alone. If  we divide 
morality into objective and subjective, that is utterly absurd; for all morality is objective, 
and only the condition for applying it can be subjective” [27:264]. For Kant, the good will 
is willing in accordance with the universal, objective moral law. The Wille /  Willkiir 
distinction therefore acknowledges the existence o f certain human rational powers, yet still 
maintains some distance between such natural capacities and the moral ideal.82
81 Notes by Collins (1784-5) in Kant’s Lecture on Ethics, eds. Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind, 
trans. Peter Heath (Cambridge: UP, 1997). All pagination from Lectures on Ethics refers to the 
volume and page number of the Prussian Academy.
82 As Richard Velkley and Ian Hunter point out, under the influence of Rousseau and German 
rationalist critique Pufendorfian and Thomasian natural law doctrines, Kant became increasingly 
apprehensive of the exercise of rational freedom absent of universal law. The latter, Kant believed, 
results in morality’s collapse into subjectivism or relativism, whereby morality is the mere product 
of individual human creation. Velkley points out this connection between Rousseau and Kant 
admirably in Freedom and the End o f Reason; On the Moral Foundation o f Kant’s Critical 
Philosophy (Chicago: UP, 1989). See also Henrich, “Ethics of Autonomy,” p. 98. For Kant’s 
connection to Leibnizian rationalism and the latter’s critique of civil natural law (represented by 
Grotius, Pufendorf, and Thomasius) see Ian Hunter, Rival Enlightenments; Civil and Metaphysical 
Philosophy in Early Modern Germany (Cambridge: UP, 2001)
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VI. Lowering the Moral Ideal: The Empiricisation o f  the Categorical 
Imperative
According to the constructivist view, the moral ideal must be humanised or 
empiricised if  we are to make Kantian pure practical reason philosophically relevant and 
applicable. In the previous sections, I showed how Rawls and Korsgaard attempt to 
extrapolate from Kant’s theory a rational procedure which can serve as basis o f either 
public law-making, or interpersonal reciprocal endorsement o f one’s prudential ends. To 
do this, both interpreters attempt to fortify the natural capacities o f our rational agency. 
The autonomous rational will is understood as responsible for the positive creation o f moral 
obligations and political institutions. This, however, is only part o f how these interpreters 
try to close the moral gap: effectively, Kantian pure practical reason and the categorical 
imperative become empiricised in order to lower the demands o f the moral ideal. This is 
achieved by injecting material content into the categorical imperative -  content which 
builds upon existing preferences, intuitions, and beliefs. We see this particularly in the 
Rawlsian reading, where he argues that practical reason and the Cl-procedure “takes for 
granted an already established background o f commonsense beliefs and knowledge about 
the world. Thus, at step (1), in deciding whether a maxim is rational, and in assessing 
adjusted social worlds at step (4), agents are supposed to have considerable knowledge, 
which is public and mutually shared.”83 On Rawls’ interpretation, the Cl-procedure 
incorporates and improves upon existing commonsense beliefs about the world. 
Consequently, the categorical imperative is no longer attached to questionable metaphysical 
frameworks, implicit in the conventional understanding o f  pure practical reason as the 
causality o f the moral law. Understood in the latter sense, the categorical imperative is an 
expression o f a moral ideal which originates from our partial membership in a 
supersensible, noumenal realm.84
Rawls instead interprets Kantian practical reason in purely anthropocentric terms; he 
believes that human rational agency and the moral ideal are tightly connected. He states,
For Kant [...] God’s reason is intuitive reason and quite different from our own. We 
comprehend only our human reason, with its various powers and concepts, principles 
and ideas, discerned by reflecting on our thought and capacity for judgment. It is our 
practical human reason that must have supremacy on moral questions: we have no
83 Rawls, Lectures, p. 218.
84 See Dieter Henrich, “The Moral Image of the World,” in Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image 
of the World (Stanford: UP, 1992).
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access to a higher, more supreme, reason. What is radical is the place Kant gives to 
human reason and the constructivist role he sees it as having.85
This anthropocentricity grounds both instrumental and pure practical reason. O f course, an 
anthropocentric turn occurs in Kant’s famous Copemican revolution, where he denies the 
possibility that humans can truly come to know the “things in themselves”, though it is part 
and parcel o f the human predicament to fixate on speculative questions which we can never 
answer. It is this latter claim -  that human aspirations extend beyond their sensible 
capacities into the metaphysical domain -  which distinguishes Kant’s anthropocentric turn 
from the naturalist temper within contemporary philosophy. In short, the anthropocentrism 
o f the Copemican turn is confined to the domain o f theoretical reason and does not imply a 
similar move towards the naturalist dismissal o f reason’s metaphysical aspirations, as 
mistakenly suggested by the Rawlsian version o f human practical agency. For Kant, the 
demands o f pure practical reason may take priority over instrumental reason; however on 
the Rawlsian account we arrive at the categorical imperative when we judge whether or not 
our pmdential maxim is universalisable. As Bernard Williams correctly points out, it is not 
that Rawls is trying to derive justice from personal self-interest, but “that a self-interested 
choice in ignorance o f  one’s identity is supposed to model in important respects non-self- 
interested or moral choice under ordinary conditions o f knowledge.”86 Another way o f 
saying the same thing is, we examine our pmdential maxim -  our subjective want -  and 
judge whether this is something everyone would want if  they were fully rational.
Instrumental willing therefore provides the basic material content for categorical 
willing. Rawls has in mind conditional social goods or “true human needs, certain requisite 
conditions, the fulfilment o f which is necessary if  human beings are to enjoy their lives”.87 
But for Kant Rawls’ list o f these needs -  food, drink, rest, education and culture88 -  would 
be strictly empirical, hence contingent, not moral goods; indeed, the introduction o f such 
material content contradicts the very purpose o f Kant’s categorical imperative. Morality 
comes to depend on and require empirical content, whereas from Kant’s perspective moral 
autonomy is freedom from such conditional content. For Kant, the introduction o f material 
content into the categorical imperative compromises the universal and categorical nature o f 
moral willing; the moral law would seem to take its cue from various elements o f human 
contingency (wants, needs, intuitions, beliefs) rather than vice versa. In that case, morality
85 Rawls, Lectures, p. 207, emphasis added.
86 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, p. 78, emphasis added.
87 Rawls, Lectures, p. 174. Rawls himself notes that his account of “true human needs” is 
“amending or adding” to Kant’s conception (p. 174, n.4). But more fundamentally this rests on a 
misreading of the relevant passages of MS 6:393,432 and 435).
88 Ibid.
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would be based on purely heteronomous considerations. From Kant’s perspective, Rawls is 
conflating the categorical imperative with hypothetical imperatives by introducing these 
conditional goods and building upon the content o f  instrumental rationality in the Cl- 
procedure.
Similarly, Korsgaard claims that the Kantian instrumental principle regresses 
analytically to the categorical imperative, by virtue o f our unified rational agency. 
Korsgaard’s account o f rational moral normativity as constitutive o f  human practical 
agency illustrates too her adherence to an anthropocentric account o f morality developed 
along naturalised, non-Kantian lines.89 Both Rawls and Korsgaard are motivated to move 
away from a metaphysical reading o f  Kant’s account o f pure practical reason: if  pure 
rationality is coextensive with human rational agency and incorporates conditional human 
goods and material content, justification o f the categorical imperative becomes less 
problematic, particularly from a scientific, secular point o f view; moreover, the “spectre o f 
the unconditioned”90 as a basis o f morality -  o f which so many o f  Kant’s historical heirs 
objected to -  is successfully eradicated. Out o f Kant we can extrapolate a non­
metaphysical account o f  moral obligation that is ultimately grounded in existing capacities 
for both free, creative rational agency, and established, commonsense knowledge. It is 
“when we see [the moral law] exemplified in someone’s life, we are made fully aware for 
the first time o f the dignity o f our nature as free, reasonable, and rational persons.”91
The concern to minimise the moral gap leads both Korsgaard and Rawls to empiricise 
the demands o f pure practical reason. Conversely, prudential instrumental reason has an 
inflated moral worth. This interpretation effectively conflates the normativity o f 
instrumental and pure practical reason. In the case o f Korsgaard, the unique moral aspect 
to the categorical imperative is lost by her proposal that its rational normativity exerts the 
same necessity as hypothetical imperatives on all agents. Yet Kant never intends the 
categorical imperative to be a formula which justifies, reinforces, or even improves upon 
our prudential maxims; it is not a procedure whereby our prudential or instrumental reasons 
gain a moral stamp o f  approval. Moreover, we neglect the complexity o f our moral 
practical judgements if  the exercise o f pure practical reason is thought o f as simply the 
application o f a procedural formula. The Rawlsian interpretation supports, rather than 
rejects, the caricature o f Kant as a hard, deontological taskmaster: in the bid to make Kant
89 She states in Sources o f  Normativity, “When you deliberate it is as if there is something over and 
above all of your desires, something which is you, and which chooses which desire to act on. This 
means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being 
expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or way so choosing is to be, in St. Paul’s 
famous phrase, a law to yourself’ (p. 100).
90 Karl Ameriks, “The Critique of Metaphysics: The Structure and Fate of Kant’s Dialectic,” in Karl 
Ameriks, Kant and the Historical Turn; Philosophy as Critical Interpretation (Oxford: Clarendon, 
2006) pp. 154-60.
91 Rawls, Lectures, p. 202.
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practically relevant to our contemporary dilemmas, Rawls’ Cl-procedure in fact makes 
Kant’s moral system formulaic, rigid and austere. Practical reason -  instrumental and 
moral -  is a matter o f mechanistically applying a rational procedure.
Initially it may not be clear how both Rawls and Korsgaard both fail to distance 
themselves sufficiently from the standard model, particularly since it appears that Rawls 
and Korsgaard end up occupying different ends o f the metaphysical spectrum. Korsgaard’s 
reading o f Kant endorses some kind o f  hyperrealism which claims that individuals are 
moral when they are rational, whereby rationality is defined by the sort o f  agency that wills 
ends that others could will as well. By comparison, Rawls emerges with a much more 
contextualist position which claims that Kantian practical reason will incorporate the 
backdrop o f commonsense beliefs about certain conditional ends or human needs which 
stem from the types o f beings we are.
But despite these differences, both readings by Korsgaard and Rawls are revealed to 
share a number o f  the same presuppositions o f the standard model, based on their common 
desire to accommodate the prevailing naturalistic temper in philosophy. I have in mind 
three shared features in particular: first is scepticism o f the thick metaphysical or 
foundationalist commitments which are traditionally associated with philosophical 
frameworks positing the existence o f  normative objectivity. Second, this scepticism then 
invokes a response to rope o ff these commitments and ground normativity in an 
anthropocentric rational source imbued with the capacity to “construct” morality out o f 
subjective material content -  this does not mean that such subjective content forms the 
standard o f morality, but that such material content informs the content o f  moral reasoning. 
Finally, i f  practical reason is still to have significance for us, it must be a procedural 
conception. This means that practical reason will be characterised by a certain method or 
procedure o f thinking towards an unspecified end. For Rawls, these features manifest 
themselves in the politicised form o f human “reasonableness” and legislating for a new 
social reality. For Korsgaard, despite her realist moral stance, these presuppositions are 
revealed in her dismissal o f the analytic /  synthetic distinction so that one can effectively 
regress from the conditional content o f instrumental norm to the unconditional moral law. 
The moral law becomes equivalent to the valuing o f human rational agency and our ability 
to create our own moral principles. Thus, regardless o f their differences, both Korsgaard’s 
and Rawls’ readings o f moral practical reason take on a subjectivist and conditional hue 
which reveals some important similarities with the standard model and distorts our 
understanding Kant’s purpose in his moral philosophy.
173
Conclusion
As shown in this chapter, Korsgaard and Rawls make certain interpretive moves so 
that Kant is more digestible to empirically-minded philosophers, and directly applicable to 
contemporary political dilemmas. The Rawlsian reading illustrates well the problem 
confronting us in contemporary critiques about instrumental reason: even as they rightfully 
worry about the reductivism o f the standard model they fail to sufficiently distance 
themselves from this account. As this chapter has explained, Korsgaard and Rawls end up 
mimicking the freestanding and proceduralist characteristics o f the standard model. By 
empiricising the categorical imperative, the normativity o f  the moral law becomes too 
closely connected to heteronomous prudential or technical considerations. This leads to 
misleading conclusions about the necessity o f hypothetical imperatives: the subjective 
necessity o f these imperatives becomes indistinguishable from the objective necessity o f 
the moral law. The Rawlsian account is in danger o f  injecting morality with the conditional 
content o f  instrumental reason and therefore does not differ in substantial respects from the 
sub-Humean account o f  means-end rationality. Ultimately, Rawlsian reasonableness is not 
going to resolve the central predicament surrounding the standard model.
Following his immediate German critics, Kantian practical reason is often considered 
the pinnacle o f modem preoccupations with anthropocentric mastery and domination over 
the external environment.92 The Rawlsian interpretation arguably tends to perpetuate this 
inflection given to Kant’s work93: all willing, whether it is instrumental or moral, is 
supposedly expressive o f anthropocentric rational autonomy and the capacity to outwardly 
project individual maxims. Norms and procedures o f practical rationality become 
associated with the achievement o f idealised pmdential maxims; further, our moral norms 
are based on the creative anthropocentricity which defines the overall character o f  practical 
reason. In dismissing Kant’s dualistic philosophical framework, Rawls and Korsgaard both 
understand Kantian practical rationality as providing an account o f positive morality — 
moral obligations are the creation o f the free, human will. I f  understood this way, Kant’s 
conception o f  either instrumental or moral reasoning differs little from the subjectivist and 
self-supporting inflection appointed to the standard model. To understand their 
fundamental differences we need to set aside the Rawlsian reading. We lose the normative 
significance o f pure practical reason -  as a moral constraint on instrumental reason and our
92 Obvious examples include Hegel and Heidegger. For more contemporary instances of this 
critique, see Arendt, The Human Condition, pp. 136-9; also Ronald Beiner in “Kant, the Sublime, 
and Nature,” in Ronald Beiner and William James Booth, eds., Kant and Political Philosophy; The 
Contemporary Legacy (New Haven: Yale UP, 1993) pp. 276-88.
93 See Karl Ameriks, Kant and the Fate o f Autonomy (Cambridge: UP, 2000).
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unfettered prudential interests -  if  we adopt the Rawlsian’s simultaneous empiricisation o f 
the moral law and inflation o f humanity’s natural creative capacities.
As we will see in the following chapter, Kant identifies the need to separate 
instrumental from moral reasoning precisely on these grounds. Like Aristotle and Hume, 
the situated character o f instrumental reason within a broader framework helps avoid the 
subjectivist and evaluative reductivist tendencies o f the standard model. This overarching 
normative framework does not build upon conditional and subjective content but has an 
entirely separate objective and unconditional normative source. The aspirations o f 
instrumental reason are firmly constrained in this framework.
The next chapter illustrates how and why Kant’s dualisms are crucial to 
understanding the fundamental differences between his conception o f instrumental reason 
and the standard model.94 In the next chapter I will discuss how normativity in itself is a 
necessity only for the rationally imperfect beings we are, thus giving an inflection to Kant’s 
philosophical framework different to that o f the Rawlsian reading. Moreover, norms o f 
pure practical reason are never created, but reflect human weakness and duality. Rather 
than the picture o f an individuated “voluntarist” will impressed upon the natural world, 
Kant’s conception o f instrumental reason can be seen to contain two central insights: first, 
that Kantian instrumental reason heightens our awareness o f the moral law; second, that 
this sociability itself leads to the recognition o f how we as individuals fall short o f the 
principles o f pure practical reason. The alternative reading I propose in the next chapter 
will show how, against Korsgaard, Kant conceives o f instrumental reason as a non-moral 
conception o f practical rationality; not every rational procedure has to be moral, or reflect 
individual moral autonomy. This brings to the fore two claims: first, like Aristotle and 
Hume, Kant’s philosophical framework helps him avoid collapsing into a version o f the 
standard model. Second, the core reason why current reappropriation strategies have failed 
as a critique o f the standard model is the reluctance to undertake a similar re-examination 
o f the current philosophical framework.
941 will explore this in more detail in the next chapter.
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7 The Dualism of Kantian Practical Reason
“ [W]hen delight o f eternity draws us upwards and the pleasure o f temporal goods holds us 
down, the identical soul is not wholehearted in its desire for one or the other. It is tom  
apart in a painful condition, as long as it prefers the eternal because o f its truth but does not 
discard the temporal because o f familiarity.”
St. Augustine, Confessions VIII. X  (24)1
In the previous chapter I challenged different constructivist interpretations o f Kantian 
practical reason. I argued that Korsgaard and Rawls make a number o f exegetical moves, 
including the rejection o f Kant’s dualisms, which then result in the conflation o f  the 
normativity o f instrumental and pure practical reasoning in Kant. Kant’s philosophical 
framework is viewed as an optional extra which can be bracketed in order to suit the current 
naturalistic temper. Korgaard’s implicit concern to accommodate the naturalistic temper 
results in an albeit unintended realignment between Korsgaard’s reading o f instrumental 
reason and the standard model, undermining her critical endeavour.
This chapter presents an alternative understanding o f Kant’s conception o f 
instrumental rationality and its relationship to pure practical reason through the lens o f the 
dualisms which are constitutive o f Kant’s philosophical framework. By reinstating Kant’s 
philosophical framework I show how the subjective exercise o f instrumental reason is 
situated within, and effectively constrained by, the objective ends o f pure practical reason. 
K ant’s account can be seen to differ in important respects from the unsituated subjective 
character o f the standard model. Moreover, Korsgaard’s attempt to retrieve Kantian 
practical reason as a critique o f the standard model is unsuccessful because she, like Rawls, 
fails to recognise how Kant’s dualistic framework helps him avoid the problems o f the 
standard model. Thus, correcting where the Rawlsian interpretation goes astray has a 
deeper significance beyond exegetical issues. The Rawlsian’s treatment o f  Kant’s 
philosophical framework illustrates well the moral dilemma we are facing in current 
debates surrounding the standard model: on one hand the evaluative reductivism o f the 
standard model is deeply criticised for its subjectivism and potentially indigestible 
consequences from a moral point o f view; on the other, these implications are unavoidable 
given the widespread proceduralist bias and rejection o f metaphysical commitments shared 
by both proponents and critics o f the standard model. In dismissing the significance o f 
Kant’s framework the current retrieval strategies represented by Rawls and Korsgaard can 
be seen to apply the same short-sighted approach towards their examination their own 
philosophical framework.
1 St. Augustine, Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: UP, 1991).
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I make two central interpretive claims in this chapter. First, I want to capture the 
dynamic o f activity and receptivity inherent in Kant’s conception o f instrumental
rationality. This will place central importance on human openness to our surrounding
phenomenal environment. Second, I claim that Kant’s instrumental rationality is situated 
within a deeply metaphysical framework. Specifically, instrumental reason contains a 
dialectical trajectory towards a metaphysical conception o f the moral ideal and pure 
practical reason. These two claims are fleshed out in a number o f interpretive points which 
depart from Korsgaard’s reading. First, I show that the desiderative faculty -  crucial to 
setting the end for instrumental reason -  appeals to the conceptual apparatus involved in 
theoretical knowledge. In short its normative source is a combination o f standards o f 
practical efficacy as well as good theoretical cognition. Second, prudential or skilful 
normative standards o f instrumental reason are independent from the categorical
imperative.2 I argue that Kant’s account o f desires presupposes certain rational capacities 
which are nonetheless not to be confused with rational norms o f moral reasoning. I f  moral 
autonomy is moreover taken as constitutive o f all human rational agency -  as it is in 
Korsgaard’s account -  we have in effect no freedom to judge when moral obligation does 
or does not obtain. We subsequently fail to capture how theoretical normative sources o f 
instrumental reason incorporate a stance o f openness and receptivity to the natural world.
In addition, this chapter provides an alternative, more metaphysical reading o f  pure 
practical reason and the categorical imperative, supplementing my critique o f  the Rawlsian 
Cl-procedure in the previous chapter. In associating “reasonableness” with the categorical 
imperative Rawls attempts to incorporate a conception o f substantive human needs into his 
reading o f Kantian practical reason. The conditional nature o f  these goods nonetheless fails 
to capture Kant’s notion o f pure practical reason’s objective ends. As I illustrated in the 
previous chapter the Rawlsian reading at root takes on board the proceduralist bias o f the 
standard model: this assumes that practical reason must be bound up with an objective 
procedure rather than the articulation o f objective goods. The proceduralist bias responds 
to the metaphysical and evaluative neutrality expected o f moral theory in light o f  value 
pluralism and the current scientific age. But like Aristotle and Hume, Kant can be seen to 
forward a more substantive conception o f practical reason. This claim is potentially 
controversial so let me clarify: I am not suggesting that moral reasoning for Kant is 
constituted by actual material content and so it is not “substantive” in the Rawlsian sense. 
Ultimately, Rawls’ proceduralist bias reveals itself in his notion o f the categorical 
imperative as a procedure which is immediately applicable to action. By contrast, for Kant, 
the categorical imperative -  the principle o f pure practical reason — represents a form of
2 Patrick Kain, “Pmdential Reason in Kant’s Anthropology,” in Brian Jacobs and Patrick Kain, eds., 
Essays on Kant’s Anthropology (Cambridge: UP, 2003) p. 231.
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practical judgement or reorientation o f the will towards the highest good. In other words, 
Kant’s conception o f practical reason is “substantive” in the sense that it is not focused 
solely on the procedure o f  reasoning o f obligatory, discrete acts, but the realisation and 
articulation o f the idea o f the objective good o f pure practical reason in a properly, 
reorientated will. We see this specifically in Kant’s notion o f the summum bonum  -  the 
highest good. Thus, like Hume and Aristotle, Kantian pure practical reason articulates an 
idea o f the objectively good which ensures that instrumental reason is situated within wider 
ethical considerations. This is particularly so if  the Groundwork is read in conjunction with 
Kant’s later works.3
Sections I and II show that the gap between theoretical and instrumental reason is not 
as great as conventionally supposed. I explain norms o f  empirical and theoretical cognition 
contribute to the normativity o f instrumental reason, and make hypothetical imperatives 
distinct from the law-like form o f  pure practical reason. As I explain in Section E l, the 
distinctive function o f instrumental reason towards specific anthropocentric ends leads to a 
dialectical and conflicted dynamic with pure practical reason. Section IV then explains 
how the dualism o f practical reason indicates the inadequacy o f empirical, conditioned 
definitions o f prudential happiness, and in its place points to the highest good o f  pure 
practical reason — a moral ideal which unites virtue with proportionate happiness.
I. Theoretical Sources o f  Instrumental Reason’s Normativity
The reading proposed by Korsgaard and Rawls assumes Kant’s practical philosophy 
can be examined independently o f his account o f theoretical reason. Ultimately, 
instrumental rationality is part o f a united conception o f  practical reason, based on their 
common normative source in autonomous rational agency. But in this section, I want to 
indicate that the distinction between theoretical and instrumental rationality is in fact o f 
greater systematic importance to a proper understanding o f Kant’s practical philosophy 
than either Korsgaard or Rawls suppose. Through his dualisms Kant legitimises reason in 
both its theoretical and practical use and in turn, he carves out a sphere o f instrumental 
practical reason which is neither pure practical reason nor pure theoretical cognition, but 
somewhere in between. I want to show that, Kant’s conception o f reason in general can be 
thought o f as a continuum that ranges from theoretical, to instrumental, to pure practical / 
moral rationality, where instrumental reason falls between theoretical and pure practical 
rationality. In particular, I wish to emphasise how the normativity o f instrumental
3 Barbara Herman also interprets the categorical imperative as a kind of moral judgement. However, 
my account of practical judgement departs from Herman, insofar that I do not think that Kantian 
pure practical reason is as amenable to cultural diversity as she seems to suggest. See The Practice 
o f Moral Judgment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1993).
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rationality incorporates standards o f theoretical cognition. This will highlight how moral 
reasoning must be independent from instrumental reason in order to be able to exercise 
critical authority over it.
For Kant instrumental reason is “practical” in the sense that through its intentionality 
some kind o f change is produced in the phenomenal world. However, instrumental 
rationality is connected more closely to theoretical reason than pure practical reason in 
many respects and therefore cannot be conflated with the moral legislation o f the latter. 
Embedded within instrumental desires or impulses are aspects o f  theoretical cognition 
which also form part o f  the normativity o f instrumental rationality. First, desiderative ends 
already presuppose as well as integrate a conceptual grasp o f the sensible object in 
question. Second, the means-end connection -  where human possibility or powers are 
evaluated and judged -  presupposes the active synthesis o f disparate empirical experience 
and concepts into laws o f nature.
Common among both intellectual components is the use and application o f 
theoretical cognition in order to formulate situationally appropriate principles o f practical 
action. Theoretical reason therefore becomes “practical” when it is animated by the 
desiderative faculty and outlines means and ends based on possible experience. Kant 
suggests instrumental reason should be understood as “theoretical reason which is only 
extrinsically and contingently practical.”4 By contrast, the moral law as an unconditional 
practical law is discoverable by “a reason that is intrinsically practical.”5 In a crucial 
passage from the second Critique, Kant writes, “Whether the causality o f the will is 
adequate for the reality o f  the objects or not is left to the theoretical principles o f  reason to 
estimate, this being an investigation into the possibility o f  objects o f  volition, the intuition 
o f  which is accordingly no component o f  the practical problem ” [5:45, emphases added].6 
This suggests that instrumental reason is theoretical knowledge animated by impulse or 
desire. Theoretical knowledge is applied to the desiderative context, resulting in the 
generation and execution o f  guiding practical rules.
Overall, Kantian instrumental reason integrates different elements from both ancient 
and modem philosophical traditions. For Aristotle the irrational parts o f the soul are 
ensconced within a broader rational order; passional elements thus possess a propensity 
towards the rational. Desiderative and emotional parts o f the soul are “receptive to reason” 
[E N 1102b 15] and can “participate in reason, in the sense that it is submissive and obedient 
to it” [1102b31-33]. In fact, reason and habituated inclination work together in harmony to 
actualise natural human function. By contrast, the modem viewpoint typically detaches
4 Beck, Commentary, p. 40.
5 Ibid., p. 40.
6 Kritik der praktischen Vernunft {Critique o f Practical Reason), trans. Mary Gregor (Cambridge: 
UP, 1997), hereafter abbreviated to KpV, Prussian Academy pagination.
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inclination from reason: reason becomes subservient to the dictates o f  passion or natural 
self-preservation. According to this latter picture, human inclinations are unreceptive to 
rational cognition or instruction. Or in the case o f Hume, these rational capacities become 
naturalised: practical reason -  its principles and judgements -  are rooted in sympathetic or 
social propensities instinctive to humans.
For Kant, inclinations can never qualify as truly “rational” in the Aristotelian sense. 
This is because stringent criteria differentiate moral practical reason -  the purely rational -  
from non-moral functions o f reason (theoretical and instrumental). Human volitional 
propensities and their direction through the instrumental use o f reason remain rooted in, 
receptive to, and conditioned by, the causally governed natural world. The desiderative 
elements o f instrumental rationality have an uneasy dynamic vis-^-vis moral reason, unlike 
its relative cooperation in the Aristotelian soul.
Yet, by the same token, the cognitive component to instrumental reason is not 
subservient to its conative counterpart, as is typical o f modem conceptions o f practical 
reason.7 The Aristotelian distinction between animal and human passions can help explain 
Kant’s point. For Aristotle, the souls o f both animals and humans contain an appetitive 
component which responds to sensory experience: this is a passive state o f receptivity to the 
external, sensory world. But unlike animals, human passions incorporate active quasi­
judgements or states o f mind which direct us towards specific objects in particular 
circumstances. Thus, on one hand, human passions are intrinsically receptive: external 
sensory experience is required in order to provoke some kind o f passional response.8 Yet, 
on the other hand, intentional action for Aristotle results from a close interaction of 
receptive passional and active intellectual features. Human purposive action therefore 
results from the modification and active direction o f the passions, by the apprehensive 
capacities o f the intellect.9 The active input o f the intellect is the crucial differentiating 
feature between human passions and animal appetite, and corresponds to Aristotle’s 
functional placement o f human essence above animals on a hierarchical scale o f beings in 
Nicomachean Ethics 1.7.
Like Aristotle’s functional hierarchy, Kant’s dualistic vision o f human nature 
imposes limits on human beings from below (that o f nature and animals) and above (that of
7 This differing dynamic eventually leads to a dialectical relationship between the two forms of 
practical reason in Kant’s teleology (moral and non-moral, instrumental), as I will explain further in 
a later section.
8 See Susan James, Passion and Action; The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1997) pp. 41-2.
9 For Aquinas’ adoption of these features of Aristotle, see ibid., p. 60.
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a purely rational, omnipotent being).10 His dualism draws a distinction between the desires 
involved in the instrumentally purposive action o f humans, and the instinctual desiring o f 
animals:
That which can be determined by inclination (sensible impulse, stimulus) would be 
animal choice (arbitrium bruturri). Human choice, however, is a choice that can 
indeed be affected but not determined by impulses, and is therefore o f itself (apart 
from an acquired proficiency o f reason) not pure but can still be determined to 
actions by pure will. [MS 6:214]
Animals cannot unify their appetitive needs through active thought so as to achieve a 
degree o f deliberative distance from inclination. For humans, receptivity to sensible 
phenomena simultaneously provokes the cognitive capacity for imagination. We 
necessarily draw upon this capacity o f theoretical reason when we desire, will, or choose a 
particular end out o f the conceptual unity encompassed within the thinking individual. This 
cognitive activity introduces a crucial element o f human, rational control over inclination 
absent in animals.11
Kant therefore restores in two distinct but related ways non-mechanical cognitive 
activity to means-end rationality. First, Kant has a cognitivist definition o f  desire: 
instrumental desires — the notion o f good and evil -  are always derived from theoretical 
concepts or judgements which evoke possible pleasure or pain. He states in the Critique o f  
Practical Reason, “ [g]ood and evil [are] always appraised by reason and hence through 
concepts, which can be universally communicated, not through mere feeling, which is 
restricted to individual subjects and their receptivity” [5:58]. Determination o f  the 
hedonistically good involves the distinctively human rational, theoretical tools which 
supplement sensibly given experience [5:61]. Kant’s cognitivism is further evident in his 
reference to the concept. In the first Critique a “concept” refers to the active process o f
10 I want to emphasize that these delimitations are not concrete but fluid, as Kant’s teleology claims 
that humanity is constantly progressing towards the ideal of perfect morality. Thus limitations 
stemming from human dualism change as humanity grow in rationality and morality.
11 For example, Kant writes a footnote in the Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht 
(Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point o f View. 1st ed. 1798; 2nd ed. 1800), trans. Robert B. Louden 
(Cambridge: UP, 2006): “The irrational animal <perhaps> has something similar to what we call 
representations (because it has effects that are <very> similar to the representations in the human 
being), but which may perhaps be entirely different -  but no cognition of things; for this requires 
understanding, a faculty of representation with consciousness of action whereby the representations 
relate to a given object and this relation may be thought” (7:141, n. 24). There also exist many 
similarities with Aquinas’ view on instrumental action featuring elements of cognitive activity and 
human control as indicators of rational capacities beyond instinctual animality; see for instance, De 
Veritate 22:4, 22.13, 24.2, also Summa Theologiae II-I 48, A. 6 ad 2, A. 15 ad 2. See also David 
Gallagher, “Thomas Aquinas on the Will as Rational Appetite,” Journal o f  the History ofPhilosophy 
29:4 (1991): 559-84.
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thought representation, whereby our sensations must to conform to the categories o f  the 
understanding. Kant incorporates this notion o f “concept” into his account o f the 
desiderative faculty: “The faculty o f desire in accordance with concepts, insofar as the 
ground determining it to action lies within itself and not in its object, is called a faculty to 
do or to refrain from  doing as one pleases” [MS 6:214]. He writes elsewhere, “I f  the 
concept o f the good is not to be derived from an antecedent practical law but, instead, is to 
serve as its basis, it can be only the concept o f something whose existence promises 
pleasure and determines the causality o f the subject, that is, the faculty o f  desire, to produce 
it” [KpV 5:58]. Which representations o f objects are subjectively pleasurable cannot be 
determined a priori}1 Only after phenomenal experiences are accumulated can specific 
representations be seen as subjectively, hedonistically good. Thus, for Kant, the 
desiderative faculty is bound up with a necessary conceptual apparatus; reason is always 
present in inclinations, as the latter cannot even be formed without the prior employment o f 
cognitive tools.13
This leads to the second point. Instrumental reason assesses physical possibilities or 
constraints in the practical context. Aggregated empirical experience is utilised to consider 
how the analytic means-end relationship can be realised or hindered [see G 444 (93-5)]. 
Indeed, the very notion o f experience presupposes this process: human understanding 
spontaneously apprehends, associates, recognises, and reproduces sensibly-given 
appearances in accordance with a law-like form [KrV  A 124-5, A643/B471 -  A 
644/B672].14 Means-end rationality cannot function without theoretical reason’s 
determination and compilation o f disparate experiential facts into practically usable 
empirical laws, which may accordingly hinder human desiderative possibilities. Kant 
affirms this close connection between instrumental reason and the understanding o f 
theoretical cognition in the second Critique:
Subsumption o f an action possible to me in the sensible world under a pure practical
law  does not concern the possibility o f the action as an event in the sensible world;
12 Importantly, although the representations themselves are not subjectively constituted, the relation 
between pleasure and pain sensations and their representations are. The subjective relation is a 
crucial point that will be elaborated below to reject the collapse between the subjective and objective 
reasons in Korsgaard’s interpretation.
13 Velkley, Freedom and the End o f Reason, p. 186, n. 10. Imagination entails discussion of how the 
spontaneity of thinking of concepts a priori and the receptivity involved in the mere reproduction of 
representations is unified in the “I” of apperception, but it goes beyond the scope of what I want to 
claim here. For more on the transcendental unity of imagination and the “I” of apperception, see 
KrV A 121-5.
14 That the understanding is a presupposition in the relevant empirical laws in means-end reasoning 
is further confirmed in the following: “[t]o make systematic the unity of all possible empirical 
actions of the understanding is a business of reason, just as the understanding connects the manifold 
of appearances through concepts and brings it under empirical laws” (KrV A665/B693).
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fo r  it belongs to the theoretical use o f  reason to appraise that possibility in 
accordance with the law o f  causality, a pure concept o f the understanding for which 
reason has schema in sensible intuition. [K pV5:68, third emphasis added]
In other words, instrumental reason falls partly under the normative domain o f  the 
theoretical use o f reason since causal laws -  generated by the understanding -  help 
determine the physical possibilities o f realising a desired object. Consequently, the agent 
judges the physical constraints relevant to means-end reasoning in accordance with the 
norms o f theoretical reasoning, thus ensuring that the means to a desired object -  and the 
object itself -  reflect careful consideration o f intervening limits, based on one’s 
understanding o f the natural world. Inclination can therefore have an intermediate, not 
immediate, influence on human action; it always involves theoretical reason’s pre- and 
post-reflection on possible empirical constraints or miscellaneous causal connections. The 
imagination can redirect or deter an agent’s desire away from a chosen object accordingly, 
in response to these possible phenomenal restrictions. Indeed, if  one fails to respond in a 
situationally appropriate way, the agent either has not acquired the relevant practical 
experience, or has insufficient awareness o f their surroundings.
The discussion so far hints at where I believe Korsgaard’s account, outlined in the 
previous chapter, goes astray. The dichotomy implicit in Korsgaard -  either instrumental 
and pure practical reason must share the same normative source, or instrumental reason 
fails to qualify as practical reason at all -  ignores Kant’s subtle inclusion o f theoretically 
rational elements in the desiderative faculty.
II. Empirical, not Moral Laws
The first implication o f  the above reading that Kantian instrumental reason involves a 
mixture o f theoretically and practically rational components. Kant confirms this in the 
Critique o f  the Power ofJudgem ent’.
For even if  the will follows no other principles than those by means o f which the 
understanding has insight into the possibility o f the object in accordance with them, 
as mere laws o f nature, then the proposition which contains the possibility o f the 
object through the causality o f the faculty o f  choice may still be called a practical 
proposition, yet it is not at all distinct in principle from the theoretical propositions 
concerning the nature o f things, but must rather derive its own content from the latter 
in order to exhibit the representation an object in reality. Practical propositions, 
therefore, the content o f  which concerns merely the possibility o f  a represented
183
object (through voluntary action), are only applications o f  a complete theoretical 
cognition and cannot constitute a special part o f a science. [20:197-8, emphasis 
added]15
Importantly, the will in means-end rationality is marked by a certain dependency: in these 
situations, the will seeks ends that do not originate in pure practical reason. Accumulated 
empirical experiences and theoretical knowledge help inform and direct the faculty o f 
desire towards subjective ends. Ultimately, the fundamental distinction between the 
subjection o f the will (that o f instrumental reason) or the subjection o f nature (that o f  moral 
reasoning) lies in whether or not the representations o f desired objects o f nature, derived by 
theoretical means, intrude on practical choice.16
This suggests that the normativity o f instrumental reason is partly constituted by the 
correct application o f empirical laws, not the moral law o f autonomous willing. Although 
the means-end relationship will vary depending on the contingently willed end, the relevant 
empirical law is nonetheless formally contained within such willing. As we saw in the 
previous chapter, Korsgaard’s understands the instrumental principle to require making law 
for oneself.17 Yet this directly contradicts what Kant says in the second Critique:
All practical principles that presuppose an object (matter) o f the faculty o f  desire as 
the determining ground o f the will are, without exception, empirical and furnish no 
practical laws. By “the matter o f the faculty o f  desire” I understand an object whose 
reality is desired. Now, when desire for this object precedes the practical rule and is 
the condition o f its becoming a principle, then I say (first) that this principle is in that 
case always empirical. [KpV 5:21, second emphasis added]
For Kant, principles o f instrumental reason are subjective and contingent; they depend on 
its desiderative and empirical components, resulting in a normative source which is neither 
pure theoretical or pure practical reason. Instrumental reasons are necessary only after an 
object has been represented, and its principles can never stand independently o f  that 
representation. Whereas the principle o f pure practical reason must be obeyed even in light 
o f opposing inclinations, hypothetical imperatives derive their necessity only from the 
conditional and particular volitional circumstances, and can easily change should 
inclinations point elsewhere. Kant writes, “for an action necessary merely in order to 
achieve an arbitrary purpose can be considered as in itself contingent, and we can always
15 Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique o f the Power o f  Judgment), trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews 
(Cambridge: UP, 2000), Prussian Academy pagination.
16 Hence why Kant would define moral reasoning as “pure practical reason”.
17 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 246.
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escape from the precept if  we abandon the purpose; whereas an unconditioned command 
does not leave it open to the will to do the opposite at its discretion and therefore alone 
carries with it that necessity which we demand from a law” [G 420 (59)]. Principles o f 
instrumental reason reflect the conditionality and transience of human desiderative needs, 
illustrated particularly in cases where the required means to one’s chosen end proves to be 
either unpalatable or infeasible to the human agent.18 In the instrumental use o f  reason, we 
rely and participate in the natural world, in line with our partially sensible constitution. 
Practical reason can only issue principles, rules, or recommendations -  never laws -  in the 
instrumental case because phenomenal considerations -  and thus, theoretical cognitive 
features -  must be given due weight. This combination o f dependency and conditionality is 
captured in principles o f instrumental reason conceived as hypothetical imperatives: 
empirical considerations infiltrate the principles o f instrumental reason, as these principles 
come into being only after a represented object determines the will.
If  I am right about the conditional normative source in the instrumental use o f reason, 
what follows from this is a conception o f practical necessitation that is manifestly weaker 
than, and indeed, dissimilar to the categorical, law-like demands o f  moral reason. As 
dependent on the phenomenal world, the “oughtness” o f hypothetical imperatives 
represents the subjective necessity o f the will unlike the objective necessity o f  the 
categorical imperative. Instrumental choice must apply and consider the causality o f  those 
empirical laws generated by the understanding; by implication, hypothetical imperatives are 
principles that can only recommend, not categorically demand, the appropriate practical 
action to the will [414 (47)]. The different principles o f practical reason — and the 
terminology Kant uses to describe them -  express their dissimilar practical necessitation. 
For Kant, instrumental reason has ends o f technical skill and happiness. The practical 
principles that guide us towards these ends, he classifies as “rules o f  skill or counsels o f 
prudence” [416 (44)]; both are “principles o f the will” [420 (59)] as opposed to the 
unconditioned and objective “commands (laws) o f  morality” [416 [44)].19
18 Here there is a clear difference between Kant and Korsgaard, as the latter claims in “Normativity,” 
p. 250: “If I am to will an end, to be and to remain committed to it even in the face of desires that 
would distract and weaknesses that would dissuade me, it looks as if I must have something to say to 
myself about why I am doing that [...] It looks as if the end is one that has to be good, in some sense 
that goes beyond the locally desirable.” I am very doubtful that Kant would expect the same level of 
‘commitment’ in instrumental reason, particularly if the desire for the end disappears or gets 
redirected elsewhere.
19 Also KpV 5:20: “The first would be hypothetical imperatives and would contain mere precepts of 
skill; the second, on the contrary, would be categorical and would alone be practical laws. Thus 
maxims are indeed principles but not imperatives. But imperatives themselves, when they are 
conditional -  that is, when they do not determine the will simply as will but only with respect to a 
desired effect, that is, when they are hypothetical imperatives -  are indeed practical precepts but not 
laws” Kant also refers to hypothetical imperatives as pragmatic imperatives, and in his lectures on 
ethics dated roughly around the same period of the Groundwork (1784) he states, “[t]he moral 
imperative is opposed to the pragmatic, and commands in a different way. Pragmatic and moral
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The causal position o f the heteronomous will clarifies the deep differences between 
instrumental and pure practical reason. In a lengthy passage from the Groundwork, Kant 
explains how represented, desired objects combine with empirical laws o f nature to 
determine the heteronomous will:
[Wherever] the object determines the will -  whether by means o f inclination, as in 
the principle o f personal happiness, or by means o f reason directed to objects o f our 
possible volitions generally, as in the principle o f perfection -  the will never 
determines itself immediately by the thought o f  an action, but only by the impulsion 
which the anticipated effect o f  the action exercises on the will: 7  ought to do 
something because I  will something e lse ' And the basis for this must be yet a further 
law in me as a subject, whereby I necessarily will this ‘something else’ -  which law, 
in turn requires an imperative to impose limits on this maxim. The impulsion 
supposed to be exercised on the will o f the subject, in accordance with his natural 
constitution, by the idea o f a result to be attained by his own powers belongs to the 
nature o f the subject -  whether to his sensibility (his inclinations and taste) or to his 
understanding and reason, whose operation on an object is accompanied by 
satisfaction in virtue o f  the special equipment o f their nature -  and consequently, 
speaking strictly, it is nature which would make the law. This law, as a law o f  nature, 
not only must be known and proved by experience and therefore is in itself 
contingent and consequently unfitted to serve as an apodeictic rule o f action such as a 
moral rule must be, but it is always merely heteronomy o f  the will', the will does not 
give itself the law, but an alien impulsion does so through the medium o f  the 
subject’s own nature as tuned for its reception. [444 (93-5) third emphasis added]
Kant claims that the normative principle o f instrumental reason can be partly sourced in the 
theoretical laws o f nature and more emphatically, does not entail the moral law. In this 
case the “will is subject” to the laws o f  nature, as opposed to “a nature which is subject to a 
wiir for “in the former the objects must be the causes o f the representations that determine 
the will” [KpV 5:44]. When Kant argues that the instrumental use o f reason presupposes a 
conception o f oneself as an acting cause, he is not arguing that all practical agency stems 
from the pure autonomous and moral will ( Wille). Rather the instrumental, non-moral will 
( Willkur) functions as the efficient cause to practical action. By “efficient cause” Kant 
means that we actively insert the will {Willkur) within the causal, means-end connection
imperatives are very often confounded with one another, which happens not only among the 
ancients, but also even nowadays among the modems, though the two things are poles apart. 
Pragmatic imperatives are merely counsels; moral imperatives either motiva, rules of virtue, or leges, 
juridical laws.” (C. C. Mongrovius notes, 29:619)
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once we have ascertained the w ill’s adequacy to effect change in the phenomenal world and 
as informed by a combination o f  empirical knowledge and desiderative conditions.
Yet the will conceived as “efficient cause” does not obliterate human agency in any 
way. As argued so far, the human understanding actively collates particular ideas/concepts 
into a law-like form. Once applied to the practical context, our subsequent reflection on 
causal possibilities towards our desired end together reveal “a further law in me as a 
subject”. Attention to the theoretical norm o f instrumental reason brings out how, in the 
means-end case, Kant is concerned primarily with empirical, not moral, constraints. In 
other words, in relation to morally indifferent actions, reason alerts us that we must apply 
another law which regulates part o f our dual nature -  namely, as sensibly driven, 
imperfectly rational beings, who are open to, and function within, a natural, mechanistic 
environment [5:6n]. Both laws o f nature and the moral law are practically relevant, since 
both correspond and apply to different aspects o f humanity’s dual constitution. By 
implication, in the very recognition o f which law is salient and applicable to the particular 
circumstance, individuals already demonstrate a deliberative, spontaneous component 
which, on one hand, progresses beyond the instinctual, unreflective activity o f animals, and 
on the other, is ultimately bound and limited by the inescapable experience o f human 
rational contingency.
Thus, theoretically rational components in instrumental choice or desire means that 
instrumental reasons are generated without appeal to the categorical imperative.20 
Ultimately, the normativity o f instrumental reason relies upon the active conceptualisation 
and practical application o f causal empirical laws in order to first, link a desired end 
(represented object) with the necessary means, and second, ascertain whether or not this 
theoretical connection is practically realisable. More importantly, if  moral autonomy is 
taken as constitutive o f all human rational agency, we fail to capture how theoretical 
normative sources o f instrumental reason express practical agency’s openness and 
receptivity to the natural world, as well as how this stance o f  openness can influence human 
purposive action.
The application o f normative principles in the instrumental use o f reason can be 
better understood in light o f what has been said so far. Active choice ( Willkur) o f  an end 
does indeed involve applying law to oneself, but crucially, this refers, not to the moral law, 
but to theoretically informed principles or laws the function o f which is practical by virtue 
o f their attachment to ends set by the faculty o f desire. From the vantage point o f 
humanity’s partially sensible nature, the law o f causality and nature is perfectly valid; from 
the viewpoint o f our intelligible, noumenal counterpart, these empirical laws are merely
20 Korsgaard, “Normativity,” p. 244.
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impure practical rules or recommendations owing to its inherent reliance on phenomenal 
nature to fulfil our subjective desire.
Hypothetical imperatives o f instrumental reason are therefore normative insofar that 
they appeal to the sensible, empirical side o f  humanity’s imperfectly rational constitution. 
Kant explicitly confirms this point:
The human being is a being with needs insofar as he belongs to the sensible world, 
and to this extent his reason certainly has a commission from the side o f  his 
sensibility which it cannot refuse, to attend to its interest and to form practical 
maxims with a view to happiness in this life and, where possible, in a future life as 
well. But he is nevertheless not so completely an animal as to be indifferent to all 
that reason says on its own and to use reason merely as a tool for the satisfaction o f 
his needs as a sensible being. For, that he has reason does not at all raise him in 
worth above mere animality if  reason is to serve him only for the sake o f  what 
instinct accomplishes for animals; reason would in that case be only a particular 
mode nature had used to equip the human being with the same end to which it has 
destined animals, without destining him to a higher end. No doubt once this 
arrangement o f nature has been made for him he needs reason in order to take into 
consideration at all times his well-being and woe. [5:61-2]
Norms o f instrumental reason possess a motivational hold over agents because ends o f skill 
and happiness are ones that humans naturally seek; it appeals to the sensible part o f our 
human constitution. Their normative authority is derived, not from the purely rational part 
o f human nature, but from our status as partly rational, partly sensible agents situated 
within phenomenal conditions.
Thus, we can see how Kant answers the question regarding the motivational grip o f 
hypothetical imperatives without appealing to a  conception o f  autonomous rational 
agency.21 Instrumental reasons therefore have a motivational “grip” on the desiderative 
components generated from our combined human constitution -  features from our finite, 
sensible as well as practically rational nature. Kant subsequently implies that, in cases 
where those practical principles fail to rationally compel the human agent, their appeal to 
our sensible/desiderative side would ultimately compensate.22 We can see that the opposite 
also holds: reason can contribute to our natural, sensible interest in human well-being and 
happiness, and can help determine its constituents for particular agents.
21 That said, my view of Kantian instrumental reason appears to accommodate particular 
compatibilist conceptions of practical freedom.
22 An evident example is simply when the means-ends connection fails to be practically enacted 
because the desire for the object changes or altogether dissipates.
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III. The Dialectic o f  Practical Reason
Central to Kant’s dualism between instrumental and moral reason is a conflicted 
dynamic between universal morality and the individual rational pursuit o f  desire or self- 
interest. The particularistic application o f instrumental reason frequently opposes the 
universality o f the categorical imperative. This articulates the open-ended oscillation 
between the subjective and objective which lies at the heart o f the humanistic use o f  both 
spheres o f practical reason. Kant therefore affirms two legitimate and separate but 
ultimately discordant spheres o f human agency in alignment with our dual features.
Among all rational beings, only humans formulate hypothetical imperatives: they are 
exclusively human requirements which correspond to distinctively human ends, such as 
skill and happiness.23 Such subjective ends o f instrumental reason are rooted in the natural 
world, vary arbitrarily between individuals, and therefore cannot be the basis for a 
conception o f universal morality.24 Kant assumes a close connection between phenomenal 
experience, hedonistic inclination, and the end o f  happiness to justify his argument. He 
writes:
Only experience can teach what brings us joy. Only the natural drives for food, sex, 
rest, and movement, and (as our natural predispositions develop) for honor, for 
enlarging our cognition, and so forth, can tell each o f us, and each only in his 
particular way, in what he will fin d  those jobs; and, in the same way, only experience 
can teach him the means by which to seek them. All apparently a priori reasoning 
about this comes down to nothing but experience raised by induction to generality, a 
generality [...] will so tenuous that everyone must be allowed countless exceptions in 
order to adapt his choice o f a way o f life to his particular inclinations and his 
susceptibility to satisfaction and still, in the end, to become prudent only from his 
own or others’ misfortunes. [MS 6:215-6]
On one hand, we can never shed our empirical selves: given our dualistic constitution, part 
o f us will always be rooted within the phenomenal world and interested in our prudential 
happiness. We need to be receptive to sensibly-given intuitions in order to know what 
particular inclinations successfully promote our pragmatic interests in happiness; we
23 Aristotle similarly determines the sphere of phronesis, or prudence / practical reason, as the 
feature which humans exclusively have. But Kant’s adherence to modernity’s decisive break with 
Aristotelianism/scholasticism is present insofar that the traditional moral connotations embedded 
within this distinctive human feature (for Aristotle, humans -  unlike the gods -  are capable of moral 
virtue via prudential reason) are dismissed as lacking purity from passional elements.
24 As discussed in the previous chapter, Rawls’ definition of “true human needs” would fall under 
this category.
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accumulate subjective prudential experience through the exploration o f what desires 
promote pleasure and satisfaction. Skilful or prudential ends, and our motivation towards 
them, are not moral in Kant’s restricted definition o f the term; indeed they are subjective 
and contingent. But despite their non-moral status, these ends are nonetheless necessary to 
the kind o f desiring beings we are.
Instrumental reason -  including its constituents, application, and purpose -  must 
therefore be an exclusively anthropocentric exercise o f reason, particularly since a perfectly 
rational being is incapable o f willing contrary to the moral law. For Kant, the word 
“subjective” has two connotations: the more straightforward reading suggests a variety o f 
individualised ends, but on a deeper level, the term stands for the predisposition o f 
humanity in general, complete with the limited rational capacities which set us apart from 
divine, non-desiderative beings. Consider what Kant says in his lectures on philosophical 
theology, dated 1783-4:
Holiness is the absolute or unlimited moral perfection o f the will. A holy being must 
not be affected with the least inclination contrary to morality. It must be impossible 
for it to will something which is contrary to moral laws. So understood, no being but 
God is holy. For every creature always has some needs, and if  it wills to satisfy 
them, it also has inclinations which do not always agree with morality. [...] For every 
creature has needs which limit its inclination to make others happy; or at least these 
needs limit its ability to make such use o f  these inclinations that it may have not 
regard at all for its own welfare. But God is independent benevolence. He is not 
limited by any subjective ground, because he him self has no needs?5
Desiderative elements and pragmatic interests within instrumental reason already suggest 
that a perfectly rational, non-appetitive being, such as God, would never need to use reason 
in an instrumental way. The anthropocentricity o f the term, “subjective”, can be further 
illuminated if  we consider how theoretical cognition contributes to means-end deliberation. 
The rational capacity to aggregate disparate empirical experiences into the form o f law in 
itself, though thought o f as universal, are “subjective” insofar as this form o f cognition is 
necessary only to the human understanding. Kant states in a footnote that an individual 
“might apply the most rational reflection to these objects [of choice] -  about what concerns 
their greatest sum as well as the means for attaining the goal determined through them -  
without thereby even suspecting the possibility o f  such a thing as the absolutely imperative 
moral law which announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the highest incentive [i?
25 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, trans. by Allen W. Wood and Gertrude M. Clark (Ithaca: 
Cornell UP, 1978) p. 114, final emphasis added.
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6:26 note, emphasis added]. The correspondence between instrumental reason and the 
predisposition o f humanity provides the keystone as to why the two forms o f  practical 
reasoning have an antagonistic, rather than cooperative, relationship. Inclinations towards 
“self love which is physical” exemplify the predisposition o f humanity: both this 
predisposition and the instrumental use o f reason have an acquisitive, self-interested 
inflection, and together, both promote a picture o f human divisiveness, comparison, and 
multiplicity o f ends [6:27], For something to be “objective” in Kant’s sense, it has to apply 
universally, to all rational beings (G 421 [51]); a priori, universal principles are laws which 
are valid for all rational beings without exception. Happiness is classified as a “subjective” 
end because Kant rejects a conception o f morality and objectivity that is defined strictly in 
anthropocentric terms, within the empirical confines o f our indelible rational contingency.
The flip side o f this, however, is that the prudential interests we pursue through the 
instrumental use o f reason often divert us away from the true end o f  morality. Indeed, we 
often put our happiness before our moral duty; we prioritise the instrumental use o f  reason 
over our moral reason. Kant criticises Greek eudaimonistic theories because he believes 
that these philosophers confuse prudential self-regard and our instrumental, empirical 
desires with the objective end o f morality.26 Self-love and individual inclinations are made 
the basis o f morality -  or in Kant’s words, “subjective determining grounds o f  choice 
[become] the objective determining ground o f the will” [KpV  5:74]. But for Kant, our 
pursuit o f  happiness through hypothetical willing is at odds with our moral duty, leading to 
a dialectical relationship between instrumental and pure practical reason:
Man feels in himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands o f duty presented 
to him by reason as so worthy o f esteem -  the counterweight o f his needs and 
inclinations, whose total satisfaction he grasps under the name o f  ‘happiness’. But 
reason, without promising anything to inclination, enjoins its commands relentlessly, 
and therefore, so to speak, with disregard and neglect o f these turbulent and 
seemingly equitable claims (which refuse to be suppressed by any command). From 
this there arises a natural dialectic -  that is, a disposition to quibble with these strict 
laws o f duty, to throw doubt on their validity or at least on their purity and strictness, 
and to make them, where possible, more adapted to our wishes and inclinations; that
26 This applies especially to his critique of Epicureans. But his account of Stoic happiness is 
criticised on slightly different grounds. See KpV. I am not going to engage with the issue of 
whether or not Kant was indeed justified in his criticisms of Greek eudaimonistic theories. For a 
critical examination of this issue, see T. H. Irwin, “Kant’s Criticisms of Eudaemonism,” in Stephen 
Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, eds., Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics; Rethinking Happiness and Duty 
(Cambridge: UP, 1998). Irwin makes insightful comments about how Kant’s criticisms of 
eudaimonia cannot apply to theories whereby prudential imperatives are thought of as categorical 
imperatives, because the latter are grounded on external reasons (p. 81).
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is, to pervert their very foundations and destroy their whole dignity -  a result which
in the end even ordinary human reason is unable to approve. [G 405 (23)]
Another way to understand this is to say that how our pursuit o f empirical conditions for 
happiness makes us feel with greater intensity the moral gap: our instrumental reason 
directs us towards certain natural ends, but in doing so, we are aware that our conditional 
pursuit o f  happiness falls short o f the moral demand [KpV  5:119]. All o f this appears to 
point to an irresolvable antinomy within practical reason: humans inevitably seek happiness 
through hypothetical willing, yet this pursuit is wrought with ills and is inappropriate to our 
predisposition o f moral personality. I will have more to say on this point in the next 
section.
One could object to my interpretation so far that embracing Kant’s dualisms -  and 
indeed, the moral gap -  results in a rather ominous gulf between hypothetical imperatives 
and the categorical imperative. On this view, to read practical reason through the lens o f 
Kant’s dualisms weakens the overall coherence o f his moral philosophy. No material 
content appears capable o f bridging this interminable gulf between our intelligible and 
sensible natures and their divergent practical manifestations. One strategy would be to go 
along the constructivist path, outlined by Rawls and Korsgaard: practical reason is unified 
if  the normative source o f both instrumental and moral reason is founded on human 
capacities for creative self-legislation. Based on its common normative source, 
instrumental and pure practical reason interacts in an unproblematic and cooperative 
manner towards individual happiness and the societal or political good. In turn, Kant’s 
overall theory appears to gain in cohesiveness.
This appearance o f a gain in overall cohesiveness, however, is purchased at a large 
philosophical cost -  namely at the expense o f a moral framework which can restrict or 
critique instrumental reason. Indeed, I believe that, far from lacking cohesion, the dualism 
between instrumental and pure practical reason is central to the full understanding o f  how 
morality is meant to constrain and reorientate humans away from an empirical 
understanding o f happiness. An answer to this interpretive dilemma can be uncovered if  
the metaphysical framework underlying Kant’s conception o f pure practical reason is 
properly considered. The prudential aspirations in the human exercise o f instrumental 
reason point towards contradictions in its unrestricted pursuit. This necessitates certain 
postulates o f practical reason to mitigate the deficiencies within our empirical and 
conditioned definitions o f  happiness, and to direct us towards an alternative, unconditional 
definition o f happiness, whereby happiness is proportionate to virtue. As I will explain 
below, this involves our exercise o f pure practical reason to realise the requirements o f 
moral faith and hope in light o f certain rational postulates, and to develop our moral
192
practical judgement accordingly. This will allow us to generate an alternative 
understanding o f the categorical imperative.
IV  Pure Practical Reason and the Highest Good
This section provides an alternative account o f the Kantian categorical imperative 
and pure practical reason which respects Kant’s intended metaphysical grounding to 
morality. Our instrumentally rational capacities can never help us fulfil the moral ideal; 
rather, these capacities frequently hamper our moral progress, where this side o f our nature 
needs to be mitigated or subdued in order to fulfil imperfectly the requirements o f  pure 
practical reason.27 In recognising our limitations, Kant neither exaggerates human 
capacities, nor diminishes the perfection o f the moral ideal. As Kant sees it, the moral gap 
is partly bridgeable if  we adopt an alternative definition o f happiness, away from its 
prudential grounding, and is bound up with a kind o f moral rational faith. This contests the 
notion that Kantian practical reason is closed off from a metaphysical framework, and can 
be then used to accommodate the humanist and naturalist presuppositions shared by both 
proponents and critics o f  the standard model o f instrumental reason.28
To better understand this, two aspects neglected or misconstrued by the constructivist 
account outlined in the previous chapter need to be embraced. First, Kant does not have a 
procedural understanding o f moral practical reason; rather, pure practical reason functions 
more as a form o f ethical judgement which actively constrains our instrumental use o f 
reason, while reorientating the will towards the highest good. Second, Kant’s alternative 
definition o f  happiness, through a conception o f the highest good, tries to address the 
problem o f the moral gap, but without either the constructivist strategy o f lowering the 
ideal or bolstering human capacities.
As we saw in the previous chapter, Kantian constructivists understand the categorical 
imperative in procedural terms: it is a rational formula or procedure that we apply to 
existing prudential maxims. By contrast, I want to recapture here how pure practical reason 
in accordance with the moral law -  or the categorical imperative as it is known by humans 
-  involves the cultivation o f complex practical judgements and a reorientation o f  the will. 
In the Second Critique, Kant defines practical judgement as the capacity to assess “whether
27 This is where I agree with Henrich’s assessment that Kant rejects moral sense philosophies of 
happiness, surrounding ambiguities of moral motivation (Henrich, “The Moral Image of the World,” 
p. 22). Ultimately, I believe that this leads Kant to adopt the view that prudential and moral 
motivation is conflicted and cannot unified.
28 Andrews Reath in “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” Journal o f the History o f 
Philosophy 26 (1988): 539-619, argues for a secular, political understanding of the highest good. 
This is deeply contestable on exegetical grounds, not least because this fails to capture the 
demandingness of the moral ideal in Kant.
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an action possible for us in sensibility is or is not a case that stands under the rule [...] by 
which what is said in the rule universally {in abstracto) is applied to an action in concreto” 
[KpV 5:67]. Kant further restates the Formula o f Universal Law from the Groundwork as a 
rule o f judgement29:
The rule o f judgement under laws o f pure practical reason is this: ask yourself 
whether, if  the action you propose were to take place by a law o f the nature o f  which 
you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will [...] 
I f  the maxim o f  the action is not so constituted that it can stand the test as to the form 
o f a law o f nature in general, then it is morally impossible. This is how even the 
most common understanding judges; for the law o f nature always lies at the basis o f 
its most ordinary judgements even those o f experience. [5:69-70]
At first glance, these passages appear to support Rawls’ procedural reading: practical 
judgement applies the form o f  universality to existing maxims, beliefs or outlooks at hand; 
universal laws are applied to, and even build upon, the empirical world as we know it. 
Material content for the categorical imperative is provided by our subjective maxims. Part 
o f the problem stems from the fact that the Groundwork seems to endorse this procedural 
reading. But if  we supplement this reading with later works, such as the second Critique, 
the Metaphysics o f  Morals x and the Religion within the Boundaries o f  Mere Reason, there is 
good textual evidence indicating that as the principle o f pure practical reason, the 
categorical imperative is not a formula or mechanical procedure we apply to existing, 
prudential maxims.30
Rather, moral practical reason is a form o f practical judgement which expresses the 
cultivation o f virtue, o f respect and love o f the moral law, and ultimately, the incorporation 
o f such love into our “life-orientation”. “For Kant, the proper objects o f moral evaluation 
are not so much actions, or even the principles that prescribe actions,” John Hare writes, 
“but rather the fundamental choices that shape a life either around respect for the moral law 
or around the agent’s own happiness.”31 In other words, practical judgement develops a 
newfound moral attitude, rather than reacting to an already existing action or viewpoint.32 
Understood as such, pure practical reason’s application o f the categorical imperative can be
29 The Formula of Universal Law is as follows: “Act only on that maxim through which you can at 
the same time will that it should become a universal law” [G 421 (52)].
30 This is particularly so if we interpret the categorical imperative in the Teleological reading 
endorsed by H. J. Paton, as opposed to the Practical Contradiction test endorsed by Korsgaard. See 
Paton, The Categorical Imperative; A Study in Kant’s Moral Philosophy (London: Hutchinson, 
1947) pp. 146-52.
31 Hare, The Moral Gap, p. 80.
32 See Onora O’Neill, “Practical Principles and Practical Judgment,” The Hastings Center Report 
31:4(2001): 19.
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sensitive to the intricacies and particularities o f different situational contexts.33 It is akin to 
Aristotelian description o f  practical reason as the “universal particular”: the form o f 
universality is responsive to the inevitable particularities and contingencies o f  practical 
agency. This does not mean that the principle itself incorporates particularised material 
content.34 But how one chooses, judges, and acts in that particularity reflects whether or 
not the authority o f the moral law determines and shapes one’s life. For Aristotle, one’s 
choice in a situational particular reflects the moral disposition and character o f an agent, 
insofar as they can be sensitive to the uniqueness o f the context, but situate that within the 
broader horizon o f one’s life, reflective o f  one’s rational essence. Similarly, for Kant 
choices o f moral worth reflect consideration o f salient circumstances, but they more 
importantly reflect the correct orientation and aspirations o f the will; it expresses an 
“ethical frame o f mind” [R 6:46n]. There is much more latitude for practical discretion 
between the moral law and our unavoidably contextually and empirically situated selves, 
when we understand our application o f the categorical imperative as such.
Moreover, understood as practical judgement, the categorical imperative brings 
together human virtue and the law o f the noumenal realm, the moral law; it is the crucial 
bridge between human reason and objective morality. “There is no doubt that this exercise 
and the consciousness o f a cultivation o f our reason in judging merely about the practical,” 
writes Kant, “arising from this exercise must gradually produce a certain interest in 
reason’s law itself and hence in morally good actions” [5:160-1]. We can better see what 
Kant means if  we examine how moral virtue is acquired. For Kant, virtue and practical 
judgement are reciprocal terms. A morally virtuous agent cultivates and imposes 
constraints upon her instrumental reason, for “[v]irtue is the product o f pure practical 
reason insofar as it gains ascendancy over such inclinations with consciousness o f its 
supremacy (based on freedom)” [MS 6:477]. Though we cannot be holy, humans “can be 
virtuous. For virtue consists in self-overcoming’.35 The need to mitigate against self- 
inflicted, destructive aspects within our subjective pursuit o f  happiness through 
instrumental reason instigates the further internal discipline o f human reason towards a 
moral orientation; humanity must undergo an internal change o f heart, possible only with 
the use o f pure practical reason. This dynamic tension between the two forms o f reasoning, 
between humanity as simultaneously natural and morally autonomous being, energises and 
propels an individual’s eventual commitment towards this development o f  practical 
judgement. The cultivation o f moral virtue, o f our practical judgement, therefore involves 
both a negative as well as positive dimension: it incorporates critique o f  our prudential use
33 See Herman, The Practice o f Moral Judgment; see also Patrick Kain, “Self-Legislation in Kant’s 
Moral Philosophy,” Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie 86 (2004): 294.
34 Kain, “Self-Legislation,” p. 294.
35 Lectures on Philosophical Theology, p. 114.
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o f instrumental rationality, and replaces in its stead a positive notion o f pure practical 
rationality and its principles [R 6:50]. “Considered in its complete perfection, virtue is 
therefore represented not as if  a human being possesses virtue but rather as i f  virtue 
possesses him” [MS 6:406].36 It is not the case that our natural rational capacities are 
improved upon, where we acquire the virtues one by one; rather, we are virtuous in the 
Kantian sense when our rational capacities are reorientated so that the moral law becomes 
practically effective and comes to dominate our use o f reason. The categorical imperative 
as practical judgement represents the rationalist analogue to the Augustinian notion o f  the 
‘turning o f the soul’ towards the moral ideal, away from the natural pull o f our self-love 
and prudential self-interest. This means that the moral law becomes more practically 
effective on agents, for “the moral law determines the will objectively and immediately in 
the judgement o f reason” [KpV  5:78].
The fact we can never know whether or not our maxims are moral further supports 
this interpretation. If  the categorical imperative is a procedure by means o f which we chum 
out individual maxims to ensure their moral permissibility, it would imply that we can 
know with certainty whether we are acting from the moral law. Our moral or non-moral 
state becomes introspectible by virtue o f the correct application o f  a rational procedure and 
through the laws we ourselves create. But Kant believes that at the level o f  individual 
agency the morality o f our maxims is “inscrutable” to us [R 6:2In]. Indeed, “ [t]he real 
morality o f actions (their merit and guilt), even that o f our own conduct, therefore remains 
entirely hidden from us [...] How much o f it is to be ascribed to mere nature and innocent 
defects o f temperament or to its happy constitution (merito fortunae) this no one can 
discover, and hence no one can judge it with complete justice” [KrV  A551/B579 note]. We 
can never assess conclusively the purity o f our maxims, nor chart our individual moral 
progress. Contra the Rawlsian reading, the ultimate moral ideal emerges “precisely 
because we are not its authors but the idea has rather established itself in the human being 
without comprehending how human nature could have even been receptive to it” [7? 6:61, 
emphasis added]. Our individual moral progress is therefore opaque to us as individuals — 
our pragmatic pursuit o f happiness through instrumental reason can never be the basis o f 
morality, yet the human possibility o f a good will seems tinged with uncertainty and 
stonewalled by our rational contingency.
36 “[A] human being’s moral education must begin, not with an improvement of mores, but with the 
transformation of his attitude of mind and the establishment of his attitude of mind and the 
establishment of a character, although it is customary to proceed otherwise and to fight vices 
individually, while leaving their universal root undisturbed. But now, even the most limited human 
being is capable of all the greater a respect for a dutiful action the more he removes from it, in 
thought, other incentives which might have influence upon its maxim through self-love [...] And so 
the predisposition [to the good] gradually becomes an attitude of mind, so that dutymereXy for itself 
begins to acquire in the apprentice’s heart a noticeable importance.” [R 6:48]
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This opacity to even our own morality can lead to discouragement and despair which 
is why Kantian pure practical reason requires a reorientation o f the will, o f  thinking and 
judgement. A moral reorientation o f  the will occurs when an agent’s deepest choices 
reflect aspirations of, and are animated by, an objective and impartial goal. This requires a 
belief, a moral faith, in something else which overrides and yet, is also consistent with the 
human aspiration for happiness.37 Moreover, as we saw, our instrumental use o f reason 
points to a conditional, natural end -  namely our desire for happiness -  but its empirical 
foundations will always be contingent, subject to variation and vulnerable to luck. It 
diverts our attention away from humanity’s true end, namely the moral law.
This uncooperative tension is resolved in the notion o f the highest good. Our interest 
does not go away, but is included in the highest good; subjective grounds, however, are 
strictly limited and are not the motivational impetus to our moral action. Rather, morality 
comes to ground our own individual happiness, and as such, resolves the inner conflict o f 
our practical reason. At first glance, my claim here may appear rather close to Korsgaard’s 
reading, who similarly views morality as the condition o f our happiness. But my 
interpretive position differs insofar as I accept, rather than reject, the postulates o f  practical 
reason as a necessary condition o f this possibility. Acceptance o f Kant’s metaphysical and 
objectivist commitments in his philosophical framework reveals the reasons why 
Korsgaard, unlike Kant, ends up resembling the freestanding and subjectivist character o f 
the standard model.
As the final and necessary command o f  the moral law, the highest good is “happiness 
proportioned to that morality” [.KpV  5:124], where there is the systematic combination o f 
virtue and happiness. By command o f the moral law, individuals are obligated to intend 
and promote the highest good so defined. We cannot, however, know the purity o f  our own 
maxims, let alone that o f others, and the just apportioning o f happiness to virtue through 
human devices would be nigh impossible. How does one then fulfil the command o f the 
moral law in our pure practical reason?
For Kant, the systematicity and coherence o f  the highest good relies, first, on the 
recognition o f inherent limits to human rational powers -  and more controversially -  
requires the rational postulate o f the existence o f a perfectly rational, omniscient and divine 
being. First, the failure o f the deduction o f the moral law in Groundwork III is attributable 
to the gap which exists between imperfectly rational beings, such as humans, and the law o f 
pure practical reason.38 Even if  it were somehow possible to derive the categorical 
imperative by analytic means, the link between the moral law and the will o f finite beings,
37 See Hare, The Moral Gap, p. 78.
38 See Patrick Kain, “Interpreting Kant’s Theory of Divine Commands,” Kantian Review 9 (20050: 
135.
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such as humans, would be synthetic, by virtue o f our rational imperfection.39 As Camois 
accurately states, “our will is good enough to allow us to conceive its connection with the 
moral law, but not good enough to allow us to conceive that connection as analytic. The 
synthesis is the mark o f  our flnitude, and the subjective imperfection o f our will.”40 For 
perfectly rational beings the deduction o f  the moral law in the Groundwork would be 
successful. But for contingent beings such as ourselves a gap exists between us and the 
highest good o f pure practical reason. We are obliged to will only that which is possible, 
but given the limits to our moral introspection and our epistemic reach, the highest good 
would remain unattainable. Yet, “the command that we ought to become better human 
beings still resounds unabated in our souls,” writes Kant,” consequently we must also be 
capable o f it, even if  what we can do is itself insufficient, and by virtue o f it, we only make 
ourselves receptive to a higher assistance inscrutable to us [R 6:45].
Thus, in order to bridge the moral gap, the human exercise o f  pure practical reason 
points to a theological postulate. The postulation o f  God’s existence is necessary to confer 
rational systematicity on our obligatory intention to will the highest good, since only with 
this postulate, in combination with the postulate o f immortality, does the objective end o f 
the moral law become possible.41 Moreover, it is only through this postulate that the end o f 
pure practical reason is both complete and necessary42:
The moral law commands me to make the highest possible good in a world the final 
object o f all my conduct. But I cannot hope to produce this except by the harmony o f 
my will with that o f a holy and beneficent author o f the world; and although in the 
concept o f the highest good, as that o f a whole in which the greatest happiness is 
represented as connected in the most except proportion with the greatest degree o f 
moral perfection (possible in creatures), my own happiness is included, this is 
nevertheless not the determining ground o f the will that is directed to promote the 
highest good: it is instead the moral law (which, on the contrary, limits by strict 
conditions my unbounded craving for happiness). For this reason, again, morals is 
not properly the doctrine o f how we are to make ourselves happy but o f how we are 
to become worthy o f happiness. Only if  religion is added to it does there also enter
39 Camois, Kant's Doctrine o f Freedom, pp. 51-3.
40 Ibid, p. 51.
41 See Kain, “Divine Commands,” p. 132.
42 Ibid, p. 133. Also, ’’Thus without a God and without a world invisible to us now but hoped for, 
the glorious ideas of morality are indeed objects of approval and admiration, but not springs of 
purpose and action. For they do not fulfil in its completeness that end which is natural to every 
rational being and which is determined a priori, and rendered necessary, by that same pure reason.” 
[KrV A813/B841]
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the hope o f some day participating in happiness to the degree that we have been 
intent upon not being unworthy o f it. [Kp V  5:129-30]
An assertoric yet practically grounded belief in the existence o f God helps close the gap 
between reason’s divergent aspirations. This belief would not be speculative knowledge 
about the noumenal domain or theoretical comprehensibility o f God.43 But our cultivation 
o f  practical judgement requires the orientation o f the belief or faith, “act as if  we know”44, 
its purpose would not be for our epistemological advancement -  indeed, we are required to 
avoid such beliefs from becoming spurious speculative aspirations — but rather, for our 
moral progression in practical life.45 It is a rational, reflective faith in an omniscient and 
just divine being who can exercise a judicial and executive function, and can therefore 
justly determine equitable rewards and punishments. This is not to say that the anticipation 
o f rewards and punishments is the underlying motivation towards the highest good. In that 
case the rational postulation o f  God’s existence would be as heteronomous as are 
theological voluntarist conceptions o f moral obligation, according to which arbitrary divine 
commands are binding for us simply because they issue from God’s will. Morality then 
would be a means to the end o f happiness, or towards divine reward or punishment. 
Instead, Kant holds that there is something in the striving o f reason itself which, for its own 
coherence and demand for systematicity, requires the rational belief in certain metaphysical 
postulates, such as the existence o f God (and the immortality o f the soul).46
The highest good, moreover, is not a self-created end -  it is not something 
individuals make for themselves, despite how vigorously current proponents o f  liberal 
autonomy, such as Rawls and Korsgaard endorse this view. Individuals’ hope is in the 
participation o f happiness as a providential whole, and it is this whole which situates, 
ultimately overcomes, individual egoism and particularised interests.47 Kant subsumes the 
prudential end o f humanity under that o f morality, much in the same way as classical 
teleological philosophy integrates anthropomorphic ends within a larger cosmological and 
meaningful whole. The highest good o f pure practical reason is a heuristic idea that 
orientates the way we think, judge, and act within the present and future. The empirical 
evidence as it stands -  o f  the rampancy o f our instrumental use o f reason, as well as the 
contingency and temporality o f  life -  would cause individuals to falter over any prospect o f
43 Kain shows why it has to be an assertoric belief that “God exists”, not simply an agnostic stance 
that “it is possible that God exists” in “Divine Commands,” p. 136.
44 Ibid.
45 See Kant, “What Does it Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking” in H. S. Reiss, ed., Political 
Writings (Cambridge: UP, 1991).
46 See R 6:52.
47 Reinhard Brandt, “The Guiding Idea of Kant’s Anthropology and the Vocation of the Human 
Being,” in Kain and Jacobs, Essays on Kant’s Anthropology, p. 100.
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progress; it would be cause for moral pessimism and despondency. In that case, the 
rational postulates o f pure practical reason become all the more vital, as they impart much- 
needed hope. We cannot know what this systematic unity o f happiness and virtue will look 
like, for it reflects something different than the causal and phenomenal nature as we 
understand it. Our only hope is this moral ideal, o f “an order beyond our knowledge -  
toward another dimension o f  our lives” where we must trust that our exercise o f  pure 
practical reason, when divorced from our instrumental use o f reason promotes the highest 
good.48 Thus, the moral gap for Kant is bridged by these postulates, and the acquisition o f 
moral faith and hope.
The most pressing question that emerges from my reading is: why reinstate the 
metaphysical postulates; why understand Kantian pure practical reason in light o f  the 
highest good? For instance, Andrews Reath tries to extrapolate a “secular” interpretation o f 
the highest good, which can be “described entirely in naturalist terms, as a state o f  affairs to 
be achieved in this world, through human activity.”49 To reach this interpretive conclusion, 
Reath minimises the connection between virtuous character and happiness, whereby 
“satisfaction o f permissible ends would be a component o f the Highest Good” .50 In its 
place, Reath proposes that the highest good can be achieved through the ordering o f  social 
institutions. The proper functioning and maintenance o f these institutions promote the 
happiness o f its members. Clearly, Reath’s reading is influenced by the Rawlsian 
application o f Kant’s theory to the public, political domain. These secular interpretations 
o f the highest good are problematic for the same reasons the constructivist readings were 
rejected in the previous chapter. Just as do proponents o f the standard model, so Reath and 
Korgaard’s Rawls-inspired readings o f Kant assume, often without much supportive 
argument, that theories with deep metaphysical commitments ought to be rejected for their 
non-humanistic focus. Or if  humans fall short o f the moral ideal, if  human limitations are 
reinforced, we “remove the need to address the problem o f non-ideal circumstances”, such 
as injustices in the world.51 Whilst this political /  social understanding o f  the highest good 
may seem to have the advantage o f  its immediate applicability to contemporary dilemmas, 
it is hard not to feel troubled by the implicit hubris o f such a radically secular humanistic 
outlook. Reath’s interpretation o f the highest good o f our moral reason does not depart in a 
significant respect from the numerous assumptions informing the standard model.
48 Henrich, “The Moral Image of the World,” p. 21. Henrich maintains that Kant eventually 
abandons this notion of ‘worthiness of happiness’ through the moral law (p. 24), but I think this is 
not entirely right, given the three postulates of reason in the second Critique, and how the postulates 
of a divine being and immortality bring together virtue and happiness.
49 Andrews Reath, “Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant,” p. 601.
50 Ibid., p. 611.
51 Ibid., p. 619.
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This conception o f procedural practical reason that emphasises anthropocentric 
control and humanistic creation seems vitally unfaithful to the Kant’s moral project. By 
contrast, an overriding spirit o f  humility pervades Kant’s notion o f the highest good -  and 
indeed his dualistic conception o f instrumental and pure practical reason: first, Kant is 
cognisant o f the way in which the moral ideal, sought through the cultivation o f virtue and 
practical judgement, must constrain and impose order onto our naturally self-regarding use 
o f empirical practical reason. Second and more importantly, he accepts that the ultimate 
grounds o f our idea o f a given moral order are necessarily unknowable by us; we cannot 
attain to it be sheer effort o f  the human will, but can only judge our moral efforts in 
accordance with the idea itself. To say the same point differently, we must have hope and 
faith in a divine being in order to think the moral ideal is even within our possible grasp, 
but this in no way compromises the grandiosity o f the moral ideal. For both instrumental 
and moral reasoning, everything is not anything fully within our creative grasp and control. 
When we examine the theoretical sources o f normativity in the instrumental use o f  reason, 
we see it involves a dynamic o f receptivity to our surrounding environment, and activity to 
change it. With pure practical reason, we see it involves receptivity to the highest good and 
the requirements o f moral faith. Even if  we find Kant’s solution to the moral gap deeply 
unattractive from a secular point o f view, we can nonetheless retain a kernel o f its insight: 
namely how the recognition o f limits to human creative powers can inspire a stance o f 
humility and openness towards what is scientifically unknowable or external things which 
lay outside anthropomorphic control, but nonetheless function as objects o f  practical faith 
or orientations o f moral thought, valuing, and action.
This suggests that underlying Kant’s entire theory o f practical reason is a dynamic o f 
humility and certainty, o f openness and activity. Human rationality is imperfect and 
incomplete: ultimately, both our moral experiences and participation in phenomenal nature 
point to our unavoidable human contingency.52 Coupled with our humility, with our 
acknowledgement o f human limitations, is a sense o f receptivity and belief in a benevolent 
moral order.53 In some ways, Kantian practical reason becomes less rigouristic than the 
constructivist /  Reath route, simply because the recognition that humans fall short, that 
aspects to our moral life often fall out o f our control, means it is much easier to adopt a 
stance o f charity towards the moral failings o f others. Ultimately, even without a 
theological postulate, our exercise o f pure practical reason -  and the necessity o f the 
highest good -  still integrates a notion o f moral faith which would restrict the scientific and
52 See Richard L. Velkley, “Moral Finality and the Unity of Homo sapiens: On Teleology in Kant,” 
in Richard F. Hassing, ed., Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs (Washington: Catholic 
University of America Press, 1997) pp. 110-1. This is not to say that Kant doesn’t believe in rational 
progress and improvement; I will elaborate more on this point in section three.
3 Hare, The Moral Gap, p. 92.
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humanistic aspirations shared by both contemporary proponents and critics o f the standard 
model o f  instrumental reason.
Conclusion
This chapter has suggested that once understood through the lens o f Kant’s dualisms, 
the normativity o f instrumental reason is separate from the normativity o f pure practical 
reason. This was to achieve two things: first, to distance Kant’s conception o f instrumental 
reason from contemporary Rawlsian readings; second, to reveal how Kant’s philosophical 
framework helps him evade the subjectivist and freestanding implications o f the standard 
model. The latter point brings to the fore the reasons why current reappropriation strategies 
are unsuccessful as a critique against the standard model. On one hand the rejection o f 
metaphysical commitments is deemed an apposite reflection o f the plural and secular social 
reality, yet on the other hand critics end up resembling the standard model as a result o f 
their “picking and choosing” strategy. Indeed, closer examination o f  Kant’s conception o f 
instrumental reason shows how his model cannot be compared to the standard model 
precisely because o f how it is situated within a robustly objectivist philosophical 
framework.
But even removed from Kant’s dualistic framework his non-moralised conception o f 
instrumental reason departs from the standard model in subtle but important ways. First 
and foremost is Kant’s cognitivist account o f desire: the requirements o f theoretical 
cognition are themselves a constitutive feature o f the faculty o f desire in its relation to the 
world o f appearances, i.e. the sensibly given world and its possible objects o f  desire. 
Second is the character or inflection given to instrumental reason: the freestanding 
character o f the current standard model infuses our conception o f instrumental rationality 
with a spirit o f  anthropocentric subjective power capable o f imposing the individual’s 
desires and preferences on the natural environment. But for Kant, instrumental rationality -  
and its proper use -  essentially involves the interplay between receptive and active 
elements. As implied by his cognitivist conception o f desire, to even be in a position to 
instrumentally reason requires first, an openness to or interaction with the natural and 
empirical world, and second, the mind’s activity to process, understand, apply, and indeed, 
restrict these passive responses. Based on these cognitive elements within the faculty o f 
desire, the use o f instrumental reason is intrinsically dependent on the empirical world for 
its content and remains a firm reminder o f human contingent limits. Thus, we may exercise 
our instrumental reason in a spirit o f prudential self-interest or in light o f subjective 
concerns, but even then our participation and dependence on nature is unavoidable -  we 
cannot completely subdue our sensible nature and its drive towards the necessary human
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ends o f technical skill and happiness. Thus understood Kantian instrumental reason cannot 
be the expression o f untrammelled anthropocentric power but rather conveys our individual 
frailty, needfulness, and incompletion.
But this chapter has more crucially shown how Kant’s moral framework situates and 
exercises critical authority over and above the exercise o f instrumental reason. This very 
feature is lost in contemporary reappropriations o f Kant. In following the standard model’s 
rejection o f metaphysical claims the Rawlsian reading collapses back into a version o f the 
standard model, essentially mimicking the latter’s freestanding and conditional character. 
But whereas the spirit o f  human creation or conditional ends characterise instrumental 
rationality for the standard model, this spirit is transferred to moral reasoning by 
contemporary reappropriations o f Kant. This nonetheless fails to articulate how Kant 
envisages the overarching normative framework o f practical reason. These ideals may, to a 
degree, describe the way and spirit humans aspire (but nonetheless fail) to utilise 
instrumental reason, but not moral reason. And unlike the standard model this spirit we is 
firmly situated and constrained by the dualisms constitutive o f his philosophical 
framework. For Kant, pure practical reason is never an expression o f humanistic creative 
control, but rather gestures towards the moral law’s necessary constraint on pure 
anthropocentric, self-projecting action. Normative constraints on our instrumental
rationality will limit this spirit, replacing it instead with a spirit o f  humility, a receptivity to 
what lies outside anthropocentric control and knowledge, and rational hope in light o f the 
moral gap humans inevitably face.
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8 Conclusion
[T]he aim o f morality cannot be simply action. Without some more positive conception o f 
the soul as a substantial and continually developing mechanism o f attachments, the 
purification and reorientation o f  which must be the task o f morals, ‘freedom’ is readily 
corrupted into self-assertion and ‘right action’ into some sort o f ad hoc utilitarianism. I f  a 
scientifically minded empiricism is not to swallow up the study o f ethics completely, 
philosophers must try to invent a terminology which shows how our natural psychology 
can be altered by conceptions which lie beyond its range.
- Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f  Good1
Through an investigation o f historical models o f  instrumental reason this thesis has 
articulated a central dilemma surrounding current debates about the desire /  belief model, 
with a particular focus on contemporary critics o f  the sub-Humean model. The 
pervasiveness o f the standard model has understandably come under attack in the spheres 
o f moral, political, and even economic theory, with its critics united in rejecting its ethical 
and explanatory reductivism as well as its worrying subjectivist implications. Yet at the 
same time, these critics often endorse the standard model’s view that an eschewal o f 
objectivist philosophical frameworks is an apposite reaction to our value pluralist and 
scientific age: traditional foundationalist views proposing a single moral vision have 
become fractured; the legitimacy o f philosophical frameworks espousing an objective 
description o f moral truth are routinely called into question. What is currently promoted is 
a radically anthropocentric outlook in our philosophical framework which automatically 
precludes theistic or non-anthropocentric views. The latter are deemed remnants o f  a 
simplistic past we are now free o f as a result o f our enlightened historical trajectory towards 
the disintegration o f traditional hierarchical societal structures and the triumph o f the 
natural sciences.
Given the contemporary context, critics o f the standard model seek to articulate an 
alternative conception o f instrumental rationality which simultaneously retains the latter’s 
avoidance o f contentious foundationalist claims regarding normative objectivity. In their 
appeal to historical models o f  practical reason the original philosophical frameworks are 
discarded due to their presumed implausibility in light o f  our current scientific intuitions. 
Yet this is to reinforce, not to challenge, the presumed correctness o f the standard model’s 
rejection o f objectivist metaphysical foundations. Aristotle, Hume and Kant are applied as 
solutions to address worries surrounding the standard model; relevant aspects o f their
1 Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f Good (London: Routledge, 2001) p. 69.
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theories deemed most desirable or attractive are anachronistically “lifted out” and recruited 
for contemporary normative projects. These partial reappropriations result, first, in 
distorted readings o f Aristotle, Hume and Kant; second and more crucially, their general 
methodological continuity with the standard model means that critics are ultimately 
unsuccessful in their challenge o f the latter. To support these claims, it was necessary to 
examine how, unlike contemporary retrieval strategies, each o f these thinker’s respective 
philosophical frameworks help distance their conceptions o f instrumental reason from the 
sub-Humean model, evading the latter’s subjectivist and freestanding character.
More specifically, in Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that Aristotle’s account o f means-end 
deliberation is not comparable to the standard model for three reasons: first, instrumental 
reason is situated within Aristotle’s objective philosophical framework which articulates 
human function and the moral goods capable o f actualising it. This diverges from the 
contemporary rejection o f metaphysical commitments that is characteristic o f the 
predominant naturalistic temper which unites both critics and proponents o f the standard 
model. Second, Aristotle may appear to have a conception o f instrumental rationality akin 
to the sub-Humean model in his notion o f cleverness, but the fact that this kind o f 
deliberation is not the paradigmatic conception -  meaning that by itself it is a  deficient 
account o f means-end reasoning -  reveals a further important difference. I argued in 
Chapter 2 that admirable practical deliberation -  different from cleverness -  demands the 
moral articulation and evaluation o f the particular goods constituting our naturally prior end 
o f eudaimonia. Thus, even if  Aristotle’s discussion o f means-end deliberation includes 
something similar to the standard model, it is contextualised by, and subordinate to, a more 
substantive and complex conception o f practical reasoning which demands the more 
specific articulation and assessment o f ends constitutive o f human flourishing.
Third, in Chapter 3 I examined important differences between the theoretical and 
practical syllogisms in terms o f  their function and structure. This was to illustrate how the 
practical syllogism diverges from the explanatory reductivism and proceduralism 
characteristic o f the standard model. But Chapter 3 also resisted Martha Nussbaum’s claim 
that the divergence between the two syllogisms lends support for value incommensurability 
and divergent, conflicting conceptions o f the good. I argued that Nussbaum’s retrieval o f 
Aristotle shares the standard model’s resistance to metaphysical and foundationalist 
commitments, whereby her interpretation o f human ergon leads to relatively indeterminate, 
pluralistic, and incommensurable functional roles. Though she may have retrieved 
Aristotle for contemporary debates about liberalism and practical reason, it is at the 
expense o f  weakening Aristotle’s objectivist philosophical framework, causing her thin 
account o f practical reason to resemble the subjectivism and indeterminism o f ends o f the 
standard model.
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Chapters 4 and 5 argued against two different interpretations o f Humean instrumental 
reason, both which mistakenly attribute to his philosophy an ethical subjectivist position 
due to their common suspension o f Hume’s unique naturalist and intersubjective 
philosophical framework: first, in Chapter 4 I argued that, despite claims to the contrary, 
Hume’s combined sceptical and naturalistic philosophical framework distances his account 
o f  practical reason from the standard model. I demonstrated how Hume’s naturalism 
differs in important respects from the naturalistic temper o f contemporary philosophy: in 
particular, Hume is sceptical about the possibility o f genuine scientific, theoretical 
knowledge in order to affirm certain natural beliefs that are necessary to function as 
practical, social agents. Hume’s naturalistic framework therefore leads to scepticism about 
the possibility o f truly knowing brute facts about our environment, but it integrates and is 
non-sceptical about the necessity o f ethical normative objectivity for humans as practical 
beings. Importantly, I showed that Hume’s philosophical framework posits objective ends 
o f  sociability and common life, creating space for reason in a practical rather than 
theoretical function, which ultimately prioritises the intersubjective sphere expressing 
common moral values and beliefs.
Chapter 5 argued that the misguided sceptical interpretation o f Hume — endorsed 
mainly by constructivist Kantians -  illustrates well the tendency among critics o f  the 
standard model to hive off a thinker’s original philosophical frameworks and replace them 
instead with current presuppositions about reason. I showed that, at root, the sceptical 
reading shares a number o f the same premises as the standard model, such as adherence to 
the Moore-inspired misreading o f the fact/value gap and a proceduralist conception o f 
practical reason. These commonalities weaken the sceptical reading’s critical normative 
agenda against the standard model. However, in Chapter 5 I distanced Hume from the 
sceptical reading, where I argued that correcting our reading o f the is/ought divide helps 
expose the articulatory, more substantive function o f practical reason in Hume: specifically, 
similar to Aristotle, Hume’s instrumental rationality involves the articulation o f admirable 
character traits deemed valuable in the intersubjective context. Not only did this bring to 
the fore a more substantive conception o f practical reason in Hume, it also illustrated how, 
as situated within a naturalistic and intersubjective framework that is constituted by socially 
valuable norms, Hume’s account o f practical motivation averts the evaluative neutrality, 
subjectivism and freestanding character o f the standard model.
I claimed in Chapters 6 and 7 argued against the contemporary retrievals o f  Kantian 
practical reason by Korsgaard and Rawls. Taking her cue from Rawls, Korsgaard’s 
dismissal o f Kant’s dualistic philosophical framework means that her proffered alternative 
account o f instrumental reason does not differ substantially from the sub-Humean model. 
Specifically, I argued that, though Korsgaard arrives at a sort o f “hyperrealism”, while
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Rawls forwards a more contextualist conclusion, both interpreters empiricise the 
categorical imperative as well as humanise and lower the moral ideal, so as to render 
Kantian practical reasoning amenable to the predominant naturalistic temper. But in so 
doing, moral reasoning’s critical authority over and above instrumental reason is reduced: 
the categorical imperative becomes a procedure by which prudential maxims gain a moral 
stamp o f  approval. Instrumental reasoning, based on the constructivist interpretation, 
acquires an inflated importance. Ultimately, because o f the lack o f substantive normative 
distance between instrumental and pure practical reason, Korsgaard’s and Rawls’ unitary 
conception o f practical reason ends up emulating the freestanding and conditional nature o f 
the standard model. Given their shared presuppositions with the latter, the constructivist 
Kantian reading is unsuccessful both as a critique and an alternative to the latter.
In contrast, I argued in Chapter 7 that a more metaphysical reading o f  Kantian 
practical reason helps his account o f practical reason avoid the characteristic traits o f the 
standard model. My interpretation stressed three points in contradistinction to both Rawls 
and Korsgaard: first, I claimed that instrumental reason has a normative source that is 
separate to that o f pure practical reasoning and is partially constituted by norms o f 
theoretical reason; second, I argued for the importance o f Kant’s metaphysical, dualistic 
framework which manifests itself in an uneasy dynamic between instrumental and moral 
reasoning; third, I rejected a procedural understanding o f the categorical imperative and 
argued instead that it should be understood more substantively. In other words, unlike the 
view that the categorical imperative is merely a procedure to approve o f  or improve on our 
prudential, instrumental reasons, I argued that it is focused on the promotion and realisation 
o f the highest, objective good of pure practical reason through pure moral willing. My 
interpretive claims were important to establish how Kant’s conception o f instrumental 
reason is ensconced within broader objective, ethical normativity -  even if  hypothetical 
willing has a conflicted dynamic with moral reasoning, the function o f the separate, 
overarching normative framework o f pure practical reason is meant to critique and 
constrain the prudential interests pursued by instrumental reasoning.
The originality o f this dissertation lies in two areas: first, my thesis contributes to our 
understanding o f the role and problems surrounding instrumental rationality in current 
moral and political theory. Contrary to the dominant retrieval strategies adopted by both 
critics and proponents o f the standard model, I argued that these reappropriations paper 
over rather than confront the central dilemma surrounding the role o f instrumental 
rationality in moral and political philosophy. Instead, criticism o f the standard model 
requires deeper examination o f past and current philosophical frameworks: I will elaborate 
more on this point below. Second, my thesis contributes to interpretive debates 
surrounding the work o f Aristotle, Hume and Kant, arguing, firstly, against the
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predominant tendency to render these thinkers amenable to our naturalistic temper, and 
secondly, for a sympathetic reading o f their conceptions o f practical reason as situated 
within their respective philosophical and orientating frameworks, regardless o f their 
implausibility from our own current viewpoint.
As previous chapters have shown, historical models o f instrumental reason differ 
from the standard model precisely because o f  their respective orientating, objective 
frameworks; these frameworks provide the context for those aspects o f their theories 
deemed salient or valuable. As we have seen so far, such objective moral frameworks are 
problematic if  we take as our point o f departure a bundle o f sceptical doubts surrounding 
moral, epistemological, and motivational issues as informed by the predominant naturalistic 
temper. These doubts accompany (and are subsequently imported into) contemporary 
readings o f these historical thinkers. Specifically questioned is, first, the objective status o f 
moral judgements regarding right and wrong; second, the notion that such judgements can 
provide some objective explanation o f the world as experienced by conscious humans; and 
third, that such judgements and reasons can motivate humans independently o f  subjective 
preferences, desires, or ends. We are then required to postulate additional motivational 
factors without which we cannot show how reason can move us to act. As we have seen in 
preceding chapters, these sceptical doubts are taken as the point o f departure in current 
retrievals o f historical authors even if  they do not fully subscribe to their normative or 
explanatory implications.2
The fact that Aristotle, Hume and Kant are all committed to one or more claims 
which fly in the face o f these sceptical doubts makes their respective philosophical 
frameworks problematic from the perspective o f current philosophical background 
convictions. These thinkers’ philosophical systems reflect a non-sceptical belief that 
orientating, value-constituted frameworks are inescapably part o f how humans react, 
function and navigate ourselves in this world. Included within their conceptions o f 
practical agency is a sense o f how individuals are moved  by this horizon o f defined 
goodness: as situated within this horizon, instrumental and, more generally, practical reason 
requires no additional motivational postulate to explain its grip on ourselves as agents. 
Moreover, their conceptions o f instrumental reason are ensconced within questions 
regarding moral value and worth: instrumental rationality’s situatedness within a broader 
system o f normative objectivity therefore ensures that the two standpoints are connected in
2 What I mean is that though Nussbaum, Korsgaard, Rawls, and Hampton may not subscribe to 
moral or motivational scepticism, they take on board the legitimacy of these doubts and read 
Aristotle, Hume, and Kant with these problems in mind, whether or not these were salient issues for 
these thinkers. It is evident that as a response to the sceptical doubts they seek to present a 
metaphysically sanitised version of these historical thinkers through the dismissal of their objectivist 
normative frameworks.
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some fashion -  perhaps in a conflicted manner (as in Kant) or in a more cooperative sense 
(as in Aristotle and Hume). Because their philosophical frameworks convey this 
fundamental belief, if  we discard them we do violence to the elements we find so 
compelling.
Even more than distorting the philosophical views o f historical authors, these 
retrieval strategies are unsuccessful as a critique or amendment o f  the standard model for 
some important but neglected reasons. These strategies’ inattentiveness to how historical 
models o f instrumental reason are anchored within their philosophical frameworks 
translates into a corresponding theoretical neglect o f contemporary philosophy’s own 
situatedness. In other words, lacking in the retrieval projects investigated in this thesis is 
the critical examination o f how instrumental reason is situated -  or not -  within our current 
philosophical framework. I have shown in the preceding chapters how this problem reveals 
itself in both a superficial and a deep way: superficially, it is manifested in how critics o f 
the standard model end up replicating or reinforcing rather than querying central 
characteristics and commitments o f the standard model. Even where they seek normatively 
to apply these thinkers’ respective accounts o f instrumental reasoning, current retrieval 
projects often remain at root closely tied to the view they are critical o f -  implicitly 
endorsing the same philosophical strategies and underlying sceptical assumptions o f the 
standard model. Since the eschewal o f metaphysical foundational claims is deemed an 
appropriate response to the value diversity and the rise o f  the scientific, secular perspective, 
the partial retrievals o f Aristotle, Hume, and Kant come to mimic the freestanding and 
subjectivist qualities o f the standard model. Neglected in this approach is how a 
sympathetic rendering o f historical thinkers, with all the idiosyncratic or metaphysical 
baggage that may involve, attains critical distance from underlying theoretical assumptions 
simply taken for granted in contemporary moral and political philosophy. I f  opponents o f 
the standard model rely implicitly on the same presuppositions informing the standard 
model, then it is not necessarily in the best position to criticise it.
Perhaps more worryingly, the approach adopted by critics o f  the standard model 
effectively papers over rather than confronting head-on the central dilemma regarding our 
own unexamined moral foundations which this debate about instrumental reason alerts us 
to: namely the problematic dynamic between our philosophical and unexamined, situating 
moral frameworks . The naturalistic temper characterising both critics and proponents o f 
the standard model claims that we can do away with evaluative horizons altogether -  
indeed, the partial reappropriation strategies reflect that assumption explicitly. But if  they 
are wrong -  if  we agree with Taylor that such frameworks are inescapable -  the distortion 
o f historical models is symptomatic o f a deeper ambiguity and incoherence surrounding our 
own moral horizon. In other words, the casual treatment o f historical philosophical
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schemas by both sides o f the debate about the standard model -  particularly in 
contemporary retrieval strategies -  translates into a willful blindness and inarticulacy about 
our own orientating landscape. Thus, investigating these historical accounts o f 
instrumental reason within their original philosophical frameworks -  no matter how 
unappealing or outdated from the scientific perspective -  is important if  only to draw 
critical attention to our own unexamined views and assumptions, highlighting our need for 
our philosophical theories to better confront, articulate and critically assess the thick values 
constitutive o f our own moral foundations.
The implication is that this dilemma cannot be solved through some kind o f  retrieval 
o f these different historical traditions: we cannot simply pick and choose what we like from 
historical models and insert them unreflectively within our own unexamined framework. In 
the previous chapters I have argued that we cannot align the standard model with these 
historical conceptions o f instrumental reason, but neither can we partially appropriate their 
theories for our own normative purposes. Several questions then need to be answered: does 
this then commit me to a Skinnerian, contextualist approach? What can be drawn from 
these historical theories o f instrumental rationality if  historical and philosophical 
constraints preclude their straightforward retrieval? Moreover, does this mean we are, and 
will continue to be, saddled with the reductivism and subjectivism o f  the standard model?
To answer the first question I do not think my approach compels me into the 
Skinnerian camp. The contextualist approach towards the history o f ideas is an important 
and valuable enterprise in itself; nonetheless, I need not be committed to the view that this 
is the only use o f historical theories. Ultimately, any work in the history o f  moral and 
political philosophy will need to display sensitivity to the original historical context and 
guard against anachronisms influencing their particular reading. This will involve respect 
for the original philosophical frameworks and the recognition that ideas cannot be lifted out 
without doing some violence to the original meaning and intention o f these ideas. But this 
claim, coupled with my scepticism about contemporary retrieval strategies, does not 
automatically make me a Skinnerian. The assumption that it does is founded on a false 
dichotomy: either past thinkers must be reinterpreted or amended to fit our current 
intuitions so their ideas are relevant and applicable to our own moral and political 
dilemmas, or these theories and ideas -  if  solely understood within their original historical 
and philosophical context -  are o f mere antiquarian interest to us. But it is simply false to 
assume that these are the only two options available to us. This leads to my answer to the 
second question.
There are three possible alternatives as to what can be drawn from historical models 
o f  practical reason, all o f which confront the crisis I have identified above directly. The 
first strategy, endorsed by Bernard Williams, is the recognition that historical
210
consciousness brings about the “relativity o f distance”3: the values we are confident about 
today may not obtain for future generations and thus we need to embrace, rather than fight 
against, a degree o f philosophical and rational inarticulacy. In fact, a distinctive and 
problematic feature o f  modem philosophy is the use o f outdated ethical concepts 
surrounding rationality; these concepts, Williams argues, are ill-equipped to grapple with or 
describe the unavoidably individualist and contextualist nature o f society. “The resources 
o f most modem moral philosophy are not well adjusted to the modem world,” he writes. 
“This is partly because it is too much and too unknowingly caught up in it, unreflectively 
appealing to administrative ideas o f rationality.”4 For Williams, this insight, coupled with 
an awareness o f the history o f moral and political philosophy, should bring about an 
acceptance that we cannot “return” to certain historical views so the best way to reconcile 
our moral claims with reality is to relinquish all aspirations o f establishing any moral 
foundationalist theories.
Moreover, Williams’ scepticism about the possibility o f establishing frameworks o f 
normative objectivity is in line with both the naturalism and pluralism underlying modem 
philosophy today.5 Like Nussbaum and Rawls, Williams claims that the diversity and 
incommensurability o f value is the core ethical truth we can grasp today:
We also have the idea that there are many and various forms o f human excellence 
which will not all fit together into one harmonious whole, so any determinate ethical 
outlook is going to represent some kind o f specialization o f human possibilities. That 
idea is deeply entrenched in any naturalistic or, again, historical conception o f human 
nature -  that is, in any adequate conception o f it -  and I find it hard to believe that it 
will be overcome by an objective inquiry, or that human beings could turn out to 
have a much more determinate nature than is suggested by what we already know, 
one that timelessly demanded a life o f a particular kind. The project o f giving to 
ethical life an objective and determinate grounding in considerations about human 
nature is not, in my view, very likely to succeed. But it is at any rate a 
comprehensible project, and I believe it represents the only intelligible form o f 
ethical objectivity at the reflective level.6
Thus, W illiams’ scepticism about the existence o f normative objectivity then leads to his 
advocacy o f a minimalist philosophical foundation.
3 Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, pp. 162-73.
4 Ibid., p. 197.
5 Ibid., p. 166.
6 Ibid., p. 153.
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Though Williams is right to confront the modem crisis directly, his solution is 
wrong-headed for two reasons. First, Williams’ prescription to the current dilemma 
ultimately atrophies into the subjectivism o f the standard model. He argues that any 
foundations to ethical thought lie in individual or subjective dispositions. “Even if  ethical 
thought had a foundation in determinate conceptions o f  well-being,” Williams writes, “the 
consequences o f that could lie only in justifying a disposition to accept certain ethical 
statements, rather than in showing, directly, the truth o f those statements”.7 For Williams, 
these personal dispositions are “a necessary truth” and occupy an essential causal role.8 
Thus, if  we are seeking to find an alternative to the subjectivism o f the standard model -  as 
most critics are -  then W illiams’ solution is not a real contender.
However, Williams thinks this subjectivism a welcome result. It is also the natural 
consequence o f his doubts about what philosophy can accomplish, which leads to the 
second problem. As I will explain in more detail below in the option that I propose, 
Williams’ dismissal o f ethical foundationalism is premature, particularly if  one does not 
subscribe to his scepticism about rational explanation or the belief that situating 
frameworks can be hived off. Williams claims, “how truthfulness to an existing self or 
society is to be combined with reflection, self-understanding, and criticism is a  question 
that philosophy, itself, cannot answer.” Rather, “the answer has to be discovered, or 
established, as the result o f  a process, personal and social, which essentially cannot 
formulate the answer in advance, except in an unspecific way.”9 I f  Taylor is correct in 
arguing that orientating moral frameworks are inescapable -  and I believe he is, particularly 
in light o f my investigation o f Aristotle, Hume, and Kant in this thesis -  it is not clear to me 
that the rational articulation o f its content is beyond human reach, or that we should 
relinquish our aspirations for such articulation in philosophy. As I see it, the problem 
facing us today seems to be the very lack o f  articulation and examination o f our orientating 
normative frameworks in the domain o f practical philosophy, or the failure o f our 
philosophical systems to accurately reflect the inescapable but unexamined values 
constitutive o f our moral landscape.
The second option tries to rectify precisely this inarticulacy. This strategic use o f 
historical ideas is a retrieval project slightly different from those examined in the preceding 
substantive chapters. To return to where I began this thesis, Taylor is an obvious example 
o f a philosopher who tries to bring to the fore the deeply spiritual and multilayered moral 
roots o f our instrumental reasoning. His historical genealogy is, as he eloquently puts it, 
“an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation -  and thereby to make these
7 Ibid., p. 199, emphasis added.
8 Ibid., p. 201.
9 Ibid., p. 200.
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sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs o f the 
spirit.”10 Investigating the history o f philosophy is important in order to uncover either a 
theistic moral source or a hope in historical progress which is capable o f sustaining the 
spiritual aspirations underlying our most important human goods. As he writes,
That is why adopting a stripped-down secular outlook, without any religious 
dimension or radical hope in history, is not a way o f avoiding the dilemma, although 
it may be a good way to live with it. It doesn’t avoid it, because this too involves its 
‘mutilation’. It involves stifling the response in us to some o f  the deepest and most 
powerful spiritual aspirations that humans have conceived.11
According to Taylor, these sources have become blunted by the proceduralist inflection o f 
the current predominant naturalist temper, which has also led to the unfortunate idealisation 
o f  disengaged instrumental rationality. Such a potent mixture is illustrated by the 
freestanding and reductivist nature o f the standard model. But Taylor’s hope is that 
through historical genealogy an alternative but suppressed narrative o f modernity can be 
reclaimed, one which sheds light on the thick values that are hidden but nonetheless 
constitutive o f our current situating framework. Thus, values such as autonomy, human 
dignity, justice, and benevolence stem from a spiritual, theistic root which we lose sight o f 
if  one pays little attention to the alternative historical strands shaping modernity.
Though I am ultimately sceptical about the success o f the retrieval projects examined 
in this thesis, it should be noted that Taylor’s strategy differs from these projects in some 
important respects; it may thus possess more critical bite against the standard model. For 
one, he does not shy away from the central problematic which underlies our ambivalence 
about instrumental reason, but rather undertakes his historical philosophy in hopes o f 
shedding further light on it. Taylor is fully aware o f the paralysis caused by our current 
unexamined, situating framework which, on one hand, promises a radical humanistic 
freedom, but on the other, constricts the deeper spiritual sources animating the goods we 
think o f as especially significant and valuable. As he states, “ [d]o we have to choose 
between various kinds o f  spiritual lobotomy and self-inflicted wounds? Perhaps. Certainly 
most o f the outlooks which promise us that we will be spared these choices are based on 
selective blindness.”12 Taylor’s diagnosis o f the problem penetrates the innermost root o f 
the crisis we face today and for that reason is deeply valuable. In an age where “epistemic
10 Taylor, Sources o f the Self, p. 520.
11 Ibid., p. 520.
12 Ibid., p. 520.
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abstinence”13 is the predominant game in town, where our moral values and goods have 
shallow and self-created roots, there is a cost which Taylor is rightly pointing out -  both in 
terms o f a narrowed moral and aspirational vision as well as a self-willed rational 
inarticulacy about substantive values.
Second, Taylor’s approach does not follow the retrieval strategies examined here in 
their dismissal o f historical philosophical frameworks. This difference follows from 
Taylor’s own emphasis on the inescapable nature o f orientating moral frameworks. Thus, 
contrary to those I discussed in previous chapters, Taylor’s normative conclusions about 
instrumental rationality do not collapse back into the subjectivism or reductivism o f the 
standard model. His retrieval strategy does not “lift out” attractive claims irrespective o f 
their original philosophical systems; rather he seeks to trace and bring to the forefront the 
residual imprint caused by neglected historical strands o f  modernity. The result, Taylor 
hopes, is an enrichment o f contemporary discussion about human values and goods, where 
philosophers are less hesitant to engage in thick evaluation.
On one hand Taylor is engaged in a valuable project that I believe needs to be carried 
out -  confronting the central crisis o f instrumental reason that has been precipitated by 
numerous causes, such as the overwhelming naturalistic temper and the ideals o f 
disengaged agency, and examining the deeper moral sources which have animated 
instrumental rationality historically. In some respects my work has been a continuation of 
Taylor’s project. But on the other hand, I remain much more sceptical and pessimistic 
about the prospects o f historical retrieval, not only o f those reappropriations o f Aristotle, 
Hume, and Kant examined in the preceding chapters, but also o f Taylor’s variant. Taylor 
may be much more careful in avoiding those mistakes committed by others; however, I 
remain unconvinced by the possibility o f  retrieving those neglected historical strands 
Taylor refers to. In some respects it would be a much more comfortable and 
straightforward if  my pessimism did not extend to Taylor’s solution: Taylor provides an 
incisive diagnosis o f the core dilemma and an interesting suggestion that a theistic source is 
capable o f sustaining our ideals. Ultimately, however, given secularism’s stranglehold on 
contemporary moral and political philosophy (particularly among its liberal strands) -  and 
indeed this is considered by many as a virtue rather than a vice -  it seems unlikely that the 
retrieval Taylor envisages is a realistic solution out o f our current predicament. There 
seems to be a virulent entrenchment of, rather than retreat from, the secularism and 
naturalistic humanism in our current age. Arguably, this trend has contributed to the 
seeming inescapability o f the standard model and also explains precisely why current 
retrieval strategies, in adhering to the same naturalistic humanism, find it so difficult to
13 See Joseph Raz, “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 19 (1990): 3-46.
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distance themselves from the view they criticise and reject. So though I am deeply 
sympathetic to Taylor’s solution, my own diagnosis o f the crisis as examined here in this 
thesis suggests that it is ultimately unrealistic.
But if  his remedy is infeasible, we could still take something out o f Taylor’s insight 
about the importance o f situating frameworks. This third is my proposed option, and where 
the central originality o f  my thesis lies in arguing for a new way o f approaching the 
problematic of instrumental rationality which differs substantially from the current retrieval 
strategies in vogue. If  we are genuinely worried about the standard model and we want to 
confront the crisis head-on, study o f these historical thinkers within their respective 
philosophical systems can be instructive in heightening our critical awareness o f  how 
instrumental reason is embedded within a broader, self-orientating horizon o f thick 
evaluation. Throughout this thesis I have pointed out how appreciation o f historically 
dissimilar perspectives and metaphysical commitments has some crucial, deeper normative 
implications which are applicable for us today. By heightening our awareness o f the 
importance o f past and contemporary situating and philosophical frameworks, we gain 
some much needed critical distance from the unquestioned tendency to do away with these 
orientating frameworks altogether in their theories, a view subscribed to by both 
unapologetic supporters as well as critics o f the standard model. Williams, like other 
contemporary philosophers, rejects wholesale endeavours to establish some philosophical 
schema of normative objectivity that is analogous to historical models, favouring instead 
theoretical minimalism and parsimony. Foundationalist projects such as Aristotle’s, 
Hume’s, and Kant’s are considered unjustifiably grandiose, especially given our secularist 
and value pluralist age.14 Taken as a point o f departure this sentiment results in a patch-up 
job, papering over the central problem rather than confronting it directly, as illustrated by 
the retrieval strategies examined in previous chapters. At root, both sides o f the debate 
about the standard model reflect great faith in the promise , o f  naturalist humanism -  where 
moral self-grounding and subjectivism as a philosophical schema has in some ways 
liberated us from particular theistic or deeply objectivist commitments. But this faith 
comes also at a price, whereby current moral and political philosophers have gradually 
argued themselves into a comer in response to features o f  modernity and denied themselves 
the necessary theoretical resources needed to get out -  meaning their stripped-down 
philosophical theories reflect the illusory view that objective, value-constituted horizons o f
14 One may be tempted to say that Hume’s project is not a foundationalist one. But as I showed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, Hume’s philosophy involves naturalistic claims which involve a substantive 
conception of appropriate, objective human ends. Moreover, Hume’s almost classical description of 
“nature” implies a departure from the contemporary, more brute account of nature. Hume’s claims 
in these respects would be questionable from a modem naturalistic point of view, as shown in 
differences between Hume and contemporary scientific naturalists, such as Larry Laudan and 
Ronald Giere.
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meaning can be eliminated altogether. By contrast, though we cannot reclaim their views 
directly, historical models o f practical reason can nonetheless function as significant 
examples o f how to approach the dilemma we are facing -  o f how to reconcile both 
philosophical and value-constituted frameworks -  without resorting to the normative 
minimalism in vogue today.
This leads to the third question: does my solution effectively mean we are saddled 
with the standard model -  that we may decry its pervasiveness and implications, but must 
nonetheless accept it as unavoidable? To better accommodate the reality o f social diversity 
and requirements o f naturalistic science, the subjectivist framework o f the standard model 
initially appears to be the only available option. But is that the last word? In drawing our 
attention to these philosophical schemas framing instrumental reason we are confronted 
with the task o f critically examining and rectifying the absence o f normative objectivity in 
our current moral and political theories. Among these historical thinkers there is no 
hesitancy to engage in moral foundationalist projects -  indeed, that is one o f the purposes 
o f systematic philosophical inquiry and how our practical, moral agency can be better 
understood in all its complexity. For instance, the crisis o f how to reconcile a scientific 
worldview with ethics is hardly a new dilemma and we see two different options exercised 
by Hume and Kant respectively: both are trying to understand the role o f morality and 
normative objectivity in light o f a Newtonian, mechanistic universe. But rather than 
restricting themselves to highly deflationary normative claims, each embraces the task o f 
examining how their respective theoretical systems can accommodate both spheres o f 
science and ethics, and still do justice to the equal validity and significance o f morality for 
humans. Hume ultimately chooses a modem variant o f classical naturalism, whereas Kant 
seeks to resolve the dilemma through commitment to a highly distinctive form o f 
philosophical dualisms. Both are united, however, in confronting this problematic from a 
moral -  not a value-neutral -  perspective, as well as in their rejection o f a reductivist, 
freestanding conception o f instrumental reason. Thus, though their views may be 
unavailable to us today, we can nonetheless draw inspiration from their philosophical 
example.
The modesty o f my normative proposals may dissatisfy those who go to historical 
sources o f practical reason anticipating a tidy solution to our contemporaiy problems. But 
my proposal is in fact more far-reaching, though less obviously so. My project has tried to 
highlight an inherent contradiction which lies at the heart o f current moral and political 
philosophy. Like Taylor, I believe there is an aspect o f self-inflicted wounding that is 
ignored today -  on one hand we are trying to grapple with certain inescapable features o f 
modernity, such as diversity o f values and goods, on the other hand, we deny ourselves the 
very tools that would help guide and orientate ourselves at a time o f seeming rootlessness
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and dislocation. Both supporters and critics o f the standard model are united in their 
dismissal o f frameworks o f thick normative objectivity. But it is precisely when we resist 
this urge -  when we read these philosophers within their specific philosophical system, no 
matter how outdated -  it brings to the fore how broader frameworks or horizons o f 
objective significance are inescapable, no matter how much the current naturalistic temper 
tries to suggest otherwise. We may not be entirely clear about the specific contours o f that 
situating landscape, but once we acknowledge that the current dilemma surrounding 
instrumental reason is symptomatic o f a widespread illusion that we can do away altogether 
with these moral frameworks constituted by thick evaluation, we open up new possibilities 
for awareness, articulation, and examination. We begin to ask critical questions regarding 
the current unexamined framework which contextualises our contemporary understanding 
o f  instrumental rationality. The articulation o f its content with greater precision and critical 
distance becomes all the more important. This may sound like an overly pessimistic 
conclusion but I believe it should be understood more as a call to arms -  that is, unless one 
is ready to genuinely explore our own philosophical situatedness within an as o f  yet 
unarticulated objective framework o f moral significance, it will indeed appear that 
instrumental reason is freestanding and imbued with untrammelled power. Plurality o f 
values and the predominance o f the scientific age may be undeniable features o f modernity 
but this should not cause us to throw up our hands in collective resignation and assign 
ourselves the more deflationary task o f ensuring our subjective interests and preferences 
somehow cohere with one another.
For this reason we need to pay attention to the naturalistic temper that encases our 
current conception o f instrumental rationality. I use the term “encasing” deliberately: to 
demonstrate how this temper, composed o f its bundle o f sceptical doubts, effectively 
narrows and restricts our understanding o f why instrumental reason has significance for us 
today. As I have shown in this thesis, contemporary liberal moral and political 
philosophers, when examining the role o f practical reason, have in large part neglected this 
critical examination. One main reason for this neglect has been the lack o f articulation o f 
those frameworks -  it is difficult to articulate how our instrumental reason is situated in our 
cultural, moral horizons without suggesting that our practical reason will have a more 
substantive rather than procedural function (to use Taylor’s language). In other words, 
critical examination o f our current orientating framework requires a rethinking o f  the very 
function o f practical reason. Rather than focusing on whether these acts instantiate some 
cause-effect relation in the world, our accounts o f instrumental rationality should 
incorporate reflection on how our practical action reflects the shape o f one’s life as a 
coherent whole, as situated within some horizon o f broader and deeper meaning. It 
therefore becomes all the more important that we can understand those frameworks o f
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meaning; in turn it becomes possible to think o f instrumental reason less restrictively and in 
a more sophisticated, nuanced manner. We can bring into sharper relief an altogether 
forgotten “articulating function” o f practical reason.15 Reason is not just practical in the 
sense o f “prescribing” and “directing” what we ought to do, therefore not preoccupied 
simply with action that is based on an agent’s desires or aversions. The criterion for good 
practical reasoning goes beyond judgements about disparate, isolated acts. Part o f its 
function is to gain practical knowledge, to understand and articulate that conception o f 
goodness and value which moves us in our lives; it involves the explicit explanation and 
clarification o f our surrounding implicit moral landscape and o f the qualitative values 
reflected there.
But to be clear, I have not been arguing that the standard model is misguided because 
it fails to make instrumental reason equivalent to moral normativity. On the contrary, if  the 
normativity o f our moral frameworks and instrumental rationality are so condensed, we risk 
two things, as illustrated by the retrieval strategies examined in previous chapters: we risk 
obscuring the existence o f those objective, orientating frameworks, where we fail to 
acknowledge and draw attention to them. Or moral value becomes essentially reducible to 
subjective preferences -  the product o f anthropocentric, individual creation. But on the flip 
side, once we acknowledge how individual practical choices respond to and are shaped by 
the goods constitutive o f that orientating framework, we see that in no way does 
instrumental reason’s means-end structure entail a freestanding or unsituated character, 
where our lens o f meaning and significance is reducible to a purely instrumentalist stance 
to our surrounding environment. Rarely is our instrumental use o f reason isolated from a 
network o f values and moral significance, and we begin to understand how this overarching 
framework orientates or constrains our instrumental deliberation. It functions as a guide 
which may -  cooperatively or dialectically -  hone and develop our practical agency 
towards the articulation and actualisation o f substantive goods that matter in a meaningful 
human life.
Only after critical scrutiny o f our own philosophical predicament is undertaken can 
we genuinely formulate and articulate an alternative situating framework for instrumental 
reason, one which departs from the hostility towards thick evaluation and normative 
objectivity. If  value-constituted moral horizons are inescapable, it should call into question 
the claim that our theories o f instrumental reason must remain morally neutral towards 
evaluating the substantive content o f our desire, preferences, or ends. Practical, 
instrumental choices are rarely self-referential; rather, they are more often than not part o f a 
broader network o f significance and meaning with desires and motivating reasons that are
15 Taylor, “Explanation and Practical Reason,” p. 60.
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responsive to the ends o f disinterested friendship and humanity. In this light, instrumental 
reason should recommend a stance o f individual humility rather than one o f 
anthropocentric self-assertion, imbued with a spirit o f  cooperation, exploration, and 
functions as part o f an important self-orientating enterprise.
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